香港特別行政區 訴 謝瑞群

DCCC 211/2025

[2026] HKDC 795

香港特別行政區

區域法院

刑事案件2025年第211號

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判刑理由書

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1.  被告人承認一項「危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」，違反香港法例第374章《道路交通條例》第36A條。

案情撮要

2.  被告人承認的「經修訂的案情撮要」內容如下：

事件

(1) 在事件關鍵時間，天氣良好，路面乾爽。

(2) 2024年8月9日下午約6時59分，控方第一及第二證人為行人，正在良景邨巴士總站附近的行人過路處（案發地點）等候過馬路。過馬路前，控方第一及第二證人均有觀察路面情況，確認可以安全過馬路。意外發生時，控方第一及第二證人正在案發地點橫過上述行人過路處。

(3) 控方第一及第二證人在案發地點橫過上述過路處時，起初停在鄰近案發地點之的士站第一個上客位置，登記號碼ZH5773的的士（的士）突然衝前，撞到控方第一證人，然後繼續衝前，撞到控方第二證人。的士之後撞上路邊鐵欄，同時將控方第二證人困在的士車底。

(4) 碰撞的衝力導致的士左邊車頭及附近路邊欄杆變形。碰撞亦引致控方第一及第二證人身體受嚴重傷害；二人隨後送往屯門醫院治療。

現場調查

(5) 警員16555（控方第三證人）其後到場調查，觀察到的士左邊車頭及附近欄杆因碰撞而變形。案發地點沒發現輪軚痕。

(6) 被告人自稱是案發時涉案的的士司機。控方第三證人隨後對被告人進行快速口腔液測試，結果呈陰性。

醫療診斷

(7) 控方第一證人於2024年8月9日送入屯門醫院。醫療檢驗顯示控方第一證人一些傷勢，當中包括以下各項：

(a) 左橈骨頭移位骨折；

(b) 左肘外上髁觸痛；

(c) 右腿擦傷。

(8) 控方第一證人留院共6天接受治療（包括安裝護肘），獲批病假共59天（至2024年10月6日）。截至2025年12月25日，控方第一證人身體已經恢復健康，沒有永久性傷殘，亦無需就傷勢複診。

(9) 控方第二證人同樣於2024年8月9日送入屯門醫院。醫療檢查顯示控方第二證人一些傷勢，當中包括以下各項：

(a) 右額葉腦內出血；

(b) 左額葉蛛網膜下腔出血；

(c) 左側下顎枝移位骨折；

(d) 雙耳裂傷；及

(e) 左肘皮膚裂傷。

(10) 控方第二證人留院共 15 天，獲批病假共124天（至2024年12月10日）。截至2025年12月28日，控方第二證人身體已經恢復健康，沒有永久性傷殘，惟需要於 2026 年 6 月就左手及右腳的疤痕到屯門醫院燒傷及疤痕科複診。

拘捕及警誡

(11) 被告人其後被拘捕。被告人被拘捕時在警誡下表示注意到的士前方有行人，本想剎車，卻誤踩油門，導致的士衝前撞到行人。

(12) 被告人在其後的警誡會面中說出一些事情，包括以下各項：

(a) 被告人於2024年8月9日下午約1時開始駕駛涉案的士；

(b) 被告人駕駛涉案的士前，曾檢查的士運作正常；

(c) 被告人於同日下午約6時45分駛至鄰近案發地點的的士站；

(d) 同日晚上約 7 時，有兩人登上的士，擬往目的地為屯門；

(e) 被告人開動的士引擎後，目睹一名男子（即控方第一證人）在的士前方過馬路；

(f) 被告人隨即剎車，但的士仍繼而撞到控方第一證人；

(g) 被告人感到緊張，繼續試圖剎停的士，卻誤踩油門；

(h) 的士繼續駛前，撞到一名女子（即控方第二證人） ；

(i) 的士撞上路邊鐵欄後才停下；及

(j) 被告人其後發現控方第二證人被困的士車底。

汽車檢驗

(13) 經汽車檢驗，證實的士運作正常，但碰撞導致左邊車頭、車頭防撞槓、擋泥板、引擎蓋、輪輞及車頭燈受損。

行車紀錄儀片段

(14) 警方檢取的士行車紀錄儀片段，翻看後發現的士最終撞到鐵欄前，加速共6秒鐘，期間的士衝前，撞到控方第一及第二證人。

總結

(15) 案發時，被告人在案發地點，在道路上危險駕駛涉案的士，引致控方第一及第二證人身體受嚴重傷害，即被告人：

(a) 沒有適當留意路面情況；

(b) 未能分辨剎車掣及油門；

(c) 沒有剎車；

(d) 沒有適時停車或扭軚，以免撞到控方第一及第二證人。

(16) 案發時，被告人的駕駛方式屬危險，遠遜於一個合格而謹慎的駕駛人會被期望達到的水平。

被告人的背景

3.  被告人現年72歲，曾接受小學程度教育。小學畢業後便投身社會工作。被告人已婚，現與60歲的妻子及35歲的兒子同住。被告人妻子是家庭主婦，兒子從事資訊科技業。被告人另有一名女兒，任職美容顧問。女兒與被告人的一歲和五歲的孫兒同住。

4.  被告人18歲後考取駕駛執照（即至今約54 年），擁有多類車輛的駕駛資格。自考取車牌後便一直從事駕駛相關工作為生，包括紅色小巴及中港貨車。大律師指被告人自1990年始，被告人成為的士司機。可是根據被告人的經歷供詞，他是由1994年才開始任職的士司機。

5.  被告人沒有任何刑事定罪紀錄。2024 年8月24日他就一項「不小心駕駛」被定罪，處以罰款1,000 元及扣除5分。

原則

6.  「危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」是嚴重控罪，一經循公訴程序定罪，最高刑罰為第 5 級罰款及七年監禁。雖然沒有量刑指引，但量刑的要旨是阻嚇、懲罰及譴責，須判處阻嚇式刑罰。另外，除非有特殊原因，否則首次被定罪後，須停牌最少 2 年。

7.  刑期視乎被告人的罪責：HKSAR v Lee Yau-wing [2013] 1 HKC 572。於 律政司司長訴朱詠妍 [2020] 1 HKLRD 771，上訴法院指在一般情況下「危險駕駛引致他人身體受嚴重傷害」應以即時監禁為量刑起點。

8.  大律師正確地指出，於 朱詠妍 案中，上訴法庭訂明量刑時，法庭須先衡量被告人的罪責，以釐定涉案行為的客觀危險程度及被告人的道德罪責（moral culpability）。此外，法庭也須考慮受害人受到的傷害及影響和有否加刑因素，包括：

(a) 受害人受傷的程度及性質；

(b) 受害人數目；

(c) 車速；

(d) 受酒精或藥物影響的程度；

(e) 是否有不穩定（erratic）或攻擊性駕駛；

(f) 是否與他人競賽或賣弄駕駛技術；

(g) 危險駕駛時間的長短；

(h) 司機是否忽視相關的警告；

(i) 司機是否正逃離警方的追捕；

(j) 司機是否缺乏睡眠；

(k) 司機是否沒有及時將車輛停下；

(l) 案發是否在行人過路線；及

(m) 被告人是否駕駛公共車輛等等。

討論

9.  大律師指，在 朱詠妍案中，涉案司機在紅色交通燈號下駛進行人過路線，未能及時剎車，撞到三名行人及導致他們重傷，其中兩人一人永久殘缺，一人於判刑時仍處於一種癱瘓狀態。區域法院判處被告人200小時社會服務令。上訴法庭認為合適的判刑起點為18個月監禁。

10.  大律師力陳，本案被告將油門當作剎車制的行為無疑屬危險，但要求法庭考慮這是源於被告人一時疏忽和情急而出錯。另外，考慮到被告人的年紀、良好背景、過往的駕駛紀錄、本案背景及被告人已注銷駕駛執照等因素，希望法庭能夠盡量輕判。

