鄭增雄 訴 任森良

DCCJ 1435/2009

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2009年第1435號

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判案書

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1.   原告人的申索，是要求被告人向他支付服務費用的餘數，金額為HK$361,267.25。

2.  2001至2006年，原告人從事中介人（即財務顧問）的工作，以合作拆帳形式受聘於柏陵財務顧問公司（Progressive & Co. (H.K.)）(後稱 “Progressive & Co.”) 為財務顧問。約於2005年10月初，被告人的兒子任大志介紹他認識被告人。被告人自稱擁有幾萬呎坪洲的土地，該些土地可作抵押之用。他要求原告人介紹財務公司給他作貸款之用，他要將坪洲土地作抵押，作為一宗民事案件的訴訟費。他說官司勝訴及成功收回物業後，他願意按法庭判決支付5%（按實收資產值計算）給原告人作為介紹貸款的中介費。其後，被告人給他一份被告人簽署的委托書（“CTH-1”）（日期為2005年10月6日），並由被告人的生意伙伴郭繼先先生簽名作為見證；後來貸款之事不成功。為了解決訴訟費問題，被告人希望與前妻郭秀蓮之間的加拿大物業（“加拿大物業”）的業權紛爭妥協。2005年11月中，原告人、被告人與郭繼先在上環喜悅酒樓見面；被告人要求原告人幫助調解加拿大物業的業權紛爭。如果原告人促成和解，他會把和解時加拿大物業市值計算或該物業售出的成交價值的5% 給予原告人，作為酬金；他要求原告人仍用CTH-1，以證明他代表被告人進行調解。答應他的要求後，原告人便進行調解的工作。他與郭秀蓮就加拿大物業多次以長途電話溝通。經過大約2個月的交涉和討價還價後，她卒之同意與被告人和解，後來被告人和郭秀蓮聘請律師於2006年3月27日做了一份和解協議書。其後代表被告人的律師行Kelvin Cheung & Co. 律師事務所把HK$50,000存入Progressive Co. 的銀行戶口。

3.  2006年5月18日，原告人的律師去信給被告人，要求他支付原告人CAD$56,750.00，該信（“5月18日的信”）有以下的內容:-

“Re: Claim on Commission

We act for Mr Cheng Tsang Hung Dennis and enclose authorization letter dated 6^th October 2005 given by you to our client agreeing to give commission at the rate of 5% on the net asset value claimed, i.e. CAD$1,135,000.00.

We are instructed by our client that you have agreed with our client to pay the commission at the 5% i.e. CAD$56,750.00.

Our client hereby demands your settlement of the said sum of CAD$56,750.00 is paid to our client or to us on client’s behalf within 7 days from the date hereof, failing which our client would institute legal proceedings against you, claiming the amount due together with interests and costs without further notice.”

（底線後加）

上述信件所附帶的委托書（“CTH-1”）有以下的內容:-

“承諾/委托書

有關：高院民事訴訟案 編號 419 & 4010/2001及

其他與任森良有關之案件

本人任森良持香港身份証 ………… 現委托鄭增雄先生介紹律師代辦本人，及上述案件有關人仕之民事訴訟。

當訴訟完結后本人任森良同意給中介費及立即支付5% （百分之五）按法庭判決實收資產值計算；給鄭增雄先生作為中介費。

	委托人簽署：
	任森良 持香港身份証………… 2005年10月6日”

4.  在他的第二份誓章（日期為2008年1月18日）的第8段，被告人說:-

“………I have never received any demand from the Plaintiff, until the letter dated 18^th May, 2006.”

第8段清楚表示他收到2006年5月18日的信，但在他所有的誓章和庭上的證供，他沒有提及他曾給予原告人任何回覆，因此他沒有向原告人指出信中或CTH-1有任何不對的地方。

5.  在他的第一份誓章（日期為2007年10月17日），被告人說:-

‘5. I can verify that the signature appearing on “Exhibit CTH-1” was genuine and was made by me.

6.  However, in the copy that I had signed, there was not the second paragraph, i.e. the paragraph that stated that “Upon the litigation was over, I, Yam Sam Leung, agreed to pay to Mr. Cheng Tsang Hung theintermediary fees of 5% of the net assets adjudged by the Court.’

（底線後加）

這時距離2006年5月18日已超過一年了。如果CTH-1第2段（“第2段”）不存在，他應當很自然地在收到2006年5月18日的信後向原告人指出事實的真相，而不是在多個月後，於原告人在2007年5月25日提出本案的申索後，才提出反對。特別是原告人的律師指明，如果在7天內他不支付CAD$56,750，原告人便會為此提起訴訟。

6.  被告人沒有提供他在第6段所提及的“copy”的副本，以支持他的說法。如果他有提供該他聲稱簽署的“copy”的副本，本庭便可知道他所說是否屬實。這是非常重要的證據，但在審訊中，他也沒有提供該“copy”的副本。

