RE AGUS WAHYUDI
[2026] HKCA 2077 · CACV 40/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 40/2026 [2026] HKCA 2077 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 210 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 585 OF 2021) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Hon Cheng J in Court Date of Judgment: 4 November 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Cheng J (giving the Judgment of the Court): By our judgment handed down on 13 April 2026 ([2026] HKCA 484) (“the Judgment”), we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Jeffrey Chau (“the Judge”) given on 13 January 2026 dismissing the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 24 April 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against the Judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant also lodged written submissions to support the application. Having considered the Notice of Motion and written submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case, the applicant’s claim and the reasons for dismissing the appeal have been set out in our Judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. The applicant’s Notice of Motion raises six grounds or questions said to be of great general or public importance, which can be summarised as follows: (1) State protection and acquiescence: the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissed the issue of state acquiescence with no reasoning at all which is an error of law, citing Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37 and R (Bagdanavicius) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 38. The Board must specifically ask whether there is a real risk that the state would be unwilling or unable to provide effective protection in practice on the specified threats. The Board conceded that its own country of origin information (“COI”) raised doubts as to the effectiveness of the police but found that protection mechanisms “would appear to be available”. The Court of Appeal failed to see that the Board did not apply a correct assessment on state protection; (2) Treatment of hearsay evidence: the Board gave zero weight to the applicant’s hearsay evidence that his family members said the moneylender and gangster (“Burhanudin”) were still searching for him. The Board refuted the hearsay evidence on the sole basis that it “cannot be tested”, which is internally contradictory and legally wrong. This created a circular problem because the Board called his fear “speculative” for lack of primary evidence when the absence was due to the Board’s failure to give weight to the hearsay evidence. (3) Internal relocation assessment: the Board did not conduct an individualised assessment of the safety and reasonableness of internal relocation. It identified the possibility for the applicant to relocate to Semarang or Bandung based only on two Encyclopaedia Britannica descriptions of the cities and failed to conduct an analysis as to whether there would be a real risk of harm there and whether the applicant could realistically live there without undue hardship, as required in Januzi v Home Secretary [2006] 2 AC 426. The Court of Appeal’s reasoning failed to address this deficiency in the Board’s decision. (4) Forward-looking risk assessment: the Board’s conclusion and reasoning regarding the future risk of harm is flawed. It conflated absence of past violence with absence of future risk. The four-month uneventful period is irrelevant because his return from Hong Kong will be known to the Burhanudin through the same family and community networks. It did not engage the facts holistically, including the ongoing motive of harm from the creditor, the search activity and the changed circumstances of the applicant’s return from abroad, as required in Karanakaran which held that matters may only be excluded when they can be “safely discarded. (5) Severity threshold under BOR 3 and s.37U: the Board’s focus on past treatment of harm is wrong in law. It failed to engage with the cumulative assaults and ill-treatment as required in Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] 35 EHRR 1. (6) Standards to apply in leave application: the Judge’s finding at [9] of the Form CALL-1 ([2026] HKCFI 210) that the Board was “plainly correct” that state protection and internal relocation were available is a merits determination that goes beyond the threshold of granting leave to apply for judicial review. The Court of Appeal failed to identify this error. The applicant further stated in the Notice of Motion that leave should be granted because a substantial and grave injustice has occurred. He stated that the Board accepted his factual account of harm but applied a legally insufficient analysis on the above aspects of his claim. He asked for a reconsideration of his case at an oral hearing. In his written submissions, the applicant elaborated on his grounds in the Notice of Motion. We will deal with them in more detail below. Discussion We are of the view that the matters put forward in the notice of motion and the written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Firstly, they are essentially an attempt to relitigate the merits of his non-refoulement claim and to invite the Court to re-assess his claim. Secondly, most of arguments relate to the Board’s assessment of various aspects of his claim which are repetitions of the grounds in the Notice of Appeal and his written submissions, and do not involve any question of great general or public importance. Thirdly, some of the challenges against the Board’s decision, the Judge’s reasons and our reasons in dismissing the appeal are factually inaccurate. We will address the grounds in turn. Ground (1) is in essence a repetition of the applicant’s arguments in his Notice of Appeal and written submissions against the Board’s findings regarding state protection and acquiescence, and against the Board’s assessment and evaluation of the COI on police effectiveness. As explained at [9] of our Judgment, we do not see any basis in the applicant’s assertions that the Board dismissed these issues without any reasoning or came to a conclusion on these matters without considering the specific risk of harm which the applicant might face upon his return to Indonesia. His purported reliance on the case authorities and principles is simply not engaged. The applicant further submitted that the Board’s reference to the KPK (Corruption and Eradication Commission) was wrong because the KPK investigates institutional corruption and does not protect private individuals from moneylenders. The applicant misunderstood the Board’s reasoning as the KPK was cited as a body to which a complaint about police inaction could be made, not as a protector against Burhanudin. In any event, the applicant has never disputed the Board’s factual finding that he did not approach the police for assistance. There is no basis to say that the state failed to give him