CHAN SAU WAI v. LAM KIN SUM t/a KIM YUEN MINERAL CO

HCPI 1168/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 1168 OF 2005

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JUDGMENT

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1. The plaintiff claims damages against the defendant for personal injuries sustained by her as a result of an accident which occurred in a granite mine (“the Quarry”) situated at Feng Go Shan, Shi Jin Zhen, Nan An City, Fujian Province, the People’s Republic of China on 5 May 2004 in the course of her employment with the defendant.

2. At the start of the trial, the defendant, through his counsel, conceded liability and indicated further that he was not pursuing the plea of contributory negligence any further.

3. Accordingly, interlocutory judgment was entered in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant with damages to be assessed.

4. The only remaining issue with which this judgment is concerned is therefore the assessment of damages.

The accident

5. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a saleswoman and her duties included attending the Quarry to select and measure granite stones according to the orders placed by customers.

6. On the morning of 5 May 2004, the plaintiff received instructions from the defendant to attend the Quarry for inspecting suitable granite stones.  She carried out those instructions and attended the Quarry.

7. While the plaintiff was measuring a block of granite stones at the Quarry, something, believed by the plaintiff to be rocks rolled down from a steep slope above her.  Before the plaintiff could take evasive action, she was hit on the head and lost consciousness immediately.

8. The keeper of the Quarry, a Mr Wong Leung Tak, on hearing the scream of the plaintiff, ran to where the plaintiff was and found her lying at the scene with blood all over her face.  Mr Wong immediately phoned the defendant and informed him of the accident to the plaintiff.  The defendant then drove to the Quarry and took the plaintiff to a local hospital in his car.

Injuries, treatment and history

9. The plaintiff was taken from the Quarry by the defendant in his car to the Haijun Tongan Minhai Yiyuan, a local hospital, where she was admitted and hospitalized for one week from 5 to 11 May 2004.  She was diagnosed by doctors at that hospital as suffering from concussion from the head injury.  Her head wound was sutured with three stitches under local anaesthesia.

10. On about 13 May, the plaintiff returned to Hong Kong and attended Princess Margaret Hospital (“PMH”) as well as the Kwun Tong Occupational Health Clinic Hospital.  The stitches were removed.

11. Thereafter she complained of persistent headaches, vertigo, dizziness and nausea.  She also lost her temper easily with her family members.

12. She was then referred by the Accident and Emergency Department to the Neurological Department of PMH because of her persistent headache where a further CT scan was performed on 2 August 2004.  The CT scan was found to be normal.

13. In October 2004, the plaintiff tried to return to working for the defendant in her pre-accident job, but after trying it for two or three days found that she could not cope with the work because of her overall condition.  At that time the defendant indicated that he wanted to dismiss her but relented when the plaintiff reminded him that she was still on sick leave and he had no right to dismiss her.

14. However, on 25 November 2004, the defendant formally notified the plaintiff on the phone that she was dismissed from the job because she could not carry out her work, therefore he was not prepared to pay her any more salary.

15. Still later, the plaintiff became depressed and experienced emotional and personality change which strained the relationships between her and other members of her family.  Her depression and personality change manifested in her hearing voices, screaming at night, experiencing auditory hallucination and a paranoia that somebody was following her all the time.

16. In April 2005, because of her psychotic symptom, the plaintiff was made to attend the Clinical Psychological Service of the Hong Kong Family Welfare Society by her daughter and was there seen by the clinical psychologist.  The plaintiff was diagnosed to be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder with psychotic features.  However, when the plaintiff declined to receive clinical psychological services offered there, the counselling ended about a month after she started with that centre.

17. In September 2005, the plaintiff was admitted to the Kwai Chung Psychiatric Hospital for some 10 days.  Upon her discharge, there was some improvement in her psychiatric condition.  She was given psychiatric medication which has continued to the present.

The plaintiff’s evidence

18. The plaintiff adopted her witness statement and supplemental witness statement as her evidence-in-chief after confirming the contents of both.

19. She elaborated on the evidence of her witness statements as follows.

20. She divorced her husband in 1995 and thereafter raised both her son and daughter herself, being the sole breadwinner of the family by working as a saleslady and later as a manageress in a branch of the Hui Lau Shan Herbal Tea shop.  She had lived with her son and daughter in a public housing unit in Kwai Fong.

