PRIMAS MULTI-STRATEGY FUND (formerly known as PRIMAS PRIVATE CREDIT FUND) v. IN VICTORIA LTD

HCMP 371, 374-377/2026
(Heard Together)

[2026] HKCFI 5373

HCMP 371/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 371 OF 2026

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AND

HCMP 374/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 374 OF 2026

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______________

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AND

HCMP 375/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 375 OF 2026

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AND

HCMP 376/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 376 OF 2026

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______________

________________________

AND

HCMP 377/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 377 OF 2026

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________________________

(Heard Together)

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D E C I S I O N

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  Before me are the Amended Originating Summonses under sections 152 and 633 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 622) (the “CO”) in the respective proceedings against the defendants, companies incorporated in Hong Kong (the “Companies”) for registration of shares into the Plaintiff’s name and corresponding rectifications of the registers of members. The shares in question are the mortgaged shares under certain share mortgages (the “Mortgages”), with the usual pre-signed, undated instruments of transfers and bought and sold notes delivered to and kept by the mortgagee, that is, the Plaintiff. I shall refer to the mortgagors of the Mortgages as the “Mortgagors”.

2.  Also before me are the Summonses for joinder (the “Joinder Summonses”) for leave to join a total of 132 of the Mortgagors (the “Joinder Applicants”) to these proceedings, depending on the shares in question.

3.  For the procedural history, I refer to §§3-5 of my Decision delivered on 31 August 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 5173) (the “31 August Decision”).

II.  BACKGROUND

4.  On 12 July 2024:-

(1)  the Plaintiff entered into two subscription agreements (the “SAs”) with Right View Ventures Limited and Elite Era Ventures Limited respectively (collectively, the “Issuers”), whereby the Plaintiff agreed to subscribe for certain bonds issued by the Issuers; and

(2)  the Plaintiff entered into two “2-year Secured Bond” instruments (the “Bonds”) with the Issuers respectively, whereby each of the Issuers agreed to pay the Plaintiff about HK$70 million on the due dates specified therein.

5.  The Mortgages were executed as security for the Bonds. Pre-signed but undated instruments of transfers (the “IoTs”) and bought and sold notes (the “BS Notes”) were accordingly delivered to the Plaintiff. By Clause 8 of the Mortgages, the Plaintiff, as mortgagee, shall be entitled to take possession of the shares upon the Issuers’ default on the payments under the Bonds.

6.  Subsequently, the Issuers defaulted on the payments under the Bonds.

7.  By letters dated 1 December 2025 and 14 April 2026 respectively (the “Demand Letters”), the Plaintiff lodged the executed IoTs and BS Notes with the Companies and demanded the registration of the shares into the Plaintiff’s name.

8.  Even as at today, the Companies have neither effected any registration as demanded nor sent “notice of refusal to register the transfer” as mandated under section 151(2) of the CO, which prescribes a 2-month limit for sending such note of refusal.

III.  PARTIES’ POSITION

9.  Against the above background, Mr Paul Shieh SC, leading Ms Astina Au and Mr William Wong, counsel for the Plaintiff, submit that the Joinder Summonses should be dismissed and substantive relief should be granted as sought in the Amended Originating Summonses.

10.  Ms Kano Lam, counsel for the Companies, submits that there is factual dispute over the authenticity of the underlying documents for the transfers of the shares, and so the Court should order that the Amended Originating Summonses shall proceed as if begun by writ.

11.  Mr Ryan Chan, counsel for the Joinder Applicants, submits that I should allow the Joinder Summonses as they raise triable issues and arguable defences over the validity and enforceability of the Mortgages, and so the Court should order that the Amended Originating Summonses shall proceed as if begun by writ.

12.  The legal position, as I explained in §2 of the 31 August Decision, is that the right for registration has become absolute without any response from the board of the respective Companies within the 2 months period for response under section 151(2) of the CO: see Poon Ka Man Jason v Cheng Wai Tao and Others [2023] 4 HKC 434 at §50 per G Lam J (as he then was). Therefore, it is for the Companies and the Joinder Applicants to raise any triable issues and/or arguable defences to justify that no substantive order should be made on the Amended Originating Summonses and/or the same should proceed as if begun by writ. I shall analyse the Joinder Applicants’ evidence and submissions first.

