RE DIMACULANGAN JOHN ABOBO

CAMP 67/2025, [2025] HKCA 1101

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 702

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 67 OF 2025

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2235 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 11 August 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 31 July 2025 (“the Judgment”)  ([2025] HKCA 702).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s reapplication for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”)  dated 21 January 2025, by which the Deputy Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 147).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I do not agree with the decision of the court. The learned Judge did not consider my application for extension of time to appeal. My life is not safe and if I return to my home country I will be killed by my enemies. So the Notice of Appeal for my Judicial Review. The decision of the Court of Appeal for the extension of time made me liable to go back to my home country where my life is not safe.” (sic)

5.  The applicant lodged written submissions on 22 August 2025.  In those submissions, he claimed that he would be tortured and killed by his enemy upon refoulement and that he would face hardship.  He also asserted that he failed to receive the Leave Decision so he applied for extension of time to appeal but his application was dismissed.  He further claimed that the Board was irrational and procedurally unfair in failing to evaluate and make a finding of fact whether there was a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights in his home country and whether state protection existed in his home country.  He also claimed that the Judge was wrong as a matter of law in failing to apply the principles of rationality and procedural fairness and failed to analyse his claims properly.

6.  In our view, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any specific particular or evidence.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  His allegations are also a mere regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [12] - [23] of the Judgment.  He did not identify any specific error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion filed on 11 August 2025 is dismissed.