11.  首先，本案的案情與 朱詠妍 案的案情有重要的分歧。於朱詠妍案中，基於原審法官就事實的裁定，上訴法庭無奈地接受：

(1) 答辯人並沒及時留意到案發時亮著紅燈（第39 - 40段）；

(2) 答辯人沒有留意到有行人正準備行過馬路（第39 - 40段）；及

(3) 答辯人並非故意衝紅燈（第40段）。

12.  本案中：

(1) 案發地點鄰近巴士總站，所有乘容均須下車，行人流量較高。任何合格謹慎的駕駛者開車前都會先留意行人及路面情況；

(2) 案發時控方第一及第二證人在巴士總站附近的行人過路處橫過馬路。橫過馬路前，他們均有觀察路面情況，確認可以安全橫過馬路（案情撮要第2段）。換言之，如被告人有留意路面情況，他開動引擎前已應留意到有行人在過路處等候橫過馬路。被告人應讓行人橫過馬路後才開動的士。被告人不但於開車後才留意到控方第一證人，還突然衝前（案情撮要第3段）；

(3) 被告人開動引擎後，已目睹控方第一證人在的士前方橫過馬路。他聲稱隨即剎車，但的士仍繼續撞倒控方第一證人。被告人稱試圖剎車，但因太緊張，誤踏油門才撞到控方第二證人。如被告人在撞到控方第一證人前曾剎車，但未及避免意外，他的腳應正踏著剎車掣，根本沒有理由將腳移向油門。他的說法並不可信；

(4) 被告人是一名有數十年經驗的駕駛者。誤踏油門的錯誤極度明顯；任何一個合格和𧫴慎的駕駛者都會立即停止踏油門。可是被告人不但沒有減速或停車，還踏著油門，橫衝直撞，撞到控方第二證人後，再撞毁鐵欄才停車。換言之，被告人是撞到控方第一證人後再加速撞到控方第二證人；

(5) 被告人是職業司機；朱詠妍 案的被告人並非職業司機；

(6) 被告人是經驗極豐富的駕駛者；朱詠妍 案的被告人則考獲車牌約一年；

(7) 朱詠妍 案的最少一名傷者有永久殘缺。本案中，兩名傷者均沒有永久殘缺，但控方第二證人明顯有疤痕，需要繼續治理。

13.  朱詠妍 案的被告人沒有任何刑事或交通紀錄。本案被告人以往沒有任何刑事定罪紀錄，但有一次「不小心駕駛」紀錄。沒有爭議的是，被告人犯案日期為2024年3月10日，但於本案案發後才被定罪。因此，本席將本案被告人視作沒有任何刑事或交通紀錄的人。

14.  大律師要求法庭考慮被告人過徃的良好紀錄；被告亦注銷其駕駛執照，不會再犯。一般而言，就嚴重及須判處阻嚇性刑罰的控罪，被告人以往紀錄良好並非衡量量刑起點的因素。Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 指出：

[7-5] In R v Chan Ka-choi [1988] 1 HKLR 530, 534 … the traditional approach of the courts to the issue of clear record was explained:

Once the offender had been found guilty of the offence, the court must, leaving aside person circumstances and previous record, make an assessment as to the proper sentence to be imposed given the type of offence and the circumstances of its commission. When this had been done, the court must give credit for absence of previous convictions and for personal circumstances.

[7-6] Credit for a clear record is, however, by no means a given. Much will depend upon the nature of the offence and the position of the offender. In HKSAR v Law Num-chun [2014] 6 HKC 606, 617: Lunn VP said:

[T] he principle is that good character is not a factor relevant generally to determining the starting point to be taken for sentence in serious criminal offences for which a deterrent sentence is required …

[7-9] In Secretary for Justice v Lam Siu-tong [2009] 5 HKLRD 601, 610 … Ma CJHC, having said that the court would not show mercy to drivers who endangered the lives and safety of other road users, added that ‘in these circumstances, good character and remorse may count very little’; in such cases, a deterrent sentence is required, good character and remorse, notwithstanding: HKSAR v Lam Ying-yu [2014] 2 HKLRD 895 …

15.  上訴法院於 朱詠妍 案亦有探討這個論點：

“46. … The Court observed:

Some sentencing judges find it very difficult to accept that a person of good character who is unlikely to re-offend should be sent to gaol. However, Parliament has made it quite clear that the injuries occasioned by driving dangerously and, no doubt, the prevalence of the offence, require condign punishment.

