PIPI-PIJARWANTI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5562 · HCAL 2231/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2231/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5562
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2231 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Pipi-Pijarwanti |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 12 December 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 10 November 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
2231_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had failed to establish a case for
non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Thus, the
Board dismissed her appeal/petition against the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 23 June 2023 (“the
Director’s Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named “To Claim appeal Board Non-refoulement
Claim Petition Office” as the putative interested party, when the
Director should be so named.
4. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
5. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
6. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her
creditor, Dadan, as she could not repay her debt borrowed from the
creditor.
Oral hearing
7. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application,
and her case was heard on 24 September 2026.
8. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of her
intended judicial review, which were contained in her written
submission annexed to her 2nd supporting affirmation dated 2 July
2026, she merely replied that she was afraid of going back to her
country, her life was in danger and no one could help her and her
family.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not identify any ground for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
11. In her 1st affirmation dated 12 December 2023, the applicant mentioned
that she was really scared to go back to Indonesia because she could
not repay her debt borrowed from Dadan, who always went to her
parent’s home and said that he would kill her when he found her, and
that was the reason why she lost contact with her family and her
family members were in even worse condition.
12. In the applicant’s written submission annexed to her 2nd supporting
affirmation dated 2 July 2026, the applicant made some general
accusations against the Board. These general accusations were in fact
used by many applicants in similar applications as their grounds for
applying leave to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is like
a template for such applicants and they just used the grounds stated
therein without any regard to their own situations. The applicant is
no exception. Nevertheless, as the applicant is relying on those
grounds to make the Leave Application, this court will still deal with
the grounds as discussed below.
13. As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds
stated in her written submission at the oral hearing, and she only
added that her life was in danger and no one could help her and her
family.
Discussion
14. This court will first deal with the applicant’s 1st affirmation dated
12 December 2023. In the said affirmation, the applicant only
reiterated the basis of her non-refoulement claim, ie her fear of her
creditor as she could not repay the debt she owed him.
15. However, the applicant’s danger from her creditor had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
16. The applicant’s reiteration of her danger in her own country at the
oral hearing before this court cannot help her either.
17. As aforesaid, the contents of the applicant’s written submission
annexed to her 2nd supporting affirmation dated 2 July 2026 were all
very general. Some of the grounds therein were directed at the
Director. As the Director’s Decision was superseded by the Board’s
Decision, it is no longer susceptible to judicial review (see Re
Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549). This court will therefore consider only
those grounds directed at the Board in respect of the Board’s
Decision.
18. There are a total of 14 paragraphs numbered 1 to 13 (two of which were
with identical contents and both numbered as paragraph 3) in the said
written submission.
19. Paragraph 1 is only the applicant’s self-introduction. In paragraph
10, the applicant just mentioned that the Board’s Decision contained
all the details of her claim. Thus, paragraphs 1 and 10 are not
grounds for judicial review at all.
20. Paragraphs 5, 6, and 8 were directed at the Director. Hence, they
could not be used to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply
ignored. Therefore, only paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 13 are
relevant to the Leave Application.
21. In paragraph 2, the applicant alleged that the adjudicator of the
Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it was not reasonable
and fair as required by the Wednesbury test. However, the applicant
did not state how or why the Board’s Decision was wrong, unfair and
unreasonable.
22. It does not help the applicant to establish any ground by just
mentioning the right to life in paragraphs 3 and 4 either. In any
event, the Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to life and
concluded that the applicant faced no BOR 2 Risk[1] if refouled, as
there was no evidence whatsoever that any circumstance would subject
the applicant to any risk of death penalty or genocide in her home
country, and the Board found that reasonable state protection was
available to any risk of life deprivation by non-state actors (see
paragraph 57 of the Board’s Decision).
23. In paragraph 7, the applicant alleged that the adjudicator acted
unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance
on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed to take her
personal background and experience into account. However, the
applicant did not state which aspects of her personal background and
experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
24. In paragraph 9, the applicant simply alleged that the adjudicator
ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s Decision was
irrational. There were no particulars or reasons given to say how or
why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
25. In paragraph 11, the applicant complained that the Board’s Decision
was unreasonable or irrational in the public law sense or was a result
of procedural errors or unfairness. Again, the applicant did not
specify how or why the Board’s Decision was unreasonable or
irrational, or how the Board had committed procedural errors or
unfairness in the determination of her claim.
26. In paragraph 12, the applicant alleged that the Board relied on some
web news which were not officially recognized, there was no proper
investigation on her claims, and hence her claim was not determined
fairly. However, the applicant did not state which pieces of web news
that the Board relied on were not officially recognized. She also
failed to point out which part of her claim was not properly
investigated, or why her claim was not determined fairly.
27. Lastly, in paragraph 13, the applicant stated that she requested this
court to re-consider her case, and she attached some of her documents
that were submitted to the Director and the Board which she considered
were not properly investigated. She also accused the Board for
rejecting her claim as quickly as possible. However, there was no
document attached to the said written submission or the applicant’s
2nd affirmation as alleged.
28. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
29. Thus, the applicant cannot ask this court to re-assess her non-
refoulement claim. There was also no evidence that the Board did not
properly investigate her claims and only tried to dispose of her case
as quickly as possible.
30. It is therefore this court’s view that none of the matters raised by
the applicant in her 1st affirmation, the said written submission or
at the oral hearing before this court can amount to any valid grounds
to challenge the Board’s Decision.
31. Nevertheless, despite the lack of any valid ground being advanced by
the applicant for the intended judicial review, this court will still
examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law,
procedural unfairness and irrationality as aforesaid.
32. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 19 October 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the
Board in person.
33. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of all the aspects of the applicant’s claims and its
reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection.
34. The Board had laid out its assessment of the credibility of
applicant’s claims in paragraphs 34 to 37 of the Board’s Decision, and
it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
35. In gist, the Board found that the applicant had only made bare
assertions and provided no objective proof of her assertions. There
were material facts and information provided by the applicant which
the Board found implausible or unreliable and affected adversely the
applicant’s credibility and the reliability of her evidence. The
creditor had not physically harmed the applicant and her family. The
Board considered that the alleged mistreatments by the creditor did
not reach the minimum level of severity required for international
protection.
36. On the totality of evidence, the Board was not convinced that the
applicant overstayed in Hong Kong because of the alleged threat to
kill or harm her by the creditor. The Board found that the
centerpiece of the applicant’s story did not stand, the applicant was
dishonest and unreliable, and was not a genuine non-refoulement
claimant.
37. On top of its findings as summarised above, the Board also found from
COI that despite setbacks, the Indonesian government was taking action
against corruption. The Board did not accept that state protection
would not be available to the applicant against the alleged threat of
harm from the creditor (see paragraphs 47 to 48 of the Board’s
Decision).
38. Moreover, the Board found that internal relocation was a viable
alternative to the applicant, and had given full reasons in paragraphs
67 to 71 of the Board’s Decision for such a finding.
39. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds
under the USM.
40. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
41. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
42. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
43. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 30/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |30/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21908 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 445/23 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing, | |as RBCZ 5000403/23) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of violation of right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.