YUEN MACIE v. YEUNG YING KIT

CACV 7/2017

[2018] HKCA 125

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 7 OF 2017

(ON APPEAL FROM HCPI NO 528 OF 2015)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon G Lam J (giving the judgment of the Court):

Background

1.  This is the defendant’s appeal and the plaintiff’s cross‑appeal from the award of damages for personal injuries pursuant to Master Leong’s assessment dated 24 November 2016, following interlocutory judgment on liability entered in July 2014.

2.  The plaintiff was injured on 10 October 2012 when the car she was driving was hit on the rear right side by the vehicle driven by the defendant.  The plaintiff suffered neck sprain, right wrist sprain, right shoulder and back injury, and also complained of right hand numbness.  She remained conscious and was taken to the Prince of Wales Hospital by ambulance and admitted apparently in the early hours of 11 October. After being given in‑patient physiotherapy and analgesics, she was discharged on 12 October.

3.  An MRI scan of the plaintiff’s cervical spine on 15 October 2012 showed minor posterior disc bulge and no significant disc prolapse or spinal stenosis.  MRI of her right wrist in March 2013 showed intact TFCC[1] and scapholunate ligaments.  Ultrasonography of her right shoulder in May 2013 showed intact rotator cuff tendons and normal bursa.

4.  She underwent 9 physiotherapy sessions (with 4 other defaulted) at Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital from 13 November 2012 until her discharge on 18 February 2013 in view of the static condition.  She had also attended a few sessions of occupational therapy at the same hospital from 14 November 2012 until discharge on 5 July 2013.

5.  The plaintiff was given sick leave certificates continuously from 11 October 2012 to 30 May 2013 and thereafter intermittently until 18 December 2013, for a total of 309 days.

6.  The plaintiff was born in December 1977 and educated up to Form 4 in secondary school.  Before the accident, she had been working as a freelance hairdresser on her own account.  She provided hairdressing services by appointment at her home or at the client’s premises, from which she claimed to have an average monthly income of $22,085.  The plaintiff claimed that because of the injuries from the accident, she had to stop this work for a few months until March 2013 and, even after resuming then, she was not as efficient as before and consequently earned a lower income.

7.  In addition, 3 months before the accident the plaintiff had taken up work as a night‑shift quality control operator in an electronics factory earning a basic salary of $264 per night and on average $7,549 per month.  She continued with this employment until around October 2013. The plaintiff said that as a result of the effect of her injuries, she was asked by the employer to resign in October 2013.  Meanwhile, the plaintiff had become a distributor for Nu‑Skin products starting from around September 2013 from which she earned commission from sales.

8.  The plaintiff underwent a joint medical examination by the experts on 14 January 2014.  Their joint report stated there was residual neck and back tenderness with some stiffness but no genuine neurological deficit over her limbs.  There was some pain over her right shoulder and wrist upon movement.  The plaintiff had reached maximum medical improvement.  On the effect of her condition on occupation, the opinion of the defendant’s expert, which the Master accepted, was that the plaintiff’s occupation as a hairdresser or stylist or as a quality control operator would not be affected. The experts agreed that the plaintiff’s daily living activities would not be affected to a large extent except those involving heavy manual exertion.

The plaintiff’s claim at trial

9.  At trial, the plaintiff’s claim, based on her Revised Statement of Damages (which assumed a notional trial date of January 2016) and somewhat varied in the opening submissions of her counsel, was for, inter alia, damages in the following amounts:

(1) PSLA: $300,000.

(2) Pre‑trial loss of earnings and loss of profits (based on a pre‑accident total monthly income of $22,085 + $7,549 = $29,634): $482,372.65.  This was the sum of 3 parts:

(a) From 11 October 2012 to 30 May 2013, the plaintiff was granted continuous sick leave.  Although she returned to work occasionally she only managed to earn a total of $36,625.21 as a quality control operator and a total of $10,800 from her hairdresser business.  The loss during this period was therefore $29,634 × 8 – $36,625.21 – $10,800 = $189,646.79.

(b) From June to December 2013, the plaintiff said her income was $49,976.22 as a quality control operator and $132,320 as a hairdresser.  The loss during this period was therefore $29,634 × 7 – $49,976.22 – $132,320 = $25,141.78.

(c) From January 2014 to October 2016, the plaintiff said she earned a total average monthly income (including commission from Nu‑Skin) of $21,763.88.  The loss during this period was therefore ($29,634 – $21,763.88) × 34 months = $267,584.08.

