DCCJ 3882/2004
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3882 OF 2004
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BETWEEN
WONG KWOK MA
1st
Plaintiff
LAU WAI
HUNG
2nd
Plaintiff
LAU TIN YEUNG
3rd
Plaintiff
LAU CHUN TIN
4th
Plaintiff
LAU KIM FONG
5th
Plaintiff
LAU KAM
MAU
6th
Plaintiff
LAU PAK WAH
7th Plaintiff
LAU PAK YAU
8th Plaintiff
LAU KAM YUK
9th Plaintiff
LAU WAI MING
10th Plaintiff
LAU MING HEI
11th Plaintiff
LAU DANIEL PO KEONG
12th Plaintiff
and
CHAN MO KI and
CHAN SUM YEUNG
Defendants
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Coram: H.H. Judge Chow in Chambers
Hearing date: 7th March, 2005
Date of handing down Decision: 3rd June, 2005
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DECISION
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1. By this application, the Plaintiffs seek the following remedies:-
(a) summary judgment under Order 14 rule 1, Rules of the District Court, for possession of the land (“the Land”) set out in paragraph 1 of the Statement of Claim;
(b) the determination of two issues of law set out in the Schedule to the Summons, pursuant to Order 14A rule 1, and consequential upon such determination, judgment for possession be entered against the Defendants, and for mesne profits to be assessed;
(c) the defence be struck out under Order 18 rule 19 on various grounds, and consequential upon the striking out order, final judgment for possession of the said land be ordered.
2. On 22nd July 1997, the Land was let by the Tso to the Defendants under a written annual tenancy agreement for the term of one year to commence on 22nd July 1997 at an annual rent of $300. The 2nd Defendant issued a cheque for $300 made payable to the manager of the Tso as annual rent payable under the tenancy agreement.
3. On 14th March 1998 the Land was assigned by the Tso to the 1st Plaintiff at a consideration of $0.95 million. On 2nd March 1999 the 1st Plaintiff divided the Land to himself and to the 2nd to the 12th Plaintiffs.
4. It is the Plaintiff’s case that on 19th September 1998 the 1st Plaintiff, as landlord, let the Land to the Defendants for agricultural use under a written English tenancy agreement for the term of one year to commence on 22nd July 1998 at an annual rent of $300. On the same day, he further granted the following 1-year tenancies to the Defendants:-
(1) A 1-year tenancy commencing on 22 July 1999 and expiring on 21st July 2000 at an annual rent of $300;
(2) A 1-year tenancy commencing on 22 July 2000 and expiring on 21st July 2001 at an annual rent of $300;
(3) A 1-year tenancy commencing on 22 July 2001 and expiring on 21st July 2002 at an annual rent of $300.
5. On 30th August 2002 the 1st Plaintiff gave a written notice to quit to the Defendants, giving them one month notice to deliver possession of the Land. On 8th July 2003, the 1st Plaintiff instituted an action against the Defendants for possession of the Land under DCCJ 4027/03. The parties reached an agreement of settlement on 25th December 2003.
6. On 8th January, 2004 the 1st to 12th Plaintiffs served a notice to quit, giving the Defendants not less than 6 months’ prior notice to deliver possession of the Land. The notice to quit expired by effluxion of time on 21st July 2004. On 28th July 2004, the 1st to 12th Plaintiffs instituted the present action against the Defendants, seeking possession of the Land on the basis of the determination of the annual tenancy of the Defendants.
7. It is the Defendants’ pleaded case that they were, and still are, tenants of the Land. They plead that in 1961 the 1st Defendant entered into an oral tenancy with Mr. Lau Ki Keung (the manager of the Lau Fuk Wo Tso (“the Tso”) at the material time) under which he was granted a tenancy of the Land without a fixed term or duration upon payment of an annual rent. The 1st Defendant is entitled to possession of the Land unless and until he gives notice of his intention that he no longer wishes to rent the same.
8. The Defendants submitted that the oral tenancy contained terms inter alias that they may occupy the Land for as long as they wish until they give notice of termination. Such a tenancy is not a genuinely a tenancy at will. A tenancy at will is a tenancy under which the tenant is in possession, and which is determinable at the will of either the landlord or the tenant. Although on its creation such a tenancy is expressed to be at the will of the landlord, or as the case may be, the tenant only, the law implies that it is to be at the will of the other party also, because every tenancy/lease at will must in law be at the will of both parties: Halsbury’s Law of England (4th edition), Vol. 27(1), paragraph 168. Therefore on the pleading, what the Defendants alleged is an oral tenancy at will, determinable at the will of either the landlord or the tenant.
9. The Defendants raised the issue of non est factum relating to the yearly tenancies referred to in Paragraph 4. The Defendants said that they were acting under the mistaken belief that they were entering into tenancy agreements with the late father of the existing manager of the Tso, but not with the 1st Plaintiff, and that they had been told and believed that the transaction was merely a variation of rent for the existing oral tenancy with the Tso, which continued on the same terms. So effectively they alleged that they were misled about the terms of the tenancies. There is nothing in the Plaintiffs’ affirmation to refute the allegations. There is a triable issue here. But on the assumption that ultimately the Defendants succeed on this issue, and that the tenancy agreements do not bind them, their tenancies are still tenancies at will, which were determined by the aforesaid notice served on 8th January, 2004. In the result there is no arguable defence raised by the Defendants. Therefore summary judgment under Order 14 rule 1 has to be granted in favour of the Plaintiffs, and it is unnecessary to proceed to deal with the applications under Order 14A and Order 18, rule 19(1) of the Rules of the District Court.
10. I make the following orders:-
1. There be final judgment for an order for possession in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants of the Land set out in paragraph 1 of the Statement of Claim; and
2. There be interlocutory judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs against the Defendants for mesne profits to be assessed, at a date to be fixed.
3. The applications under Order 14A rule and Order 18 rule 19(1) of the Rules of the District Court, be dismissed.
Costs
11. I make an order nisi, to be made absolute in 14 days’ time, that the Defendants do pay the costs of these applications, to be taxed, if not agreed, with Certificate for Counsel.
The 1st to 12th Plaintiffs : represented by Mr. K.M. Chong and Ms. Emma Wong, instructed by Messrs Cheung, Chan & Chung, Solicitors.
The 1st and 2nd Defendants: represented by Mr. Y. Fan of Messrs Fan Wong & Tso, Solicitors.