21. Before the accident to her, she had lived in harmony with her son, daughter-in-law, grandson as well as her own daughter in the Kwai Fong flat.

22. However, after the accident, because of change in her behavior, her daughter had forced her to seek psychological counselling but that she was not aware of it herself.

23. Her behavioral problem continued and it caused friction between her and the rest of her family straining their relationship.

24. In about September 2005, she was driven out of the Kwai Fong flat by her son because of friction between them.

25. She was then admitted to the Kwai Chung Psychiatric Hospital for some 10 days receiving psychiatric treatment there.

26. After her discharge from the Kwai Chung Hospital, the plaintiff then rented a room in a Tsuen Wan tenement where she lived alone away from the rest of her family who remained in the Kwai Fong flat.  She paid her rent for the room from CSSA payments which she received after the accident and after her dismissal from her pre-accident job.

27. The plaintiff also elaborated upon when the accident happened, she lost consciousness after being hit by the rock on her head and only regained consciousness when she was in hospital in China.  She was unable to say how long it was that she was unconscious for but remembered having her head wound sutured in the hospital in China.

28. As for her dismissal by the defendant, the plaintiff gave evidence that she had tried to go back to work for the defendant for some two or three days in October 2004, but found that she could not cope with the work she had to do.  The defendant had wanted to dismiss her in October 2004 when she could not cope with the work, but at that time, the plaintiff said to him that she was still on sick leave and that he could not dismiss her.  However, on 24 November, the defendant called her up by phone and told her that since she could not do the work, there was no reason for him to employ her and pay her a salary and dismissed her there and then.

29. Apart from trying to return to work for the defendant, the plaintiff had also tried to find other employment such as being a saleslady in a boutique.  She was interviewed on a couple of occasions and actually tried out working in a boutique for one day, but she was not hired for the job.  Although the plaintiff did not tell her prospective employer of her being under psychiatric treatment, she was unable to control her emotions which was the reason for her not getting the job.  If she had gotten that job, it would have paid a salary of some $6,000 odd.

30. The plaintiff also called her daughter, Wong Hau Ling, as a witness.

31. The daughter is now 27 and works as a security guard. 

32. The daughter adopted her witness statement as her evidence-in-chief after confirming its contents as true.

33. Basically, the daughter’s evidence dwelt on the change in personality of the plaintiff after her accident.

34. The daughter confirmed the good and harmonious relationship which existed between the plaintiff and the rest of the family before the accident.

35. After the accident, however, the plaintiff began to lose her temper and throw things around in the house, resulting in friction and strained relationship between her and the rest of the family.  There were times when the plaintiff would shout and yell in the middle of the night, thus waking up everyone in the flat.

36. It was after one very heated quarrel between the plaintiff and her son (i.e. the witness’ brother) that the son suggested that the plaintiff move out of the flat because it was difficult for the others to get along with her and asked the plaintiff whether she had thought about that.

37. It was that which led to the plaintiff moving out after her discharge from Kwai Chung Hospital.  

Evidence of medical experts

38. In this case, expert medical evidence from three disciplines were adduced.  The three disciplines were orthopaedics, psychiatry and neurology.

39. There was little dispute between the respective experts in orthopaedics as well as the respective experts in psychiatry and the reports in both those disciplines were adduced without calling those experts.

40. The main difference between the parties concerned the experts in neurology.  Dr David Chin Kim Fai, the neurologist instructed by the plaintiff, as well as Dr Kan Yiu Ting, the neurosurgeon instructed by the defendant, were both called to give evidence.

41. Dr Johnson Lam, the orthopaedic expert for the plaintiff, in his report dated 23 April 2006, concluded that the head injury of the plaintiff resulted in post concussional syndrome which manifests itself in occasional headache and dizziness.

42. Dr Lam also found on examination cervical and lumbar spondylosis but which was unrelated to the accident.  This had caused the plaintiff some mild back and neck pain.

43. Dr Lam also opined that the treatment already received by the plaintiff to be adequate and surgery was not required in her case.

44. Outside of her orthopaedic impairment, Dr Lam did state in his report that the plaintiff suffered also from psychiatric illness for which she required medication, but this was outside of his field of expertise.  Whilst her orthopaedic impairment being only mild, should not prevent the plaintiff from returning to her pre-accident employment, Dr Lam recognized that the most disabling part of her impairment was her poor concentration and memory which was the major factor preventing her from returning to her pre-accident employment.

