TRAN VAN DOAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5269 · HCAL 1033/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1033/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5269
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1033 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Tran Van Doan |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and the applicant being absent in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 27 June 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 16 March 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1033_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant had failed to establish a case for
non-refoulement protection on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed
the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director
of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 18 May 2022 (“the Director’s
Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s
claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any
putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
Late application
7. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
8. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 27 June 2023, which was 3
months and 10 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 16 March 2023).
The applicant was hence late for 10 days in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
9. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
10. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave
Application. Since the applicant was absent at the oral hearing
before this court on 10 September 2026, no reason was given by the
applicant for the delay at all.
11. Although a delay of 10 days is not substantial, there is simply no
reason for this court to grant an extension of time to the applicant
to file the Leave Application when no explanation was given.
12. More importantly, there is no merit of the intended judicial review at
all as discussed below. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend
the time for the applicant to file the Leave Application, even if an
application for extension of time was made. The Leave Application can
be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone.
13. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
14. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
15. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor
TRAN Van Long and his creditor’s followers due to his inability to
repay a loan of 600 million Vietnamese Dong.
Oral hearing
16. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application.
However, the applicant was absent at the hearing on 10 September 2026.
17. As held in Re Abdus Salam [2019] HKCA 1091, an application for leave
to bring judicial review should not be dismissed for want of
prosecution merely because the applicant failed to attend the oral
hearing of the leave application. The correct approach is to treat
the applicant as having withdrawn the request for a hearing by reason
of the absence at the hearing, and to proceed to determine the leave
application on its merits.
18. Thus, this court will proceed to consider the merits of the Leave
Application based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
19. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
20. The applicant annexed a document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” to his Form 86. The contents of the said document
were all very general allegations and were in fact used by many
applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave
to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is like a template for
such applicants and they just used the grounds stated therein without
any regard to their own situations. Nevertheless, as the applicant is
relying on the said grounds to make the Leave Application, this court
will still deal with the grounds as discussed below.
Discussion
21. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
22. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicant’s said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s
grounds were directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used
to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus,
only paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave
Application.
23. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable.
24. It does not help the applicant to establish any ground by just
mentioning the right to life in paragraph 1 either. In any event, the
Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to life and concluded
that the applicant faced no BOR 2 Risk[1] if refouled, as there was no
evidence whatsoever that any circumstance would subject the applicant
to any risk of death penalty or genocide in his home country (see
paragraph 60 of the Board’s Decision).
25. This court notes that the Board may have committed an error of law in
stating that “The text of BOR2 and cases regarding BOR2 equivalent in
other jurisdictions illustrate that only a state party can violate the
right to life by the imposition of death penalty or genocide.” As
held by the Court of Appeal in Kulwinder Kaur v Director of
Immigration and another [2022] HKCA 48, “The authorities establish
that the right to life is also violated by extra-judicial killings by
State agents or by non-State actors, where the State fails to take
steps to avoid a threat to life emanating from non-State actors or
private persons.” Thus, violation of right to life is not confined to
imposition of death penalty or genocide by a State as suggested by the
Board.
26. Nevertheless, as the Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition
failed under BOR 3 Risk[2], there was no arguable ground for any BOR 2
Risk (see Kulwinder Kaur v Director of Immigration and another, supra,
at paragraph 59). The Court of Appeal acknowledged there was some
force in the argument that issues under the BOR 2 Risk are not
separable from those under the BOR 3 Risk, and this essentially meant
that upon determining that there is no BOR 3 Risk, there is no
arguable ground for any BOR 2 Risk (see Re Doyaoen Josephine Biba
[2025] HKCA 482, at paragraph 27).
27. The applicant did not specifically challenge the Board’s findings on
the BOR 3 Risk on any basis other than the general grounds as
mentioned in the said document. This court also finds no flaw in the
Board’s findings in this regard. Thus, there is no reasonably
arguable ground in the factual context of the applicant’s case, and
the aforesaid error of law, taken on its own, would not vitiate the
Board’s Decision (see Kulwinder Kaur v Director of Immigration and
another, supra, at paragraph 60).
28. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take his personal background and experience into account. However,
the applicant did not state which aspects of his personal background
and experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
29. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by him, and
unreasonably required him to respond to questions. This accusation
lacks any particulars in support. The applicant did not state which
explanations he provided were not accepted by the Board and which
questions he was unreasonably required to answer.
30. There was in fact nothing wrong for the Board to question the
applicant extensively to try to understand his claims better and to
assess his credibility and his accounts of the events leading to his
claim for non-refoulement protection. The questions were necessary
for the Board to fulfil its duty of finding of facts in relation to
the applicant’s claim. This court finds no fault or unfairness in the
Board’s questioning of the applicant at all.
31. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged that the
adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
32. The Board had in fact provided a detailed analysis of the applicant’s
claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the applicant
failed on all applicable grounds under the USM to claim non-
refoulement protection. The Board’s rejection of his non-refoulement
claim was a decision made after due consideration of the law (save for
the error of law as aforesaid) and the evidence placed before it. If
the applicant intends to challenge the finding of facts by the Board,
it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.
33. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
34. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case.
35. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
36. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review. However, the error of law as identified
above has already been discussed and it is not necessary for this
court to discuss it again in the ensuing paragraphs.
37. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 7 March 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board
in person.
38. The Board laid out its findings on the credibility of the applicant in
paragraphs 38 to 40 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
39. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s 8-months’ delay in
lodging his non-refoulement claim after his arrest, coupled with his
engagement in illegal work in Hong Kong during the period, cast
serious doubt on the veracity of his claims. The applicant had not
suffered serious harm at the hands of his creditor before he left
Vietnam. His alleged sufferings did not reach a minimum level of
severity. Moreover, the Board found the number and nature of
inconsistencies and implausibility in the applicant’s evidence were
serious and had undermined its reliability.
40. On the totality of evidence, the Board was not convinced that (1) the
applicant came to Hong Kong because of the alleged threat to harm him
by the creditor; (2) the applicant suffered any physical or mental
pain and suffering as he had alleged, (3) the applicant’s creditor and
his followers, if they ever were, were still chasing the applicant all
over his home country and want to harm him. The Board found that the
centrepiece of the applicant’s story did not stand. The Board found
him dishonest and unreliable, and that he was not a genuine non-
refoulement claimant.
41. Despite the finding of the applicant’s credibility as summarised
above, the Board did go on to assess the applicant’s case with the
facts as claimed, but the Board found that the applicant still could
not succeed in his claim for non-refoulement protection.
42. The Board found that the applicant’s fear only arose from his
inability to repay a loan, which was a private matter. There was no
evidence to support that the injuries the applicant sustained could
amount to torture or attain the level of minimum severity. The
creditor was not a state actor, and there was no element of state
acquiescence in the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. His fear
of ill-treatment did not fall within any of the Convention categories.
43. Moreover, the Board found from COI that although there were materials
that indicated corruption and inefficiency was common in the
Vietnamese police force, the Vietnamese government had taken actions
against loan sharks, illegal debt collectors and corrupt police and
other civil servants. There was no evidence that the authority in
Vietnam would fail to discharge its duties or tolerate any unlawful
and allusive behaviour committed by an individual as a systemic
practice. The Board did not accept that state protection would not be
available to the applicant if he was returned to Vietnam.
44. The Board had also given full reasons in paragraphs 70 to 75 of the
Board’s Decision for its finding that the applicant had many options
for relocation in Vietnam.
45. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM.
46. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion (save for the
error of law as aforesaid).
47. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM (save for the error of law as aforesaid), the
burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly
identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness.
This court could detect no errors of law (save for the error of law as
aforesaid), procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury
test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board
to reach its decision.
48. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
49. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 20370 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 136/22 (Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5000029/22) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of violation of right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[2] Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.