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IDA SURYANI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
IDA SURYANI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5907 · HCAL 1392/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1392/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5907
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1392 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Ida Suryani |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for | |
| |Judicial Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord.| |
| |53 r. 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and the Applicant being absent in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Director of Immigration as the putative
interested party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 10 August 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks
leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 25 July 2023 (“TCAB Decision”),
which affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”)
dated 16 January 2023 (“DOI Decision”).
2. The Form 86 incorrectly named the TCAB as the putative interested
party. I therefore amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the DOI
as the putative interested party.
3. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application, which was
held on 16 September 2026. She was absent from the hearing. I see no
irregularity in the notification process.
Background
4. The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, she fears that if
she is refouled she will be killed by a loan shark because she failed
to repay her loan. The Applicant’s personal background, the relevant
facts and relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out
in the TCAB Decision, which can be viewed through a hyperlink.[1]
There is no need for me to repeat the same. Unless otherwise
specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the TCAB
Decision are adopted herein.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision:
Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief
reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the
materials before me.
6. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. While I remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would
adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the TCAB
given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp
the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary
decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of
the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1). There must be a reasonably
arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17.
7. An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the
grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and the
supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection,
HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a
duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung
Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17.
8. The Applicant stated the following grounds of judicial review in the
supporting affirmation: -
1) “Procedural Impropriety) Failure to properly apply para 2 of the
UN committee against Torture General Comment No.2 whereby
satisfaction of a National states obligations to conduct
sufficient due diligence requires that reforms and means of relief
introduced must be effective in any event, cf, the TCAB and the
Director Decision which focused on whether such reliefs showed
merely signs of positive improvement (see also JKF CACV 103
/2014)[2]”. (“Ground 1”)
2) “Procedural Impropriety) Failure to conduct sufficient inquiry
into the relevant country of origin conditions.the TCAB Failure to
consider that I would face serious risk from my enemies who will
harm me because of my dispute against them, the TCAB failure to
consider the facts that why i would not return to my country of
origin because of fear from my enemies.” (“Ground 2”)
3) “Procedural Impropriety / Irrationality) Failure to reasons for
assessment of Lack of BOR 2risk and / or sufficient basis to
support conclusion of lack of BOR 2 risk and BOR 3 risk. It’s
seems May be my claim is personal dispute but the risk i will face
is beyond imagination, because of the risk i would face terrific
risk upon refoulement.” (“Ground 3”)
4) “Error/ Misdirection in law) Failing to take into account the
considerations of psychological strain and threats to me
personally or threats to me directly to kill me.” (“Ground 4”)
5) “Procedural Impropriety) The TCAB Failure to consider our fear
that my enemies still fear for me, I could no return to my country
in this circumstance, therefore there are genuine risk awaiting
for me, and I could not relocate other places because they could
easily trace me wherever i hide in my country.” (“Ground 5”)
6) “The TCAB gave decision only said my claim is not established,
failed to consider why i would not fear or harm by my enemies if I
return to my country.” (“Ground 6”)
7) “No sufficient basis to conclude that I and my family members
would not to be at risk of being subjected to torture and or /
CIDTP upon refoulment.” (“Ground 7”)
9. I have scrutinised the TCAB Decision carefully and come to the view
that none of the above Grounds can be established or considered as
valid or effective public law grounds. I also do not find any error
of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the
TCAB Decision.
10. As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all
the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same,
applying the correct legal principles in respect of all applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the Applicant’s
allegations were insufficient to make out any of the applicable
grounds: §§53-78. It is clear that the TCAB considered the evidence
available thoroughly and in detail. In particular, the TCAB found
that:
1) The TCAB was not persuaded that the Applicant gave a fully
truthful and reliable account of the events in the past. It noted
in particular that the Applicant’s evidence as to the loans she
borrowed from the loan shark was inherently confused and
inconsistent: §§54-56.
2) The TCAB found that the Applicant only borrowed around IDR 4-4.5
million, of which she has repaid the majority of the total capital
sum. It did not accept the claim that she borrowed IDR 70 million
– on the Applicant’s own evidence at the hearing, she only
borrowed IDR 4-4.5 million, and the figure of IDR 70 million was
just the sum that the loan shark demanded when the Applicant said
she was not able to make regular repayments, and the TCAB gave no
weight to this evidence: §§62-63. Given that the Applicant’s own
evidence was that the loan shark had seized her parents’ house to
satisfy the debt, and she had already paid more than she had
borrowed, the TCAB was not persuaded that the loan shark had any
further negative interest in the Applicant: §67. I consider that
the TCAB was entitled to come to such conclusion based on the
evidence and its analysis.
3) Further, even if the benefit of the doubt was to be given to the
Applicant that the loan shark did utter threats to kill her, the
TCAB was not persuaded that such threats amounted to realistic
statements of intent, but found that they were only wild and angry
words uttered in the heat of the moment: §§65-66.
4) The TCAB was accordingly also not persuaded that there is any real
risk of future serious harm or death to the Applicant if she is
refouled: §68. It was on this basis that the TCAB rejected the
Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds: §§69-78.
11. As to Ground 1 and Ground 5, given that the TCAB had found that the
Applicant would not face any real risk of serious harm or death if
refouled, the TCAB was entitled not to proceed to consider the issue
of the level of state protection and internal relocation options for
the Applicant.
12. As to Ground 2, given the TCAB’s findings that the Applicant’s alleged
loan had basically been repaid and the alleged threats from the loan
shark were not seriously intended, it is not clear what country of
origin information or country of origin condition would be relevant to
disturb this assessment. The Applicant did not explain this in her
grounds.
13. As to Grounds 3, 4, 6 and 7, as mentioned above, the TCAB has fully
considered the evidence of the Applicant and concluded that it was not
persuaded that the Applicant would suffer any ill-treatment that would
satisfy any ground of claim if refouled. The TCAB had clearly set out
its reasons and bases for so concluding, and I consider that the TCAB
was entitled to come to such conclusion.
Conclusion
14. Therefore, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality on the part of the TCAB Decision. I conclude that the
Applicant’s intended challenge against the TCAB Decision is not
reasonably arguable, and accordingly the application for leave to
apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 2nd day of November 2026
| |(Joyce Ooi) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 2/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Ida Suryani |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any | |Parties as may be |
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|14 days after the leave|Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|was granted (Order 53, | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|rule 4A); | |2/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and | |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance | |ref. no.: USM 21402 |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested |
|c) supply to every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|other party copies of | |1272/22 (formerly RBCZ |
|every affidavit which | |5001153/22) (T1I104) |
|the Applicant proposes | | |
|to use at the hearing, | |Department of Justice, |
|including the affidavit| |Senior Assistant Law |
|in support of the | |Officer |
|application for leave | |(Civil Law) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
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[2] This is apparently a reference to the decision in Re JKF (unreported,
CACV 103/2014, 25 November 2014).