LERTVARANURAK, VARAVOOT v. WONG, KAM WAI DAVID AND OTHERS
[2026] HKLdT 41 · LDBM 128/2024
LDBM 128/2024
[2026] HKLdT 41
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 128 OF 2024
_________________
|BETWEEN | | |
| | Lertvaranurak, Varavoot |Applicant |
| | | |
| | and | |
| | | |
| | Wong, Kam Wai David |1st Respondent |
| | |(Discontinued) |
| | | |
| | Din, Ramjahnbe |2nd Respondent |
| | |(Discontinued) |
| | | |
| |The Incorporated Owners of Civic Commercial |3rd Respondent |
| |Building | |
| |置域商業大厦業主立案法團 | |
| | | |
_________________
|Before: |Deputy District Judge W.Y. HO, Presiding Officer|
| |of the Lands Tribunal, in Court |
|Dates of Trial: |3rd and 4th March 2026 |
|Date of Judgment:|3rd August 2026 |
_________________
J U D G M E N T
_________________
The parties seek their respective costs of this action after having settled
the action on the first day of trial.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is the owner of Shops 4, 5, 8 and 9 (collectively referred to
as “the Shops”) on the Ground Floor of Civic Commercial Building (“the
Building”).
According to the Applicant’s witness statement, he tried to secure the
Respondent’s consent to install individual water meters to the Shops since
2023. However, the Respondent refused the Applicant’s request without
reason. As proof of the Respondent’s refusal, the Applicant produced a
phone message sent from a Mr. Chan (the property manager at the time of the
message) in June 2024.
The Applicant filed his Notice of Application (“Form 29”) on 15 July 2024
and sought the following relief (see paragraph 1 of the Form 29):
“The Applicant(s) apply(ies) for an order relating to
enforcement of the terms and provisions of the Deed of Mutual
Covenant of the Civic Commercial Building, specifically the
privileges that were granted to an owner explicitly and
implicitly in Sections 3c and 5 respectively.”
In addition to the relief pleaded in the Form 29, the Applicant urged the
Tribunal to compel the Respondent to give their consent to his application
for the installation of individual water meters for the Shops.
The Respondent denied they had refused the Applicant’s request to install
individual water meters for the Shops. The Respondent made it clear to the
Applicant that he must comply with various conditions before the Respondent
could consider whether consent could be given in respect of the proposed
installation of water meters to the Shops.
The conditions imposed by the Respondent are set out in the Notice of
Opposition (dated 7 October 2024), and summarized as follows (collectively
referred to as “the Conditions”):
1) The Applicant must make a written application to the Respondent.
2) The installation works must be carried out by qualified plumbers
and technicians. Details of the works must be provided to the
Respondent including plans of pipes and various installations.
3) The Respondent will need to consider whether other owners also
intend to install separate water meters and consider whether the
water supply system can support the extra water demand.
4) The Respondent must call an owners’ meeting to decide on the
matter and obtain consent from all owners before consent can be
given to the Applicant’s application.
5) The Applicant must be responsible for the costs of the
installation and undertake to compensate other owners for any
damage and/or loss caused by the installation works proposed by
the Applicant.
On 5 December 2025, HHJ SH Lee ordered the trial of the Applicant’s Form 29
be heard on 3 March 2026 with 3 days reserved.
On the first day of trial (that is, 3 March 2026), the parties reached a
settlement on all matters except for costs before the calling of evidence.
By consent of the parties, the following orders were made (“the Settlement
Agreement”):
1. The 3rd Respondent agrees to provide conditional consent to
the Applicant for the installation of a separate government water
meter for his shops Nos. 4-5 and 8-9 at the Ground Floor (the
“Shops”) of Civic Commercial Building (the “Building”) of 165-
167, Woosung Street, Kowloon, Hong Kong, subject to the following
conditions that:-
(a) The owners of the Shops shall bear all costs and expenses
arising from the application for and installation of a
separate government water meter, including but not limited
to any professional fees prescribed by the Water Supplies
Department (“WSD”) and all necessary internal and external
pipework and associated works;
(b) The said installation works shall be carried out by a
licensed plumber approved by the WSD and shall in all
respects comply with the relevant requirements of the WSD
and the Buildings Ordinance, Cap.123 (“BO”); and
(c) The said installation works shall not cause any damage to
or undue nuisance affecting the common parts of the Building
or any other owners. Any damage arising from such water
supply installation shall be promptly repaired and the costs
thereof borne by the owners of the Shops; and
2. Costs of this action be reserved.
Since parties were unable to reach an agreement on costs, I ordered the
parties to make submissions on costs and adjourned the hearing to the next
day of trial (that is, 4 March 2026).
