IRAN AHAMMED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6110 · HCAL 1441/2021
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1441/2021
[2026] HKCFI 6110
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1441 OF 2021
BETWEEN
| |Iran Ahammed |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 18 October 2021, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 1 September 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”).
2. Paragraph 60 of the Board’s Decision was amended as per the letter
dated 15 September 2021 from the Board to the applicant. The Board’s
Decision and the said letter for the amendment can be viewed in the
following hyperlinks:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL00
1444_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL00
1444_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision_Corrigendum.pdf
3. The Board found that the applicant’s application for non-refoulement
protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board dismissed the
applicant’s appeal/petition against the two decisions of the Director
of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 1 November 2013 (which dealt with
the applicant’s Torture Risk[1]) and 9 November 2018 (which dealt with
the applicant’s BOR 2 Risk[2], BOR 3 Risk[3] and Persecution Risk[4])
respectively and confirmed both decisions, which rejected the
applicant’s torture claim and non-refoulement claim under the USM
respectively.
Amendment
4. The applicant named “Adjudicator; Torture Claims Appeal Board” as the
putative interested party in Form 86, when the Director should be so
named.
5. This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to amend the name
of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Bangladesh, he would be at risk of being harmed or killed
by various people.
8. The applicant submitted to the Board that he had experienced 19
incidents[5] since 1998 when he was in Bangladesh, and was framed in a
false claim against him after he had last arrived in Hong Kong in 2006.
The applicant claimed that he went to India after the 14th incident
and remained there until the end of 2004, during which time he had also
been “frequently attacked”.
9. The applicant claimed that he had been attacked, beaten, kidnapped,
tortured, and threatened during the various incidents, the perpetuators
of which included extortionists against businessmen, people of the
Bangladesh Nationalist Party, people of the Awami League,
fundamentalists, drug dealers, a reporter for a local newspaper and
various unknown people, etc.
Oral hearings
10. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application,
and his case was first heard before DHCJ (Non-refoulement Claims)
Philips Wong on 12 January 2026. The applicant was represented by
counsel at the hearing.
11. However, the applicant’s counsel submitted a letter from the Director
of Legal Aid (“DLA”) and applied for an adjournment of the hearing
pending the result of the applicant’s application for legal aid as it
was still under assessment. DHCJ (Non-refoulement Claims) Philips Wong
acceded to the request and the case was adjourned.
12. On 21 July 2026, DLA refused the applicant’s legal aid application and
hence the hearing of the Leave Application was resumed on 15 October
2026. The applicant appeared in person this time.
13. However, before the hearing on 15 October 2026, the applicant submitted
a letter dated 8 October 2026 to this court and requested to submit
some evidence (only English version) to this court.
14. At the hearing on 15 October 2026, this court first asked the applicant
why he wanted to submit the evidence. The applicant replied that all
the evidence enclosed with the letter dated 8 October 2026 had already
been submitted to the Board, but he wanted to submit just the English
translation of the documents originally in Bengali to this court.
15. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his
intended judicial review, which were stated in a document annexed to
his Form 86 with the title “Grounds on which relief is Sought”, he said
that he had already submitted all the evidence and documents supporting
his case to the Board. He added that all the things he told the Board
were true and all the documents he submitted were originals.
Grounds for judicial review
16. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
17. By a document with the title “Grounds on which relief is Sought”
annexed to his Form 86, the applicant alleged that the Board was in
breach of procedural fairness in 11 parts, which are summarised as
follows:-
1) The Board was required to consider afresh the original decision
and arrive at its own determination in respect of the applicant’s
claim;
2) The Board’s Decision was unreasonable or irrational in the public
law sense, or was a result of procedural errors or unfairness;
3) The Board had unlawfully fettered its discretion by refusing the
applicant’s appeal on the grounds that they did not satisfy the
requirements;
4) The Board failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-
represented claimant;
5) The adjudicator acted in a procedurally unfair manner;
6) It must be kept in mind that the life and limb of the applicant
were in jeopardy and the applicant’s fundamental human rights not
to be subjected to torture was involved;
7) There was no indication that the adjudicator interacted with the
facts of the applicant’s claim, conducted any analysis of the
supporting documents or considered the applicant’s right to life
under BOR 2[6];
8) The applicant would face hardship if returned, and that the Board
had significantly relied on source of news which was not
officially recognized, or was simply hearsay;
9) The applicant’s claims should be considered afresh under the
applicable grounds;
10) The adjudicator had relied on some outdated cases without
considering the dramatic changes. The lack of credible source of
information had resulted in the Board making groundless
speculation; and
11) The applicant had submitted all the documents in spite of his
problems in his country. The Board might not have shown greater
care and made the claimant disappointed.
