KAZI MOKLES v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5876 · HCAL 1946/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1946/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5876
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1946 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Kazi Mokles |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 30 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 10 October 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1946_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 12
August 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Accordingly, the Board affirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected
the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision,
which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Bangladesh, he would be harmed or killed by people of the
Awami League (“AL”) due to his role in the Bangladesh Nationalist Party
(“BNP”) and his refusal to switch his allegiance to AL.
Oral hearing
5. The applicant requested for an oral hearing and his case was heard on
15 October 2026.
6. The applicant attached a document with the title “GROUNDS” to his
supporting affirmation dated 30 October 2023. When this court asked
the applicant to elaborate on the grounds stated therein, the applicant
merely told this court that he would rely on the document and
everything had been written on it.
Grounds for judicial review
7. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
8. The applicant did not advance any grounds for judicial review in Form
86. In his supporting affirmation dated 30 October 2023, he stated
that he did not agree with the Board.
9. In the document with the title “GROUNDS” that was annexed to his
supporting affirmation, the applicant mentioned a few matters, which
are summarised as follows:-
1) The Board did not truly consider his claim;
2) He was given a lawyer at the screening interview, but the lawyer
did not help him at all. The applicant only talked to the
interpreter, and when the interpreter was writing down his
statement, his lawyer was sleeping;
3) The Board dismissed his claim but showed some bad arguments. The
Board was prepared to dismiss his claim before the oral hearing;
4) The adjudicator should be one kind of a judge, but the adjudicator
assessing his case was not neutral, so he [sic] did not find any
reason to grant leave to the applicant.
10. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing before this court, the applicant
merely said that he would rely on the grounds stated in the said
document and everything had been written there.
Discussion
11. First of all, the applicant’s comment in his supporting affirmation
that he did not agree with the Board’s Decision cannot help him. He
did not say why he did not agree with the Board’s Decision, how the
Board’s Decision was wrong or how the Board erred in its assessment of
his non-refoulement claim and/or his appeal/petition.
12. In ground (1) of the applicant’s document as summarised above, the
applicant complained that the Board did not truly consider his claim.
However, this ground was advanced without any particulars. The
applicant did not state how the Board had failed to truly consider his
claim, or how his claim ought to be considered.
13. The applicant complained in ground (2) about the lawyer assigned to
assist him at the screening interview. However, there was nothing
before this court to support the applicant’s allegation in this
respect. In any event, if he found that the lawyer was not assisting
him at all or was even sleeping when his statement was being recorded,
he should have raised this complaint to the interviewing officer, who
should be present at the material time. He could and should also have
complained against the lawyer to the Duty Lawyer Service.
14. More importantly, the applicant failed to indicate how he had been
prejudiced as a result of the attitude of the lawyer. Thus, ground (2)
has no substance.
15. In ground (3) as summarised above, the applicant asserted that the
Board had showed some bad arguments when dismissing his claim, and was
prepared to dismiss his claim even before the Board’s hearing. Again,
this ground was advanced without any specificity. The applicant did
not state what “bad arguments” the Board had given, or why he believed
that the Board was prepared to dismiss his claim even before the
Board’s hearing.
16. In fact, this court notes from the Board’s Decision that in order to be
as fair as possible to the applicant, the Board had agreed to admit the
applicant’s late documents submitted at the Board’s first hearing on 18
May 2023 into evidence, and adjourned the hearing so that the documents
could be translated and taken into account. The Board held a second
hearing on 20 September 2023 and asked questions of the applicant in
relation to all the new evidence (see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Board’s
Decision). This is indicative that the Board was careful in
considering the applicant’s claim and his documents, even if they were
submitted late and without translations.
17. Thus, there is simply no reason to believe that the Board was prepared
to dismiss the applicant’s claim even before the Board’s hearings.
18. In ground (4), the applicant complained that the adjudicator assessing
his case was not neutral, and he [sic] did not find any reason to grant
leave to the applicant. The applicant did not specify what the
adjudicator had done to show that she was not neutral. The mere fact
that the Board found the applicant’s appeal/petition failed on all the
applicable grounds under the USM cannot in itself be interpreted as the
Board not being neutral in its assessment of the applicant’s case.
19. Thus, this court finds that none of the matters asserted by the
applicant in his affirmation and the document with the title “GROUNDS”
constitutes a valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
20. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of
judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
21. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite the
lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
22. As aforesaid, the applicant was afforded two hearings by the Board.
Thus, he was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board in
person.
23. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had duly considered
the applicant’s claims and all the documents he submitted to the Board.
The Board’s findings on the applicant’s claim and evidence, and its
reasons for concluding that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
Director’s Decision failed on all the applicable grounds, were laid out
in paragraphs 25 to 41 of the Board’s Decision.
24. In gist, the Board found so many indicators of negative credibility in
the applicant’s claim that it was unable to attach any credence to his
claims or any weight to the documents that the applicant submitted.
The Board concluded that the applicant had established only his status
as a national of Bangladesh. The Board found no background information
or other evidence to suggest that merely by dint of that status alone,
the applicant might face any risk of persecution, torture, ill
treatment or arbitrary deprivation of life upon his return to
Bangladesh.
25. This court finds that the reasons given by the Board for not being able
to afford the benefit of the doubt to the applicant fully justified.
26. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make findings on the availability of
state protection as the Board found the applicant was not at a real
risk of any of the proscribed forms of harm.
27. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
28. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of any
of the proscribed forms of harm merely as a national of Bangladesh, it
is not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.
29. The finding of facts in relation to the applicant’s case, including the
assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was primarily within the realm
of the Board. The Board was entitled to come to its own conclusion.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its conclusion.
30. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
31. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave
must be refused.
Conclusion
32. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 21/10/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no: |interested parties as |
|directions given within|Nil |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave| |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, | |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |21/10/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 18629 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 590/21 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 10891/20) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1