47. We too recognise that there will be occasions when a sentencing court may find it difficult to impose a custodial sentence on an offender who is a person of good character and who had no intention of committing such a serious traffic offence. However, the legislature has decreed by the penalty provision that a custodial sentence should be passed where the dangerousness of the driving and the moral culpability of the driver warrant such punishment. It is important to bear in mind that this offence provision is set in the context where a person has driven a vehicle in a dangerous manner causing the death of, or serious injury to, another. The dangerousness of the driving is an aspect of the offence that must be clearly recognised by sentencing courts, and guidance as to how it should be assessed has been provided by the relevant legislative provisions.”

16.  於 朱詠妍  案中，上訴法庭指在英國該控罪的最高刑期為 5 年監禁（而非香港的7年監禁）。上訴法庭提及英國的 R v Bennett [2017] EWCA Crim 748：

“43. the appellant, a man of good character with an unblemished driving record, drove a bus across a pedestrian crossing at 26 mph (below the speed limit) about two seconds after the traffic lights governing vehicles had changed to red. He struck a pedestrian who had stepped out onto the crossing when the lights had changed to red for vehicles, causing very serious injuries including fractures to his skull and face, and perforations to his lungs and liver, requiring several operations. The judge adopted a starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment, reduced to only 20 months’ imprisonment for the appellant’s late plea and other mitigation. His appeal was dismissed …”

17.  於 朱詠妍 案中，上訴法庭亦提及 HKSAR v Wong Kam Chuen [2017] HKEC 2374：

“60. A slightly earlier judgment of the District Court, which we have found, with respect, not only useful in the similarity of its facts but also in its identification of the appropriate starting point, is the sentence of HH Judge E Lin in HKSAR v Wong Kam Chuen. There, a young woman was crossing a road at a pedestrian crossing when the pedestrian lights had just turned in her favour. After she had taken about 10 steps, she was knocked down on the second lane by a light goods vehicle driven by the defendant. The road conditions were good and the traffic volume moderate. The defendant had driven through the crossing at a consistent speed, but within the speed limit of 50 kph. The young woman was rendered unconscious with severe head injuries, requiring two brain surgeries and resulting in residual hearing impairment and double vision.

61. The judge found that the defendant “must have consciously chosen to run through a red light and had, for reasons unknown, failed to notice the victim on the road and proceeded without slowing”. This deliberate risk taking was regarded as an aggravating factor. He assessed the starting point at 21 months’ imprisonment, which he reduced for the defendant’s plea and clear record to 14 months’ imprisonment.”

18.  考慮到本案的整體案情，本席認為適當的量刑基準為2年半（即30個月）監禁。

減刑

19.  被告人適時認罪，可獲三分一的扣減，刑期減為20個月監禁。

20.  大律師指被告人紀錄良好，有真誠悔意及已放棄駕駛執照，不會再犯。於 HKSAR v Ngo Van Nam [2016] 5 HKC 231，上訴法庭已述明，認罪折扣已涵括悔意及所有其他求情因素；該折扣已是最高分水線，除非有極特殊的求情因素，否則不應予以額外扣減。

21.  Sentencing in Hong Kong 11th Edition 亦指出：

[7-14] The practice of the courts in recent times has been to give the accused who pleaded guilty a sentencing discount of one-third: HKSAR v Lo Chi-yip and Anor [2000] 3 HKLRD 270, 277 … The accused who pleaded guilty at the outset will receive a full discount irrespective of whether he has a criminal record, is caught red-handed or is genuinely remorseful. Since the ‘one-third rule’ has solidified into principle, there is no scope for a further discount, save in exceptional circumstances, such as where assistance is provided to the authorities. In HKSAR v Yan Wai-ming [2003] HKCU 264 (CACC 417/2002, 26 February 2003, unreported), Stuart-Moore VP said:

In the days before the discount of one-third on timely pleas of guilty became standard practice, previous good character used to be one of many factors which judges would take into account in deciding what discount to give on a plea of guilty. The one-third discount is usually, as we have said on numerous occasions, to be taken as the high watermark of the discount unless there are very special factors to be taken into account.