45. Dr Brian Chan, the orthopaedic expert for the defendant, did not differ much from the opinion of Dr Lam.

46. Dr Chan, in a report dated 30 June 2006, concluded that orthopaedically the plaintiff suffered a mild head injury from the accident although he also found her to have lumbar and cervical spondylosis.  He opined that the plaintiff should have recovered from the head injury already.  The head injury should not prevent the plaintiff from returning to her pre-accident employment and would not affect her activities of daily living.

47. As for the psychiatric experts, Dr Benjamin Lai for the plaintiff stated in his report dated 17 May 2006 that the plaintiff suffered from post concussional disorder as well as major depressive disorder with psychotic symptoms.  Both these disorders were the indirect result of the accident.

48. Further treatment for the psychiatric disorders were recommended by Dr Lai as detailed in his report, after which, he opined that the plaintiff would likely be fit to return to her pre-accident work but with some restrictions.

49. The psychiatric expert for the defendant, Dr Law Woon Tong, in his report dated 1 June 2006, stated that the symptoms of the plaintiff (being headache, occasional dizziness, feeling sad, anxious about her future, sleep impairment and memory impairment) to be compatible with post concussional syndrome.

50. Her mood impairment, which has improved since treatment received by the plaintiff, was diagnosed at the time of his report to be an adjustment disorder with depressed mood.

51. Both the diagnosis of post concussional syndrome and adjustment disorder were consistent with the injury suffered by the plaintiff in the accident and were thus deemed to be the result of the accident.

52. Dr Law took the view that the treatment received by the plaintiff was appropriate but the plaintiff should continue the treatment for another 10 months.  Her mood should show further improvement but the residual cognitive impairment in memory and concentration will carry on.

53. Dr Law stated that the appropriate sick leave in relation to the post concussional disorder and adjustment disorder would be nine months.

54. I now turn to the neurology experts whose opinions were the main dispute between the parties.

55. Dr David Chin, a neurologist, was called by the plaintiff as her expert.

56. Firstly, Dr Chin accepted that there was no indication of any neurological deficit after a full examination of the plaintiff.  However, he took the view that the symptoms of the plaintiff collectively points to a diagnosis of a moderately severe post concussional syndrome with a relatively long period of loss of consciousness.

57. He considered the memory loss suffered by the plaintiff was likely to be permanent.  He further opined that the plaintiff would be on life long anti-psychotic medication to deal with her schizophrenic symptoms.

58. Dr Chin further said in evidence that the memory loss and the schizophrenic symptoms were the major obstacle to the plaintiff and together with the postural giddiness and personality change prevent the plaintiff from returning to her pre-accident employment which requires a high level of mental concentration and judgment.  He did not rule out the possibility of the plaintiff taking up jobs with lighter duties such as a receptionist or a saleslady, but that would depend on whether the medication could control her personality, temper, emotional outbursts and personality change.

59. He did not share the view of Dr Kan, the defendant’s expert, that the plaintiff was malingering.

60. On the other hand, Dr Kan Yiu Ting, a neurosurgeon instructed by the defendant, took the view after examining the plaintiff, that she was oriented in time, place and people, and there was no suggestion that she harboured ideas of paranoia, sense of persecution, delusion or hallucination.

61. Dr Kan also pointed to several features which, in his opinion, raised the suspicion that the plaintiff was a malingerer, namely, her refusal to detail her hospital stay in Fujian and to relate how long it was after the accident when the plaintiff regained continuous memory, her performance in the MMSE (Mini Mental State Exam) and TOMM (Test of Memory Malingering) tests, and the fact that the plaintiff was able to lead an independent life on her own and able to cope with all the activities of daily living.

Assessment of evidence and findings

62. Having heard the plaintiff and her daughter gave evidence and having had the chance of seeing their demeanour, but more particularly having heard the evidence they gave in the context of this whole case, I have no hesitation coming to the conclusion that both of them were wholly honest and reliable witnesses and that I can accept and rely on the evidence which they gave.

63. The plaintiff struck me as being a very simple but straightforward person.  That she is a simple and honest person can be seen by her evidence of the following matters :

(a)      When asked about whether she saw rocks falling down from the Quarry or whether she only heard sounds of something falling down, the plaintiff frankly admitted that she did not see that it was rocks which fell down and hit her on the head.

