WAI YIN FEI v. CHAN SHUK KING also known as CHAN SHUK KING YVONNE (in her own capacity and in the capacity as the sole Administratrix of the Estate)

HCMP 1936/2025

[2026] HKCFI 3826

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 1936 OF 2025

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DECISION ON COSTS

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Introduction

1.  By the Originating Summons dated 23 October 2025 herein (“the OS”), the Plaintiff (“P”) seeks the following against the Defendant (“D”):

(1)     an order for account concerning all the properties in the estate (“the Estate”) of the late Mr Wai Chung Fai (“Deceased”);

(2)     an order requiring D to give pre-action discovery of any grant, letter of administration and/or other documents alike issued by the competent authorities, whether executive or judicial, in the administration of the Estate in Ontario, Canada; and all documents relating or relevant to all interest that D acquired or will acquire under the law of Ontario, Canada from the Estate in Ontario, Canada.

2.  The substantive hearing of the OS took place before me on 23 June 2026.  In the hearing, Ms Teresa Yu represented P.  Mr Timothy Lam, together with Mr Isaac Ng, represented D.

3.  In the substantive hearing, after some exchanges between the bench and counsel, Ms Yu took some instructions.  Thereafter, Ms Yu sought leave to withdraw the OS.  With no objection from Mr Lam, I granted leave to P to withdraw the OS.  The only remaining issue between the parties is costs.  Each party is seeking an order requiring the other party to bear the costs of these proceedings personally.  I have heard the parties’ respective submissions on costs.  This is my decision on costs of these proceedings.

4.  Since the only remaining issue is costs of the proceedings, I have taken the “without prejudice save as to costs” correspondence passing between the parties into account.

Background

5.  The essential background facts are as follows.

6.  The Deceased passed away intestate in Ontario, Canada on 14 March 2016.  The Deceased left D as his surviving spouse, and his 5 younger brothers and sisters of the whole blood (“the Siblings”), namely (a) Mr Wai Kin Chung (“WKC”), (b) P, (c) Ms Wai Yin Yee Monica (“WYY”), (d) Mr Wai Kin Hung (“WKH”), and (e) Ms Wai Yin Ling Elaine (“WYL”).  The Deceased left no parent and no issue.

7.  On 27 July 2016, D obtained a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee Without a Will issued by the Superior Court of Justice, Ontario, Canada and was appointed as the Estate Trustee of the Estate.  The role of Estate Trustee in Ontario, Canada is similar to the role of an administrator in Hong Kong.

8.  On 14 February 2017, D made an affirmation verifying a Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for the Liabilities for the Estate in Hong Kong.

9.  On 19 September 2017, D obtained a Letters of Administration issued by this Court with Additional Schedule of Assets and Liabilities dated 7 December 2018 (“the Additional Schedule”) added thereafter. The administration of the Estate in Hong Kong was granted to D.

10.  The Estate includes the following immovable properties in Hong Kong (“the HK Landed Properties”):

(1)     Lot No. 1079 in DD 180 (“Lot 1079”);

(2)     1/5 share of Lot No. 562 in DD 180 (“Lot 562”);

(3)     1/5 share of Lot No. 566 in DD 180 (“Lot 566”); and

(4)     1/5 share of Lot No. 1078 in DD 180 (“Lot 1078”).

11.  P, WKC and WKH together are the owners of the following:

(1)     4/5 share of Lot No. 562;

(2)     4/5 share of Lot No. 566; and

(3)     4/5 share of Lot No. 1078.

12.  The following matters are not in dispute or indisputable:

(1)     At the time of his death, the Deceased was domiciled in Ontario, Canada.

(2)     Save and except the HK Landed Properties, the succession of all the properties in the Estate (whether in Canada or in Hong Kong) is governed by the law of Ontario, Canada.

(3)     Under the law of Ontario, Canada, D is the sole beneficiary of the Estate.

