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HCAL 1187/2022
[2026] HKCFI 945
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1187 OF 2022
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BETWEEN
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Larroza Lhory Centina |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 43-year-old national of the Philippines who last arrived in Hong Kong on 19 June 2017 with permission to continue to work as a foreign domestic helper until the expiration of her employment contract or within 14 days of its early termination, but upon the completion of her last employment contract on 15 June 2019, she did not depart and instead overstayed, and was arrested by police more than one year later on 8 December 2020. After she was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, she raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if she returned to the Philippines she would be harmed or killed by her former boyfriend over their relationship dispute. She was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of her claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Passi, Iloilo, the Philippines. After leaving school she cohabited with her boyfriend Lavilla Don (“Don”) and raised a family with a daughter in her family home in the home village.
3. In 2005 the Applicant had an affair with another man which led to her giving birth to another child, and after it was discovered by her boyfriend Don, he became furious and left their home and sent her some threatening messages, and as a result the Applicant became concerned for her own safety, and with the intention of ending their relationship she then went to work in Singapore as a domestic servant before coming to Hong Kong in 2011 to work as a foreign domestic helper, ceasing all further contact with Don.
4. After the expiration of her last employment contract on 15 June 2019, the Applicant however was afraid to return to the Philippines and therefore overstayed in Hong Kong, and upon her arrest by the police she then raised her non-refoulement claim for protection, for which she completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 31 July 2021 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).
5. By a Notice of Decision dated 26 August 2021 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of her absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
6. In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and found no substantial grounds for believing that there will be any real and substantial risk of her being harmed or killed by her former boyfriend Don upon her return to the Philippines due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from him, that there is no evidence of any real intention of him to seriously harm or kill her other than some angry words and empty threats, nor is it accepted that he would still have any adverse interest in her after all these years since they ended their relationship without any further contact with each other for some 13 or 14 years, that in any event it was a private relationship dispute between just the 2 of them only without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in the Philippines with a large population of 109 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 300,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from her home district in large cities such as Manila where it would be difficult if not impossible for Don to locate her.
7. On 9 September 2021 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which she attended an oral hearing on 12 January 2022 before the Board during which she gave evidence and answered questions raised of her claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 30 June 2022 her appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
8. In its decision[1] the Board found on the factual basis of even the Applicant’s own case and her own concession given at her appeal hearing of no real risk of any harm from her former boyfriend Don or any real intention of him to seriously harm or kill her other than some angry words and empty threats from him many years ago, nor is it accepted that he would still have any adverse interest in her after all these years since they ended their relationship and ceased any further contact with each other some 15 years ago that it concluded that the Applicant has failed to establish that she would face any real risk of any proscribed harm from her former boyfriend upon her return to the Philippines that her claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
9. On 2 November 2022 the Applicant filed her Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for her intended challenge:
(1) That the Board’s decision to refuse the Applicant’s appeal was unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense or the result of procedural errors or unfairness;
(2) That the Board had unlawfully fettered its discretion by refusing the Applicant’s appeal on the grounds that they did not satisfy the requirements;
(3) That the Board failed to meet the greater care and duty owned to a self-represented claimant;
(4) That the Adjudicator acted in a procedurally unfair manner in dealing with the Applicant’s appeal;
(5) That the Adjudicator dismissed the Applicant’s appeal without any indication of having interacted with the facts of the Applicant’s claim or conducted any analysis of her supporting documents or turned his mind to the ground under consideration being the risk of violation of the Applicant’s right to life under BOR 2;
(6) That the Board had significantly relied on source of news not officially recognized or were simply hearsays;
(7) That the Adjudicator had relied on some cases that were outdated considering the dramatic changes in the Applicant’s home country and with the lack of credible source of information that resulted in making groundless speculation.
10. All these are however just some bare and vague assertions of the Applicant containing a few key words or phrases but without any necessary or relevant particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what COI were not officially recognized or were hearsays or outdated, or what relevancy was BOR 2 risk to her claim when on the factual basis of even her own case that it was just some harmless personal relationship dispute between her and her former boyfriend only without any threats to her life at all. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for her intended challenge.
11. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
12. In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected her claim for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in its decision with the benefit of hearing her in her oral evidence and her answers to questions raised of her claim, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in her process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the finding of the Board.
13. Furthermore, the fact is that it has also been correctly established by the Director in his decision that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim even if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for her to relocate to other part of the Philippines, a decision also agreed and confirmed by the Board, there is simply no justification to afford her with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
14. In the premises, and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
15. It is also of note that the Applicant recently on 14 January 2026 in writing requested to withdraw her application as she now wants to return to her the Philippines as soon as possible but without any explanation as to what happens to her claimed risk in her home country.
16. For all these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I therefore refuse to grant leave and accordingly dismiss her application.
Dated the 12th day of February 2026
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on 12 February 2026
Larroza Lhory Centina
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 12 February 2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 18720/21/9/72/F1357
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 1202/21
(formerly RBCZ 368/20)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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