K,LYS v. T,CKE

CAMP 96/2026, [2026] HKCA 1155

On appeal from [2026] HKFC 85

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 96 OF 2026

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM FCMC NO 10356 OF 2013)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Kwan VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.  On 29 May 2026, the Registrar of Civil Appeals directed that: (1) the summons of the respondent filed on 27 May 2026 for urgent stay of his means examination in the Family Court pending the determination of his application for leave to appeal in CAMP 96/2026 and other directions (“Stay Summons”); and (2) the application of the respondent for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal filed on 26 March 2026 in CAMP 96/2026 (“Leave Summons”) against the decision of Deputy District Judge Jacqueline Lee (“Judge Lee”) dated 6 January 2026 in FCMC 10356/2013 (“6 Jan 26 Decision”) be dealt with together on an urgent basis, unless the Court of Appeal directs otherwise, as the means examination of the respondent will take place on 6 July 2026. For this purpose, and in view of the time constraint, the Registrar gave a very strict timetable for the filing of affidavits, the lodging of written statements, submissions and the application bundle.

2.  Both parties have complied with the Registrar’s directions. Both are acting in person and have made their submissions in English.

3.  On 22 June 2026, the respondent filed an application for leave to file an “Annex A”, purportedly to correct a “material factual error” in the petitioner’s submissions dated 16 June 2026 regarding the “revocation” of his legal aid, which the respondent sought to correct was an “administrative closure”. This is hardly material. We would not grant leave to put in the additional material, nor would we consider the legal aid history of the respondent.   

4.  Having considered the papers, we agree with the Registrar it is appropriate to deal with the Stay Summons and the Leave Summons expeditiously. We exercise our power to do so on paper without an oral hearing pursuant to Order 59 rule 2A(5) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.

5.  It is appropriate to deal with the Leave Summons first. The view formed on the prospects of success of the intended appeal would impact on the discretion in disposing of the Stay Summons.

Background

6.  The relevant factual background is taken from the judgments of His Honour Judge K K Pang (“Judge Pang”) dated 31 August 2018 ([2018] HKFC 148) and 29 December 2020 ([2020] HKFC 269; “Maintenance Order Judgment”), and the judgment of Judge Lee dated 10 March 2026 ([2026] HKFC 39; “10 Mar 26 Judgment”).

7.  The parties were married in November 2011. They have two children, a daughter who is now 16 and a son who is now 14 (collectively, “Children”). The petitioner has a son in a former marriage dissolved in 2007.

8.  The petitioner filed a petition for divorce on the ground of unreasonable behaviour on 22 July 2013. A decree nisi was granted on 22 August 2014 and it was made absolute on 29 June 2021.

9.  The court granted joint custody of the Children to the parties, with care and control to the petitioner and defined access to the respondent on 8 January 2014.

10.  On 15 October 2013, the court ordered the respondent to pay interim maintenance for the Children in the sum of $10,000. On 30 August 2017, Judge Pang ordered that the interim maintenance be increased to $15,000 from September 2017.

11.  On 31 August 2018, upon dismissing the petitioner’s application of 17 January 2017 to relocate to Canada with the Children, Judge Pang ordered that the respondent shall pay the petitioner a sum of $154,000, being the arrears of interim maintenance for the Children from 2013 to August 2017, and that the respondent shall pay the petitioner $25,000 per month as interim maintenance for the Children, starting on 10 August 2018 until further order.

12.  The petitioner’s application for ancillary relief was heard by Judge Pang in October 2020 and the Maintenance Order Judgment was handed down on 29 December 2020. Both parties were on legal aid at the time and were represented by counsel. Judge Pang ordered that the respondent shall continue to pay the petitioner $25,000 per month as maintenance for the Children as ordered on 31 August 2018, starting from 10 August 2018 until the Children attain the age of 18 or cease to receive full-time education, whichever is later (“Maintenance Order”).

13.  The respondent failed to comply with Judge Pang’s order dated 31 August 2018 and the Maintenance Order. He made two applications to vary the Maintenance Order on 9 July 2021 and 11 December 2023, alleging that the petitioner had concealed her assets. He did not show up at the substantive hearing of his first application to vary the Maintenance Order and failed to attend the adjourned call-over hearing of the second application for variation. His variation applications were dismissed.

14.  The petitioner only recovered the arrears of interim maintenance of $154,000 in October 2024. As at the time of the 10 Mar 26 Judgment, she had taken out six judgment summonses against the respondent.

15.  As noted by Judge Lee, the parties’ relationship remains severely strained, fighting over matters relating to the Children, ancillary relief and arrears of maintenance. Numerous applications have been made to the Family Court.