(3) Post‑trial loss of earnings (based on a multiplier of 19.5): ($29,634 – $21,763.88) × 12 × 19.5 = $1,841,608.

(4) Loss of earning capacity: Not less than $100,000, to account for the plaintiff’s disadvantage in the labour market.

(5) Medical expenses: $24,050.

The Master’s assessment

10.  In his assessment, the Master awarded damages for PSLA in the sum of $230,000.[2]

11.  For pre‑trial loss of earnings, so far as the plaintiff’s income as a quality control operator was concerned, the Master was “not convinced that there was any significant reduction in her income after the accident”, but on the basis that the plaintiff had taken a total of 77 days of sick leave since October 2012, he awarded her $264 × 77 = $20,328.[3] He also awarded her 3 months’ salary for October to December 2013, ie $7,549 × 3 = $22,647.[4]

12.  So far as the plaintiff’s income from her business as a hairdresser was concerned, the Master found the plaintiff’s evidence of income “problematic”.[5] He did not accept she was making an average $22,085 per month from this business before the accident, but decided to award her $5,000 per month for a total of 8 months, ie $40,000.[6]

13.  The Master found that the plaintiff was fit to resume her previous occupation and therefore refused to award any damages for post‑trial loss of earnings.[7] He also found that the plaintiff did not suffer any continuing disadvantage in the labour market and did not make any award for loss of earning capacity.[8]

14.  In light of the receipts produced for medical expenses, the Master allowed the amount claimed in full of $24,050.

15.  The Master ordered the defendant to pay the costs of the action on the District Court scale.

The appeal and cross‑appeal

16.  The defendant now appeals against the Master’s assessment, contending that damages for PSLA should be reduced to no more than $100,000 and that awards for pre‑trial loss of earnings under the 3 heads described above should be set aside or reduced, that the award of special damages for medical expenses should be set aside in part and that the plaintiff should be deprived of costs either wholly or in part.

17.  For her part, the plaintiff cross‑appeals against the Master’s assessment of pre‑trial loss of earnings as being too low and against his refusal to award damages for post‑trial loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity.

18.  While the subject matters of the appeal and cross‑appeal overlap, for the purposes of presentation we set out our views below under the relevant grounds of appeal and cross‑appeal respectively.  It seems to us more logical to deal with the plaintiff’s cross‑appeal first as it raises a fundamental challenge to the Master’s assessment.

The plaintiff’s cross‑appeal

19.  The plaintiff contends that the Master was wrong in awarding only $82,975 in total for pre‑trial loss of earnings and in not awarding damages for post‑trial loss of earnings and loss of earning capacity. There are 5 grounds advanced in the Respondent’s Notice for the cross‑appeal, but, regrettably, and contrary to the requirement in RHC O 59 r 6(1) that a cross‑appealing respondent must specify “the precise form of the order which he proposes to ask the Court to make”, the document only asks that damages be awarded in “such sums to be re‑assessed at the appeal hearing” without making clear what award is sought.  We will deal below with the alternative awards proposed in the written and oral submissions of Ms Diana Cheung who appeared for the plaintiff. 

Ground 1

20.  The plaintiff’s first ground is that the Master failed to consider the undisputed medical evidence and opinions that the accident caused permanent impairment to the plaintiff’s person, particularly in her neck, right wrist and shoulder.  It is said that the Master failed to consider the effect of such impairment on the plaintiff’s working ability and efficiency, especially as a hairdresser.

21.  We do not accept this ground.  Plainly the Master did not ignore the medical evidence or the plaintiff’s injuries: he did award her a substantial sum for PSLA.  But the expert evidence was not unanimous.  There was a difference between the experts in particular as to the effect of the injuries on the plaintiff.  While both assessed there was some degree of whole person impairment, the plaintiff’s expert Dr Tio assessed it at 5%, whereas the defendant’s expert Dr Kwok assessed it at only 1.5%.  Although Dr Kwok accepted there might be residual pain over the wrist and neck, he opined that it would not affect the plaintiff’s working capacity or daily living activities to a significant extent.  The Master accepted Dr Kwok’s opinion that the plaintiff’s injuries would not affect her occupation either as a quality control operator or as a hairdresser.[9] 

22.  Insofar as the plaintiff relies on the experts’ opinions on loss of earning capacity, it has been stated by this court in Tang Shau Tsan v Wealthy Construction Co Ltd (unrep, CACV 58/2000, 5 April 2000) that such opinions are inadmissible and unhelpful.  Further, damages for loss of earning capacity is not a conventional award made in the abstract but a specific mode of compensation that has to be based on evidence: Chan Wai Tong v Li Ping Sum [1985] HKLR 176 at 183B–D.  Given the experts’ opinion, the Master’s finding that the plaintiff does not suffer any future disadvantage in the labour market cannot be faulted.  There is no basis to make any award for loss of earning capacity.