(4)     The succession of the HK Landed Properties is governed by the Hong Kong law.

(5)     According to s.4(4) of the Intestates’ Estates Ordinance (Cap 73) (“IEO”), the beneficiaries of the HK Landed Properties are D and the Siblings.

13.  On 26 November 2018, D’s solicitors, Messrs. Tony Lam & Co (“TLC”) notified the Siblings of their entitlements to the HK Landed Properties.

14.  On 7 December 2018, D filed her affirmation verifying the Additional Schedule.

15.  On 17 December 2018, Messrs. Hugill & Ip (“HIP”), acting for P, WKC, WYY and WKH, wrote to TLC.  In that letter, HIP said that their clients were entitled to 50% of the HK Land Properties.  HIP proposed that the distribution of the HK Landed Properties could be taken in a way of transfer of lands between D and their clients.

16.  Thereafter, there were some without prejudice discussions between TLC and HIP concerning distribution of the HK Landed Properties.

17.  On 1 April 2019, in a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter, TLC told HIP that D would waive her claim against the Estate for the expenses paid by D on behalf of the Estate, and also her entitlement to the lump sum payment under s.4(4) of the IEO.

18.  On 14 May 2019, HIP wrote to TLC to demand D to provide an inventory and a proper account of the Estate, along with supporting documents for expenses.  On 31 May 2019, HIP sent a follow-up letter to TLC reiterating the demand.  On 3 June 2019, TLP replied and said, inter alia, “your clients have been informed or fully aware of the details of immovable properties to be shared by them, and we do not know what inventory your clients require”.

19.  On 24 January 2021, P sent a letter to TLC and said that she had ceased to engage HIP as her solicitors from early December 2019.  P stated her view on the distribution of HK Landed Properties in that letter.  P further suggested to engage Citiland Surveyors Limited (“Citiland”) to make a formal valuation on Lot 562 and Lot 566.

20.  On 12 April 2021, P wrote to TLC, in which P said “… [WKC], [WYY] and [WKH] have authorised me to represent them to liaise with [HIP] as well as to make decisions for them on this matter.  I am representing [the aforesaid beneficiaries] in the same capacity herewith and act as one”.

21.  There were some further discussions between P and TLC on the distribution of the HK Landed Properties in 2021 and 2022.

22.  On 19 December 2023, the Shatin District Lands Office wrote to D (as the administratrix of the Estate) and informed D that upon the payment of premium of HK$13,729,400, the Lands Department would grant the necessary consent to allow D to assign Lot 1079.

23.  On 6 March 2024, TLC wrote to P and provided 3 Valuation Reports prepared by Citiland to P.  The 3 Valuation Reports covered Lot 562, Lot 566, and Lot 1079.  In TLC’s letter, TLC said that Valuation Report on Lot 1078 had not been prepared for the purpose of saving costs, and adopted the net value of Lot 1079 as the net value of Lot 1078.  TLC stated their view on the distribution of the HK Landed Properties in their letter.  TLC also raised D’s entitlement to HK$1 million under s.4(4) of the IEO in the letter.

24.  On 16 September 2024, in a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter, TLC told P’s solicitors, Messrs. Patrick Mak & Tse (“PMT”), that D would waive her claim against the Estate for the expenses paid by D on behalf of the Estate upon settlement as a gesture of goodwill.

25.  On 23 October 2024, in a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter, TLC urged PMT to accept D’s settlement proposal as set out in TLC’s letter dated 16 September 2024 by 6 November 2024.

26.  On 14 October 2025, PMT demanded for an account of the Estate.

27.  On 20 October 2025, TLC replied and said that D had discharged her duty to investigate the Estate and had made her best effort to administer the HK Landed Properties.  TLC refused to provide details of the Deceased’s assets and the grant of administration in Canada as D was not obliged to do so.  In that letter, TLC set out the past exchanges with P and/or her solicitors in detail and said:

“4. Under the laws of Ontario, the surviving spouse, that is our client, is the only lawful beneficiary entitled to the Estate (subject to the laws of intestacy of Hong Kong applicable to the landed properties as stated below).