6 Jan 26 Decision

16.  On 6 January 2026, Judge Lee dismissed three summonses issued by the respondent acting in person on 29 May 2025, 15 September 2025 and 5 January 2026. The full reasons for the 6 Jan 26 Decision were given in the 10 Mar 26 Judgment, when Judge Lee also gave reasons refusing to grant leave to the respondent to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the 6 Jan 26 Decision.

17.  The summons on 29 May 2025 was to “void for fraud” the maintenance orders made by Judge Pang on 31 August 2018 and 29 December 2020.

18.  The summons on 15 September 2025 was to strike out five judgment summonses to enforce the maintenance orders issued by the petitioner on 5 July 2019, 7 June 2021, 26 July 2023, 22 January 2024, and 24 March 2025.

19.  The grounds of the above applications and the reliefs sought may be summarised as follows:

(1)  The maintenance orders should be made void because the petitioner had provided inaccurate or untrue information on her financial position. She had given false information to mislead the court by her Form Es and the answers filed in response to the respondent’s questionnaire. As Judge Pang had made the maintenance orders based on the petitioner’s false information, all the maintenance orders should be made void.

(2)  The respondent alleged that the petitioner deliberately concealed she owned a property jointly with her mother in 2007. He relied on an interview of the petitioner and her sister in June 2021 to allege that the petitioner has an interest in a funeral planning company and received income from the funeral consultancy business since 2020. He claimed to have found out she had inflated her expenses when she disclosed further documents in subsequent applications.

(3)  As the maintenance orders were obtained by fraud, the judgment debt sought to be enforced by the judgment summonses is not lawfully due. The judgment summonses should be struck out as the proceedings disclose no reasonable cause of action, they are scandalous, they prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the real issue, and they constitute an abuse of process.

(4)  The judgment summonses caused “parental alienation by paper” in that every “procedural stumble” was used to deny the respondent’s access to the Children, alleging that he is an “unworthy father” who does not pay child support.

(5)  The court should convene a hearing to investigate the petitioner’s financial position and to restore the respondent’s direct contact with the Children.

(6)  The respondent’s father (“Grandfather”) should be released from his undertakings to the court given on 31 August 2018: (a) to allow the petitioner and the Children to reside in the former matrimonial home in Pokfulam (a property owned by a company of the respondent’s parents) at no charge until the Children complete their full-time education; and (b) to pay the school fees of the international schools attended by the Children. The petitioner should be ordered to pay market rent for residing in the Pokfulam property since 2018 and pay back the international school fees incurred by the Grandfather since 2018.

(7)  Complaints were made against the petitioner’s solicitors. They served the sealed order on him dated 28 May 2025 in Chinese only and it was filed only on 11 September 2025. As a result, he was hampered in seeking legal advice, obtaining legal aid or bringing an appeal. And the court documents should be in English. He sought costs against the petitioner’s solicitors personally.

20.  The summonses of 29 May 2025 and 15 September 2025 were fixed to be heard before Judge Lee on 6 January 2026.

21.  On the day before the hearing, the respondent issued his third summons on 5 January 2026 seeking: an urgent order against the petitioner and her solicitors for contempt of court; reliefs similar to his two previous summonses; an order vacating the hearing on 6 January 2026 or adjourning it sine die; and indemnity costs against the solicitors personally. A further complaint made in this summons was that the petitioner’s solicitors served the hearing bundle and speaking note on him only on 5 January 2026, thereby depriving him of adequate time to review the papers, to respond, to prepare for the hearing and this contravened the “principles of natural justice and fair trial”. We note that this summons of 5 January 2026 consisted of four pages typed on single spacing, with a supporting affidavit of one page and a considerable bundle exhibiting nine items of documents.

22.  At the end of the hearing on 6 January 2026, Judge Lee dismissed the respondent’s three summonses, and awarded the petitioner costs for the two summonses of 29 May 2025 and 15 September 2025 on an indemnity basis, and costs for the summons filed on 5 January 2026 on a party-and-party basis. The judge ordered the judgment summonses filed by the petitioner on 7 June 2021, 26 July 2023, 22 January 2024 and 24 March 2025 (“3^rd to 6^th Judgment Summonses”) be adjourned to 29 April 2026 for a second pre-trial review.

23.  As mentioned, reasons in full for the 6 Jan 26 Decision were given by Judge Lee in the 10 Mar 26 Judgment and may be summarised as follows:

(1)  The judge considered that the main contention by the respondent to make void the maintenance orders of Judge Pang was that the petitioner had provided inaccurate or untrue information regarding her financial position. The judge noted that the history of the proceedings showed that the respondent is unwilling and unable to accept the findings of the court. The summons to make void the maintenance orders was taken out after the respondent’s two applications to vary the maintenance orders were dismissed.  