Grounds 2, 3 and 4

23.  In these grounds, the plaintiff contends that the Master was wrong to ignore her evidence regarding the effect of the injuries on her working ability and efficiency as a hairdresser and complains that the Master erred in rejecting her complaints of “subjective symptoms”. She contends that the Master should not have rejected her claims on the ground of the finding that she could return to her previous occupations, because her complaint was that her income as a hairdresser would be reduced and continue to be lower than the pre‑accident level.

24.  The plaintiff’s assertions about the continuing effect of the injuries on her ability to work as a hairdresser turn upon a question of fact on which the Master had to come to a decision.  He clearly formed a highly unfavourable view of the plaintiff as a witness, having found her evidence evasive, illogical, vague and incredible in various respects (as explained by the Master), and came to a conclusion that the plaintiff was not a credible witness.[10]

25.  Ms Cheung submitted that the fact that the plaintiff was the only one out of 4 quality control operators to have been asked to resign shows that her working ability had been impaired.  But this begs the question why the plaintiff left that position in the first place — an area where the plaintiff’s evidence was, in the Master’s view, “evasive”.[11] There was also evidence that the plaintiff was made redundant because her tasks were taken up by newly installed machines.  It is also to be noted that the plaintiff left that position soon after she had begun work for Nu‑Skin. 

26.  Ms Cheung further submitted that even if the plaintiff was evasive about her other substantial sources of income, it did not follow she did not suffer loss of income as a hairdresser.  As to this, the plaintiff’s income was of course a critical fact in the assessment exercise. The plaintiff failed to disclose her income from Nu‑Skin in her Revised Statement of Damages, and did not reveal certain income in 2015 from another company called Synergy which only emerged during cross‑examination. There were also other relatively large deposits in her bank account which the plaintiff could not account for.  These are matters which would inevitably cast doubt in the mind of the assessing tribunal with respect to the truthfulness and reliability of a plaintiff’s evidence.  In the circumstances the Master was entitled to be sceptical about the plaintiff’s evidence.  In our view, Ms Cheung has not been able to point to any ground sufficient for passing the high threshold for challenging the Master’s rejection of the plaintiff’s evidence: see Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen t/a Tam Dick Yuen Engineering and Others (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336; China Gold Finance Ltd v CIL Holdings Ltd (unrep, CACV 11/2015, 27 November 2015).

27.  Furthermore, as the Master noted[12], even the plaintiff’s own expert considered she was fit to resume her pre‑accident work without stating there would be any continued disability (subject to certain caveats such as the lifting of heavy objects or prolonged walking and standing, which was not said to be a requirement in the plaintiff’s hairdressing work).  There is no medical evidence independent of the plaintiff’s subjective complaints that supports her assertion that after March 2013, when she stopped wearing a wrist splint and resumed her hairdressing services, her ability to work as a hairdresser was in any way meaningfully affected by her injuries to any significant extent.

Ground 5

28.  The fifth ground attacks the Master’s award of $5,000 net profit per month for the hairdressing business as being too low. It is said that the Master was wrong to place no weight on the handwritten notes produced by the plaintiff.  These are notes on which the plaintiff had written down certain dates and amounts of money.

29.  The Master did not find that the plaintiff had not worked as a hairdresser prior to the accident, nor did he find that the handwritten notes were fabricated.  The problems with those notes, however, were that (i) inexplicably, the notes that were disclosed only extended back to June 2012, a bare 4 months before the accident, even though on the plaintiff’s case she had been working as such for many years; (ii) they only recorded the revenue but not any of the expenses such as transportation and cost of hairdressing products; (iii) they did not distinguish between receipts from the sale of hairstyling products to her clients (which, on the plaintiff’s admission, continued despite the accident) and receipts for hairdressing work; and (iv) they were not corroborated by any tax returns or accounting records showing the net profit.

30.  Ms Cheung further criticised the Master’s inference that the income from hairdressing would not be significant and would be nowhere close to the sum of $22,085 as the plaintiff claimed.  We do not accept this submission.  It is in our view an inference open to him having regard to the fact that the plaintiff decided in July 2012 to take up a rather poorly paid night‑shift job that required her to work from 11pm to 7am.