IV.  THE JOINDER APPLICANTS

13.  The Joinder Applicants’ positions are broadly the same, with some variations to their individual accounts of events which are, in my view, not material. In §§10 and 11 of his Skeleton Submissions for the Joinder Applicants, Mr Chan summarises the Joinder Applicants’ case as follows:-

“10. In gist, the Applicants’ case is that the purported Mortgages are unenforceable against them for various reasons:-

10.1. 13 of the Applicants depose to having signed signature pages which were provided to them with no document attached at all;

10.2. 48 of the Applicants depose to having signed detached or loose pages in some form, which were not bound to any document;

10.3. 63 of the Applicants depose to having the signature pages taken away from them after signing thereon, after which they had no knowledge of what was done with it;

10.4. 108 of the Applicants deny having signed on 12 July 2024, which is the date stated on the face of the purported Mortgages;

10.5. 37 of the Applicants have signed on an execution page which named a company other than the one whose shares the instrument purports to mortgage;

10.6. Various representations were made to 122 of the Applicants to cause and/or induce them to sign on the purported Mortgages, which representations turned out to be false and/or deliberately misleading; and

10.7. The circumstances are ones which easily invite an inference of undue influence. For example, one Applicant put it in terms of putting HK$5.5m of shares at risk for an upside of about HK$100,000 (Lui Man Keung’s 1^st Affirmation §§41-42…

11. As such… Three distinct defences to the Plaintiff’s claim to ownership of the shares via mortgages are clearly at least arguable on the evidence, namely:-

11.1. Non-execution of the purported mortgage;

11.2. Misrepresentation; and

11.3. Undue influence.”

14.  I shall analyse these three defences one by one.

A.  Non-execution of the purported mortgage

15.  By this defence of “non-execution”, Mr Chan must have to mean that the Joinder Applicants did not intend to enter into any legal documents. If, objectively, the Joinder Applicants knew that they were entering into legal documents, then on the evidence, the closest defence they could raise is non est factum.

16.  In the present case, almost all of the Joinder Applicants explain the circumstances of their signing to be connected with some investment or purchase of shares. For others (for example, Wan Chi Yan, Wong Hung Bun and Chong Lai Yung), at most, they just say that they cannot recall being told about what documents they were asked to sign and about what purposes of those documents, but they understood that other shareholders were also being asked to sign, or it was “just a signing formality”. But none of them can, or can believably, say something like “someone asked me to sign on a blank paper for no reason, or for reason that he simply likes to have my autograph but not for signing any documents, and I did so accordingly”. None of them can say positively that they signed without any intention to enter into any sort of legal relationship, and none of them adduces positive evidence to the effect that objectively, the parties did not intend to enter into any legal relationship.

17.  In my view, putting the Joinder Applicants to the highest, objectively, they still intended to enter into legal relationship by signing the execution pages.

18.  In reliance on R (on the application of Mercury Tax Group Ltd and Another) v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs and Others [2008] EWHC 2721 (Admin) at §39, Mr Chan submits that the present case is like that case – “the taking of a signature page from one document and its recycling for use in another”, and so, following that case, the Mortgages should be invalid. With respect, one has to appreciate the dicta in §39 in proper context of that case. That case was a case of fraud (§§21, 22, 34 and 38). In this context, the above description of the case was followed by the following passage:-

“The parties in the present case must be taken to have regarded signature as an essential element in the effectiveness of the documents: that is to be inferred from their form. In such a case I believe that the common understanding is that the document to be signed exists as a discrete physical entity (whether in a single version or in a series of counterparts) at the moment of signing. The significance of this is not entirely talismanic (though it would not affect my view even if it were): the requirement that a party sign an actual existing authoritative version of the contractual document gives some, albeit not total, protection against fraud or mistake.” (emphasis added)

19.  In the present case, there is no suggestion of recycling. There is no suggestion that the execution page was attached to some other documents not originally intended, objectively. It is materially different from R (on the application of Mercury Tax Group Ltd and Another) v Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs and Others, supra. That case has no application here.

