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NGUYEN QUANG DUC v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
NGUYEN QUANG DUC v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 4141 · HCAL 977/2022
Court of First Instance
HCAL 977/2022
[2026] HKCFI 4141
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 977 of 2022
BETWEEN
| |Nguyen Quang Duc |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the Applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion
2. There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 21 September 2022, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”).
The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director
of Immigration (“Director”) dated 28 June 2021 (“Director’s Subsequent
Decision”) refusing the applicant's request (“Request”) for making a
subsequent claim under s. 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115).
2. In the applicant’s Form 86, the applicant has erroneously stated the
year of the date of the Director’s Subsequent Decision as “2022”
instead of “2021”. In the circumstances, the Form 86 shall be
accordingly amended on the court’s own motion.
3. Pursuant to the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave
Application, this court scheduled a hearing on 14 July 2026. A notice
of hearing with a reminder of the consequence of absence dated 18 June
2026 was sent to the applicant’s last known address by ordinary post.
The applicant was absent from the hearing. Before the hearing, phone
calls were made to the applicant’s given telephone number before the
hearing but to no avail. Since the information before this court shows
that the said notice of hearing has not been returned undelivered
through the post, and that the applicant had been separately notified
by phone, this court will dispose of the Leave Application according
to the materials already placed before the court.
4. The following background is taken from the Director’s Subsequent
Decision.
Background
5. On 11 January 2017, the Director rejected the applicant’s (along with
his father’s) non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]
(“Director’s Decision”). The applicant was 17 at the time of the
making of the non-refoulement claim. Hence, he was still a minor. The
basis of his claim (and of his father) was that, if refouled to
Vietnam, his father would be harmed by the Vietnamese authorities due
to the land compensation issue, and the applicant would be ill-treated
by the creditors for outstanding debts borrowed by his mother. On 19
March 2018, the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement
Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal
against the Director’s Decision. On 17 August 2018, the applicant was
voluntarily repatriated to Vietnam.
6. On 17 November 2020, the applicant was arrested by the police, and he
claimed to have illegally entered Hong Kong in February 2020. On 25
March 2021, the applicant made the Request. The basis of the
applicant’s claim in the Request was that, if refouled, he would be
harmed or killed by a creditor for an outstanding loan, which he
borrowed to enable him to open a boutique after he returned to
Vietnam.
Discussion
7. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
8. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In the Form 86, the applicant averred that internal
relocation was not reasonably feasible for him and the Director had
failed to consider it. The applicant’s supporting affirmation did not
provide any grounds.
The statutory provisions on subsequent claims
9. Subsequent non-refoulement claims are regulated by section 37ZO of the
Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115), which provides:
37ZO
“Limitation on subsequent claim
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has
previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another
torture claim.
(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides
sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that—
(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since
the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and
(b) the change, when taken together with the material
previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would
give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim
under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any
finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the
Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the
person.”
10. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4]
11. The applicant was not legally represented in the Request, and did not
submit further information and evidence in support of the Request as
Director had requested. Having considered the applicant’s claim, the
Director found that the applicant’s new fear was still originated from
an inability to repay outstanding debt as his previous claim. Having
regard to the findings made in the Director’s Decision and the Board’s
Decision, the Director found that there were no sufficient grounds to
believe that there was a significant change of circumstances that
would negate the availability of state protection and internal
relocation. The Director found that the Request had no realistic
prospect of success, thus refused the Request.
12. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Director correctly applied the law and observed a high standard of
fairness. The applicant’s written grounds set out in Form 86 were
vague and did not condescend to particulars. The applicant has not
shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in
the Director’s Subsequent Decision. The applicant’s intended
challenge to the Director’s Subsequent Decision is not reasonably
arguable with realistic prospects of success such that would enable
this court to grant leave[5].
Whether to extend time for the late application
16. Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r
4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for judicial
review shall be made promptly and in any event within 3 months from the
date of the Board’s Decision. The applicant was late for about 1 year.
17. The applicant provided no explanation at all for the 1 year’s delay.
In the circumstances, the court refuse to exercise its discretion to grant
him an extension of time to file the Leave Application.
Orders
13. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
14. There shall be no extension of time for the applicant to file the
application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time.
15. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 31st day of July 2026
( Alfred CHAN )
for Registrar, High Court
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 31/7/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Nguyen Quang Duc |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |31/7/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM5937/17/1/221/V879; |
| | |USM5938/17/1/222/V880 |
|c) supply to every other| | |
|party copies of every | |Director of Immigration |
|affidavit which the | |Putative Interested |
|Applicant proposes to | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|use at the hearing, | |890/16 (formerly RBCZ |
|including the affidavit | |1610/14), QA T/C 896/16 |
|in support of | |(formerly RBCZ 82/16) |
|the application for | | |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Department of Justice, |
|6(5)). | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4]
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Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage
Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676