(2)  Regarding the complaint that the petitioner had inflated her expenses in respect of the domestic helper’s salary (which would appear to have been paid by the petitioner’s mother and not by her) and the maintenance payment for her son from her first marriage, the judge noted that both parties were legally represented when the Maintenance Order was made five years ago. The respondent should be well aware that once a decision was made and there was no appeal against the Maintenance Order Judgment, the court order should be complied with. Finality in litigation must be upheld in this instance. The summons to make void the Maintenance Order effectively amounts to an appeal by the backdoor and an abuse of the process of the court.

(3)  As for the allegation that the petitioner has an interest in a funeral planning company with her sister, the petitioner has exhibited the annual return of that company filed with the Companies Registry on 15 December 2021, showing that the company was wholly owned by her brother. The annual return had been produced by the petitioner on 6 May 2022 in opposition to the respondent’s application to vary the Maintenance Order. The respondent was aware of this since May 2022 and has not adduced any evidence to rebut this other than making a bare assertion that the petitioner has an interest in the company.

(4)  As for the properties in Hong Kong and Canada for which the respondent alleged that the petitioner has ownership, the matter was resolved by a court order dated 9 February 2017 declaring that the petitioner’s mother has 100% beneficial interest in the properties in Hong Kong and Canada.

(5)  The judge rejected the respondent’s contention that the petitioner had inflated her expenses. She noted that Judge Pang had already considered all relevant circumstances of the case, including the family’s standard of living during the marriage, when he made the Maintenance Order.

24.  For the above reasons, the judge held that the respondent’s applications were without merit. There was no valid reason or legal basis to declare void the Maintenance Order.

25.  The judge also dealt with other complaints raised by the respondent:

(1)  Insofar as he contended that the petitioner must provide documents to him in English, documents prepared for the use by the court in any family proceedings may be in either official language (Official Languages Ordinance, Cap 5 section 3(1); Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap 179A rules 4(5), (6) and (7)). Further, the respondent has demonstrated no difficulty in reading Chinese or has the means to arrange for his own translation.

(2)  As for the complaint about lateness in receiving the sealed court orders, speaking note and hearing bundle, the alleged late service did not cause any prejudice to the respondent. The petitioner had already set out her grounds of opposition in her affirmation filed on 30 October 2025, and the speaking note of her solicitors merely summarised that affirmation.

(3)  On the alleged inability to obtain legal advice, the proceedings have continued for over 12 years, the respondent had many opportunities to seek legal advice as he thought fit.

26.  The judge dismissed all three summonses of the respondent as they are “hopeless to proceed further for trial” and “obviously had no merit whatsoever”.

10 Mar 26 Judgment – for leave to appeal

27.  On 7 January 2026, the respondent issued an application in the Family Court for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the 6 Jan 26 Decision, with 11 draft grounds of appeal of six pages typed on single spacing and a written statement of two pages. This was before the reasons in full for the 6 Jan 26 Decision were given by the judge. The draft grounds were largely a repetition of the respondent’s allegations against the petitioner. He sought to set aside the 6 Jan 26 Decision; an order to remit his three summonses of 29 May 2025, 15 September 2025 and 5 January 2026 for rehearing before a different judge; an order to stay enforcement of the 3^rd to 6^th Judgment Summonses and any committal proceedings pending his intended appeal; and costs on an indemnity basis against the petitioner and her solicitors.

28.  This leave application was dealt with by Judge Lee on paper. She handed down the 10 Mar 26 Judgment refusing leave to appeal in the latter part of her judgment at §§53 to 64. She grouped the 11 draft grounds of appeal into four and dealt with them in this manner:

