GAZI SADDAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2102/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2102 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 9 January 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 17 December 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 8 October 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 17 December 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 31 December 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 9 January 2026, the applicant gave the reason for his delay in lodging the appeal. He alleged that the sealed order, Form CALL-1 and Judgment were lost in post and he could only get those documents after searching the court file, but by then he had already missed the deadline. However, he did not give any grounds for his intended appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 26 March 2026, when the applicant was asked why he was late in lodging the appeal, he replied that the letterbox of his house was taken away and hence he did not receive the court’s documents. He was given the court’s decision by the court when he went back to the court 2 or 3 months ago after he had received a letter from the court to inform him to collect the decision. When I asked him why he stated in the Summons and his supporting affirmation that he could only get those documents after searching the court file, the applicant replied that he did not receive the decision, but after checking his mobile phone, he found out that his case was dismissed, and hence he filed the Summons.

9.  It is clear that the applicant did not provide any good reasons for his delay in lodging the intended appeal, as he had provided inconsistent explanations for his delay.

10.  When I asked the applicant for his grounds of appeal, he merely explained why he could not go back to Bangladesh at this time and he did not have any bad record in Hong Kong. He also said that when the situation in Bangladesh became better, or if someone could guarantee nothing would happen to him in Bangladesh, then he would go back. Thus, the applicant did not provide any valid grounds for his intended appeal at all.

11.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.