7.  被告人指原告人的案情與授權書的內容不符，原告人的證供不是完全沒有瑕疵，但CTH-1的第2段清楚記錄被告人同意給予原告人5%。本庭裁定第2段是存在的。

8.  被告人的大律師指出:-

‘17. However, from the attachment of a letter issued by Plaintiff’s previous solicitors, Messrs. Pang, Wan & Choi dated 18^th May 2006 ….., this version of “authorization letter” was different from that of CTH-1….. in that apart from the handwritten words “郭繼先”were written on top of the purported signature of Guo, at the bottom of the page, there were those type-written lines “由打官司轉為和解加拿大物業官方估價CAD$1,135,000.00 x 5% = $56,750.00 3個半月服務/顧問費用連同代墊支 + 借款（合共港幣500,000.00元）”。

22.  At worst, this is a case where Plaintiff fabricated the very document of the “authorization letter” in the forms of CTH-1 ….. and ……  At best, Plaintiff was lying in court about the different versions of the “authorization letter”.’

本庭不同意上述的論點。原告人的授權書（CTH-1）沒有上文所指的 type-written lines；因此，原告人寄給被告人的授權書 (CTH-1) 沒有該些 type-written lines，所以被告人收到的授權書亦不會有 type-written lines。如果他收到的委托書中有type-written lines，為甚麼他不在收到2006年5月18日的信後，去信原告人，指出他簽署的委托書並無type-written lines？

9.  被告人存檔的證物表載有2006年5月18日的信（見第15頁）和委托書（附有type-written lines，見第16頁）。第17頁是“任森良承諾書證物”（“CTH-1”），該頁有“鄭增雄2007年9月24日在本人面前 …… 確認”等字樣；第18頁是委托書（CTH-1）的內容。（CTH-1並不附有type-written lines）。第17和第18頁與原告人存檔“狀書有關之證物”的第1和第2頁是完全相同的。很明顯，第17頁和第18頁是附在原告人某些證物內的某些部份。被告人沒有在他的口供紙中提及他怎樣得到第17頁和第18頁。

10.  如果被告人所說屬實，他收到的5月18日的信和委托書反映出：- 1. 他同意給予原告人CAD $56,750; 2. 委托書中不存在第2段；3.委托書中不存在type written lines。 原告人的律師指出，如他不支付CAD$56,750，它會在7日內提起訴 訟。面對三項虛假的指控，被告人竟然不作出反應，他亦沒有解釋他為何不作出反應。本庭不相信他的証供。本庭接納原告人的証供。被告人管有的授權書上面的 type-written lines是不會由原告人加上授權書上面的。附有 type-written lines 的授權書是由被告人所管有，他管有的授權書上面為甚麼會有 type-written lines？這應該由被告人解釋才對，但被告人沒有提出解釋，唯一的合理推斷就是該些 type- written lines 是在被告人的知情下被打上授權書上的。這亦真實反映了事情的真相，該些type-written lines支持了原告人的指稱。本庭裁定原告人指稱的口頭合約存在。

HK$50,000的支付

11.  原告人指被告人已支付給他HK$50,000。他指出Kelvin Cheung & Co. 律師事務所致電給他，告訴他會有付款給“你哋”，並要求受款人的名字。他又指出職員告訴他會有一筆款項給他，而他叫該職員把款項直接支付予Progressive & Co.。他要求直接支付予Progressive & Co. 因為他欠Progressive & Co. 錢。

12.  被告人指稱，它的前律師Keung Cheung & Co. 這樣做，這是由郭繼先以欺詐手段促成的，被告人已向警方就此事報案（報案日期是2007年1月26日）。被告人沒有提出證據，證明警方的調查結果，因此該指控沒有實質的證據支持。

13.  被告人又辯稱：-

“40. The staff of Messrs. Kelvin Cheung & Co. was not called upon to give evidence. Further, had there been any instructions to Messrs. Kelvin Cheung & Co. to make payment to Plaintiff personally, no doubt the solicitors would ask for a clear written instructions from Plaintiff to make the payment to another person so designated. This is plain common sense as otherwise Plaintiff could always deny having given such instructions and claim against the solicitors for paying to the wrong person.”

本庭不會就假設性的事作出裁定。

14.  被告人指稱：“The Plaintiff plays no part or makes no contribution in the procurement of the transfer of the Vancouver Property”。

15.  郭秀蓮的律師Kelvin Chan，Solicitor 傳真Draft Deed of Settlement (Final) 給他。晚上他與被告人在加拿大的代表律師Chan & Leung 律師事務所通長途電話和電郵，他又與郭透蓮多次以長途電話聯系（參看原告人呈堂的電訊盈科賬單）作為達成和解協議的過程。原告人的大律師亦承認 “… … there is some evidence of P putting in some efforts in contacting the ex-wife …” 原告人與郭秀蓮原不相識，他與她溝通正是為了加拿大物業糾紛之事達成和解而進行的，本案沒有証據他是因別的事和她接觸的。被告人與郭秀蓮關係不好，他沒有參與該過程。原告人的證供有文件才為支持。他提出足夠的證據，證明他曾與被告人的前妻郭秀蓮聯繫，最終達成和解。本庭裁定，通過原告人的努力，被告人與郭秀蓮之間的協議才能達成。

16.  被告人指稱原告人與被告人的協議是“屬於包攬訴訟（champertous）”的協議，因此是無效的。在陳辭書中被告人說：-

‘55. Champerty has been defined as “an aggravated form of maintenance” and occurs when the person maintaining another stipulates for a share of the proceeds of the action or suit or other contentious proceedings, where property is in dispute.’