Ground (1):	The court should not dismiss the applications without a full trial or substantive hearing. This was particularly prejudicial to the respondent as a litigant in person.   The judge rejected this ground. Order 1A rule 4(2)(c) of the Rules of the District Court, Cap 336H empowers the court to actively manage cases including “deciding promptly which issues need full investigation and trial and accordingly disposing summarily of the others”. As explained in her full reasons for the 6 Jan 26 Decision, the judge found the respondent had encumbered the court with three unmeritorious applications that were nothing but a waste of the court’s time, public resources and against the underlying principles of Order 1A rule 1 of the Rules of the District Court.
Ground (2):	The petitioner failed to disclose her ownership in properties and the court ought to set aside or make void the Maintenance Order. The court order of 9 February 2017 only addressed the beneficial ownership, it did not excuse the petitioner from the omission to declare she had legal title in the property held jointly with her mother.   The respondent merely repeated his allegations. Ownership in the property had been disposed of by a court order dated 9 February 2017. There was no substance in this allegation.
Ground (3):	The petitioner’s solicitors had been late in serving documents, hearing bundle and speaking note on the respondent. This was tactical and wilful delay.   There was no force in his arguments. His applications were wholly unmeritorious, devoid of legal and factual basis. The fact that the solicitors were late in serving documents on him would not assist his hopeless applications.
Ground (4):	The petitioner had inflated her expenses in her Form Es.   Judge Pang had set out his analysis regarding the petitioner’s expenses in §§45 to 51 of the Maintenance Order Judgment. He had taken into account all relevant circumstances of the case including that during the marriage the parties had a domestic helper to serve them. As for the allegation that the petitioner inflated her expenses regarding her need to pay $27,000 as maintenance for her son from her first marriage (referred to in §§47 and 48 of the Maintenance Order Judgment), Judge Pang had never allowed the petitioner’s alleged payment of $27,000 as part of her expenses. In §50 of the Maintenance Order Judgment, he only allowed $4,140 as the petitioner’s personal expenses.

29.  Judge Lee concluded that the intended appeal against the 6 Jan 26 Decision has no prospect of success and refused to grant leave to appeal.

30.  The respondent renewed his application for leave to appeal by issuing the Leave Summons in CAMP 96/2026 on 26 March 2026. The application for leave to appeal was made two days out of time. The Registrar granted leave to him to file a supplemental affidavit on or before 24 April 2026 to explain the delay in seeking an extension of time for his renewed leave application. Directions were also given for the respondent to re-lodge skeleton arguments compliant with Practice Direction 4.1 and a fresh application bundle compliant with Practice Direction 5.6.

31.  The Leave Summons was stayed until 26 May 2026 due to the respondent’s application for legal aid.

Proceedings in the Family Court

32.  In the meantime, there was a flurry of activities in the Family Court, due to incessant applications made by the respondent.

33.  On 3 February 2026, he applied for a transcript/digital audio recording of the hearing on 6 January 2026. When this was refused by Judge Lee on 23 February 2026, noting that the court rules do not provide for an official note or transcript to be supplied to a party if no oral evidence was given in court, he applied for re-consideration of this decision. He followed up with an application on 27 March 2026 for leave to appeal the decision of 23 February 2026 refusing to provide the transcript or audio recording of the hearing on 6 January 2026. Judge Lee refused to grant leave to appeal in a judgment handed down on 29 May 2026 ([2026] HKFC 85).

34.  At the second pre-trial review of the 3^rd to 6^th Judgment Summonses on 29 April 2026, Judge Lee refused to adjourn the Judgment Summonses pending the determination of the renewed leave application in CAMP 96/2026. Instead, she adjourned the Judgment Summonses to 6 July 2026 for examination of the respondent with one day reserved and gave directions for the filing of evidence and hearing bundles. The judge also adjourned the petitioner’s summons filed on 7 March 2025 for leave to enforce arrears for more than 12 months sine die, with liberty to restore.

35.  On 30 April 2026, the respondent issued a summons for a stay of all enforcement proceedings pending the determination of his renewed application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal in CAMP 96/2026, in the alternative an adjournment of the means examination fixed on 6 July 2026 until after the determination of the said leave application.

36.  Also on 30 April 2026, the respondent applied for a transcript/audio recording of the hearing on 29 April 2026.

37.  On 11 May 2026, the respondent applied for leave to appeal against the order made by Judge Lee at the second pre-trial review of the 3^rd to 6^th Judgment Summonses on 29 April 2026 and for a stay of the said order and all further steps, directions and enforcement proceedings. It would appear that is no ruling on this application as yet.

38.  On 12 May 2026, upon a consent summons filed by the parties and the Grandfather (the proposed 2^nd respondent), Judge Lee granted leave to the Grandfather to be joined as a party to these proceedings for the limited purpose of applying to be discharged from his undertakings given to the court dated 27 June 2018.

39.  On 18 May 2026, the respondent issued a summons of four pages typed in single spacing and small print seeking to dismiss or permanently stay the means examination fixed on 6 July 2026, on the ground that the joinder of the Grandfather by order dated 12 May 2026 has “fundamentally altered the financial and procedural landscape of these enforcement proceedings”, rendering the examination “incapable of producing a safe or complete finding of ‘means’ ”. Further or in the alternative, the respondent sought a declaration that any finding of “means” made at the examination on 6 July 2026 cannot constitute a safe or lawful basis for the issue of a committal order against him while the Grandfather’s discharge application remains pending. The respondent also applied for an order that no committal order or further enforcement step be taken against him pending (i) the determination of the Grandfather’s discharge application; (ii) the respondent’s applications concerning the release of the audio recordings of the hearings on 6 January 2026 and 29 April 2026; and (iii) the respondent’s renewed application for leave to appeal in CAMP 96/2026.