20.  On that basis, the closest defence the Applicants can raise by saying that they did not execute the mortgages must be non est factum. The following propositions are well-established and often cited for this defence:-

(1)  “Reliance is universally placed on signatures appended to documents by persons of full age and understanding as signifying the signatory’s assent or adherence to what that document states. Where such a person has signed a document which purports to have legal effect, the law has never regarded it as enough to show that he signed without knowing its contents for the document to be disavowed. It is an everyday occurrence that people sign documents without reading the small (or even the large) print and therefore sign without actually knowing the terms (or all the terms) of the document signed. But they are held to the documents which they have chosen to sign unless there is shown to be a recognized legal basis for concluding that their apparent consent has been in some way vitiated or that reliance on that document by some other person falls into some category of unconscionable conduct justifying relief in equity”: see Ming Shiu Chung and Others v Ming Shiu Sum and Others (2006) 9 HKCFAR 334 at §84 per Ribeiro PJ.

(2)  “As a matter of general law, it is no defence to say that he or she did not understand the contents of a legal document; that person takes the chance of being bound by its terms, as he or she can take the simple precaution of not signing until its contents have been fully explained and understood”: see Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd v Fung Chin Kan and Another (2002) 5 HKCFAR 515 at 533 per Litton NPJ.

(3)  “For the defence of non est factum to apply, it has to be established that (i) the defendant was under a disability, whether permanent or temporary; (ii) the document he signed was fundamentally different from what he thought he was signing; and (iii) he was not careless in appending his signature to the document: Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1971] AC 1004. The defendant bears a heavy burden of proof and he must establish each of the three components.”: see Keswani Soshila v Keswani Motiram [2022] 2 HKLRD 822 at §34 per Chu JA (as she then was).

21.  First, none of the Joinder Applicants has alleged that he or she was under any disability such that he or she could not read, whether permanent or temporary. On the contrary, all the Joinder Applicants’ affirmation are affirmed in English without any interpretation clause. This is consistent with some of the Joinder Applicants’ evidence that they could read English though not able to read English legal documents, or that they could read English “comfortably”, and also consistent with the absence of any positive evidence that they were English-illiterate. Being “rushed” does not mean any absence of ability. Therefore, element (i) stated in in §20(3) above is not established. This is sufficient for me to dismiss the defence of non est factum.

22.  Second and in any event, in relation to element (iii) in §20(3) above, the evidence does not suggest that the Joinder Applicants were not careless in appending his signature to the documents. None of them has adduced any positive evidence like, when they were asked to sign, they sought time to consider the matter, make enquiry with the matters in sufficient detail, but was still somehow misled to the nature of the Mortgages. In my view, they were careless if they signed without asking, or if they signed simply by being “rushed”, or if they signed because the others had, or if they simply did not care. As I explained in Zhu Bei v South China Securities Limited and Another [2026] HKCFI 2798 at §82, “in signing a document, it is not just the signatory who is involved, but also involved is the side who relies on the signature and who has no means to know what the signatory is thinking subjectively in his or her mind. This rule, in my view, is a manifestation of the objective standard applied throughout in contract law, fundamental to achieving certainty essential to parties’ consideration of their legal positions in agreed transactions, be it commercial or not. This, in turn, is fundamental to the rule of law – parties can know with sufficient certainty how to arrange their own affairs without being subjected to others’ unknown subjective thoughts.”   

23.  In conclusion, element (iii) in §20(3) above is also not established.

24.  As such, the defence raised on “non-execution of the purported mortgage” fails.

B.  Misrepresentation and undue influence

25.  As regards the defence of misrepresentation and undue influence, one important piece of evidence for understanding this defence is that the alleged misrepresentation (mainly in relation to the nature of the documents the Joinder Applicants signed) or the alleged undue influence was made by someone other than the Plaintiff (representatives from Lofter Group Limited or the 1% Training Institute). Against this evidence, there is, however, no evidence to suggest that the Plaintiff had any knowledge of such misrepresentation and undue influence, if any.

