RAI AMBER v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 367/2022

[2022] HKCFI 2113

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 367 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;            or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the Applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 11 April 2022 refusing to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection after his previous claim had been rejected by both the Director and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) on all applicable grounds.

2.  The Applicant is a 55-year-old national of India who last arrived in Hong Kong on 4 June 2014 as a visitor with permission to remain up to 7 June 2014 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and on 19 March 2015 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim on the basis that if he returned to India he would be harmed or killed by the local leader of the political party Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (“GJM”) and followers as he supported their rival party Bharatiya Gurkha League (“BGL”).

Previous Non-Refoulement Claim

3.  By a Notice of Decision dated 8 November 2016 the Director rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

4.  In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from those local GJM people upon his return to India as low due to the absence of any past ill-treatment from them, that that there was no evidence of any intention of the local GJM people to harm or kill the Applicant other than some hearsays and his own speculation, nor is there any reason why they would have any adverse interest in him being just an ordinary BGL supporter without any official post in the party, that in any event in the absence of any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in India with a large population of 1.2 billion people spread across a vast territory of more than 2.9 million square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of India away from his home district in large cities such as Mumbai where it would be difficult if not impossible for those local GJM people to locate him.

5.  The Applicant’s appeal against the Director’s decision was dismissed by the Board on 7 June 2018 after hearing him in evidence and submissions and upon finding no merits in his claim or his appeal, and that it also confirmed the Director’s decision.

6.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was also refused by this Court on 16 April 2021 upon finding none of the proposed grounds for his intended challenge reasonably arguable, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision, and that there was no prospect of success in his intended application (HCAL 1104/2018 [2021] HKCFI 1044).

7.  The Applicant’s subsequent appeal against the Court’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 6 December 2021 upon finding no error of law or any failure to consider relevant matters by the Court or the Director or the Board in their decisions regarding the Applicant’s claim (CACV 208/2021 [2021] HKCA 1817).

Request To Make Subsequent Claim

8.  Some 3 weeks later on 28 December 2021 the Applicant in writing to the Immigration Department requested to make a subsequent claim on the basis that he still fears of being harmed or killed by those GJM people in his home district if refouled to India, plus the fact that the Indian government has since he left the country passed a new legislation requiring all citizens to apply for an identity card upon proving their ancestry in India or else they may be deemed stateless and risk being removed from the country, and as the Applicant’s passport has since expired and hence he fears that without a valid passport that he may not be able to prove his ancestry in India or to be allowed to return to his home country or to bring his family which he has established in Hong Kong with him to settle in India.

9.  There are however constraints on a claimant who has previously made a non-refoulement claim to make a subsequent claim, as stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance as follows:

“(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

10.  Accordingly, the Director required the Applicant to provide further information and evidence in writing in support of his request within 14 days, which he subsequently did via his lawyer from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

11.  By a Notice of Decision dated 11 April 2022 the Director refused to allow the Applicant to make a subsequent claim upon finding that his basis of fear of harm from the GJM people was essentially the same as that of his previous claim, and that he failed to provide sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was determined, or that those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim any realistic prospect of success, as while accepting that the Indian Government did in 2019 enact a new legislation known as Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019 (“CAA 2019”) requiring all citizens to apply for an identity card as proof of their citizenship, and that the Applicant never obtained one after he left the country but which he could have easily done so at the Indian Consulate in Hong Kong or through other valid means to first renew his passport that his claim of risk of not being allowed to return to his home country without a valid passport is just some groundless and unfounded speculation unsupported by any evidence or rationale that it is not accepted that there is any merits in his request to make a subsequent claim.

12.  On 20 May 2022 the Applicant filed a Form 86 in these proceedings for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s decision, and in his supporting affirmation filed on the same day he put forward various grounds for his intended challenge which can be summarized as follows:

(1)  That the Director failed to properly or sufficiently consider the realities in India to find that his claimed fear of not being allowed to return to India due to the requirements of CAA 2019 was just his bare assertion and speculation was wrong as there are numerous articles by the Indian government confirming that an Indian passport would not be considered as good proof of the Applicant’s lineage or ancestry in India;

(2)  That the Director’s decision was wrong to find that the Applicant has failed to show a significant change of circumstances since his previous claim was finally determined when the Director could have clarified those issues regarding CAA 2019 by conducting his own enquiries when the Applicant had already provided all the documents and information that he was asked for that the Director just issued a standard refusal of his application without considering its merits properly or sufficiently; and

(3)  That the Director’s refusal of his request to make a subsequent claim has deprived the Applicant of the avenue to appeal the decision to the Board where his case could be considered by an independent adjudicator who could have taken a different view regarding his subsequent claim.

