RE AAMAR ALI

CACV 300/2025, [2026] HKCA 1337

On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 44

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 300 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 3850 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 19 March 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time against this court’s judgment of 19 January 2026 (“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 44).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Martin Wong (“the Judge”) dated 12 May 2025, by which the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1530).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  Pursuant to section 24(2) of the HKCFAO, an appellant has 28 days from the date of the Judgment to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the present case, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Judgment fell on 16 February 2026.  Accordingly, the applicant was over one month late in taking out his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  As the applicant did not apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal within time, the Court has a discretion to extend time under section 24(5) of the HKCFAO only if good and sufficient grounds are shown by the applicant: see Re Imran Muhammad [2021] HKCA 482 at [9] and the authorities cited therein.  In deciding whether there are such good grounds, the Court is entitled to take into account (a) the length of the delay; (b) the reasons for the delay; (c) the chances of the appeal succeeding if an extension of time is granted; and (d) the degree of prejudice to the respondent if the application is granted: Begum Jahanara v Ian Candy, Esq & Another [2021] HKCA 83 at [4] and the authorities cited therein.

6.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant claimed that the Judge erred in law in failing to apply the principles of procedural unfairness and to consider whether the Director and the Board were irrational and unreasonable.  He further complained that the Judge did not consider whether the Board failed to fairly assess his evidence and whether the Board had made sufficient enquiry.  The Judge also failed to give sufficient reasons in refusing his application for leave to apply for judicial review and to consider the gravity of risk of harm faced by the applicant upon refoulement.

7.  In his supporting affirmation filed on 19 March 2026, the applicant sought extension of time to file his Notice of Motion as he was not legally trained and did not fully understand the effect of the decision or the applicable time limits for taking further action.  He also stated that he was currently detained at the Immigration Centre and it was difficult for him to obtain legal assistance or arrange for documents to be filed in the High Court as he had no legal knowledge.

8.  Contrary to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant failed to lodge any written submissions.

9.  At the outset, the applicant’s delay of over one month is substantial.  Ignorance of the time limit in taking out his application or that he is unrepresented are not good reasons for his substantial delay.

10.  In any event, the applicant’s application is also plainly devoid of merit.  His assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence. General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  More importantly, he fails to point out any error in the Judgment with specific particulars.  His intended appeal is plainly a nonstarter and should be dismissed on this basis alone.

11.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

12.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

13.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.