5. Beside other properties, Mr Wai had the following landed properties in Hong Kong in question (“Properties”) before his death and the laws of intestacy of Hong Kong apply to the Properties only and not any other assets of the Estate:-

(1) Lot No. 1079 in D. D. 180;

(2) 1/5" share of Lot No.562 in D. D. 180;

(3) 1/5" share of Lot No.566 in D, D. 180; and

(4) 1/5" share of Lot No.1078 in D.D. 180.

6. On 19 September 2017, Letters of Administration of the Estate was granted to our client (as the administratrix) in Hong Kong (under Grant No. HCAG002459/2017).

7. As soon as our client realised the applicability of the laws of intestacy of Hong Kong to the Properties, we took the initiative to and did send 4 letters all dated 26 November 2018 to Wai Kin Chung, Wai Yin Fei, Wai Yin Yee Monica and Wai Kin Hung (collectively “Siblings”) respectively notifying them their possible entitlement to share in the Properties.

8. The Siblings were and are also the owners of 4/5^th share of Lot No. 562 in D.D. 180; 4/5^th share of Lot No.566 in D.D.180 and 4/5^th share of Lot No.1078 in D.D.180.

9. On 17 December 2018, Hugill & Ip on behalf of the Siblings sent us a letter to us proposing (inter alia) transfer of the Properties between our client and Siblings.

10. Thereafter, correspondences (most of them were marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE”) were exchanged between Hugill & Ip and aur firm from 10 January 2019 to 6 February 2020 on (inter alia) the proposals as to distribution of the Properties between our client and the Siblings.

11. The last 6 letters on distribution proposals were all from our firm dated 3 June 2019, 5 June 2019, 6 June 2019, 19 July 2019, 18 October 2019 and 6 February 2020 respectively, to all of which there was no reply from Hugill & Ip.

12. On 24 January 2021, Wai Yin Fei sent us a letter notifying her discontinuance of the service of Hugill & Ip from early December 2019 and giving proposals as to distribution of the Properties.

13. Thereafter, correspondences (some of them were marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE”) were exchanged between Wai Yin Fei and our firm from 24 February 2021 to 19 July 2024) on (inter alia) the proposals for exchange of some of the Properties between our client and the Siblings, and sale of the building on Lot No. 1079 in D.D. 180.

14. The last 3 letters/email on distribution proposals were from our firm dated 6 March 2024, 5 April 2024 and 19 July 2024 respectively, to all of which there was no reply from Wai Yin Fei.

15. On 25 July 2024, you sent us a letter notifying that you were taking instructions from Wai Yin Fei.

16. Thereafter, you acted for Wai Yin Fei and Wai Kin Hung, and correspondences (all of them marked “WITHOUT PREJUDICE”) were exchanged between your firm and our firm from 19 August 2024 to 23 October 2024.

17. The last letter on distribution proposals was from our firm dated 23 October 2024, to which there was no reply from your firm.

18. In the premises, our client has duly discharged her duty to investigate the Estate and inform the Siblings their entitlement to share in the Properties under the laws of Hong Kong, and has made her best effort to administer the Properties.

19. In view of No. 17 hereof, we are very surprised to suddenly receive the Letter which (inter alia) demanded an account for and a full list of inventory of the Estate, as if your clients did not know anything about the Estate (in fact they have known their only entitlement to share in the Properties since November or December 2018) and/or forgot the parties’ negotiations for distribution of the Properties for about 6 years.

20. As stated in 4^th paragraph of our letter to Hugili & Ip dated 3 June 2019, your clients have been informed or are fully aware of the details of the Properties (the only assets of the Estate entitled by your clients) to be shared by them, and we do not know what account and/or inventory your clients require.

