RE DISANAYAKA MUDIYANSELAGE WIJERATHNA BANDARA alias DISSAMAYAKE MUDIYANSELAGE WIJIERATNE BANDA
[2026] HKCA 2078 · CACV 58/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 58/2026 [2026] HKCA 2078 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 76 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 58 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 2208 OF 2020) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Hon Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 4 November 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court): By our judgment handed down on 13 April 2026 ([2026] HKCA 487) (“the Judgment”), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Levy given on 12 January 2026 dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 15 May 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant also lodged written submissions to support the application. Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case, the applicant’s claim and the reasons for dismissing the appeal have been set out in our Judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 24(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal shall be filed within 28 days from the date of the judgment to be appealed from. Section 24(5) further provides that the Court of Appeal may extend the time for the filing of the notice of motion. The applicant’s present application is late by about four days. In his notice of motion, the applicant explained that he cannot read or understand English legal documents and was not aware of the time limit for appeal. He said he only “fully understood” the time limit when he attended the Resource Centre for Unrepresented Litigants on 13 May 2026 and immediately sought assistance to prepare this application. While we note that the applicant is unrepresented and may not be familiar with the judicial process, we do not accept that he could not have obtained legal or language assistance earlier to prosecute the application. We therefore do not find the delay has been satisfactorily explained. We now turn to the merits of the application. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. The grounds in the Notice of Motion state that: (1) the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) and the Judge erred in discounting (i) his contemporaneous first-tier screening evidence, including the first questionnaire, the first screening interview and other documents, and (ii) contemporaneous documents such as service records and letters, which materially affected its conclusion as to credibility resulting in substantial injustice; (2) the Board and the Judge failed to address the procedural unfairness and interpretation issues in his earlier screening proceedings; (3) the Board misapplied country of origin information and state protection analysis to his individual circumstances. In his written submissions, the applicant raised two questions said to be of great general or public importance cited as follows: (1) “Question 1: Whether the court’s high duty of “anxious scrutiny” and the “enhanced standard of fairness” required in non-refoulement cases mandates a Judge to actively offer an unrepresented, traumatized litigant an opportunity to amend or clarify their Form 86 when they have mistakenly left the legal grounds completely blank due to language barriers and a lack of legal literacy. (2) Question 2: Whether an administrative tribunal acts irrationally or fails to apply anxious scrutiny by assuming that a state’s military apparatus (specifically the Navy) and its local law enforcement or political factions operate as a single, perfectly synchronized, and flawlessly integrated database, thereby drawing an adverse credibility finding against an applicant who successfully re-enlisted using his own name while fleeing localised, targeted thuggery.” As to Question (1), the applicant submitted that the Judge should not have treated the blank Form 86 as a fatal omission and should have issued clear directions or grant a brief adjournment to enable the applicant to seek translation or legal aid. As to Question (2), he submitted that the Board rejected his claim based on a factual finding about his re-enlistment in the Sri Lankan Navy which is logically flawed, as the Board incorrectly assumed that the government has a flawless network connecting the police, political factions and military branches, and incorrectly assumed that his enemies were no longer seeking revenge against him. He further submitted that the Judge failed to scrutinise the Board’s oversimplified assumptions regarding the real-world country conditions. We are of the view that the matters put forward in the Notice of Motion and the written submissions do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal: The matters raised in the Notice of Motion and written submissions were new grounds that were not raised in the application made to the Judge or in the appeal before us. It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the appeal before it. Nor is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new and fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal. The procedural unfairness grounds raised in the Notice of Motion are vague and unparticularised, and do not involve any question of great general or public importance. Question (1) does not raise any question of great general or public importance. It is in any event misconceived as the Judge did not dismiss his application solely because he failed to raise any grounds for seeking relief in his Form 86. The Judge considered the applicant’s oral submissions and the Board’s decision, and found no arguable public law errors. Question (2) is a challenge to the Board’s findings. For the reasons given in [7] and [8] of our Judgment, the applicant’s numerous assertions in his Notice of Motion and written submissions against the Board’s assessment of his claim are unarguable. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). Given that the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, and given the delay and the lack of merits in the present application, there is no basis for us to extend the time for the filing of the Notice of Motion. Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person.
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RE DISANAYAKA MUDIYANSELAGE WIJERATHNA BANDARA alias DISSAMAYAKE MUDIYANSELAGE WIJIERATNE BANDA
CA · [2026] HKCA 2078
This judgment