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BATALLA MARY JEAN LUMANAS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
BATALLA MARY JEAN LUMANAS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 4732 · HCAL 1610/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL1610/2023
[2026] HKCFI 4732
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1610 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Batalla Mary Jean Lumanas |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial | |
| |Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 | |
| |r. 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and the Applicant being absent in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Val Chow:
1. Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion as follows:-
a. The Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims
Petition Office be named as the Putative Respondent; and
b. The Director of Immigration be named as the Putative
Interested Party.
2. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 11 September 2023 (the “Form 86”), the Applicant
sought leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”)
against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-
refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 23 May 2023
(the “Board’s Decision”).
2. Only the Board’s Decision is under challenge in the Leave Application.
Therefore, the Board should be made the proposed respondent and the
Director of Immigration (the “Director”) should be the proposed
interested party. I make an order to amend the Form 86 accordingly on
the court’s own motion.
3. An oral hearing was requested by the Applicant. It took place before
me on 27 July 2026 (the “Hearing”) and the Applicant was absent.
Notwithstanding her absence, I shall proceed to determine the Leave
Application on paper.
Background
4. The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments
she advanced had been set out in details in the Board’s Decision, and
it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. The hyperlink to
the Board’s Decision is included below[1] for reference. In short, the
Applicant claimed that she will be killed by her former boyfriend and
his family (the “Adversaries”) if she were to be returned to the
Philippines because of a dispute over the guardianship of the son of
the Applicant and the boyfriend. She also claimed that the boyfriend’s
family is rich and powerful and the boyfriend’s brother was the vice
mayor of Davao in 1993 and 1996.
The Leave Application is out of time
5. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant has to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made. However, the Form 86 was filed late for
about 3 weeks.
6. In AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam CACV 63/2015
(unreported, 3 November 2015), the Court of Appeal held that the
following factors are relevant in determining whether to grant leave
to file an application for leave to apply for judicial review out of
time: (1) length of the delay; (2) explanation for the delay; (3)
merits of the substantive application; (4) prejudice to the applicant
if leave is refused vis-à-vis that to the respondent and public
administration if leave is granted; and (5) whether the application
raises any questions of general public importance, and whether those
questions are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any
event. Usually, the first three factors, particularly merits, are
most crucial and determinative. If the sum total of these three
factors is in favour of grant of extension, the court could be more
relaxed in the remaining two. Conversely, if it is against the grant
of extension, there is no need to consider the remaining two factors.
7. In the present case, the delay of about 3 weeks is not insignificant.
No explanation for the delay has been provided by the Applicant in her
application documents despite the express requirement on the Form 86
to do so. The Applicant also failed to attend the Hearing which
indicates a want of prosecution. On account of these matters, no time
extension should be granted on the court’s own motion.
8. In any event, I will consider the merits of the Leave Application
below for completeness.
Merits
9. It is trite law that:-
1) Determination of the merits of a non-refoulement claim is essentially
within the remit of the Director and the Board, who are the primary
decision-makers in the evaluation of the evidence based on the
materials available to them. A court will not usurp their primary
decision-making role in a judicial review, which is not an avenue for
revisiting the assessment by the Board in the hope that the court may
consider the matter afresh in the absence of any legal error. A
finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of the Board, which a
court in a judicial review will not interfere with unless such finding
involved an error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality: see
Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur
Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
2) An applicant, even if unrepresented, is required to properly identify
the grounds of judicial review in the Form 86, and to fully and
frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers, see:
Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection (HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016) per Chow J. (as he was then) at [142].
10. In the Form 86 and the accompanying supporting affidavit, the
Applicant did not advance any grounds in support of the Leave
Application.
11. Having examined the Board’s Decision, the papers and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to all applicable
grounds; the burden of proof and standard of proof; correctly
identified the issues and observed the requisite high standard of
fairness and considered all relevant factors. The Board’s rejection of
the Applicant’s claim is plainly correct:-
1) I do not see any basis to interfere with the Board’s finding
that there was no risk of threat:-
a) As analysed by the Board (at [37]-[38], [42]), the
Applicant’s relationship with her former boyfriend was
short-lived and she became pregnant in 1993. Any dispute
over the guardianship of their son took place a long time
ago. The Applicant also returned to her home in the
Philippines a number of times between 2000 and 2008. The
Adversaries have not located the Applicant or the son for
decades. If the Adversaries were in fact as influential or
powerful as alleged, they would have found the Applicant
and her son a long time ago.
b) The Applicant’s claim that the boyfriend’s brother was the
vice mayor of Davao in 1993 and 1996 is shown to be false
by official documents ([38iv]).
c) In any event, reasonable relocation alternatives were
available to the Applicant. As pointed out by the Board
after considering the relevant Country of Origin
information ([52]-[53]), the Philippines is a large and
populous country, the Applicant should have no significant
difficulty moving to a big city such as Manila or Cebu.
There was no evidence that the Adversaries would have the
means and determination to pursue the Applicant there.
12. Hence, I am not satisfied that the Board has erred in the enhanced
Wednesbury sense. The Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s
Decision is not reasonably arguable and will fail in any event if a
time extension is granted.
Conclusion
13. In the premises, I make an order that the Form 86 be amended as
described above and the Leave Application be dismissed as it was made
out of time.
|Dated the 24th day of September | |
|2026 | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| |(Vivian Lai) |
| |for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal
advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits
of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 24/9/2026 |Respondent / the Putative |
|interested parties | |Respondent’s solicitors / |
|as may be directed by |Batalla Mary Jean |such Putative Interested |
|the Court the order |Lumanas |Parties as may be directed |
|granting leave and any | |by the Court / the Putative|
|directions given within |Applicant’s ref. no: |Interested Parties’ |
|14 days after the leave |Nil |solicitors on 24/9/2026 |
|was granted | | |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |Torture Claims Appeal |
| | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|b) issue the originating| |Claims Petition Office |
|summons within 14 days | |Putative Respondent’s ref. |
|after the grant of leave| |no.: |
|and serve it in | |USM 21281 |
|accordance with Order | | |
|53, rule 5; and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested Party’s|
|c) supply to every other| |ref. no.: |
|party copies of every | |QA T/C 1115/22 (formerly |
|affidavit which the | |RBCZ 5000994/22) |
|Applicant proposes to | | |
|use at the hearing, | |Department of Justice, |
|including the affidavit | |Senior Assistant Law |
|in support of | |Officer |
|the application for | |(Civil Law) |
|leave | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | | |
Form CALL-1
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[1]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL0016
10_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf