VIKRAMJIT SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1964/2025

[2026] HKCFI 2153

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1964 OF 2025

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 9 February 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 7 January 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 19 August 2025.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 7 January 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 21 January 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 9 February 2026, the applicant did not give any reason as to why he was late in lodging the appeal, nor any ground for his intended appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 10 April 2026, the applicant said that he was late in lodging the appeal because he was mentally upset due to his brother’s passing away about 5 months ago, but he confirmed that he received my decision around 7 January 2026.

9.  When I asked the applicant for his grounds of appeal, he merely said that his brother was killed in India during the 5 months when he was detained by the Immigration Department and he did not want to go back because the situation was not good in India. He further said that if the Hong Kong government wanted to send him back, he would like to be sent to Japan instead of India.

10.  The reason that he was mentally upset due to his brother’s passing away cannot be a reasonable excuse for his delay in lodging the appeal, as it happened about 5 months ago and there should be enough time for him to recover from the distress. It is also clear that the applicant did not provide any valid ground for his intended appeal.

11.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.