40.  On 20 May 2026, Judge Lee dismissed the respondent’s summons filed on 30 April 2026 for a stay of the all enforcement proceedings, alternatively for adjournment of the means examination pending the determination of his renewed application for leave to appeal, and awarded costs to the petitioner. The judge also dismissed the respondent’s summons filed on 18 May 2026 for dismissal or stay of the means examination and other relief, purportedly due to the Grandfather’s pending discharge application, and made no order as to costs. The judge expressed the view that these repetitive applications are an abuse of the process of the court and exercised her case management powers to dismiss them, to ensure that the court’s resources would be distributed fairly. She had refused to grant leave to appeal against the 6 Jan 26 Decision on 10 March 2026 on the basis that the intended appeal has no prospect of success. The minimum requirement for granting a stay is not met. She took the view the fact that the Grandfather has joined in the proceedings recently has no bearing on the examination of the respondent. She was not satisfied there would be risks of causing irreversible prejudice to the respondent by proceeding with the examination. She concluded there is no reason to grant a stay of all enforcement proceedings.

41.  The dismissal of these two summonses on 20 May 2026 led to the Stay Summons issued in CAMP 96/2026 on 27 May 2026 to renew the stay application before the Court of Appeal.

42.  On 26 May 2026, the respondent applied for leave to appeal against the judge’s orders made on 20 May 2026.

43.  On 5 June 2026, the respondent applied for the recusal of Judge Lee from all further conduct of these proceedings (including the means examination on 6 July 2026) and for an interim stay of these proceedings, on the ground of his complaints regarding the judge’s conduct.

44.  On 15 June 2026, the judge refused to grant leave to the respondent to obtain the audio recordings of the hearings on 29 April 2026 and 20 May 2026, on the ground that the audio recording for the hearing on 29 April 2026 bore no relevance to the respondent’s pending application for leave to appeal before the Court of Appeal, and that neither hearing would have any bearing on the upcoming 6 July 2026 hearing. Furthermore, the judge took the view that the audio recording of the 20 May 2026 hearing was unnecessary for the conduct of the respondent’s intended appeal.

The Leave Summons

45.  As mentioned, we will first consider whether leave to appeal should be granted to appeal against the 6 Jan 26 Decision.

46.  The respondent was two days late in issuing the summons to renew his leave application in the Court of Appeal. He sought leave to bring this application out of time. He claimed that the delay was caused by the judge handing down the 10 Mar 26 Judgment on 10 March 2026 at 4:30 pm. Further, although the letter of the Family Court Registry notifying him of the handing down of the judgment was dated 3 March 2026, it was only posted on 10 March 2026. This letter was received by the respondent “several days later”. The respondent maintained that the two-day delay was unintentional, minimal and caused no prejudice to the petitioner.

47.  The petitioner argued that the delay should not be excused, because the respondent should have made enquiries as an experienced and sophisticated litigant.

48.  In considering whether leave should be granted to extend time to bring this application, apart from the length of delay, the explanation for the delay, any prejudice to the other party, the court would take into consideration the prospects of success of the intended appeal. The respondent sought to lay the blame on the court for his delay. We do not think his reasons for delay are excusable. In light of the short duration of the delay, if the intended appeal has reasonable prospects of success, we might be prepared to extend time. We turn to consider the draft grounds of appeal and would determine whether to extend time and if so whether to grant leave to appeal at one go.

49.  Section 63A(2) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success, or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. A reasonable prospect of success means an appeal with prospects that are more than “fanciful” but which do not need to be shown to be “probable” (SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at §17). The grounds of appeal will have to be more than merely arguable (Wynn Resorts (Macau) SA v Mong Henry [2009] 5 HKC 515 at §19).

50.  There are 15 numbered draft grounds of appeal. They will be considered in turn.

Grounds 1 to 3

51.  These grounds alleged fraud of the petitioner in that she falsely omitted to mention her legal title held jointly with her mother of a property in Allway Gardens in her Form Es. A distinction should be drawn between legal title and beneficial interest. The respondent reiterated his allegations and arguments against the petitioner.

