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HCAL 657/2026
[2026] HKCFI 3097
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 657 of 2026
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BETWEEN
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Maneboy William Montero |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board / |
Putative |
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Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 30 March 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director (“Director”) dated 16 March 2026 (“Director’s Subsequent Decision”) refusing the applicant’s request (“Request”) for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement under s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance. In an earlier decision of the Director dated 23 December 2014 (“Director’s Earlier Decision”), the Director rejected the non-refoulement claim under all applicable grounds[1] except the ground on BOR 2 risk, which further ground was also rejected by a decision of the Director dated 1 February 2017 (“Director’s Earlier Further Decision”).
2. On 17 July 2015, the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) refused to allow the applicant’s late filing of the notice of appeal against the Director’s Earlier Decision (“Board’s Decision”). On 24 June 2019, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal (“Board’s 2nd Decision”) against the Director’s Earlier Further Decision. On 11 September 2024, a Deputy High Court Judge (“Judge’s Decision”) refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. On 13 March 2025, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Judge’s Decision. On 7 May 2025, the Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to the applicant to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against its decision.
Background
3. The background can be viewed at Judge’s Decision [2024] HKCFI 2442 at the Judiciary website. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s 2nd Decision.
4. After the dismissal of his leave application to the Court of Final Appeal, the applicant made the Request on 12 January 2026. The applicant was not represented in the Request.
The statutory provisions on subsequent claims
5. Subsequent non-refoulement claims are regulated by s.37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which provides:
"Limitation on subsequent claim
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.
(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that—
(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and
(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.”
6. The applicant only submitted 1 letter for the Request. The Request was based on the applicant’s claim that, if refouled to Philippines, his life would still be in danger and that his problem would affect his family.
Discussion
7. A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the Director’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
8. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no such grounds.
9. As the applicant had requested for a hearing, the court scheduled a hearing on 28 April 2026. The applicant appeared in person, and stated that he had nothing to say despite having been reminded that he had provided no written grounds.
10. In the Director’s Subsequent Decision, after the Director had taken into account the facts and findings he made in the Director’s Earlier Decision and the Director’s Earlier Further Decision, the Director found that the applicant provided no new information or evidence despite having been given sufficient time. The Director found that the applicant’s claim of the change of circumstances was not substantiated. After having considered the updated check of the country of original information, the Director found that there was no change of situation regarding the previously found availability of state protection and internal relocation. The Director found that the Request had no realistic prospect of success and refused the applicant’s Request. These are findings of fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any public law errors.
11. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Director correctly applied the law and observed a high standard of fairness. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Director’s Subsequent Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to Director’s Subsequent Decision is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant leave[4].
Order
12. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 10th day of June 2026
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( Alfred CHAN )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 10/6/2026
Maneboy William Montero
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors 10/6/2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
Nil
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
L/M (35630) in ImmD RA 7/37/C (Formerly RBCZ/9001561/16 and RBCZ/1640/08)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676
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