Case Details
SIDHU BRAR GURMUKH SINGH AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 3595 · HCAL 1488/2021
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1488/2021
[2026] HKCFI 3595
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1488 OF 2021
BETWEEN
| |Sidhu Brar Gurmukh Singh |1st Applicant |
| |Sandeep Kaur |2nd Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicants in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The 1st and 2nd applicants’ application for leave to apply for
judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicants:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 26 October 2021, the applicants
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 10 May 2021 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2021/HCAL00
1488_2021_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the 1st and 2nd applicants failed to establish
their claims for non-refoulement protection on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the
Board denied their applications for non-refoulement protection in Hong
Kong and confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the
Director”) dated 1 March 2017, which rejected the 1st and 2nd
applicants’ non-refoulement claims.
Amendments
3. The applicants named the Board as both the putative respondent and the
putative interested party in Form 86 and spelt the Board’s name wrong.
4. In fact, the Board should only be the putative respondent and the
Director should be the putative interested party.
5. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicants had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicants filed Form 86 on 26 October 2021, which was
more than 5 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 10 May 2021).
The applicants were hence late for more than 2 months in making the
Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any
good reason to extend the time for the applicants to make the Leave
Application.
8. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
9. The applicants did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when they filed the Leave
Application. At the oral hearing before this court on 11 June 2026,
the applicants simply said that they did not receive the Board’s
letter containing the Board’s Decision at their address, even though
the letter was posted to their correct address. They thought that the
letter was misplaced, but could not provide any reason why it would be
so. They went to the Board to collect the Board’s Decision and they
immediately made the Leave Application thereafter.
10. A delay of more than 2 months is substantial, and the explanation
given by the applicants at the hearing is not satisfactory, as there
was no reason given as to why the letter would be misplaced. More
importantly, there is no merit in the intended judicial review as
discussed below.
11. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicants to file the Leave
Application, even if an application for extension of time was made.
The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of
being made out of time alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
The applicants’ case
13. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicants’ case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
14. In sum, the 1st applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection
because if refouled to India, he feared that his uncles and his
cousins, with whom he had a land dispute, would kill him. Moreover,
since he was a Sikh and married the 2nd applicant who was a Muslim, he
was afraid that he would be killed by the 2nd applicant’s father who
objected to their marriage.
15. As to the 2nd applicant’s case, she was afraid that her father would
kill her because she married the 1st applicant and abandoned her
Muslim faith. She also feared that she would be killed by the 1st
applicant’s uncles because of her marriage with the 1st applicant.
Oral hearing
16. The applicants requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and their case was heard on 11 June 2026.
17. When this court asked the applicants for the grounds of their intended
judicial review, the applicants merely adopted what was stated in the
1st applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 26 October 2021, ie they
could not go back to their country because their lives were not safe
there.
Grounds for judicial review
18. The applicants are required to identify clearly the grounds for their
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
19. The applicants did not advance any ground for their intended judicial
review in their Form 86, nor in the 1st applicant’s supporting
affirmation. The 1st applicant only mentioned in his supporting
affirmation that he was not satisfied with the Board’s Decision, and
he could not go back to his country because his life was not safe
there. Both the 1st and 2nd applicants just adopted the same at the
oral hearing.
Discussion
20. First of all, the applicants’ danger upon returning to their country
had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If they intend to
challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an
application for judicial review.
21. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
22. Thus, it is not for this court to re-assess the applicants’ cases or
their danger upon refoulement to India. This court will only
scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural
unfairness or irrationality.
23. In assessing the 1st and 2nd applicants’ appeal/petition, the Board
held 4 sessions of oral hearing on 26 March 2018, 10 April 2018, 13
April 2018 and 26 November 2018. The applicants were present and were
thus given ample opportunity to present their cases to the Board in
person.
24. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had extensively
analyzed every aspect of their claims and provided full and detailed
reasoning in rejecting their claims for non-refoulement protection.
25. With regards to the 2nd applicant’s claimed fear of harm from her
father, although the Board attached some credence to her story that
her parents disapproved of her out of caste marriage and that she
might be in danger if she returned to her parents’ home in Jahal,
Punjab or to that vicinity, the Board did not find that the threat
from her father was more than a local issue or that she faced a real
risk of ill-treatment or loss of life by her father if she relocated
to a different area of Punjab or another state in India. The Board
found no credible evidence that her father, a truck driver, had the
financial resources, connections or network to find and harm her if
she relocated to another area of India. The Board found that the 2nd
applicant had failed to discharge the burden on her to prove that she
faced a real risk of harm from her father if she returned to India
(see paragraphs 54 to 63 of the Board’s Decision).
26. It followed that the 1st applicant’s risk from the 2nd applicant’s
father for being the 2nd applicant’s husband had also not been proven.
27. The Board had discussed in great length the 1st applicant’s many
claims in paragraphs 64 to 143 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not
necessary to repeat the same here.
28. In gist, the Board found countless discrepancies, inconsistencies and
inventions in the 1st applicant’s evidence. Based on the accumulation
of discrepancies and implausible assertions in the 1st applicant’s
evidence, as well as instances in which he lied and distorted his
evidence, the Board found that he was neither credible nor reliable.
