RE RASHID WALEED

CAMP 53/2023, [2024] HKCA 716

On Appeal From [2024] HKCA 274

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 53 OF 2023

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 697 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the judgment of the court):

1.  On 27 March 2024, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 22 March 2024 (“the Judgment”)  ([2024] HKCA 274).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s reapplication for extension of time to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”)  dated 26 September 2022, by which the Judge dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2022] HKCFI 2848).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“I would like to inform to Court of Final Appeal. There were error in my decision maker authorities. I am disagree with the decision made by the Director of Immigration as well as the decision made by the Torture Claim Appeal Board. They were totally relied on some web news which officially not recognised. I do not think my case determined fairly.” (sic)

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged his written submissions on 8 April 2024.  In those submissions, he complained that there was no interpretation service given with regards to his BOR2 risk claim assessment. He further claimed that the authorities and the court failed to perform to a standard duty of care specifically applied to non-refoulement claimants like him and that the court procedures discriminated against him and placed him at a disadvantage.

6.  There is no merit in his submissions.  The matters raised in his Notice of Motion are all general and bare allegations without any specific particulars or explanation.  General assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Moreover, his allegations are essentially a repeat of those submissions he previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had already considered and rejected: see [12] - [24] of the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Specifically, the applicant was provided with interpretation services during the oral hearing before the Board where his non-refoulement claim was assessed on all applicable grounds (including his BOR2 risk claim).  There is plainly no substance in his arguments.  More importantly, he has failed to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  His assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal and are in any event devoid of merit.

7.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant fails to identify any question of great general or public importance in the intended appeal, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.