Counsel for the Respondent, Mr. Leung, submitted the Respondent should be
considered substantially successful in these proceedings and therefore
should get their costs. Mr Leung’s submissions are summarized as follows:
1) As early as October 2024 (that is, the date of the Notice of
Opposition), the Respondent made the Conditions known to the
Applicant. However, the Applicant did not comply with the said
Conditions.
2) The Applicant’s litigation conduct warrants a costs order
against him. The conduct complained of are as follows:
a) The Applicant raised many complaints in his Re-Re-
Amended Notice of Application, which generated a
number of collateral issues to be dealt with at the
trial.
b) The Applicant habitually disobeyed deadlines given by
the Tribunal. For example, the Applicant frequently
filed documents out of time and made late
interlocutory applications.
c) The Applicant’s position kept changing.
d) The Applicant all along insisted the Respondent give
its unconditional consent and refused to abide by the
Conditions set by the Respondent.
e) The terms of the Settlement Agreement mirror the
Conditions.
The Applicant argued it was the Respondent’s unreasonable refusal to his
proposed installation works that necessitated the need to proceed with the
present litigation. The Applicant submitted he should be awarded the costs
of the proceedings by reason of the Respondent’s litigation conduct as
follows:
1) During 2023 – 2024, the Respondent gave a blanket refusal to the
Applicant’s application. It was not until the Respondent changed
its chairman, did the Respondent then proceed to propose the
Conditions as a pre-condition to granting consent to the
Applicant’s application.
2) The Applicant is of the view the Conditions were “discriminatory
and unprecedented” as no other owner had been subjected to the
same conditions when they made similar installations. In fact,
the Respondent granted approval or acquiesced to the same
situation in respect of other owners (namely, owners of Shops 2
and 3).
3) The Applicant made a “Calderbank Offer” on 28 January 2026 but
the same was rejected by the Respondent. Furthermore, in
addition to rejecting the Applicant’s proposed costs order, the
Respondent unreasonably insisted on indemnity costs.
I now proceed to set out the legal principles governing the present costs
application.
THE LAW
The Tribunal’s power to award costs is set out in section 12 of the Lands
Tribunal Ordinance, which states, inter alia:
(1) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the
Tribunal are in the discretion of the Tribunal, and the Tribunal
has full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs
are to be paid.
When exercising the Tribunal’s discretion on costs, the Tribunal should
have regard to the matters set out in Order 62 Rule 5 Rules of High Court
(Cap 4A):
“1) The Court in exercising its discretion as to costs shall, to
such extent, if any, as may be appropriate in the circumstances,
take into account— (L.N. 152 of 2008)
(aa)the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A, rule 1;
(L.N. 152 of 2008)
(a)any such offer of contribution as is mentioned in Order
16, rule 10, which is brought to its attention in pursuance
of a reserved right to do so;
(b)any payment of money into court and the amount of such
payment;
(c)any written offer made under Order 33, rule 4A(2); (L.N.
152 of 2008)
(d)any written offer which is expressed to be “without
prejudice save as to costs” and which relates to any issue in
the proceedings, but the Court may not take the offer into
account if, at the time it is made, the party making it could
have protected his position as to costs by means of a
sanctioned payment or a sanctioned offer under Order 22;
(L.N. 152 of 2008)
(e)the conduct of all the parties; (L.N. 152 of 2008)
(f)whether a party has succeeded on part of his case, even if
he has not been wholly successful; and (L.N. 152 of 2008)
(g)any admissible offer to settle made by a party, which is
drawn to the Court’s attention. (L.N. 152 of 2008)
(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(e), the conduct of the
parties includes—
(a)whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or
contest a particular allegation or issue;
(b)the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his
case or a particular allegation or issue;
(c)whether a claimant who has succeeded in his claim, in
whole or in part, exaggerated his claim; and
(d)conduct before, as well as during, the proceedings. (L.N.
152 of 2008)”
In considering the appropriate costs order to be made after the trial has
been settled, the Hon Au-Yeung J has succinctly summarised the matters to
be considered in the case of Famous Marvel Co Ltd & Ors v Conversant Group
Ltd & Ors, HCA 2153/2009, (unrep), 29 October 2012, at paragraph 22 of the
judgment as follows:
“22. There is no dispute that even if a case is settled except
as to costs, the Court still has power to determine which party
should be liable for costs. There is no tradition for there to
be "no order as to costs" in such a scenario. I am guided by the
following principles in deciding costs:
(i) The Court is to decide if the party seeking costs has
substantially obtained the reliefs sought in the litigation:
Re Chinese United Establishment Ltd, HCCW 291/1994, 5
October 1995, Rogers J (as he then was), approved in CACV
214/1995; Lai Yuet Chun v Super Deluxe International Limited
& ors, HCCW 186/2001, 3 June 2003 Kwan J (as she then was).