21. As to your request (at 5^th paragraph of the Letter) for details of Mr. Wai’s assets and grant of administration/probate in Canada, our client is not obliged to provide them (which are irrelevant to the Siblings in any event) in view of No. 4 hereof.

22. Please advise your clients to review all previous correspondences and to consider sensible distribution of the Properties between all parties with a view to saving further costs and disputes (instead of making unjustified or unnecessary demands with threats for legal proceedings).” (Emphasis added)

28.  On 25 October 2025, in a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter, TLC asked PMT to consider to accept D’s settlement proposal as set out in TLC’s letter dated 16 September 2024 within 21 days.

29.  Without giving any response to TLC’s open letter dated 20 October 2025 or the “without prejudice save as to costs” letter dated 20 October 2025, on 27 October 2025, P commenced these proceedings.

30.  On 6 November 2025, TLC provided a letter from Canadian lawyers confirming that D was the only lawful beneficiary in Canada to PMT, and requested withdrawal of the proceedings.

31.  On 18 November 2025, PMT refused to withdraw the proceedings.

32.  On 21 November 2025, TLC wrote to PMT and said, inter alia, the following:

(1)     To remove doubts and avoid arguments, D confirmed that she would not claim the HK$1 million and the interest thereon against the Estate in any event.

(2)     Except the HK Landed Properties, the Deceased’s siblings would not be entitled to any other assets in the Estate, whether in Hong Kong or in Canada.  A copy of a letter from Canadian lawyers dated 20 November 2025 was enclosed in that letter.

(3)     Lot Nos. 562, 566 and 1078 were in possession of the Deceased’s siblings.  There were rental incomes from these lands, but the rental incomes had not been accounted for to D.  D had no details as to those rental incomes.

(4)     To save arguments and costs, D sought clarification as to what documents P required D to provide.

33.  On 9 December 2025, PMT replied and said, inter alia, that it was for D to provide all necessary documents to prove the accounts and the administration of the Estate to discharge her duty, rather than shifting the burden to P to list documents which she had no knowledge of, nor access to the same.

34.  On 6 January 2026, TLC wrote to PMT and requested for copies of tenancy agreements concerning Lot Nos. 562, 566 and 1078 and an account of 1/5 of the net rental incomes from these lands from March 2016 to December 2025.

35.  On 12 January 2026, PMT replied and said “[w]e … have no instruction to act for [WKH] in respect of the issues set out in your side letter, as that is a separate matter”, and “[w]e are instructed that [P] has no knowledge of, nor has she ever received, any alleged rental income from the properties referred to in your said letter.  Our client also does not have any copy of any tenancy agreements of the properties.”

36.  On 19 January 2026, TLC wrote to WKH and requested for copies of tenancy agreements concerning Lot Nos. 562, 566 and 1078 and an account of 1/5 of the net rental incomes from these lands from March 2016 to December 2025.  No reply was given by WKH.

37.  On 19 March 2026, in a “without prejudice save as to costs” letter, TLC invited PMT to withdraw the OS, and there be no order as to costs.  The invitation was not accepted by P.

Discussion

38.  At the beginning the substantive hearing of the OS:

(1)     Ms Yu confirmed that P’s entitlement was limited to a share in the HK Landed Properties, and P would not be entitled to have any share in any other assets in the Estate, whether in Hong Kong or in Canada.

(2)     Mr Lam confirmed (“D’s Confirmations”) that (a) D would not claim the HK$1m and interest pursuant to s.4(4) of the IEO; and (b) D would not claim against the HK Landed Properties for reimbursement of the expenses already paid by D for the Estate in the administration of the HK Landed Properties.

39.  At the beginning of the hearing before me, Ms Yu told that Court that P intended to seek the following from D:

(1)     updated valuation reports of the HK Landed Properties;

(2)     an account of the rental incomes from the HK Landed Properties; and

(3)     an account of the expenses in relation to the administration of the HK Landed Properties.