18. The contents as stated in the above-mentioned documents were in fact
used by many applicants in similar applications as their grounds for
applying leave to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It seems
that the applicant had combined these standard grounds and used them
without any regard to his own situation.
19. As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds at
the hearing on 15 October 2026. He only added that all the things he
told the Board were true, and all the documents he submitted were
originals.
20. As the applicant is relying on the said grounds to make the Leave
Application, this court will deal with the grounds as discussed below.
Discussion
21. First of all, this court will deal with the documents submitted by the
applicant via his letter dated 8 October 2026, which, as confirmed by
the applicant at the hearing on 15 October 2026, had all been submitted
to the Board for its consideration of his non-refoulement claims.
22. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
23. Thus, it is not for this court to re-examine the documents that the
applicant had already submitted to the Board for its assessment of the
applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection. The assessment of
evidence, including the documents submitted in support of the
applicant’s claim and the oral testimony given at the Board’s hearing,
was within the exclusive ambit of the Board. This court will not
interfere with the Board’s finding of facts, unless there were errors
of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
24. Hence, the applicant cannot ask this court to re-assess his non-
refoulement claim. What he said at the hearing on 15 October 2026 that
all the things he told the Board were true and all the documents he
submitted were originals cannot help him at all, unless the Board’s
assessment involved errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality as aforesaid.
25. In relation to the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s
document with the title “Grounds on which relief is Sought” annexed to
his Form 86, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general
assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a
judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz
Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further,
as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020]
HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an
appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars
related to the facts of his case”.
26. Thus, the general assertions put forward by the applicant in the said
document, which merely contained “key words” such as the Board’s
Decision was “unreasonable or irrational”, the Board had “unlawfully
fettered his discretion”, the Board “failed to meet the greater care
and duty owed to a self-represented claimant”, the Board “acted in a
procedurally unfair manner”, in parts (2), (3), (4), (5) and (11)
cannot help the applicant at all.
27. As to parts (1) and (9) of the applicant’s assertion, which concern the
Board’s role in determining the applicant’s claims afresh, it is clear
from the Board’s Decision that the Board was aware of its role and the
applicant’s appeal/petition was indeed a fresh consideration by the
Board (see paragraphs 59 to 62 of the Board’s Decision). Thus, parts
(1) and (9) are simply unfounded allegations.
28. The applicant mentioned in parts (6) and (7) that there was no
indication that the Board interacted with the facts of the applicant’s
claim, conducted any analysis of the supporting documents or considered
the applicant’s right to life under BOR 2.
29. However, contrary to the applicant’s assertions, this courts notes that
the Board had discussed and analyzed in details every single incident
and all the events raised by the applicant at different settings, as
well as all the documents submitted by the applicant in support of his
claims.
30. In fact, in its assessment of the applicant’s claims, the Board held
three oral hearings on 12 and 16 September 2019 and 18 October 2019
respectively. Thus, the applicant was given full opportunity to
present his case and evidence to the Board in person.
31. The Board gave a detailed account of what transpired at the Board’s
hearings in its description of the applicant’s case (see paragraphs 75
to 380 of the Board’s Decision). It is clear that the Board had
interacted with the facts of the applicant’s claim and questioned the
applicant extensively in relation to all aspects of his claims.
32. Further, under the part “Discussion” in the Board’s Decision, the Board
laid out its reasons in full for: (1) its finding on the credibility of
the applicant; (2) rejecting most of the applicant’s evidence in
relation to the claimed incidents; and (3) its finding that most of the
documents submitted by the applicant in support of his claims were
unreliable or could not advance the applicant’s claim further (see
paragraphs 383 to 480 of the Board’s Decision).
33. Based on its detailed assessment of the applicant’s claims including
all the supporting documents, the Board was not persuaded, even to the
low standard applicable, that there was a real chance, or a real risk,
that the applicant would be liable to suffer ill-treatment of any sort,
including being arbitrarily deprived of his life in contravention of
BOR 2, if he was refouled to Bangladesh.
34. This court finds nothing wrong or irrational in the Board’s analysis of
the applicant’s claims and its findings as aforesaid.
35. Finally, in relation to parts (8) and (10) of the applicant’s grounds,
the applicant failed to identify which pieces of news or cases that the
Board relied on were not officially recognized, or were hearsay or
outdated. As aforesaid, such general assertions without particulars
cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review.
36. In fact, this court notes from the Board’s Decision that, in its
determination of the applicant’s case, the Board did not rely on any
specific COI but focused on the applicant’s claimed incidents and
events, and the documents the applicant submitted, in its assessment of
the applicant’s future risks. Parts (8) and (10) are simply
groundless.
37. Thus, none of the grounds mentioned in the applicant’s document with
the title “Grounds on which relief is Sought” can be valid ground for
the intended judicial review.