13.  The first two grounds or complaints of the Applicant can be conveniently considered together, as noted by the Director in the decision ([13]), the burden is clearly on the Applicant to prove his case that he would not be able to establish his lineage or ancestry in India to comply with the requirements of CAA 2019, and as pointed out to him by the Court during the hearing of his application, of which he conceded that he has never made any attempt to do so through the Indian Consulate in Hong Kong or any other means, but in any event this claim of the Applicant even if true in my judgment would not, and could not, assist or advance his case at all as it would not in any way engage any of the applicable grounds, as clearly not being able to establish one’s own lineage or ancestry in India to comply with its law or legislation which is applicable to all its citizens simply does not amount to or come within torture risk, BOR 2 risk, BOR 3 risk or persecution risk to constitute any basis for the Applicant to make a subsequent claim under any of those applicable grounds. As such these grounds of the Applicant are simply not arguable at all for his intended challenge.

14.  As for the remaining ground or complaint that the Applicant is deprived of an avenue to have his subsequent claim argued before the Board, it is clear that the whole purpose of the legislation not to provide any avenue of appeal to the Board against a refusal by the Director of a request to make a subsequent claim is to filter hopeless or vexatious applications from being repeated in the screening process of non-refoulement claims, and that in any event, for the same reason as noted above that this ground of the Applicant would not assist or advance his case at all and is simply not arguable for his intended challenge either.

15.  In the premises and having considered the decision of the Director with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the decision or any failure to apply high standards of fairness in the consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s request for subsequent claim, and as I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, I accordingly refuse his leave application.

Restricted Proceedings Order

16.  Given the facts that the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim has already been finally and conclusively determined in the previous proceedings, ending with the order of the Court of Appeal dated 6 December 2021, but that the Applicant is still trying to re-litigate his case by making this subsequent claim based on essentially the same facts and basis as before or on any viable ground, I shall next consider whether it would be appropriate to make a Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) against him.

17.  Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4 provides as follows:

“Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings

(1)  The Court of First Instance may, on the application of the Secretary for Justice or an affected person, make an order that –

(a) no legal proceedings shall without the leave of the Court of First Instance be instituted by the person against whom the order is made; and

(b) any legal proceedings instituted by that person in any court before the making of the order shall not be continued by him without the leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  The Court of First Instance may not make an order under subsection (1) unless –

(a) it is satisfied that the person against whom the order is to be made has habitually and persistently and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious legal proceedings, whether in the High Court or in any inferior court, and whether against the same person or against different persons; and

(b) it has heard the person against whom the order is to be made or given him an opportunity of being heard.

(3)  An order made under subsection (1) –

(a) may be made on such terms and conditions as the Court of First Instance thinks just; and

(b) may provide that it is to cease to have effect at the end of a specified period, but shall otherwise remain in force indefinitely.

…”

18.  Relevantly, Section 27A also provides:

“(1) Leave for the institution or continuance of any legal proceedings by a person who is the subject of an order for the time being in force under section 2791) shall not be given unless the Court of First Instance is satisfied that –

(a) the proceedings are not an abuse of the process of the court in question; and

(b) there are reasonable grounds for the proceedings.

(2) No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of First Instance granting or refusing leave required under this section, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court of First Instance.”

19.  In Etik Iswanti v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2021] HKCFI 1589, Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) examined the relevant principles for making an order under Section 27 against a non-refoulement claimant to prevent him or her from commencing vexatious legal proceedings which sought to re-open a non-refoulement claim which had already been finally and conclusively determined in previous proceedings, and held that repeated actions evidencing a calculated attempt by a claimant to delay an inevitable judgment or its execution or a refusal to accept the unfavourable final result of a litigation or seeking to re-open matters already determined in a previous action may be regarded as vexatious legal proceedings which would justify a RPO being made under the section.

20.  His Lordship in the subsequent case of Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 (again sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) went on to hold that apart from Section 27 of the High Court Ordinance, the Court has an inherent jurisdiction which it can exercise on its own motion to make a RPO to prevent similar abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants, as the underlying purpose of the court’s jurisdiction to make a RPO is the prevention of abuse of process ([9] – [10]).

21.  In the subsequent jointly heard appeals of Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration, CACV 420/2021 and Reza Sahin v Director of Immigration, CACV 422/2021 ([2022] HKCA 327, 28 February 2022), Poon CJHC in giving judgment of the Court of Appeal also held that where a judge of the Court of First Instance (“CFI judge”) makes a RPO, he may where appropriate properly exercise his power under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction to also make a restrictive order against vexatious appeals under which the non-refoulement claimant concerned cannot appeal without first obtaining leave from him or another CFI judge designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court upon observing procedural fairness by putting the non-refoulement claimant concerned on notice and giving him or her the opportunity to address the court before making the restrictive order ([38] –[40]).

22.  In the present case, it is clear from the above that the Applicant’s conduct in seeking persistently to re-litigate his non-refoulement claim without viable grounds amounts to an abuse of process, and that unless a RPO is made against him, he will likely continue to do so and/or to make vexatious appeals, thereby wasting further precious time and resources of the Judiciary.

23.  Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to or touching upon or leading to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, or any appeal, including this Order, without the leave of a Judge of the Court of First Instance;

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with his said application for leave;

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)  Notice of each decision by the designated Judge made pursuant to this Order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave under this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge;

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this Order; and

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

Disposition

24.  The Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.

25.  A RPO in terms of paragraph 23 be made against the Applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1