31.  Given these difficulties, although the plaintiff might well have been earning some income from hairdressing, the Master was in our view entitled to conclude that he could place little reliance on the handwritten notes.[13] The weight to be put on a piece of evidence is of course a matter for the trial court with which this court will not interfere except on special grounds, which have not been made out.

32.  Ms Cheung submitted that this court should proceed on the basis that the net profit would be not less than 2/3 of the recorded revenue and invited us to assess damages on the basis of 2/3 of the pre‑accident average monthly revenue ($22,085) for October 2012 to February 2013, and thereafter on the basis of 2/3 of the difference between the pre‑accident revenue and the post‑sick leave revenue ($13,114).  We are unable to accept this submission.  This basis was not set out in the Respondent’s Notice, was never explored in the evidence at trial, and seems to us speculative and lacking in evidential support. 

33.  As a last resort, Ms Cheung submitted on her feet that this court should award the plaintiff a lump sum of not less than $1 million on account of loss of earnings as hairdresser.  We cannot accept this submission, quite apart from the highly unsatisfactory manner in which it was raised.  There is no principle or authority for taking this arbitrary approach: see Lo Hing Kin Nelson v The Personal Representative and/or Executor and/or Administrator of the Estate of Lam Yuk Wan (deceased) [2017] 3 HKLRD 294, §§29‑31.

The defendant’s appeal

34.  We turn now to the defendant’s appeal.  There are 6 points raised: (i) the award of $20,328 for pre‑trial loss of earnings based on 77 days of sick leave; (ii) the award of $22,647 for pre‑trial loss of earnings based on 3 months’ salaries as quality control operator for October to December 2013; (iii) the award of $40,000 for pre‑trial loss of earnings as a hair‑dresser for 8 months; (iv) PSLA; (v) medical expenses; and (vi) costs.

Loss of earnings over sick leave days

35.  Challenging the award of $20,328 based on 77 days of sick leave at $264 per day, Mr Sakhrani, who appeared for the defendant on this appeal but not below, submitted that the Master had confused the claims referred to in §9(2)(a) and (b) above.  We disagree.  As Ms Cheung demonstrated, the salary records show that the plaintiff actually took sick leave on 77 days between October 2012 and November 2013 (coincidentally the same number as the sick leave certificates between June and December 2013):

Month	Sick leave
October 2012	11 days
November 2012	8 days
December 2012	25 days
January 2013	0 day
February 2013	0 day
March 2013	5 days
April 2013	1 day
May 2013	0 day
June 2013	0 day
July 2013	4 days
August 2013	2 days
September 2013	0 day
October 2013	7 days
November 2013	14 days

36.  We agree with Mr Sakhrani, however, that the 25 days of sick leave in December 2012 should not be included because, as the Master found, “most, if not all, of the 25 days of ‘sick leave’ taken by the plaintiff in December 2012 would likely to be [sic] for her wedding and honeymoon and therefore not related to any sick leave caused by this accident”.[14] In cross‑examination, the plaintiff admitted that these days of sick leave were unrelated to the accident.  On such evidence and finding it cannot be said that any loss of earnings over those 25 days was caused by the defendant’s negligence.

37.  We are unable to accept Mr Sakhrani’s next point, which is that the plaintiff had failed to show that the sick leave taken after the usual period of up to 6 to 8 months for recovery from neck and wrist sprain (ie after June 2013) was justified as being caused by the injury from the accident.  Although the general period of recovery for the kind of injury in question was up to 6 to 8 months, the experts also recognised there might be need for symptomatic treatment on a need basis.  The plaintiff gave evidence that the sick leave after June 2013 was also related to the accident, on which she was not challenged in cross‑examination. In these circumstances she could not be blamed for not going into detail in relation to each day of sick leave after June 2013.  Nor can the Master’s award be criticised for lack of proof of causation.

38.  At the hearing Ms Cheung submitted that the daily wage of the plaintiff should be $316.80 instead of $264 because of a 20% allowance applicable to the plaintiff as a night‑shift worker.  To raise such a point in this manner, which featured neither in submissions at trial nor in the Respondent’s Notice nor even in Ms Cheung’s skeleton arguments in this court, is wholly unacceptable.  We decline to entertain the argument.  In any event, the plaintiff’s own witness statement stated the daily wage to be $264.[15]

3 months’ salaries for October to December 2013

39.  As to the Master’s award for pre‑trial loss of earnings in the form of 3 months’ salaries for October to December 2013, Mr Sakhrani submitted that the plaintiff had found alternative work as distributor for Nu‑Skin and received some HK$43,000 in commission by 20 February 2014.  Spread over 4 months this still exceeded what the plaintiff had been earning on average per month from the electronics factory.  The plaintiff also admitted it to be a better‑paid job. 

40.  On this basis, we accept the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff had failed to prove any loss of earnings for October to December 2013 (it appears the plaintiff was still on the factory’s payroll in October and at least part of November 2013). 

8 months’ loss of earnings as a hairdresser

41.  Mr Sakhrani submitted that there was no evidence to support the award of pre‑trial loss of earnings as a hairdresser, and the Master was not entitled to “speculate” and name an arbitrary monthly sum of $5,000.  He further submitted that the Master erred in finding that such loss occurred throughout the 8 months following the accident.

42.  The only documentary evidence adduced in support of the plaintiff’s income from the hairdressing business was her handwritten notes.  We refer to the discussion above as to why the Master was justified in placing little weight on them.

43.  Nor was the Master impressed by the plaintiff’s oral evidence.  When she was asked about various relatively larger deposits into her bank account, she was either very vague in her answers or claimed not to be able to remember, which the Master found incredible.[16] The Master was left with an impression “that the plaintiff has other rather substantial source or sources of income which she was very evasive about”.[17] He also had doubts whether she could have carried on substantial hairdressing work on a regular basis after having worked an 8‑hour night shift as a quality control operator.[18] This led the Master to conclude:

“the plaintiff’s evidence regarding her hairdressing business simply does not make sense. I did not find the plaintiff a credible witness”[19]

and that

“The court was left with no reliable evidence to assess what the plaintiff’s net profit from the claimed hairdressing business was, if any.”[20]

44.  The burden of proving loss lies of course on the plaintiff.  Having reached this point, the Master made a further inference (which was in our view unassailable) that whatever the plaintiff’s income from hairdressing was, it would not be a significant amount or anywhere close to HK$22,085 as claimed, but he went on to say:

“With no reliable evidence from the plaintiff, I would allow HK$5,000 per month as her net profit as a hairdresser. This is generous, given that it is not unreasonable to argue that the plaintiff has completely failed to prove her income as a hairdresser, or indeed, question whether the plaintiff was working as a hairdresser at all at the relevant time!”[21]

45.  With respect, this in our view crossed the line between taking a robust and broad‑brush approach and making an award without evidential and factual basis.  We are not concerned here with a common type of employment with a generally expected prevailing range of salary however broad it might be.  What is involved instead is the assessment of the likely net profits, if any, from a sole proprietor’s hairdressing business. Given the circumstances this cannot be done without reliable admissible evidence.  It is not a matter of which judicial notice can be taken or for which an arbitrary figure can be adopted.  Nor is there any proper factual basis to make a sound inference as to the likely minimum amount of profit made.  It is sometimes appropriate or even necessary to take a broad‑brush but there are limitations in this approach.  As Newman J stated in Chase International Express Ltd v McRae [2004] PIQR 314 at §§31‑32:

“31. … [The method of preparation and presentation adopted in this case] has, in my judgment, departed too far from the basic principle that a claimant must prove his case by evidence capable of supporting the conclusions to which the court is invited to come. … No doubt [the deputy district judge] had in mind the principles often expressed to the effect that judges must often simply do their best or approach an issue on a broad brush basis, but these principles have limitations. There is a need for evidence and there is a need for an analysis of such evidence; then the judge can make findings of fact by drawing inferences and doing the best he can, but on the evidence which is available.

32.  Approaching a matter with a broad brush does not mean an absence of material is acceptable.  The broad brush approach merely enables the court to do justice where there may be gaps in detail, which normally arise because of the character of the case under investigation.”

46.  In the total absence of evidence, allowing $5,000 as monthly net profit of the plaintiff’s hairdressing business is in our view impermissible.

47.  It is also, with respect, erroneous in principle for the Master to award this loss over 8 months on the assumption “she was unable to cut hair for the full 8 months”[22] when the plaintiff’s own evidence was that she resumed hair‑styling work in March 2013 to a limited extent by serving some of her regular individual clients.  Further, the plaintiff admitted that she continued to sell hair‑styling products to her clients even before March 2013.  It follows that this award has to be set aside.