protection. Furthermore, the applicant argued that the court merely relied on the Board’s awareness of the test for the risk of harm from state or non-state actors without considering whether the Board had applied it. These submissions do not accurately reflect the court’s analysis at [9] of the Judgment, which noted that the Board considered whether the applicant would receive state protection despite the fact that Burhanudin and his associates were non-state actors. For these reasons, there is no merit in this ground. Ground (2) relates to the Board’s assessment of the hearsay evidence which merely repeats the applicant’s grounds of appeal before us and which we addressed at [11] of the Judgment. The Board’s treatment of family reports about the threats was an assessment of the weight of the evidence, which was a matter for the Board. The applicant’s circularity argument is misconceived because the Board’s finding that his fear was speculative rested on multiple grounds; it was not merely because of the absence of corroborative or primary evidence. These included the fact that Burhanudin had ample opportunity to harm the applicant before he left, that the extent of past harm was minor, and that the applicant had lived elsewhere during the four-month period without harm. In relation to Ground (3), we would first note that, as the Board pointed out at [82] of its decision, it was not strictly necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation because the applicant had failed to make out his case on any ground, and that this issue was only considered as a matter of caution. In any event, the Britannica passages, which showed that Semarang and Bandung were substantial cities with economic activity and transport links, are objective and relevant country situation information which supported the Board’s reasonableness assessment, though they are not the only pieces of information relied on by the Board. The Board was alive to the propositions in Januzi v Home Secretary [2006] 2 AC 426 as seen in [84] of its decision in conducting its analysis of the prospect of internal relocation. As explained at [12] of the Judgment, the Board took into account a range of facts and the evidence of the applicant before coming to its conclusion on the viability of internal relocation, including his background and personal situation. The applicant is merely repeating his arguments which we have already considered and dismissed in the appeal, without pointing to any questions of great general or public importance. Under Ground (4), the applicant submitted that the Board should have engaged with what he had experienced in the past, in order to assess what would happen to him in the future if he were to return to Indonesia. At the same time, the applicant raised the contradictory argument that the Board should not have relied on past treatment to determine his future risk, arguing that the Board’s treatment of the absence of past harm and the brief quiet period of four months was flawed. We do not see any merit in these submissions. Firstly, as explained at [10] of the Judgment, the Board’s assessment of the future risk of harm was multi-faceted. The fact that the Board reached a conclusion adverse to the applicant does not mean that its approach was wrong. Secondly, the Board expressly cited Karanakaran at [18] and [19] of its decision and took a holistic approach in assessing future risk of harm. The Board’s concluded view that his fear was speculative was a finding of fact based on its consideration of the evidence, which it was entitled to make. Thirdly, the applicant’s complaint that we failed to identify errors in the Board’s approach is simply a disagreement with the conclusion of the court, without engaging with our reasoning or identifying any errors in the Board’s approach. For these reasons, we do not see any merit in this ground. Ground (5) raises the argument that the Board treated absence of severe past harm as settling future risk. The applicant argued that BOR 3 and section 37U are forward-looking. He submitted that the Board ignored the “cumulative dimension” of what he had experienced. The Board found at [71] of its decision that the applicant had neither claimed nor been subjected to abuse at the level of torture of CIDTP. It then found at [72] that he had failed to substantiate that he would face torture or ill-treatment if refouled, and there were no substantial grounds for believing he would face a genuine risk. The Board applied the correct test and found the threshold in Ubamaka was not met. Further, the applicant’s citation of the case of Pretty v United Kingdom does not assist him, as it was cited by the Board at footnote 40 of its decision for the general principle that treatment which humiliates or debases may be degrading. The Board was not required to make a finding of cumulative ill-treatment where the evidence did not support one. It was open to the Board to find on the evidence that the past harm was minor and hence did not meet the threshold. As to Ground (6), the applicant complained that the Judge applied a merits standard by describing the Board as “plainly correct”. However, the Judge’s observation was made in the context of his assessment of whether the applicant’s intended challenge was reasonably arguable. It was a conclusion reached after having considered the Board’s reasoning, the applicant’s grounds for the intended challenge and the applicable legal principles; it was not a substitution of the Judge’s view for the Board’s. The Judge was entitled to conclude that the Board’s findings were clearly supported by the evidence and the law, and that the applicant failed to mount a reasonably arguable challenge against them. As already noted at [14] of the Judgment, the Judge did not treat the leave application as a full merits review. Lastly, the applicant relies on the Board having accepted the basic facts of his claim to show that a substantial and grave injustice has occurred. However, there is no injustice when the Board accepted the basic facts but found that the applicant’s case failed on the legal tests applicable to each ground. The applicant has not identified any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s decision. Nor has he identified any error in the Judge’s decision or in the Judgment. The threshold for substantial and grave injustice is not met. To conclude, the matters put forward by the applicant do not provide any viable grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. No question of great general and public importance has been identified, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Ordinance. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). The substantial and grave injustice ground is also not made out, for reasons given above. As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person.
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RE AGUS WAHYUDI
CA · [2026] HKCA 2077
This judgment