(ii) At each end of the spectrum there will be cases where
it is obvious which side would have won had the substantive
issues been fought to a conclusion. In between, the position
will, in differing degrees, be less clear. How far the Court
will be prepared to look into the previously unresolved
substantive issues will depend on the circumstances of the
particular case, not least the amount of costs at stake and
the conduct of the parties. Brawley v Marcynski (No. 1)
[2003] 1 WLR 813.
(iii) The Court will first consider if it is in a position
to say what the likely outcome after trial would have been.
If it is not in a position to do so, the order may well be
no order as to costs: Brawley v Marcynski (No.1), at para
18, Longmore LJ; followed in BCT Software Solutions Ltd v C
Brewer & Sons Ltd [2004] FSR 150.
(iv) The Court may permit parties to adduce evidence on the
question of costs: Ta Tung China & Arts Ltd v Fontana
Restaurant Ltd [1999] 1 HKLRD 404; Lai Yuet Chun v Super
Deluxe International Limited & ors, at para 12. However, to
say that the parties must go to trial in order to resolve
any outstanding questions of costs would be contrary to the
underlying objectives enshrined in Order 1A rules 1 and 2:
Graham M Morley v Kwan Wo Wan & others, HCA 4366/2003, 30
December 2009, Recorder Jat SC.
(v) A broad brush can be taken by referring to all matters
already laid before the Court, eg pleadings, correspondence,
witness statements, transcripts of evidence and the terms of
the settlement order: c.f. BCT Software Solutions Ltd v C
Brewer & Sons Ltd, at para 9; Graham M Morley v Kwan Wo Wan
& others.
(vi) The objective is to do justice between the parties
without incurring unnecessary Court time and consequently
additional cost: Brawley v Marcynski (No.1).”
With the above principles in mind, I now proceed to consider the parties’
respective application for costs.
WHETHER THE PROCEEDINGS WERE UNNECESSARILY BROUGHT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
One of the main disputes between the parties is whether the present action
was avoidable or whether it was commenced unnecessarily.
I am of the view this action was unavoidable.
The Applicant produced evidence to prove he was informed by a Mr Chan (a
representative of the management company) that his application to install
water meters in the Shops was rejected by the Respondent. Despite the
Respondent’s attempt to absolve itself from any representations made by the
previous chairman, the Respondent has not adduced any evidence to rebut the
Applicant’s evidence. The Respondent merely explained they have not found
any record of rejection or approval of the proposed installation works
before 2019.
Furthermore, there is no evidence produced by the Respondent to prove the
Respondent communicated the Conditions to the Applicant prior to the filing
of their Notice of Opposition. In other words, in so far as the Applicant
is concerned, the Respondent’s position up until the filing of the Form 29
was a point-blank refusal to the Applicant’s application for installation
of water meters.
Hence, I do not find the proceedings to be avoidable or unnecessarily
commenced.
WHETHER EITHER PARTY CAN BE CONSIDERED SUBSTANTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS
I am of the view the Respondent could not be considered to be substantially
successful in the present proceedings.
There is no evidence before me to prove whether the Conditions were made
known to the Applicant prior to the filing of the Notice of Opposition. On
the documentary evidence before the Tribunal, the Notice of Opposition is
the first written record of the Conditions.
It is clear that once the Conditions were made known to the Applicant
through the Notice of Opposition, the Applicant submitted his written
application on 10 February 2025 (“the Written Application”). In the Written
Application, the Applicant acceded to the Conditions as follows:
1) He provided the intended plumbing route plan showing the route
and location of the water pipes.
2) He explained the intended location at which the water meters
would be installed.
3) He agreed the works would be carried out by licensed plumber.
4) He agreed he would submit the proper documentation to the WSD
(Water Supplied Department) for their approval.
5) He agreed the installation would comply with all relevant
regulations and guidelines set down by the WSD.
Although the Applicant did not expressly say he would be responsible for
the costs of the installation works, I am of the view it has been the
implicit understanding between the parties the Applicant would pay for the
said installation works. In any event, there is no evidence the Applicant
requests the Respondent to the pay the same.
Hence, save and except for the undertaking to compensate owners for any
damage or loss arising from the installation, the Applicant acceded to all
of the Conditions.