PSLA

48.  The amount of $230,000 may be said to be on the high side and if the issue were at large, we might well have awarded a lower figure.  But this is an area where different tribunals may legitimately come to different views within a considerable degree of latitude.  The Court of Appeal will only interfere where  the trial judge is found to have fallen into serious error or to have acted upon a wrong principle of law or the amount awarded was so very high or small as to make it, in the judgment of the appellate court, an entirely erroneous estimate: Cheung Kai Chi v Chun Wo Contractors Ltd [2008] 1 HKLRD 102 at §70.[23]

49.  The Master took into account a number of precedents, of which the closest to the present case was perhaps Chui Wai Kan Michelle v Gillespie John Thomas (unrep, DCPI 1696/2014, 12 May 2016), a case of whiplash injury from a traffic accident.  There the plaintiff suffered soft tissue injury in the neck and the accident caused previously asymptomatic degeneration in the cervical spine to become symptomatic.  There was desiccation at C5/6 consistent with spondylosis, and foraminal stenosis with impingement on the left C6 exiting nerve root.  The court awarded $225,000 for PSLA.

50.  Ms Cheung was correct in pointing out that what the plaintiff suffered was not a minor traffic accident.  The plaintiff’s car was hit by a 10‑ton lorry and rolled over and spun and eventually stopped after hitting the kerb.  We accept that it must have been a traumatic experience. The plaintiff also suffered multiple injuries, which distinguished this case from some of the examples cited by Mr Sakhrani that involved only back or neck sprain.  The plaintiff had to wear a neck collar and wrist splint for several months to March 2013.

51.  Mr Sakhrani also fairly reminded us that recently, in David John Slater v Commission of Police (unrep, HCPI 646/2012, 7 July 2017), Bharwaney J increased the starting point for awards of damages for PSLA within the Serious Injury category to $530,000.

52.  In all the circumstances, we are not persuaded that the award of $230,000 was so far out of the range as to justify interference by this court.

Medical expenses

53.  Mr Sakhrani submitted that the medical expenses, whilst supported by receipts, should be rejected on the ground they were not shown to have been caused by the accident.  We reject this contention.  The fees charged by public hospitals were admitted by the defendant in his Answer to Revised Statement of Damages.  The plaintiff gave evidence that she consulted a private doctor because of her injuries.  The experts agreed that the medical treatment was appropriate.  There is no warrant for disturbing this award.

Costs

54.  Mr Sakhrani submitted that since the plaintiff prosecuted a claim for over $3.8 million in the Revised Statement of Damages but was only awarded $344,025 plus interest by the Master, she should have been refused costs either wholly or in part.  We note that the Master had already ordered costs on the District Court scale.  We see no reason why in addition the plaintiff, who had after all succeeded in recovering more than a nominal amount, should be deprived of her costs either in whole or in part.

Disposition

55.  For the above reasons, the defendant’s appeal is allowed in part as indicated in §§36, 40 and 47 above.  The award of pre‑trial loss of earnings is therefore to be reduced by $69,247 (ie $264 × 25 + $22,647 + $40,000).  The plaintiff’s cross‑appeal is dismissed.

56.  There will be an order nisi that the plaintiff do pay the defendant the costs of the appeal and cross‑appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

[1] triangular fibrocartilage complex

[2] The Master’s Assessment, §8.

[3] The Master’s Assessment, §17.

[4] The Master’s Assessment, §54.

[5] The Master’s Assessment, §29.

[6] The Master’s Assessment, §§52, 58.

[7] The Master’s Assessment, §77.

[8] The Master’s Assessment, §78.

[9] The Master’s Assessment, §§62, 75.

[10] The Master’s Assessment, §§19, 21, 38, 39, 49, 75.

[11] The Master’s Assessment, §19.

[12] The Master’s Assessment, §76.

[13] The Master’s Assessment, §49.

[14] The Master’s Assessment, §18; see also §13 where it was stated: “The earning in December was only HK$320.90 but the plaintiff said she was taking time off for a month (until early January 2013) for her wedding and honeymoon.”

[15] §13(d)

[16] The Master’s Assessment, §§37‑38.

[17] The Master’s Assessment, §39.

[18] The Master’s Assessment, §40.

[19] The Master’s Assessment, §49.

[20] The Master’s Assessment, §50.

[21] The Master’s Assessment, §52.

[22] The Master’s Assessment, §58.

[23] This was said not in relation to PSLA but to assessment of damages more generally.