Consequently, the Board was unwilling to attach any credence to more
than the most basic aspects of his evidence. While the Board accepted
that he was shot in the abdomen, the Board was unwilling to attach any
credence to his evidence about the circumstances which caused him to
be shot. Similarly, although the Board also accepted that the 1st
applicant was tortured on at least one occasion in India, the Board
found him so lacking in credibility and reliability and had such
little confidence in his honesty and truthfulness that the Board was
unwilling to attach any credence to his evidence regarding how he came
to be tortured. More importantly, there was no evidence which
suggested that he was tortured or shot at for a Convention reason.
29. The Board did not accept that the 1st applicant had told the truth
about his situation in India, or honestly described his life
experiences there. The Board was concerned that he had concealed
evidence which he thought would be detrimental. It was more than
clear to the Board that he had fabricated and manipulated evidence
related to parts of his story. Having duly considered the 1st
applicant’s evidence, the Board did not find that he had discharged
the burden on him to prove the centerpiece of his story.
Specifically, the Board had not accepted that his uncles and cousins
involved their political allies and the police in framing him as many
as 8 times, or that the 1st applicant was a fugitive from justice.
The Board noted that the land allegedly in dispute remained in the
applicant’s name and for which he continued to receive rental income.
30. The Board accepted that the 1st applicant’s experience of having shot
at and having been tortured did attain a minimum level of severity.
However, the 1st applicant’s evidence did not support a finding that
he would once again face such treatment or that there was a genuine
and substantial risk that he would be subjected to similar ill-
treatment if he was returned to India.
31. The Board did not find that the 1st applicant had provided truthful
evidence regarding the conflict with his family. Hence, the Board
found that the 1st applicant had failed to prove that his uncles and
cousins continued to represent a credible threat to him upon his
refoulement. By the same token, the Board found that the 2nd
applicant’s risk as the 1st applicant’s wife in respect of the risk
from the 1st applicant’s uncles and cousins had also not been proven.
32. In its assessment of the 1st applicant’s Torture Risk[1], the Board
explicitly stated in paragraph 165 of the Board’s Decision that while
it had accepted that the 1st applicant was subjected to torture in
Punjab, in almost all the other respects, the Board found that he was
not credible or reliable. His evidence was marked by demonstrable
dishonesty, exaggeration, manipulation, a significant number of
discrepancies relevant to his core story, implausible assertions, and
a notable reliance on hearsay. The Board found that he had not proven
the centerpiece of his story and did not accept that he was in police
custody as a result of having been framed by his uncles and cousins.
33. As the 1st applicant had not provided honest and credible evidence
related to the circumstances of his interactions with police, the
Board did not find on his evidence that there were substantial
grounds, or any grounds, for believing that he would be subjected to
torture in Punjab or India if he was refouled. Thus, the Board
concluded that the 1st applicant’s claim under the head of Torture
Risk failed. In addition, any risk of torture that the 2nd applicant
might face as the 1st applicant’s wife, had thus not been proven.
34. On the issue of state protection, the Board considered that the 2nd
applicant was likely to be able to access effective protection from
the state should such need arise. With regards to the 1st applicant,
country of origin information (“COI”) suggested that he might have
greater difficulty accessing effective protection from the state,
given the Board’s finding that he was previously subjected to torture.
However, as the 1st applicant had failed to prove the circumstances
which caused him to suffer the incidents of torture, the Board was
unable to conclude that effective protection would be unavailable to
him if he returned to Punjab, India. The Board found it possible that
if he relocated to a different state within India, he would have a
better chance of accessing effective protection from the police.
35. As to internal relocation, as said, the Board found the 2nd applicant
could avoid the risk from her father by internal relocation. In
addition, the Board was satisfied that as a couple, the 1st and 2nd
applicants would be able to cope with relocating in India and it was
not unduly harsh for them to do so. It should be noted that the Board
had explicitly stated that as the 1st applicant had not established
that he was at risk in regard to any of the available grounds under
the USM, there was actually no need for it to consider how relocating
might impact his safety in India.
36. Hence, the Board concluded that both the 1st and 2nd applicants were
not entitled to non-refoulement protection under any of the applicable
grounds.
37. The finding of facts, including assessment of evidence, COI and risk
of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
38. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
39. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicants have failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
40. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application in respect of both the
1st and 2nd applicants is dismissed for being made out of time and
also for devoid of merits.
Dated the 24th day of June 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicants/the |putative respondent / the |
|interested parties as |applicants’ |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such putative|
|Court the order |on: 24/06/2026 |interested parties as may |
|granting leave and any| |be directed by the Court /|
|directions given | |the putative interested |
|within 14 days after |Applicants’ ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|the leave was granted |Nil |24/06/2026 |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | | |
| | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|b) issue the | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|originating summons | |Claims Petition Office |
|within 14 days after | |Putative respondent’s ref.|
|the grant of leave and| |no.: |
|serve it in accordance| |USM 6545/17/3/200/IN1303 &|
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM 6546/17/3/201/IN1304 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative interested |
|other party copies of | |party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |QA T/C 1696/16 (Formerly |
|the Applicant proposes| |RBCZ 11545/16 (T1 I89)) & |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 1697/16 (Formerly |
|including the | |RBCZ 11546/16 (T1 I89)) |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.