(b)     When asked about the length of time as to her loss of consciousness, the plaintiff again frankly admitted that all she could say was that she lost consciousness after being hit on the head and only regained consciousness when she was already in the local hospital.  Not only was this her answer in the courtroom when she was on the witness stand, but was something which she consistently maintained when asked by the experts this same question.

(c)     On the issue of her dismissal by the defendant, when initially the defendant wanted to dismiss her in October 2004, she protested saying to him that she was on sick leave and he could not dismiss her during her sick leave, but when on 25 November, the defendant again repeated that he was going to dismiss her because she could not carry out her duties she accepted his dismissal of her from her employment.  Not only was there a ring of truth in that evidence of hers, but that the defendant did not give evidence to challenge the plaintiff’s evidence on this.

(d)     The plaintiff’s evidence that she was offered further sick leave by government doctors beyond what was actually given to her but she declined further sick leave on the basis that she was no longer in employment (after her dismissal by the defendant) and there was no need for further sick leave to be given to her.  This is not the action of one who is malingering, but that of a simple person who is being practical.

(e)      The evidence of the plaintiff that when she was admitted to the Kwai Chung Psychiatric Hospital, she was advised by a doctor there that as the registered tenant of the public housing unit in Kwai Fong, her son had no right to ask her to leave the flat; but that even with such advice given to her, the plaintiff nevertheless decided it would be better for her to move out alone.  This shows the plaintiff to be the loving mother deep down inside her, but unfortunately afflicted by personality change due to her psychiatric condition.

(f)      The plaintiff’s evidence that after she had moved out and rented a room in a tenement flat in Tsuen Wan, although she had the use of the kitchen facilities, she rather cooked in her own room using an electric stove than to use the kitchen because other tenants had complained of her forgetting to turn off the kitchen stove after cooking there.  This evidence shows a person genuinely suffering from a memory problem rather than a malingerer.

64. It was submitted by counsel for the defendant that I should not accept the evidence of the plaintiff as to her having lost consciousness immediately after the accident and until she was in the hospital.  It was also submitted that I should not accept the evidence of the plaintiff relating to her dismissal by the defendant.

65. The evidence in these two areas directly concerned the defendant and he was present in both instances and could have given evidence to challenge the evidence of the plaintiff.  The defendant did not give evidence and no explanation has been given as to his failure to give evidence at the trial.  I am therefore left with only the evidence of the plaintiff.

66. For all the reasons above, I have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of the plaintiff and her daughter which evidence I find to be true and can rely on.

67. Turning now to deal with the conflicting medical evidence, specifically the conflicting opinion expressed by Dr David Chin and Dr Kan Yiu Ting, the two experts in neurology.

68. It should first of all be noted that whether a plaintiff is malingering or not is a question of fact for the trial judge to decide. 

69. In so far as medical opinion expressed by an expert is concerned and where such medical opinion touches on the issue of malingering, the court will of course consider, and at times be assisted by, such evidence in deciding that factual issue in the light of all the evidence in the case.

70. Such medical opinion as to malingering will not be decided in isolation but will be looked at as one of the factors for the court to come to a conclusion on that issue of malingering.

71. One of the main reasons for Dr Kan to form his opinion that the plaintiff was malingering was her failure to recount to him the length of time of her post traumatic amnesia (what Dr Chin referred to as the period of loss of consciousness).  Although technically speaking, there may be a difference between the two, that difference is of little or no relevance in the present case.  As such it would not be necessary for me to go into the details of their difference technically.

72. I do not in the least accept that the inability of the plaintiff to relate to Dr Kan the period of her post traumatic amnesia as being an indication of malingering.

73. It is accepted by both experts that in a normal case, it would usually be a bystander or someone other than the injured person who will be able to give a reliable indication of the period of loss of consciousness or post traumatic amnesia.

74. However, in the present case, the evidence showed that when the plaintiff was injured in the Quarry, she was found to be lying on the ground by the keeper of the Quarry, a Mr Wong Leung Tak, after she had suffered her head trauma.  The keeper then called the defendant by phone notifying him of the accident to the plaintiff and the defendant arrived at the Quarry in a car some 15 minutes later.  The defendant took the plaintiff to the local hospital in his car but the keeper of the Quarry did go along with them to the hospital.

75. In those circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the plaintiff could not, with any degree of accuracy, gave even an estimate as to the time when she was unconscious, since there was no third party who was able to assist her as to that.

