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HCAL 397/2026
[2026] HKCFI 1188
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 397 OF 2026
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BETWEEN
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WONG SIU, OPERATING HUAXIA DESIGN AND DECORATION ENGINEERING LIMITED |
Applicant |
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(黃紹經營華廈裝飾設計工程) |
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and |
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YEUNG CHUN YIU (楊俊耀) |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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WEST KOWLOON LAW COURT 30 JUDGE TAI |
Putative |
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(西九龍法院30庭戴法官) |
Interested Party |
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| Before: |
Hon Coleman J in Chambers (Open to Public) |
| Date of Decision: |
24 March 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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A. Introduction
1. By Form 86 dated 12 February 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review so as to “review” the 23 January 2026 decision (“Impugned Decision”) made by Mr Terence Tai, Deputy Adjudicator (“Deputy Adjudicator”) of the Small Claims Tribunal (“Tribunal”) in the small claims proceedings SCTC 5235/2023.
2. The Applicant was the Plaintiff in SCTC 5235/2023. The Form 86 names a Yeung Chun Yiu (transliteration) (i.e. the Defendant in SCTC 5235/2023) as the Putative Respondent and the Deputy Adjudicator as the Interested Party.
3. The relief sought by the Applicant is merely “to apply for judicial review”. No other form of substantive relief is identified. The Applicant’s affirmation merely affirms “What I said is absolutely true and nothing but the truth”, and exhibits the Form of Award/Order made in the small claims proceedings.
4. Having considered the materials provided with the application, it seems to me that it can appropriately be dealt with on paper.
5. This is my Decision.
B. No Merit
6. With respect, the application has no merit.
7. First, though perhaps the result of the Applicant acting in person, naming the counterparty in the underlying small claims proceedings as the Putative Respondent to this application tends to suggest the Applicant is seeking to take another step in pursuit of his private law claim, rather than raising a matter of public law suitable for judicial review proceedings.
8. Secondly, and more importantly, it is trite that an applicant for leave to apply for judicial review must identify on the Form 86 the relief sought and the public law grounds which the applicant says could lead to that relief and which are of sufficient merit for the grant of leave.
9. The Applicant has not set out specific relief sought by him (other than the grant of leave to apply for judicial review). Further, merely alleging that the Deputy Adjudicator “knew the Defendant well [and] favoured the Defendant” (in English translation) (“Bias and Favouritism Allegation”), and requesting for a “review” of the Decision, does not identify any specific public law error. This is a breach of the mandatory requirements in Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court. It is not for the Court to try to identify grounds for an applicant. This alone is fatal to the application. What is stated in the affirmation does not assist the Applicant in this regard.
10. Thirdly, where the application has been made (as is usual) on an ex parte basis, there was an improper failure of the Applicant to have made full and frank disclosure of details of the Decision that he seeks to review, except that he merely provided a copy of the awards/orders dated 23 January 2026 made by the Deputy Adjudicator in SCTC 5235/2023 regarding the results of the Plaintiff’s claim and Defendant’s counterclaim, the quantum of the awards, the resultant set-off and the costs order.
11. In an application for leave to apply for judicial review, it is the duty of an applicant to make full and frank disclosure in support of his application. The Applicant has failed to do so. It is not for the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction to guess or try to ascertain the details of or particular aspects of the Decision that the Applicant intends to challenge. This is also fatal to the application.
12. Fourthly, judicial review is a remedy of last resort, and leave to apply for judicial review would unlikely be granted if there is an effective alternative remedy. Here, there would be – or would have been – such an effective alternative remedy, as provided under the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance Cap 338.
13. In small claims proceedings, if any party is not satisfied with an adjudicator’s order or judgment, the party may apply either (1) to Tribunal for review by filing of a Form 8C, or (2) to the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) of the High Court for leave to appeal by filing of a Form 9 with the Registrar. However, there is a time limit of 7 days for the making of either application.
14. Leave to appeal will not be granted by the CFI unless the appeal involves a question of law, or the claim/counterclaim is outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It is trite that the CFI has no power to reverse or vary what the Tribunal has determined on questions of fact.
15. From the available materials, there is no indication on whether the Applicant has filed any application either for review or for leave to appeal in accordance with the prescribed procedures. In any event, it seems that the Applicant’s Bias and Favouritism Allegation is a question of law, which could be – or could have been – dealt with by way of seeking leave to appeal. This Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction does not act as an appellate court from another court, nor to enforce orders made by other courts.
16. If the Applicant has failed to bring either an application to the Tribunal for review, or an application to the CFI for leave to appeal, within the required 7-day timeframe, it is impermissible to seek to get around that failure by bringing intended judicial review proceedings.
C. Result
17. The Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds for review with any realistic prospect of success. Further, the complaint essentially relates to a private law matter in small claims proceedings, where there was a statutory available alternative remedy (whether it was actually pursued or not).
18. In those circumstances, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
19. I make no order as to costs.
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(Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
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The applicant, acting in person
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