宁波梅山保税港区和光泰润二号股权投资中心(有限合伙) v. 北京微影时代科技有限公司 AND OTHERS

HCCT 61/2022

[2026] HKCFI 4318

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTRUCTION AND ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS NO 61 OF 2022

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DECISION

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  By my Decision rendered on 20 May 2026 ([2026] HKCFI 3071) (the “Decision”), I dismissed the Receivers’ Summons (the “Receivers’ Summons”) for an order to receive the assets including the Maoyan Shares held in the name of the BVI Subsidiaries.  By Summons filed by the Applicant on 3 June 2026 (the “Applicant’s Summons”), the Applicant applies for leave to appeal against the Decision.

II.  LOCUS STANDI

2.  The Receivers’ Summons was not served on the Applicant.  The Applicant was not a party to the Receivers’ Summons.  I do not agree with the apparent submissions of Mr Donald Ting, counsel for the Applicant, that the Applicant should be regarded as a party simply because the Applicant is a party to the main proceedings herein, and it should be regarded as a party to any applications made within the main proceedings, even though the application did not join the Applicant as a party and was not served on it.  In any event, the Decision is not an order against the Applicant, and so the Applicant has no locus standi to appeal from the Decision.  See Pacific Harbor Advisors Pte Ltd and Another v Winson Federal Limited and Others, HCMP 1285/2015, 21 August 2015 at §§26.1 and 26.2.

3.  I agree with Mr Ting that the Applicant, as a creditor, is an interested party to the Receivers’ Summons and has interest in the Decision.  However, I do not think that such interest would confer locus standi on the Applicant: see Pacific Harbor Advisors Pte Ltd and Another v Winson Federal Limited and Others, supra at §§27.1-28.2.  After all, the Receivers’ Summons was in relation to the enforcement of the Receivership Order.  Although the Receivers were appointed upon the Applicant’s application, the Receivers are independent of the Applicant – if the Receivers, representing the interests of all the creditors, have decided not to appeal, I do not think it is right that the Court would allow a creditor or some creditors to appeal simply on the premise that the creditor(s) have interest in the order against which appeal is being sought.

4.  The lack of locus standi is sufficient for me to dismiss the Applicant’s Summons.

5.  For the sake of completeness, I shall consider the two grounds (“Ground 1” and “Ground 2”) of appeal in the Draft Notice of Appeal annexed to the Applicant’s Summons.

III.  GROUND 1

6.  In summary, in Ground 1, Mr Ting submits that I did not properly construe the Receivership Order.  In particular, he submits that they way I construed the Receivership Order goes contrary to the text, and I gave undue weight to the context and the purpose of the Receivership Order as I found.  With respect, I disagree.  In §13 of the Decision, I expressed my view that the text alone, including the phrase “other assets of the Company”, was clear enough to show that the “assets” were meant to be the Company’s assets, but not the third parties’ assets.  I went on in §§15 and 16 of the Decision to consider the context and purpose which I found reinforced my such view.  In any event, it was an evaluative assessment of the relevant factors, including the text, the context and the purpose.

7.  Mr Ting’s submissions effectively are a re-run of the arguments presented at the hearing of the Receivers’ Summons. 

8.  I see no reasonable prospects of success in Ground 1.

IV.  GROUND 2

9.  The focus of Ground 2 is on the phrase “to [all the property and assets…and other assets of the Company…to which the Company…appears to be entitled”.  Mr Ting submits, like what was submitted at the hearing of the Receivers’ Summons, that so long as the Company appeared to be entitled to the assets, the Receivers would have the power to receive the assets.  In §14 of the Decision, I explained that the only evidence the Receivers relied upon was that the Company wholly owned the BVI Subsidiaries.  This in itself was not sufficient to raise such a prima facie case by the doctrine of separate legal entity.  In any event, as I also explained in §14 of the Decision, the BVI Subsidiaries, in whose name the Maoyan Shares were held, were not even parties to the Receivers’ Summons.  In such circumstances, I saw, and still see, no possibility that a Court would allow the Receivers to take away the properties from parties who had not been afforded any chance to make submissions.

10.  Again, Mr Ting’s submissions effectively are a re-run of the arguments presented at the hearing of the Receivers’ Summons.

11.  I see no reasonable prospects of success in Ground 2.

12.  Therefore, even assuming that the Applicant had locus standi, I would dismiss the Applicant’s Summons due to the lack of reasonable prospects of success in the Grounds.

V.  CONCLUSION

13.  For the above reasons, I dismiss the Applicant’s Summons with no order as to costs.