76. The other main reason for Dr Kan to reach his opinion that the plaintiff was malingering was based on the TOMM test administered by him.

77. It is the evidence of Dr Kan that while the TOMM test is widely used in Canada, he accepts that he knows of no other medical expert employing the TOMM test in Hong Kong.

78. From the medical literature provided by Dr Kan relating to the TOMM test, it would appear that the TOMM test is not a foolproof test but that there can be margin for errors.  Test of Memory Malingering TOMM by Tom N. Tombaugh, Ph.D in Chapter 5 under the heading of “Interpretation and Case Studies” starts off with the following words :

“The Interpretation of the TOMM should proceed with caution because there can be serious consequences for misinterpretation in either direction.  Incorrectly diagnosing a person as a malingerer can deny him or her services, financial compensation, etc.”

79. Chapter 5 then goes on to lay down two decision rules for use in the interpretation of the TOMM.  The two rules are stated as follows :

“1.   Scoring lower than chance on any trial indicates the possibility of malingering.”

and

“2.   Any score lower than 45 on Trial 2 or the Retention Trial indicates the possibility of malingering.”

80. These two decision rules were repeated by Dr Kan in his report.  However, it does not appear that Dr Kan did anything further to interpret or diagnose the score of the plaintiff in the TOMM test.  Dr Kan merely stated in his report, after giving the score of the plaintiff in the TOMM test, these words :

“Thus in accordance with the Rules, [the plaintiff] was identified as a malingerer at the test.”

81. I have the gravest doubt that such a simplistic approach as adopted by Dr Kan is the correct approach in the light of the medical literature provided by him, particularly when no other evidence in this case (both factual and medical) even comes near to suggest malingering in the case of this plaintiff.  Nor, for that matter, did any other medical evidence, whether from an expert or treating doctor, even indicate malingering by the plaintiff.

82. I therefore reject the opinion evidence of Dr Kan and accept the opinion evidence of Dr David Chin where they differ.

83. I find that the plaintiff was not malingering but a genuine case of psychiatric impairment brought about by her post concussional syndrome which also affected her memory.

84. I further find that her depression and psychiatric condition was at its worst immediately before her admission to the Kwai Chung Psychiatric Hospital in September 2005 but gradually improved after her discharge therefrom.  That she had improved, perhaps even quite considerably, was not only the evidence in the case but can be seen by her performance in the witness box.

85. However, I do accept that she has still some residual psychiatric condition, that she is still on medication and that further treatment will be necessary in the case of this plaintiff.

Pain suffering and loss of amenities

86. Pain suffering and loss of amenities will be assessed on the basis of the findings made above as to the condition of the plaintiff.

87. In this respect, I have been referred to comparable awards made in Hong Kong by counsel for the plaintiff in the following cases :

(a)      Lam Hok Fai v. Chan Sai Kit and anr, HCPI 377 of 2003;

(b)     Sin Kin Man v. Hsin Cheong Construction Co. Ltd, HCPI 740 of 2004;

(c)     Yu Heung Yuk v. Ho Man and ors, HCPI 57 of 1998; and

(d)     Leung Pui Ying v. The Incorporated Owners of Albert House and ors, HCPI 828 of 1997.

88. From the awards made in the above cases, it can be seen that such awards for injuries and/or disabilities similar to those of the present plaintiff ranges from between $440,000 to $600,000 depending on whether the injuries come within the range between the lower end or the upper end of the “Serious Category” as it is defined in the case of Lee Ting Lam.

89. In the light of the injuries and disabilities of this plaintiff, and taking into account the fact that the worst period for this plaintiff has passed and that she has made improvements since her discharge from Kwai Chung Psychiatric Hospital in September 2005, and furthermore, from the medical evidence before me, there is still some possibility of some improvement with future psychiatric treatment/counselling as well as continued medication, I assess the damages under this head to be $500,000.

Pre-trial loss of earnings

90. There is no dispute that the plaintiff was earning $28,000 per month before the accident.

91. There is also no dispute that the plaintiff is entitled to full loss of earnings for the first 9½ months after the accident, that being the reasonable period of sick leave for her, in the condition that she was then in. 

92. The full loss of earnings for the first 9½ months therefore comes to $266,000.

93. As for the remaining 27 months of the pre-trial period, counsel for the plaintiff submitted in final submission that the plaintiff, despite her not having worked during that period, was prepared to claim only partial loss of earnings.