26.  In a commercial relationship, the contractual party’s actual knowledge or notice of the misrepresentation by a third party is required before the transaction may be set aside as against the contractual party: see Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) (HL(E)) [2002] 2 AC 773 at §§87-88 per Lord Nicholls; Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionable Dealing (4^th edition) §23-014; Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-disclosure (7^th editon) §4-82.[1]  Mr Chan submits that the Mortgages were not commercial or not entered into in commercial context. He relies on Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No 2) (HL(E)), supra at §43 per Lord Nicholls:-

“… These are tripartite transactions. They involve the debtor as well as the creditor and the guarantor. The guarantor enters into the transaction at the request of the debtor. The guarantor assumes obligations. On the face of the transaction the guarantor usually receives no benefit in return, unless the guarantee is being given on a commercial basis. Leaving aside cases where the relationship between the surety and the debtor is commercial, a guarantee transaction is one-sided so far as the guarantor is concerned. The creditor knows this…” (emphasis added)

27.  In particular, Mr Chan relies on the emphasised sentence to contend that a commercial relationship, for the purpose of misrepresentation and undue influence, means that all the parties would have benefits or gains, and where the guarantor would not have any benefit or gain, then the guarantee is not commercial.  With respect, I am unable to accept such contention for the following reasons:-

(1)  In context, Lord Nicholls was focused on what would “usually” happen in a non-commercial situation. It does not follow that Lord Nicholls was trying to define what was “commercial”.

(2)  “Commercial” should be understood in its ordinary sense – it is benefit-related and involves exchanges, and the parties involves would expect benefits, but the parties involved would also understand that the expected benefits may not occur – there are always commercial risks. There is no profit-guaranteed business. There is always risk of losing without gaining any benefit.

(3)  But the Court is loath to second-guess any commercial decisions. This is because one, the Court is not well-equipped to do so; second, it is always easy to give a post-mortem analysis with the benefit of hindsight without proper regard to the context and reality at the relevant time. For the Court to second-guess commercial decisions would unduly interfere with commercial lives.

(4)  Therefore, one cannot define a commercial relationship with reference to what actual benefit or gain there was because at the outset, parties well understood that any expected benefits may not actualise. Nor can the Court define a commercial relationship by examining whether the parties thought about the risk of benefits and losing, because it would be asking the Court to second-guess.

(5)  The Mortgages were executed not in a family or quasi-family context, not in any friendship context, and not in any charitable context. The Mortgages were executed as part of the commercial activity of the Issuer and the Plaintiff – the Issuers borrowing money from the Plaintiff under the Bonds. In such circumstances, no reasonable Court would segregate the Mortgages and understand the Mortgages to be anything other than commercial.

28.  On my finding that the Mortgages were commercial, actual knowledge or notice is required. In the present case, in the absence of any positive evidence of such actual knowledge or notice in the present case, even assuming that there were misrepresentation and/or undue influence, such defences cannot be raised against the Plaintiff. The Joinder Applicants’ submissions that further investigation is warranted for this matter cannot be maintained. The minimum threshold of a triable issue and/or arguable defence has to be met before they can join. Just like when a plaintiff commences a claim without pleading positively a necessary factual element for the cause of action, the plaintiff cannot maintain submissions that because the matter needs further investigation to see whether there is evidence for that necessary factual element, so the pleading should not be struck out as showing no reasonable cause of action.

29.  Therefore, the defence of misrepresentation or undue influence is not a defence against the Plaintiff in the present proceedings.

C.  Conclusion

30.  In the circumstances, the Joinder Applicants fail their burden to show a triable issue and/or an arguable defence. Therefore, I dismiss the Joinder Summonses.

