ANWAR MUHAMMAD ATTIQUE v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 356/2020

[2025] HKCFI 4204

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 356 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 30 July 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for leave to appeal out of time against my order dated 15 July 2025.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 15 July 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 29 July 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 30 July 2025, the applicant alleged that he was not very well aware of the deadline for filing appeal application because he did not understand the court procedure.

8.  However, at the hearing of the Summons on 3 September 2025, the applicant claimed that he received the court’s letter late and when he received the letter, it was already the last date for filing the appeal application. When I asked the applicant when he received the court’s letter, he said that it was on 14 July 2025. This is clearly impossible, as my order was made on 15 July 2025. The applicant then claimed that his friend told him to go to appeal and it was late because he had to appeal within 14 days. He also claimed that he did not remember the date of receipt of the court’s letter but it was the last date for filing the appeal application.

9.  Thus, the applicant gave two versions of the reason for his delay in making the appeal. In his affirmation, he claimed that he did not understand the court procedure, whereas at the hearing, he claimed that his friend told him about the deadline but he received the court’s letter on the last date of the deadline.

10.  Both versions do not appear to be credible to me. In any event, both versions are not good reasons for filing the appeal late. It is trite that ignorance of the law is no excuse and hence the applicant cannot delay the process by saying that he did not know the court procedure. The court’s letter was sent out on 15 July 2025, and it should be delivered to the applicant within 1 or 2 days in the normal course of event. The applicant did not provide any reason why the letter was delivered to him late at all. I am not prepared to accept his bare allegation in this regard.

11.  Moreover, there is no merits of the intended appeal or the intended judicial review at all.

12.  It is not necessary for me to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s decision dated 16 January 2020, which can be viewed in the hyperlink attached to the Form CALL-1 dated 15 July 2025.

13.  The applicant failed to advance any ground for the intended appeal in the Summons or his supporting affirmation. At the hearing on 3 September 2025, the applicant even admitted that he was not saying my decision was wrong and he wanted to appeal because he wanted to stay in Hong Kong for 2 to 4 months more.

14.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

15.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

16.  Furthermore, as discussed in the Form CALL-1, the applicant’s alleged dangerous situation was duly considered by the Board. The finding of facts was solely within the ambit of the Board. This court finds nothing wrong in the way the Board reached its conclusion based on the evidence available to the Board.

17.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

18.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.