[7-15] In Secretary for Justice v Ko Wai Kit [2001] 3 HKLRD 751, 757 … Stock JA said that the ‘lack of previous convictions will often be subsumed in the credit given for a plea of guilty’. In Secretary for Justice v Lee Cho Keung and Ors [2004] 4 HKC 179, 189, the court noted that ‘The established course is now to view the presence of good character as part and parcel of the one-third discount given upon a plea’. The ‘element of good character is normally taken as being included in the one-third discount for a plea of guilt’: Secretary for Justice v Tso Tsz Kin [2004] 2 HKC 139, 144. In HKSAR v Cheng Kelly Kit Yin [2014] 4 HKLRD 34 …, Barma J said ‘the one-third discount for a plea of guilty is the discount to be afforded even to those with clear record’ [16]. In Secretary for Justice v Cheng Tsz Hin [2020] 1 HKC 576 …, a judge who awarded a two-month sentencing discount to an accused who have been convicted of dangerous driving causing death for his clear record and perfect driving record was held to have erred …

[7-16] The judge who granted an accused who pleaded guilty an additional discount of three months’ imprisonment ‘to take account of her [hitherto] good character’, was said to have erred in Secretary for Justice v Chau Wan Fun [2007] 1 HKC 423, 428 … The discount for a guilty plea already has ‘built into it and allowance for good record where there is one’: HKSAR v Yung Wai Siu [2001] 1 HKLRD 277, 279 … In this context, a clear record is not so much a mitigating factor as a ‘neutral feature in the case’: HKSAR v Wen Zelang [2006] 4 HKLRD 460, 465 …

[7-17] In HKSAR v Wong King-wai [2008] 2 HKC 614, 622, Stuart-Moore ACJHC said:

Personal circumstances, including a clear record, may, of course, have a bearing on mitigation for offences which are comparatively minor in nature. However, for serious offenses, we have indicated time and time again that, with the introduction of the ‘one-third rule’ which in usual circumstances provides a discount of a third of the prison sentence that would normally have been imposed of the trial following timely pleas of guilty, there should be no further discount for a clear record unless evidence of positive good character is forthcoming.

[7-18] The relevance of good character is related to the circumstances of the accused. Good character sometimes refers to no more than an absence of previous convictions, and this is not a basis for an additional discount: HKSAR v Wong Kam Shing, Jackie [2010] 4 HKC 580, 584 … The mere absence of criminal convictions must not be confused with positive good character, and the simple discharge of duties in a proper manner ‘does not constitute what is to be regarded as positive good character’: HKSAR v Leung Ping Nam [2007] 5 HKC 413, 427; HKSAR v Chung Ka Hung [2010] HKCU 738 …”

22.  大律師指被告人現年72歲，還有尿酸和痛風等老人疾病，但身體狀況大致良好。案發後，被告人患上創傷後遺症，經常發惡夢並會浮現案發時的畫面。被告人因此感到焦慮、失眠、食欲不振。醫生已處方藥物給被告人，被告人的情況已有好轉。

23.  一般而言，除非有其他特別求情因素，單單是被告人的年齡並非減刑原因： Secretary for Justice v Wong Hong-leung[2010] 1 HKLRD 226, 235。本案被告人的年齡亦不算特別老邁： HKSAR v Chow Chi-ming[2006] HKCU 398； HKSAR v Lau Yuk-Huen [2008] HKCU 864； HKSAR v Tsui Lai-Ying and Ors [1987] HKLR 857, 881; R v Clarke; R v Cooper [2017] EWCA Crim 393.

24.  眾所周知，被告人的身體狀況亦非求情因素： Clarkson v R (2007) 171 A Crim R 1, 49； Yip Kai-foon v HKSAR [2000] 1 HKC 335, 339； HKSAR v Tong Fuk-sing [1999] 3 HKC 332, 336； HKSAR v Wong Chi-choi[2005] HKCU 1443; HKSAR v Woo Shun-cheong and Anor [1998] HKCU 2082； HKSAR v Chan Kau-tai[2008] 3 HKC 78, 89。

25.  於 Secretary for Justice v Cheng Tsz-hin [2020] 1 HKC 576，上訴法庭指創傷後遺症是極度悔意，與一般病患有別，亦構成減刑因素；但減幅必須合乎適當的判刑。

26.  基於被告人患上創傷後遺症，本席酌情減刑一個月，即19個月監禁。

27.  另外，雖然被告人已放棄駕駛執照，但本席必須根據香港法例第374章《道路交通條例》第36A(2) 及 (3)(a) 條，下令取消被告人的駕駛資格2年。被告人亦須於停牌期最後三個月內，自費參加駕駛改進課程。