V.  THE COMPANIES’ DEFENCE

31.  As mentioned above, the Companies did not send any notice of refusal to register the transfer as required by section 151(2) of the CO, and the law is that without any notice of refusal, the right to the registration of the shares becomes absolute. The Companies’ main defence is that despite the absence of the notice, in June 2026 (still within the 2-month period under section 151(2) of the CO), the boards had resolved to refuse the registration. However, there is no explanation, whether in the evidence or from counsel, as to why the boards did not send the notice of refusal to register the transfer to the Plaintiff in accordance with section 151(2).  Further, though it is not appropriate for me to make any finding relying on affirmation evidence, and so I do not, I have to express serious doubt over the provenance of the board minutes purported to record the board meetings and thus the board meetings themselves. In both the first hearing of the Originating Summonses back in early July 2026, and the Companies’ application for time for filing opposing affirmations in August 2026, in order to gauge how much time I should give them for filing evidence, I repeatedly asked the Companies’ then counsel what defence they would like to raise, and upon pressed, on each occasion, the Companies’ then counsel’s answer was along the line that they were liaising with or taking instructions from various Mortgagors, but nothing was mentioned that their boards had actually resolved to refuse to register the transfer. This is particularly suspect because on the first occasion, the Plaintiff already raised the point that the Companies did not send any notice of refusal to register the transfer.

32.  Whatever the reasons were, there is no power under the CO for the Court to extend the 2-month time limit. The right to register the transfer has become absolute. The question is whether there is any basis for the Court not to exercise its power to order the Companies to register the transfer.

33.  First, insofar as the Companies would like to rely on the Joinder Applicants’ evidence to impugn the transactions based on “non-execution”, misrepresentation or undue influence, I have dismissed such “defences” above.

34.  Second, Ms Lam submits that the Companies’ board approval was not or not properly obtained for the Mortgages, and so the Mortgages are arguably invalid. I have already rejected this argument in §7(2) of my 31 August Decision. In gist, the Companies’ board approval was an internal management of the Companies and outsiders were entitled to take the Companies’ act as valid, and in any event, assuming that the Mortgagors gave undertaking by Clause 5.2 of the Mortgages (which is, as a matter of fact, not), whatever Companies’ letters of undertaking or authorization the Mortgagors undertook or agreed under the Mortgages to deliver to the Mortgagees should not affect the dealing of the properties of the Mortgagors between the Mortgagors and the Mortgagees. This lack of board approval is not a ground for the Court not to exercise its power to order registration.  

35.  Third, Ms Lam submits that under Clause 5.2 of the Mortgages, original share certificates had to delivered, but the evidence shows that the share certificates may not be authentic. She gave two examples:-   

(1)  The first is the share certificates of the shares registered in the name of Lee Ming Chu (“Ms Lee”). Ms Lam points out that the share certificate produced by the Plaintiff lacked the common seal, contained inaccurate description of the number of shares and bore an unknown signature under the director’s title.

(2)  The second is the share certificate of Wong Sze Wan Cecilia (“Ms Wong”). Ms Lam points out that the share certificate bore an address purported to be Ms Wong when Ms Wong in fact had not resided at that address since 2024.

36.  It is further pointed out that on each share certificate was stated “NO TRANSFER OF ANY PORTION OF THE SHARES COMPRISED IN THIS CERTIFICATE CAN BE REGISTERED UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY THIS CERTIFICATE”, and that the majority of the shareholders have kept the original share certificates. The Joinder Applicants have no idea how those copies of share certificates exhibited by the Plaintiff were obtained. But what defence exactly do all these translate into? In my view:-

(1)  The defence of non est factum, as I have found above, is not established. Nor the defence of misrepresentation and undue influence is established against the Plaintiff.

(2)  There is no allegation, and I can see no basis in any event to say, that the Mortgages are forged documents.

(3)  Thus, the Mortgages are prima facie a valid and enforceable contract as between the Mortgagors and the Plaintiff.

(4)  Clause 5.2 of the Mortgages set out the documents the Mortgagors undertook to give to the Plaintiff. Never was it stated anywhere that delivery would be a condition before the Mortgages would be valid and enforceable. Further and in any event, if the Mortgagors failed to perform the undertaking and breached Clause 5.2, they would be prevented by the legal principle of no reliance on oneself’s own wrong to say that the Mortgages would be invalid and unenforceable.

(5)  On the contrary, the shares to be mortgaged under the Mortgages was defined and particularised in Part B of Schedule 8. So, objectively, the parties’ intention as to what shares to Mortgages was clear and unequivocal.

