RE SABUZ MOLLAH

CACV 60/2018

[2018] HKCA 862

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 60 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 312/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Lam VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a judgment dated 26 July 2018 ([2018] HKCA 427), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock dated 7 March 2018 ([2018] HKCFI 401) refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review.

2.  The applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

3.  In his notice of motion dated 30 July 2018, the applicant put forth the following grounds for seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal:

“ - The claims that the Judgment has made stated there is no substance in the grounds of the applicant is not true.

- One the strength of the grounds was the applicant has not made a complaint about the poor performance of his duty lawyer is due to fearing he will be picked out for misappropriating by the adjudicator.

- The applicant gently did not have enough time to address the bundles.

- Rest of the grounds of appeal I will provide very soon.” (sic)

4.  The applicant also filed an affirmation (exhibiting a copy of the judgement dated 26 July 2018) in support of his application on 30 July 2018.  The affirmation has no substantive contents.

5.  The applicant belatedly lodged his written submissions on the motion on 10 October 2018. Instead of explaining how the intended appeal satisfy the statutory criteria for leave to be granted, the written submissions sought to argue the case afresh as if this was a hearing before the first instance judge.

6.  Having considered the materials before us, we are of the view that it is appropriate to process the leave application on the papers without an oral hearing.

7.  The substantive grounds raised in the Notice of Motion were not pursued by the applicant in the substantive appeal before us.  Application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is not a platform for running a new appeal.  Thus, the practice of this Court is not to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed at the substantive appeal: see Ageas Insurance Co (Asia) Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo CACV 65/2014, unreported, 19 May 2015, at [7] – [9]; and The Law Society of Hong Kong v A Solicitor CACV 78/2014, unreported, 10 July 2015, at [4] – [7].  

8.  The relevant criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal are set out in Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance Cap 484,

“ An appeal shall lie to the Court [of Final Appeal] at the discretion of the Court of Appeal or the Court [of Final Appeal], from any judgment of the Court of Appeal in any civil cause or matter, whether final or interlocutory, if, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal or the Court [of Final Appeal], as the case may be, the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court [of Final Appeal] for decision.”

9.  In our judgment, the applicant failed to raise any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine.  Nor is there any basis for us to grant leave on the “otherwise” limb.  Thus, the applicant’s application does not satisfy the statutory threshold for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

10.  For these reasons, we refuse to grant leave to the applicant to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. The notice of motion is dismissed accordingly.