40.  Ms Yu also told me that since D would not claim the HK$1m and interest pursuant to s.4(4) of the IEO, P would not pursue the application for pre-action discovery as stated in the OS.

41.  Ms Yu submitted that notwithstanding the withdrawal of the OS, save and except the costs of the application for pre-action discovery, costs of these proceedings should be borne by D personally, for the withdrawal of the OS was due to D’s Confirmations offered at the beginning of the substantive hearing.  Ms Yu submitted that D’s Confirmations made at the beginning of the substantive hearing (see §38(2) above) were concessions made by D.

42.  Mr Lam submitted that costs should follow the event.  The so-called “concessions” made by D at the beginning of the substantive hearing of the OS in fact had been communicated to P long time ago.  Knowing D’s position, P had no reason to commence and to pursue these proceedings.  There was no reason why costs should not follow the event.  Mr Lam did not seek a certificate for two counsel.

43.  In considering the question of costs, the principles set out by Kekewich J in Re Buckton^[1], as explained by Lord Scott of Foscote NPJ in Cheng Pui Yuen v Worldcup Investments Inc^[2], are relevant.  In Cheung Pui Yuen, Lord Scott of Foscote NPJ said:

“56. The case on costs …… is based on the principle that where proceedings have been properly instituted for the benefit of a trust fund, or a deceased’s estate, the court may, in an appropriate case, make an order for the costs of the proceedings to be borne by the fund or estate, as the case may be. The principle was explained by Kekewich J in Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406 at pp.414/415. He referred, first, to cases in which trustees ask the court to determine some question which has arisen in the administration of the trust. In such cases, said Kekewich J, the general rule would be that the costs of all necessary parties would be taxed as between solicitor and client and paid out of the estate. He then referred to a second class of case in which the question for determination by the court is raised not by the trustees but by some of the beneficiaries. In such a case, if the question raised would have justified an application by the trustees but for some reason or other the application has been made by beneficiaries, the same costs consequences, he said, should follow:

‘The application is necessary for the administration of the trust, and the costs of all parties are necessarily incurred for the benefit of the estate as a whole.’ (p.415)

Kekewich J distinguished, however, the first and second classes of case from the third class, a class where the application to the court is made by a beneficiary but is, in substance although not in form, an adverse claim made in hostile litigation. In such a case, said the judge, the rule applicable to hostile litigation should be applied and the unsuccessful party ordered to pay the costs.

……

58. There is, moreover, a further principle regarding litigation to resolve questions arising in the administration of a deceased’s estate that needs to be borne in mind. If it is the deceased who is responsible for the creation of the doubts that have necessitated an application to the court for the doubts to be resolved, it is the deceased’s estate on which the costs of the application should fall. The principle is a well known one: “where the difficulty is occasioned by the … conduct of the testator … the costs are costs of administration” ……

59. But these principles do not constitute rules. They provide a guide as to how, in probate or administration proceedings, judicial discretion regarding the costs of litigation should be exercised. The answer to that may depend not only on the principles referred to but also upon the particular circumstances in which the litigation has been commenced and prosecuted. ……” (Emphasis added)

44.  In my view, P’s claims against D in these proceedings are in substance adverse claims against D.  The litigation is a hostile litigation. In fact, both P and D are saying that there should be an order requiring the other side to bear the costs of these proceedings personally.  It is clear that both P and D are treating this litigation as a hostile litigation.  Hence, the general rule of costs following the event should apply.  In order to depart from the general rule, there must be sufficient reason(s) justifying the departure.

45.  I am of the view that there is no sufficient reason justifying departure from the general rule of costs following the event in this case.  It is also unreasonable for P to commence and to continue these proceedings against D until the substantive hearing of the OS.  Costs of the proceedings should be borne by P personally.

