NGUYEN VAN THONG v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1999/2023

[2026] HKCFI 2896

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1999 OF 2023

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

1.  On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.

2.  The applicant’s application to withdraw the application for leave to apply for judicial review be refused.

3.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.  By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 8 November 2023, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 2 November 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).

2.  The Board found that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection were not made out on any of the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 5 November 2020, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.

Amendments

3.  The applicant named the Board / the Non-refoulement Claims Petition office and the Director as the putative respondents, and did not name any putative interested party in Form 86. In fact, only the Board should be the putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative interested party.

4.  The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board, and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.

5.  Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the Director is added as the putative interested party.

The applicant’s case

6.  The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by the loan shark named Le Van Tinh due to his inability to repay the loan borrowed from the loan shark.

Withdrawal of the Leave Application

7.  Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the applicant filed an ex-parte application by way of his affirmation dated 14 April 2026 and sent a letter dated 14 April 2026 to this court to withdraw the Leave Application. In both the applicant’s said affirmation and letter, he stated that it was safe for him to return to his country and he would like to return to his country as soon as possible.

8.  There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the above withdrawal application other than out of his own volition. With this withdrawal application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing for the Leave Application. It is therefore not necessary for this court to afford him any oral hearing for the Leave Application even though he had requested one before.

9.  However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-

“The applicant on his own motion applied to the Court to withdraw his application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge acceded to his application, whereupon there was nothing outstanding in the action. The Judge was correct to conclude the action by ordering a dismissal of the application instead of leaving the action at large.”

10.  Thus, it is right for this court to deal with the Leave Application instead of leaving the action at large by granting leave to the applicant to withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant’s application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused, and this court will proceed to consider the Leave Application.

Discussion

11.  It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that it was safe for him to return to his country. In other words, the basis of his non-refoulement claim no longer exists.

12.  It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical purpose.

13.  It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of 2015).

14.  Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer unsafe for him to return to his own country. The Board should assess the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743).

15.  It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed.

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1