|
HCAL 1278/2022
[2023] HKCFI 363
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1278 of 2022
|
BETWEEN
|
| |
Nasir Muhammad |
Applicant |
| |
and |
|
| |
Director of Immigration |
Putative |
| |
|
Respondent |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
1. Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of Director of Immigration dated 31 May 2022 refused; and
2. The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review dismissed.; and
3. A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.
Observations for the Applicant:
THE APPLICATION
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 31 May 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1384 of 2018 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”). His application filed on 17 November 2022 is late. I shall deal with this issue below.
2. The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.
3. The applicant appeared before the Court on 14 December 2022.
The procedural history
4. The Applicant is a national of Pakistan. On 27 June 2002, he came to Hong Kong as a visitor and was permitted to stay until 4 July 2002. He overstayed and was arrested by police. On 18 May 2005, he was repatriated under a removal order. He sneaked into Hong Kong illegally in February 2006. He was arrested and charged to have a forged Hong Kong identity card and for staying in Hong Kong illegally. He was convicted of the charges and sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment. He raised a torture claim under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment by way of a written signification on 26 May 2008. His application was rejected by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”). His appeal against the refused torture claim was rejected. He applied for judicial review. By consent, his torture claim was remitted back to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) for determination afresh as the Torture risk under the Ordinance[1].
5. He lodged a non-refoulement claim with the Director on the applicable grounds of the BOR 2 risk[2], the BOR 3 risk[3] and the persecution risk[4].
6. By Notice of Decision dated 31 July 2017, the Director refused his claim on the BOR 2 risk, the BOR 3 risk and the persecution risk.
7. The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. Having considered the applicant’s reasons, the Board dismissed his appeal by the Board’s Decision dated 19 June 2018 (“the Board’s Decision”) on all applicable risks.
8. His application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 3 September 2019 (“the Court’s Order”)
9. His application for appeal against the Court’s Order out of time was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance on 17 December 2019.
10. His application for leave to appeal the Court’s Order out of time was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 14 January 2021.
11. His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal by way of Notice of Motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 2021.
12. His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 2 December 2021.
13. He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 17 February 2022.
The subsequent claim application
14. The applicant’s previous claim is based on the allegation that, if refouled, he would be harmed or even killed by the six unknown Pakistani males because of personal dispute.
15. The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated.
16. The applicant lodged an appeal/petition to the Board. He was legally represented before the Board. Having considered the evidence, the Board rejected the alleged facts of the applicant and it did not accept that the applicant would face any risk that warranted non-refoulement protection. The Board dismissed his appeal.
17. Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
18. In support of his subsequent claim, the applicant submitted to the immigration officer additional information. In gist, the applicant alleged that if he returns to Pakistan, his enemies will harm or kill him. He had the information from his son in Pakistan that his enemies are still looking for him. He has no means to relocate himself and the registration system will allow his enemies to know his new relocation.
19. The Director considered that the above matters had been considered by the Board in his previous claim and were rejected. He therefore concluded that there was no significant change of circumstances since his previous claim, which, when taken together with his previous claim, will give him a realist chance of success.
The application for leave to apply for judicial review
20. The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application and said that his application was not properly considered.
DISCUSSION
21. As mentioned in paragraph 1, supra, his application is late for about 3 months, I shall, nevertheless, consider the merits of his case in order to determine whether time should be extended for his application. The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).
22. The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said that he understood the Director’s Decision. He does not mean that the Director is wrong. But he has problems in his country and he wants to stay in Hong Kong.
23. In Re: Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022, 9 September 2019, the Court of Appeal held:
“13. (1) … …Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.”
24. The applicant is unable to set out any valid reasons to challenge the Director’s Decision. Therefore, there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim and I refuse to extend time for him to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision. Accordingly, I dismiss his application.
The RPO
25. There is clear evidence that what the applicant has been doing is an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.
26. RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.
27. In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.
28. For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he said that he had nothing to say.
29. I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.
(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.
(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.
(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.
(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.
(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.
(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.
(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.
(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.
(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.
(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.
(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.
DISPOSITION
30. Extension of time for the applicant to file his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision be refused.
31. The applicant’s application is dismissed.
32. RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.
Dated the 15th day of February 2023.
| |
(C.S. FUNG (Ms))
for Registrar, High Court
|
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
|
|
|
|
|
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
|
|
Sent to the Applicant
on 15 February 2023
Nasir Muhammad
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
|
Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 15 February 2023
Director of Immigration
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
L/M (25375) in ImmD RA 7/37/C
(formerly RBCZ/3132/14 & RBCZ/42/09)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115
[2] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[3] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[4] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
|