94. Based on government statistics as to the plaintiff’s notional earnings for this period, I would use a multiplicand of $21,500 as being her partial loss of earnings.

95. On this basis, I assess her partial loss of earnings for the remaining 27 months to be $580,500.

96. Totally, therefore, the plaintiff’s pre-trial loss of earnings comes to $846,500.

97. Adding a further 5% to take account of loss of MPF gives $888,825.

Future loss of earnings

98. In the absence of anything better, I shall continue to use the figure of $21,500 as the multiplicand in calculating loss of future earnings.

99. As for the multiplier, counsel for the plaintiff has suggested a multiplier of 8 based solely on the age of the plaintiff being 49 years old at trial.

100. However, there are other factors which I would need to take into account in arriving at the proper multiplier.

101. The evidence from the plaintiff in respect of her pre-accident job and that she was paid such a high salary of $28,000 by the defendant was because the work was difficult and dangerous and also because not many people were prepared to be stationed on a somewhat permanent basis in China in a dormitory which was also used as the office.  The plaintiff explained that the work was dangerous because the defendant and other employers like him in this line of work refused to supply workers like the plaintiff with safety helmet and other safety equipment when they had to visit quarries in their work.  The plaintiff also explained that the work was difficult because she had no holidays but was stationed in China away from her family most of the time and even when she was back in Hong Kong, she still had to work.

102. There was, however, no evidence from the plaintiff as to how long she had intended to work at this job with the defendant had the accident not occurred.

103. I say this because the two children of the plaintiff is already grown and likely not dependent on her anymore.  The son is married with child and the daughter, who gave evidence, is now working as a security guard.

104. Given the circumstances particularly the job nature of the work, there is every likelihood that this plaintiff may not have wanted to continue in her pre-accident job with the defendant for very long, especially when she enjoyed playing with her grandson before her injuries.

105. Whilst I accept that for a 49-year-old plaintiff, a multiplier of 8 would be reasonable in a normal case, given the circumstances of this case and the dangerous and difficult work nature involved, and in the absence of any evidence that the plaintiff would have continued in this job with the defendant until normal retirement, I am only prepared to adopt a multiplier of 4. 

106. The loss of future earnings is therefore assessed at $21,500 x 4 x 12 giving $1,032,000.

107. Adding a further 5% for loss of MPF would give $1,083,600.  This would be the total sum assessed under this head.

Loss of earnings capacity

108. Given the plaintiff’s psychiatric condition and, in particular, her memory defect as found by me, there can be little doubt that she will be at risk in the labour market if she should lose whatever job she may be able to secure by way of alternative employment.

109. The plaintiff claims for an amount of $76,164 under this head.  This figure represents about 12 months of the notional earnings of this plaintiff used to calculate her loss of earnings above.

110. The amount claimed is reasonable and will be allowed.

Special damages

111. Other special damages which includes medical expenses and travelling and tonic food have been agreed by the parties at a total amount of $14,187 and will be allowed.

Costs of future treatment and medication

112. Under this head, the parties have agreed $1,200 as being the future costs of medication and will be allowed.

113. The plaintiff further claims future costs of psychiatric therapies as recommended by the plaintiff’s expert.  While the plaintiff is agreeable to accept a reduced amount of $40,000 in this respect, the defendant has not seen fit to make any concession thereto.

114. In the light of the expert evidence adduced and the findings made by me, one such finding being that the plaintiff will still need to undergo future psychiatric treatment or counselling, the amount of $40,000 claimed by the plaintiff is reasonable in all the circumstances and will be allowed.

Interests

115. Interests will be awarded for the PSLA award at 2% p.a.  from the date of the writ until judgment.

116. Interests on pre-trial loss of earnings and all other special damages will be awarded at 5.375% (being half judgment rate) from the date of accident until judgment.

Summary of quantum

Deduction

118. From the above sub-total amount of $2,764,940 will need to be deducted the sum of $42,000 as being the employee’s compensation payment already received by the plaintiff.

119. The final sum therefore comes to $2,722,940.

Conclusion

120. There will accordingly be judgment in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $2,722,940.

Costs

121. There will be a costs order nisi that the defendant does pay the plaintiff her costs of this action to be taxed if not agreed.

122. The plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.