52.  Mere repetition of the arguments raised below does not constitute a valid ground of appeal. Whilst there appears to be no dispute that the petitioner held no beneficial interest in the property in question, the respondent maintained that whether the petitioner had failed to disclose the legal title is a separate matter. We do not agree this is important or significant in the context of the proceedings. Whether the petitioner had omitted to declare her legal title in the Form Es regarding the property jointly held with her mother (who is the sole beneficial owner as resolved in the court order dated 9 February 2017) is immaterial and hardly amounts to fraud of the petitioner or material non-disclosure to warrant setting aside the Maintenance Order. Nor do we find it reasonably arguable that any of the other allegations of falsehood, concealment or fabrication in the other grounds of appeal, whether individually or cumulatively, would be sufficient to support a case to set aside the maintenance orders. Grounds 1 to 3 are entirely devoid of merit.

Ground 4

53.  The respondent complained that the petitioner fabricated her expenses for a domestic helper in that her mother was the employer of the helper according to the employment contracts her mother signed in 2019 and 2021. This was not a dispute about quantum of the wages, the reasonableness of which was assessed by Judge Pang. There was “helper contract fraud” in that the petitioner bore no legal liability to pay the helper’s wages but had stated on oath that the salary of the helper was an item of her expenses.

54.  This is again a repetition of his previous complaint. We reject the contention that the allegation would provide a sufficient basis to find fraud or material non-disclosure to set aside the Maintenance Order. There was no dispute that a helper was engaged and that it was entirely reasonable to engage one given the circumstances of the family. The amount to be spent on the wages ($4,633) was not disputed by the respondent (judgment of Judge Pang on 31 August 2018, §100). Fraud is a very serious matter and requires cogent evidence as proof. It is simply not established where there are gaps in the unsubstantiated assertions. This subject has been dealt with adequately by Judge Lee in the 10 Mar 26 Judgment, with which we agree.

Ground 5

55.  This related to the maintenance payment of $27,000 made by the petitioner to her son from her first marriage. The petitioner has no legal obligation to support her son, who is cared for by the petitioner’s mother in Canada and Judge Pang was wrong to accept this as an expense of the petitioner. The respondent cited a decision of the UK Supreme Court (Gohil v Gohil [2015] UKSC 61) for the proposition that “circular reasoning” is prohibited. He complained that the judge did not mention this case in refusing leave to appeal.

56.  The respondent referred to the judgment of Lord Mance in Gohil at §23 as providing support for his argument on the prohibition of “circular reasoning”. Lord Mance was not a member of the court in Gohil. §23 has nothing to do with “circular reasoning” but was a discussion on the admission of new evidence on appeal applying the principles of Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. We agree with Judge Lee there is no merit in this ground. As the judge rightly pointed out, the maintenance payment the petitioner made to her son was not treated as an item of her expenses by Judge Pang.

Ground 6

57.  This is again an argument that the petitioner failed to disclose her legal title in the property in question. The respondent reiterated that his case was not about beneficial interest but legal title. He complained that in refusing leave to appeal, the judge did not deal with any of the cases he cited – Livesey v Jenkins [1985] AC 424; LKW v DD (2010) 13 HKCFAR 537; Sharland v Sharland [2015] UKSC 60. In dismissing his application without mentioning a single fraud authority, the judge has committed an error of law.

58.  We reject this ground entirely. There was no factual or legal basis upon which a finding of fraud or material non-disclosure could properly be made. The judge has not committed any error of law. Evidently, she did not find it necessary to refer to the cases cited by the respondent. We see nothing to criticise about this.

Ground 7

59.  This raised the question of “circular reasoning” and the wrongful application of finality. The proposition is that it is prohibited to use the tainted order’s prior acceptance as the reason to refuse a re-examination whether that order was obtained by fraud. In support of this, the respondent cited Gohil being the judgment of Lord Mance at §23.  

60.  Leaving aside the mistake in the citation of Gohil, this is simply not a viable ground of appeal. In the first place, we do not agree that the maintenance orders, made after contested hearings and in which the respondent was represented by counsel, were “tainted”. We have also rejected the contention there was proof that these orders were obtained by fraud. “Circular reasoning” has no role to play in this situation. This ground must be rejected.

61.  The respondent raised a further contention in “Ground 7A” alleging that the petitioner’s solicitors made a concession on 17 September 2025 before Master Matthew Leung at the directions hearing of his summons issued on 15 September 2025 by words to the effect “Let the matter be dealt with properly at a hearing”. He contended that by these words, the petitioner’s solicitors agreed that his summons warranted a proper hearing and there was no appeal against the order for directions of Master Leung on 17 September 2025. In light of that concession, Judge Lee was wrong to characterise his summons as a backdoor appeal and vexatious.