(6)  There is no requirement under sections 151-152 of the CO that the share certificates, be they originals or copies, should be produced for registration of transfer. Further, none of the articles of association of the Companies required production of the share certificate as a pre-condition for a valid transfer. Rather, the instrument of transfer is a pre-condition: see Articles of Association in HCMP 371/2026 article 7; Articles of Association in HCMP 374-377/2026 article 54. Insofar as Articles of Association in HCMP 374-377/2026 article 55 provided that directors may refuse to register the transfer if the instrument of transfer is not accompanied by the share certificate, this power is, by the word “may”, discretionary and relates to the registration of the transfer rather than the transfer itself. That said, I accept that absence of proper share certificate, in appropriate circumstances, may constitute good ground for the boards to refuse the registration.

(7)  The captialised sentence in the share certificate may serve as a mere statement but has no legal effect, and the share certificates serves as evidence of the shares: Cheung Pui Yuen and Others v Worldcup Investments Inc and Others (2009) 12 HKCFAR 31 at §13 per Litton NPJ delivering the unanimous judgment of the Court of Final Appeal, but not the contractual terms governing the shares.

(8)  In the present case, assuming, without finding, that there were indeed the board meetings in June 2026 as recorded by the board minutes produced lately by the Companies based on the discrepancies, one may say that the boards’ refusal was resolved with good faith.

(9)  However, now, with my finding that there is no non est factum, no representation as against the Plaintiff and no undue influence as against the Plaintiff, mere reliance on the discrepancies of the share certificates to continue to refuse registration in the present circumstances can no longer be any good faith.

(10)  Therefore, these discrepancies do not form any basis for the Court not to exercise its power to order registration of transfer.

37.  Fourth, Ms Lam submits that the Mortgages were against the self-dealing rule because the Plaintiff was connected to the parties which were restricted from dealing with the shares in the Companies. I have dismissed similar argument in §7(3) of the 31 August Decision. It does not help Ms Lam at all by dressing such argument as an argument based on the rule against self-dealing. For this rule to apply, there has to be a trust property or some fiduciary relationship at the least. I cannot see any such trust property or fiduciary relationship here.

38.  In the circumstances, I see no reason not to order registration of the transfer.

VI.  CONCLUSION

39.  For the above reasons, I dismiss the Joinder Summonses, and make an order in terms of the Amended Originating Summonses.

40.  For the costs of the Joinder Summonses, I order the Joinder Applicants to pay the Plaintiff costs (including all costs reserved or not yet dealt with) to be summarily assessed in each proceedings, with certificate for three counsel. I grant certificate for three counsel because of the voluminous evidence filed by the Joinder Applicants.

41.  For the costs of the Amended Originating Summonses, even assuming that there were the board meetings in June 2026 which may arguably show good faith, the problem for the Companies still remains that for no good reason, they did not send any notice of refusal to register under section 151(2) of the CO. As such, the Plaintiff had no choice but to commence the present proceedings. Not only that. The Companies only mentioned these meeting for the first time in their evidence filed in August 2026, and having the benefit of the Joinder Applicants’ evidence (which I reject as sufficient to constitute any defences to the Amended Originating Summonses), the Companies still oppose the Amended Originating Summonses. Therefore, good faith or not, the Plaintiff would still have to pursue the Amended Originating Summonses with full steam against the Companies as well. In the circumstances, I order the Companies to pay the costs of the Amended Originating Summonses (including all costs reserved or not yet dealt with) to be summarily assessed, with certificate for three counsel. I grant certificate for three counsel because the Companies also rely on the Joinder Applicants’ voluminous evidence.

42.  For the summary assessments, I direct that:-

(1)  The Plaintiff shall, within 7 days from today, lodge and serve revised statements of costs as against the Joinder Applicants and the Companies including the costs which the Plaintiff initially applied to be thrown away costs as a result of the adjournment of the substantive disposal of the Originating Summonses originally scheduled to take place on 31 August 2026; and

(2)  the Joinder Applicants and the Companies shall lodge and serve their respective lists of objections within 7 days thereafter.

43.  It remains for me to thank counsel for their assistance.