I note the Respondent in his witness statement formulated the condition
regarding compensation differently from that as pleaded in the Notice of
Opposition. The Respondent stated the Applicant was required to undertake
to be responsible for all maintenance and repairs of the installed water
pipes during and after the installation works, and any loss/damages arising
from the same (see the Respondent’s Witness Statement).
It is trite to say, if the Applicant causes any loss or damage by reason of
works undertaken by himself or his agents, the Respondent would have a
right to seek compensation against the Applicant. Hence, the insistence of
any undertaking to that effect does not place the Respondent in a better
position.
Furthermore, with regards to the undertaking to compensate other owners,
the Tribunal is not in a position to make orders for the benefit of non-
parties. Hence the Respondent’s request for a pre-emptive undertaking for
the benefit of other owners, whom are non-parties to this action, would not
be granted by this Tribunal.
I therefore do not see the inclusion of paragraph 1(c) of the Settlement
Agreement to be indicative of the Respondent’s success in defending the
proceedings.
However, this does not mean the Applicant is to be considered the
successful party. The Applicant’s Form 29 is not without its problems. For
example, the Applicant’s understanding of the Deed of Mutual Covenant is
not entirely correct, if at all.
The Deed of Mutual Covenant (“the DMC”) does not make any provision for an
owner’s request to install independent water meters. Clause 3(c) of the DMC
(regarding right to “free and uninterrupted passage of water”) , as relied
on by the Applicant, does not override all other provisions of the DMC. As
per Clause 11 of the DMC, the water tanks, meter rooms pump rooms etc are
all under the exclusive control of the Manager and any alterations would
require the Manager’s consent. Furthermore, any pipes to be erected in the
common areas or within common facilities must be installed with the owners’
consent. Hence it is clear the Applicant’s understanding of his rights
under Clause 3(c) of the DMS is not correct.
I refrain from opining whether any party would likely succeed if the matter
had gone to trial because the present case is fact sensitive. The Tribunal
would need to assess the evidence and factual witnesses in order to
understand whether in fact the Applicant’s right to free passage of water
to the Shops has been hindered by the refusal of the Respondent to grant
consent to the Applicant’s application. The Tribunal would also need to
make factual determinations on whether the Respondent’s initial refusal was
made unreasonably. It is not possible without the benefit of factual
evidence to gauge who would likely be successful had the matter proceeded
to full trial.
I note the Settlement Agreement reached between the parties on 3 March 2026
involves conditional consent from the Respondent and a statement that the
Applicant would be responsible for remedial works and the costs of such
works in the event of any loss or damage. The Settlement Agreement is
clearly an order that could only have been made with the consent of the
parties. It is not an order that would have been made by the Tribunal after
trial.
Since the terms of the Settlement Agreement are a product of the parties’
consensus, I am of the view neither parties can be considered to be largely
successful and no costs order should be made against either party.
THE APPLICANT’S “CALDERBANK OFFER”
The Applicant claims to have made a Calderbank offer to the Respondent by
way of his draft consent order dated 28 January 2026 (“the Draft Consent
Order”).
The Respondent denied having received any Calderbank offer on costs. The
Respondent explained that upon receipt of the Draft Consent Order, they
told the Applicant they do not agree to no order as to costs and would seek
costs. However, the Applicant refused to pay the Respondent’s costs and did
not make any further counter-offer.
Having considered the parties’ submissions, I agree the Applicant’s Draft
Consent Order cannot be considered a Calderbank offer for the following
reasons:
1) The Draft Consent Order contains various provisions relating to
the settlement of the whole action and not just on costs.
2) It is unclear whether the Applicant’s proposed costs order was
independent of other terms set out in the Draft Consent Order.
There is no evidence to prove the Applicant’s proposed costs
order could be considered independently of other terms in the
draft consent order.
3) It is unclear how long the purported offer was to be valid for
or when the deadline for the Respondent to accept was.
Hence in absence of an unequivocal offer on costs from the Applicant, I do
not accept the Applicant made a Calderbank offer to the Respondent. I
therefore do not accept the Applicant should be awarded costs on the basis
of his Draft Consent Order.
SUMMARY
By reason of the matters set out above, I am of the view the no costs order
should be made. I therefore make no order as to costs of these proceedings,
including all costs reserved.
|(Wai Yang Ho) |
|Deputy District Judge |
|Presiding Officer |
|Lands Tribunal |
Mr Lertvaranurak Varavoot, the Applicant, acting in person
Mr Leung, Samuel Y.C., instructed by Huen & Partners, for the 3rd
Respondent
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