62.  This is a plainly bad argument. Nothing more needs to be said about this.

Ground 8

63.  This ground complained that Judge Lee disposed of the respondent’s fresh summons filed on 5 January 2026 summarily on 6 January notwithstanding that this summons had a listed return date of 30 January 2026 for a substantive hearing, without prior notice to the respondent and without acknowledging the return date. He complained that a fresh application with a listed return date cannot be “extinguished” at an unrelated case management hearing without notice and without a hearing. In support of this, he cited the judgment of Lord Reid in Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40.

64.  We reject this contention without hesitation. It was a proper and sensible exercise of the case management powers for the judge to deal with the summons issued on 5 January at the hearing on 6 January. There was no breach of any principles of natural justice or fair trial.

Ground 9

65.  The complaint was that the directions made by Master Matthew Leung on 17 September 2025 did not authorise any speaking note to be submitted. The petitioner’s solicitors served a speaking note without leave on the respondent on 4 January 2026 Sunday at 16:43 hours, consisting of 6 pages of submissions and citing case law. The speaking note was considered by Judge Lee at the hearing on 6 January 2026 and she relied on the submissions. This was a breach of the principles in Ridge v Baldwin.

66.  This contention is misconceived. There is hardly any basis to interfere with the case management powers of the Master and Judge Lee. There is no breach of natural justice on any view.  

Ground 10

67.  This complained of “asymmetric” treatment. Master Leung directed the hearing bundle be lodged and served by 23 December 2025 but the petitioner’s solicitors served the bundle on the respondent only on 4 January 2026 with an unauthorised speaking note. Judge Lee did not impose any sanction for this failure to comply with the court’s direction, despite the respondent’s objection to these breaches in his summons issued on 5 January 2026. Instead, she imposed indemnity costs on him in dismissing his summonses of 29 May 2025 and 15 September 2025. This was “asymmetric” treatment. Further, an indemnity costs order requires an express finding of conduct “outside the norm”, citing Order 62 rule 28.

68.  There is no substance in this complaint of “asymmetric” or differential treatment. We see no basis to interfere with the judge’s exercise of discretion in awarding costs on an indemnity basis in dismissing the summonses of 29 May 2025 and 15 September 2025, on account of the total lack of merits and the litigation conduct of the respondent. There is no need for the judge to expressly spell out the findings of unreasonable conduct for the purpose of Order 62 rule 28 or invoke the wording of that provision, having regard to the observations she had already made in the course of her judgment in arriving at the conclusion that the summonses should be dismissed.  

Ground 11

69.  This complained of apparent bias, alleging there was “judicial coaching” and “judgment mirroring” of the petitioner’s solicitors’ speaking note. At the outset of the hearing on 6 January 2026, Judge Lee of her own initiative cited a case to the parties (LCH v WPSN [2025] HKCA 376) without prior notice, and informed the petitioner’s solicitors of “a committal route that strips [the respondent] of the means-enquiry safeguard”. The respondent, as a litigant in person, had not come across this before and could not respond in real time. This was “judicial coaching”. Further, in her judgment, the judge adopted the “framework” of the speaking note and did not mention the three cases cited by the respondent (Gohil, Sharland, Livesey). Applying the test of apparent bias in Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357 at §103 per Lord Hope and Lau Wai Wo v HKSAR (2004) 7 HKCFAR 510[1], a fair-minded and informed observer, aware of the above “judicial coaching” and “judgment mirroring” of the speaking note would conclude there was a real possibility that the judge was not deciding the case impartially.

70.  The complaint of “judicial coaching” has no substance. Judge Lee was under no obligation to give advance notice of a case she wished to draw to the attention of the parties to facilitate discussion in the course of the hearing. Besides, the case she cited (LCH v WPSN) was not mentioned in the judgment and no determination or holding was made in reliance of that case. The judge had analysed the respondent’s applications and concluded that they should be dismissed for the reasons she gave. She was entitled to accept or adopt those of the submissions or observations in the petitioner’s solicitors speaking note that she agreed with. We have rejected the complaint that she did not mention the three authorities cited by the respondent. The contention of apparent bias is simply not reasonably arguable.

Ground 12

71.  This is a reiteration of the complaint in Ground 11 as an “independent natural justice breach” in that a case adverse to the respondent’s position, LCH v WPSN, was cited by the judge without prior notice at the outset of the hearing notwithstanding that the respondent was acting in person.

72.  We reject this contention for the reasons given under the previous ground.

Ground 13

73.  The complaint here is that the judge was wrong to award indemnity costs in dismissing two of the summonses and a repetition of the contention in Ground 10.

74.  We reject this complaint for the reasons given in Ground 10.

Ground 14

75.  The complaint here is that the judge was wrong to refuse to provide a transcript of the hearing on 6 January 2026 to the respondent on the ground that no oral evidence was given. Oral submissions were made to the judge, and without the precise words of what was said he could not establish his complaint of “judicial coaching” in Grounds 11 and 12.