46.  In relation to P’s application for an order requiring D to provide updated valuation reports of the HK Landed Properties to P:

(1)     I do not see any linkage between D’s Confirmations and P’s withdrawal of this application. There is no basis to say that the withdrawal of this application is caused by D’s Confirmations.  There is no reason to depart from the general rule of costs following the event.

(2)     Further, P’s application for updated valuation reports is unreasonable for the following reasons:

(a)     D has provided 3 Valuation Reports prepared by Citiland (who are the valuers suggested by P) to P on 6 March 2024.  As set out in TLC’s open letter dated 20 October 2025, after TLC provided the valuation reports to P on 6 March 2024, P only had discussion with TLC during the period from 19 August 2024 to 23 October 2024.  Thereafter, P did not have any further discussion with TLC on the distribution of the HK Landed Properties.  If the valuations in the 2024 valuation reports are outdated, that is caused by P’s tardiness in giving response to TLC and P’s unwillingness in having further discussion with TLC.

(b)     It must be borne in mind that P is only entitled to have a share in part of the Estate (ie the HK Landed Properties), and there is no cash in this part of the Estate.  If some updated valuation reports would need to be prepared, it is inevitable that some valuation costs would be incurred.  D has no obligation to pay those valuation costs from her own pocket.  As to who would bear the valuation costs, P did not say anything before the substantive hearing of the OS.  Without indicating who would pay the valuation costs, P’s application for an order requiring D to provide updated valuation reports is a non-starter and is not a reasonable application.

(c)     In the hearing before me, when being asked who would pay the valuation costs in relation to the updated valuation reports, Ms Yu needed to seek instructions. After seeking instructions, Ms Yu submitted that P would be willing to undertake to pay those valuation costs herself.  P did not offer that undertaking until being asked by the Court in the substantive hearing of the OS.  In any event, as submitted by Mr Lam, if P would be willing to pay those valuation costs herself, applying common sense, P could directly instruct Citiland to prepare updated valuation reports and directly pay Citiland.  It would not be necessary to involve D as the middleman.  It would be a waste of time and costs to sue D for the purpose of getting some updated valuation reports, which would be prepared by the valuers suggested by P, and the valuation fees could be paid directly by P to the valuers.

47.  In relation to P’s claim for an order requiring D to provide an account of the rental incomes of the HK Landed Properties:

(1)     I do not see any linkage between D’s Confirmations and P’s withdrawal of this application. There is no basis to say that the withdrawal of this application is caused by D’s Confirmations.  There is no reason to depart from the general rule of costs following the event.

(2)     In the OS, P did not raise a specific request for an account of the rental incomes from the HK Landed Properties.  In the substantive hearing of the OS, P withdrew the application for an account of the rental incomes on her own motion.  In view of all these, it is doubtful whether P is indeed serious in the application for an account of the rental incomes.

(3)     Further, in D’s affirmation filed on 12 December 2025, D said that (a) Lot 1079 was occupied by the Deceased and her before the Deceased’s death, and D’s niece was living in one of the rooms in that house rent free since March 2009 with the Deceased’s permission; (b) Lot 562, Lot 566 and Lot 1078 were in possession of the Deceased’s siblings and no one had ever accounted the rental incomes from these properties to D; and (c) D intended to waive her entitlement to the rental incomes from Lot 562, Lot 566 and Lot 1078, if the Deceased’s siblings would waive their entitlements to the potential rental incomes from Lot 1079.  D had clearly stated the matters concerning the rental incomes from the HK Landed Properties according to her own knowledge in her affirmation.  There is no reason why P would need to bring the application for an account of the rental incomes to the substantive hearing of the OS after seeing D’s affirmation.

(4)     In view of the matters set out in subparagraphs (2) and (3) above, P’s conduct of making of the application for an account of the rental incomes and bringing the application to the substantive hearing of the OS cannot be regarded as reasonable.