38. Nevertheless, despite that the applicant did not advance any valid
ground for the intended judicial review, this court will still
scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural
unfairness or irrationality.
39. As aforesaid, the applicant was afforded three hearings to present his
case to the Board.
40. The Board’s discussion on the credibility of the applicant was
contained in paragraphs 383 to 389 of the Board’s Decision. The Board
was of the view that, looking at the applicant’s evidence as a whole,
his general credibility was undermined to such an extent that it was
not persuaded that the applicant was giving a truthful or reliable
account of his previous experiences in Bangladesh in relation to the
majority of the incidents which he described. On the totality of the
evidence, the Board was satisfied that the applicant had fabricated the
majority of the incidents in the hope of advancing his claim for non-
refoulement protection.
41. It was clear from the Board’s Decision that the Board had duly analysed
every aspect of the applicant’s case. Its analysis of each and every
claimed incident including the applicant’s alleged experience in India,
and its analysis of all the documents submitted by the applicant were
laid out in paragraphs 390 to 485 of the Board’s Decision, and it is
not necessary to repeat the same here.
42. In sum, the only incidents that the Board accepted were that: (1) in
1998, the applicant was operating a business in Barisal selling
fertilizers and pesticides, and as a result of the demands from
extortionists, the applicant closed his business rather than pay the
extortionists, and ceased trading around March 1998; and (2) a
complaint had been filed against the applicant in the terms set out in
Document 3[7], and that the newspaper articles referred to the
complaint and named the applicant as the transgressor.
43. However, in relation to the first accepted incident, the Board
explicitly stated that given its findings in relation to the general
credibility of the applicant, the Board was not persuaded, on the
balance of probability, that the applicant was ever tortured, or
attacked, by the extortionists, as he claimed in evidence.
44. As to the second accepted event, the Board also found no evidence that
any charge sheet, or summons, was issued by the court on foot of the
complaint, and there was no evidence that a warrant for the arrest of
the applicant had been issued. The Board thus found, on the totality
of evidence, the documents, even if taken at face value, did not
advance the applicant’s case further.
45. As aforesaid, the Board had also analyzed the applicant’s other
documents. Among all the documents that were submitted, the Board had
only accepted “Document 3” as discussed above, and two other sets of
documents, namely: (1) [HB 215-242] referred to in paragraphs 461 to
462 of the Board’s Decision, which related to the applicant’s previous
status as a Fertilizer and Pesticide Trader; and (2) [HB 249-254]
referred to in paragraph 472 of the Board’s Decision, which were
newspaper reports referring to the allegations against the applicant
that he obtained money from the complainant by false pretences.
46. Based on its findings on the evidence and its assessment of the general
credibility of the applicant, the Board was not persuaded, even to the
low standard applicable, that there was a real risk that the applicant
would be liable to suffer ill-treatments of any sort, if he was
refouled to Bangladesh.
47. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had failed to establish, even
to the low standard required, that there was a real chance, or a real
risk, that he would suffer any ill treatment which might amount to
persecution for a Convention reason, or be subjected to ill-treatment
of any sort under BOR 3[8], or be arbitrarily deprived of life in
violation of BOR 2, or be subjected to torture as defined in section
37U of the Immigration Ordinance.
48. The Board hence concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-
refoulement protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
49. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make findings on the availability of
state protection as the Board found that the applicant was not at a
real risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm.
50. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
51. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any
of the proscribed forms of harm upon refoulement to Bangladesh, it is
not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.
52. The assessment of evidence and risk of harm was primarily within the
realm of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition.
The Board was entitled to make its own decision. All the applicant’s
alleged incidents and documents, as well as his future risks had been
fully considered by the Board. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its decision.
53. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
54. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
55. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |on: 04/11/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted |Nil |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |04/11/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM |
| | |14522/18/11/365/B1712 |
|c) supply to every | |TCAB 890/13/11/27/B300 |
|other party copies of | | |
|every affidavit which | |Director of Immigration |
|the Applicant proposes| |Putative interested |
|to use at the hearing,| |party’s ref. no.: |
|including the | |QA T/C 1479/09 Pt.2 |
|affidavit in support | |(formerly RBCZ 72/07); |
|of the application for| |QA T/C 2960/18 (Formerly|
|leave (Order 53, rule | |RBCZ 2001655/14) |
|6(5)). | | |
| | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[2] Risk of violation of right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[3] Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.
[4] Risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principles
under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and its 1967 Protocol.
[5] As numbered and classified by the Board in the Board’s Decision
[6] Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.
[7] Referred to in paragraph 447 of the Board’s Decision, as the original
Bengali document which was an official copy of the complaint to the
Magistrate at Gournadi made on 14 August 2006; and on the face of the
document, the complainant alleged that the applicant had obtained money
from the complainant by false pretences.
[8] Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383