MD DIDHAR HOSSAIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

CAMP 237/2024, [2025] HKCA 461

On Appeal From [2024] HKCFI 2401

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 237 OF 2024

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1904 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon G Lam JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”). The applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong was rejected by the Director of Immigration and by the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”). His application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision was dismissed by the Court of First Instance. His application for extension of time to appeal against that decision was dismissed by this Court in our judgment dated 19 March 2025.

2.  By Notice of Motion filed on 1 April 2025, the applicant seeks leave to appeal against our judgment to the CFA.  In that document the applicant stated that the judges erred in not applying the “principle of procedural unfairness” and the “principle of irrationality” to the decision made by the Director of Immigration, that the authorities simply relied on country of origin information against the applicant’s claim and ignored the evidence of violence towards minorities, and that his life would be in danger if he returned to his country.

3.  In his written submissions, the applicant set out certain provisions of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Basic Law, and quoted extensively from previous judgments of various courts, but failed to show how they are relevant to the present application or identify any important question of law.

4.  There is no reason for us to depart from the usual practice of determining an application for leave to appeal on the basis of the available materials without an oral hearing, as set out in paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

5.  We take the view that this application ought to be dismissed because the applicant has not shown that the intended appeal raises any question which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the CFA for decision (which is the condition for giving leave to appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484), and also because he has failed to show any prospects of success in the intended appeal. 

6.  Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.