48.  In relation to P’s claim for an order requiring D to provide an account for the expenses paid by D on behalf of the Estate:

(1)     It is clear that D indicated that she would not claim for reimbursement of these expenses from the Estate in TLC’s “without prejudice save to as to costs” letter dated 1 April 2019, and the same indication were repeated in TLC’s “without prejudice save as to costs” letters dated 16 September 2024, 23 October 2024 and 20 October 2025.

(2)     Ms Yu submitted that all these indications were made in the negotiations for settlement, and D had never confirmed that she would be willing to waive the expenses in the absence of a settlement before the substantive hearing of the OS.  D only confirmed that she would unconditionally waive the expenses in the substantive hearing of the OS.  D’s belated unconditional offer should have an impact on costs.

(3)     With respect, I am of the view that Ms Yu’s argument is flawed.  In my view, P’s concern is that if D claims reimbursement for the expenses against the HK Landed Properties, that would affect P’s interest, and hence P would need an account of the expenses.  P’s concern can be taken care of by either (a) D’s waiver of all the expenses paid by her for the Estate; or (b) an account of those expenses from D.  D has repeatedly offered the said waiver in the negotiation process.  Even if P considers that some other terms proposed together with the waiver are not acceptable, P could certainly counter-propose accepting the waiver but not accepting the other terms.  It is inexplicable why P refused to accept the waiver but commenced these proceedings to seek an account of the expenses.

(4)     I am of the view that P’s refusal to accept the waiver repeatedly offered by D in the negotiation process is unreasonable. There is no reason to depart from the general rule of costs following the event.  Costs of the application for an account of the expenses should be borne by P personally.

49.  In relation to the costs of the pre-action discovery, Ms Yu did not dispute that the pre-action discovery would only be relevant if D would be going to claim the lump sum payment of HK$1 million and interest pursuant to s.4(4) of the IEO.  In that scenario, the pre-action discovery would be relevant, for P may argue that, pursuant to s.8A of the IEO, D’s entitlement to the Canadian assets in the Estate may need to be taken into account in determining the extent of the lump sum payment to D.  Ms Yu confirmed that the pre-action discovery would not be necessary, since D stated that she would not claim the lump sum payment under the IEO.  Ms Yu proposed that as to the costs of the pre-action discovery, there should be no order as to costs.  Mr Lam submitted that costs should follow the event, and costs of that application should be borne by P personally.  I agree with Mr Lam.

(1)     On 1 April 2019, in TLC’s “without prejudice save as to costs” letter, D has already offered that she would not claim the lump sum payment under the IEO (“the no claim offer”).  Even if P considers that some other settlement terms in that letter are not acceptable, P could certainly counter-propose accepting the no claim offer but not the other terms.  It is inexplicable why P refused to accept the no claim offer but commenced these proceedings to apply for the pre-action discovery as stated in the OS.

(2)     In my view, there is no reason to depart from the general rule of costs following the event.

50.  I would also say that Ms Yu has sensible and skillfully tried to limit the scope of the application for an order for account in the OS in her submissions.  However, in considering the costs of the OS, the fact that the scope of the account sought in the OS is unreasonably wide cannot be ignored.  The account sought in the OS in fact cover all the assets in the Estate.  It is plain and obviously that P is only entitled to have a share in the HK Landed Properties, and she has no entitlement to any other assets in the Estate.  As early as 26 November 2018, TLC has informed P of her limited entitlement in the Estate. There is no ground for P not to accept that her entitlement in the Estate is so limited. In the circumstances, commencing these proceedings and seeking the account of all the assets in the Estate as stated in the OS is completely unreasonable.

51.  For the reasons above, I would order that costs of these proceedings be paid by P personally to D forthwith.  I have considered D’s statement of costs and P’s objections to the same.  Costs payable by P to D are summarily assessed at HK$200,000.

Disposition

52.  I make the order as set out in §51 above.  I also thank all counsel for the helpful submissions provided to the Court.