17.  在Unruh v. Suberger (Final Appeals Nos. 9 and 10 of 2006)，終審庭指出：-

‘99. …… what public policy considerations result in a contract being vitiated on grounds of maintenance or champerty? I would make four points in unnoer.

100.       In the first place, the traditional legal policies underlying maintenance and champerty continue to apply although they must substantially be qualified by other considerations.  Thus, the mischief to be discouraged by the law of maintenance is still “officious intermeddling” in litigation, in particular where this results in oppression of the person against whom the action is brought and possibly if it may result in the general encouragement of litigiousness.

101.       The public policy against champerty has traditionally involved two concerns and continues to do so.

(l)                     The first is that an agreement to share in the spoils of litigation may encourage the perversion of justice and endanger the integrity of judicial processes.  As Lord Denning MR put it in Re Trepca Mines Ltd. (No 2): “The common law fears that the champertous maintainer might be tempted, for his own personal gain, to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, or even to suborn witnesses.

(m)                 Next, a champertous arrangement may be objectionable in that it involves a stranger to the litigation in “trafficking” or “gambling” in the outcome of the litigation.  Thus, in Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse, an assignment was struck down as champertous because it “…… involved the possibility, and indeed the likelihood, of a profit being made, [by a third party with no genuine commercial interest in the transaction] out of the cause of action …… [which] manifestly ‘savours of champerty,’ since it involves trafficking in litigation – a type of transaction which, under English law, is contrary to public policy.”  Such activity is obviously unacceptable to the court which sees its role as the administration of justice and not the provision of a market for speculators in litigation.

102.              Secondly, the fact that an arrangement may be caught by the broad definitions of maintenance or champerty is not in itself sufficient to found liability.  The totality of the facts must be examined asking whether they pose a genuine risk to the integrity of the court’s processes. In R (Factortame Ltd) v Transport Secretary (No 8), Lord Phillips MR stated: “…… one must today look at the facts of the particular case and consider whether those facts suggest that the agreement in question might tempt the allegedly champertous maintainer for his personal gain to inflame the damages, to suppress evidence, to suborn witnesses or otherwise to undermine the ends of justice.”  It is not enough simply to say that it is the type of agreement which “savours of” champerty.

103.              Thirdly, countervailing public policies must be taken into account, especially policies in favour of ensuring access to justice and of recognizing, where appropriate, legitimate common interests of a social or commercial character in a piece of litigation.  The traditional public policies against intermeddling in litigation must be weighed against such competing values and if the balance is in favour of the latter, the conduct complained of should not be regarded as contrary to public policy.

104.              Fourthly, it is important not to confuse related but separate policies with those which properly underlie the operation of maintenance and champerty.  For example, an agreement to take a share of litigation proceeds may be primarily objectionable because it involves the unconscionable exploitation of a vulnerable litigant.  Or it may be considered objectionable for solicitors to enter into such an arrangement because it is thought likely to give rise to conflicts between the solicitor’s interest in financial gain and his duties to the court and to the client.  It may be right to strike down the arrangement in some cases.  But in others, doing so (and characterising the conduct as criminal) in reliance on the law of maintenance and champerty may be to use too blunt an instrument.  It may, for instance, result in the litigant being left with no means to pursue good claim.  Resort might more appropriately be had in such cases to other doctrines and remedies more suited to granting relief to the exploited party or to confronting professional misconduct.”

被告人指合同是“包訴訟”的合同，因此是無效的。原告人的作為的，性質屬於調解的行為。 他的作為，不涉及防礙司法公正或影響司法程序的尊嚴性，亦沒有就訴訟的結果作出屬於賭博性的行為。如果沒有他在郭秀蓮與被告人之間作出協調，被告人便不能取得加拿大物業出售的款項，作為民事訴訟的費用。他的作為沒有違反Unruh v. Suberger一案所表述的原則，因此本庭裁定原告人的作為不構成攬訟的行為。

18.  本庭頒令，被告人須在14天內向原告人支付$361,267.25（HK$411,267.25 – HK$50,000）以及其利息，利息由2007年5月25日起計，直至債項清付為止，息率則按判決利率計算。

訟費

19.  本庭頒下臨時訟費的命令：被告人須支付予原告人本案的訟費（法庭已作出有關訟費的命令除外）；如與訟雙方未能同意訟費的款額，訟費款額由法庭評估。如在14天內，與訟任何一方面不向本庭提出申請，是項命令作實。