ANDRY WELIYANTO AKSA JULIAN TOBY (a minor) by RINA MULYANI, his next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 26/2020

[2026] HKCFI 1652

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 26 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 29 December 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 2 December 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 15 November 2019.

2.  The applicant is a minor and represented by his mother as his next friend. There is no legal representation for the applicant as required by Order 80, rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court, but I have already waived the irregularity as mentioned in the Form CALL-1 dated 2 December 2025.

3.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

4.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

5.  As my order was made on 2 December 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 16 December 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

6.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

7.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

8.  In the Summons, the applicant did not give any reason for his delay in lodging the appeal, nor any ground for the intended appeal. In his supporting affirmation dated 29 December 2025 (made by his mother), the applicant gave the reason for his delay in lodging the appeal, in that the applicant’s mother alleged that she did not receive the Judgment or the Form CALL-1 and she was not aware of the deadline.

9.  At the hearing of the Summons on 12 March 2026, the applicant’s mother confirmed that she did receive my decision but it was already late when she received it. However, she did not offer any reasonable explanation as to why she would receive the decision late. At first, she was alleging that the decision was sent to her old address, but after some clarification, she confirmed that the decision was received at her new address. Thus, there is no reasonable explanation as to why she would have received the decision late at her new address.

10.  The applicant filed a further affirmation dated 10 February 2026 (also made by his mother) in support of the Summons, in which the applicant attached a 3-page written submission. At the hearing on 12 March 2026, the applicant’s mother confirmed that the applicant would rely on the written submission as the grounds for the intended appeal. However, when I asked the applicant’s mother to elaborate on the grounds, she did not want to do so. She also confirmed that she had no other grounds for the intended appeal.

11.  The 3-page written submission contained 12 paragraphs, but the contents are just general allegations against the Director of Immigration and the adjudicator of the Torture Claims Appeal Board. They do not contain any specific particulars regarding the applicant’s own case. In fact, those paragraphs were used by many applicants in similar judicial review applications just like a template without any particulars relevant to their own cases. Such general allegations cannot be valid grounds for the intended appeal at all.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

14.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal, even though the delay was not for too long.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.