NGUYEN HO AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND ANOTHER

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JUDGMENT

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Sir Derek Cons, V.P., delivered the judgment of the Court:

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council against the decision of this Court which affirmed the decision of Mortimer J., not to admit particular evidence tendered for his consideration in proceedings for judicial review brought by nine individuals contesting the rejection of their applications to be granted the status of refugees as defined in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 as amended by the 1967 Protocol.

2. As it is an interlocutory decision we can only grant leave to appeal if we are satisfied that the questions involved are of great, general or public importance: see Rule 2(b) of the order in Council, 27th November 1957.

3. The questions which are said to be of that nature are, as we understand them, twofold. Firstly that this Court was wrong to decide that Wednesbury unreasonableness is to be judged only with regard to the material before the lower tribunal; secondly that Court was wrong to decide that Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] 1 AC 514 (and perhaps Re "H" unreported CO/826/86 31st July 1987) did not extend, with regard to cases of political asylum and refugee status, the principles of admissibility set out in R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment: ex. p. Powis [1981] 1 WLR 585 and approved by this Court in Madam Lee Bun & Lee Ching Ming v. Director of Immigration Civil Appeals 54 & 55/90 unreported 29th June 1990.

4. Since the hearing before this Court the proceedings below have been separated, and have continued for the moment with regard to one Applicant only. It is expected that judgment will be given in his respect on the 1st February. Whether the proceedings with regard to the other Applicants will then follow in turn immediately thereafter is a matter, of course, not for this Court but for the trial judge. But it seems to us almost inevitable that when the case of that one Applicant (and unless they are stayed those of the other Applicants also) have been finally dealt with at all levels, within this jurisdiction there will be further applications for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. We take the view in that circumstance that it is most desirable that their Lordships of the Privy Council should, if they are going to be troubled at all with these various matters, be troubled with them all together rather than piecemeal.

5. We acknowledge that it was essential for Mr. Daniel Fung, on behalf of the Applicants, to bring his application at this time. But we propose, for the reasons just given, to adjourn the application sine die with liberty to either party to restore the application if and when it is thought appropriate; and we shall reserve the question of costs.