76.  This ground is apparently addressed at the judge’s order on 23 February 2026 refusing to provide the transcript. The respondent sought leave to appeal on 27 March 2026, this was refused by the judge on 29 May 2026. We see no basis to interfere with her exercise of discretion.

Ground 15

77.  This ground was termed “disproportionate reasoning” and “non-engagement with named evidence”. It was a complaint that the judge did not address the respondent’s “central fraud allegation” adequately and failed to engage with the specific documentary evidence he relied upon. The judge thereby committed an error of law.

78.  There is no merit in this contention. We have addressed the fraud allegation of the respondent and found no substance in it. Nor do we think there is any valid criticism in the manner that this allegation was addressed in the judgment.

79.  In conclusion, the draft grounds of appeal are simply not reasonably arguable and the intended appeal has no or no reasonable prospects of success. Nor is there any other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard. We refuse to grant leave to appeal against the 6 Jan 26 Decision and dismiss the Leave Summons.

The Stay Summons

80.  The summons issued on 27 May 2026 sought these orders:

(1)  a stay of the means examination listed for hearing on 6 July 2026, pending the determination of the Leave Summons in CAMP 96/2026;

(2)  a stay of the orders made by Judge Lee on 20 May 2026, being (a) dismissal of the respondent’s summons dated 30 April 2026 seeking a stay of all enforcement proceedings alternatively adjournment of the means examination on 6 July 2026, pending determination of the Leave Summons in CAMP 96/2026; and (b) dismissal of the respondent’s summons dated 18 May 2026 seeking to dismiss or stay permanently the means examination on 6 July 2026 pending the determination of the Grandfather’s application of discharge from his undertakings;

(3)  a direction that the Family Court Registry do produce to the Court of Appeal the audio recordings of the hearings on (a) 6 January 2026; (b) 29 April 2026; and (c) 20 May 2026; and

(4)  the court should treat this summons issued on 27 May 2026 as “encompassing the 20 May 2026 orders” and/or extend time for seeking leave to appeal those orders.

81.  Insofar as the application to stay or adjourn the means examination and/or all enforcement proceedings is premised on the pending determination of the Leave Summons, this application must be dismissed as we have dismissed the Leave Summons. There is no pending appeal as leave to appeal is refused.

82.  Insofar as the application to stay or adjourn the means examination and/or all enforcement proceedings is premised on the pending application of the Grandfather to discharge his undertakings, the Court of Appeal has concurrent jurisdiction with the court below to grant a stay. This power is to be exercised in appropriate circumstances and on cogent grounds. The present situation is plainly not one of them. We fail to see why the examination of the respondent should not proceed pending the determination of the Grandfather’s application for discharge from his own undertakings. We refuse to grant any stay or adjournment of the means examination and/or all enforcement proceedings on this other basis. The respondent has filed an application on 26 May 2026 for leave to appeal against the judge’s orders made on 20 May 2026. This has yet to be determined by the judge. We do not propose to say anything further on this.

83.  We do not think it helpful or necessary to listen to the audio recordings of the three hearings. The direction sought in (3) is refused.

84.  We see no basis to grant extended time to the respondent to appeal against the orders of Judge Lee on 20 May 2026. He has already filed a summons to do so on 26 May 2026.

85.  For all the above reasons, the Stay Summons is dismissed.

Costs

86.  When the Registrar gave directions for the disposition of the Stay Summons and the Leave Summons on 29 May 2026, he directed that any party seeking costs of the applications, or costs of opposing the applications, shall lodge and serve their respective statements of costs together with the last round of their respective written submissions. As the petitioner has not lodged a statement of costs with her submissions on 16 June 2026 or subsequently, we take that as indicative that she does not seek costs in opposing the applications. We therefore make no order as to the costs of the Leave Summons and the Stay Summons.

87.  We consider the Leave Summons and the Stay Summons are totally without merit. We make an order that no party may request these applications to be reconsidered at an oral hearing inter partes, pursuant to Order 59 rule 2A(8) of the Rules of the High Court.

Postscript

88.  We have described in some detail the applications taken out by the respondent in the past six months, which have occupied a considerable amount of judicial time and resources. We note that quite a number of them are repetitious, not to mention the lack of merits. A party does not have unlimited and indiscriminate access to the court at the expense of other litigants. At an appropriate time, the court may exercise its power to issue a restricted application order (“RAO”, to prohibit a litigant from making further applications in existing proceedings without leave of a judge) and/or a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”, to prohibit a litigant from commencing fresh proceedings without leave of a judge) under its inherent jurisdiction to prevent persistent abuse of the process of the court.