AA v. WSC

FCMC 3096/2020

[2026] HKFC 17

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NO. 3096 OF 2020

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JUDGMENT

(Ancillary relief, non-matrimonial property and compensation)

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A.      Introduction

1.  This is the ancillary relief trial between the Petitioner (“W”) and the Respondent (“H”).

2.  H is 53 years old and W is 48 years old.

3.  W petitioned for divorce on 15 May 2020, and the Decree Nisi was pronounced on 26 April 2023.

4.  There are 3 children of the family, being the eldest daughter now aged 18 (born in December 2007); the second daughter now aged 16 (born in January 2010); and the third daughter now aged 11 (born in May 2014) (collectively “Children”).

5.  According to the order made on 3 February 2021 by consent, I granted joint custody of the Children to the parties.  After a 3-day trial, I granted sole care and control to W with defined access to H on 12 July 2023[1].

6.  Pursuant to my order dated 30 August 2023, H was ordered, inter alia, to pay W interim maintenance for the Children in the sum of HK$132,150 per month, being HK$44,050 per child[2].

7.  During the course of the trial, parties were able to reach an agreement and sign a consent summons on the Children’s maintenance. In brief, H agreed to pay W maintenance for the Children in the sum of HK$150,000 per month, being HK$50,000 per child, with some undertakings.  This consent summons was made an order by me on 14 March 2025.

8.  Both parties have also given and signed undertakings in respect of the wine in the FMH, the Children’s assets, the Children’s tertiary education fees and other mandatory expenses.  The parties further agree that should they fail to reach an agreement for the Children’s expenses when they are in university, they shall undergo private financial adjudication to resolve their differences.

9.  The remaining substantive issues for the ancillary relief trial are whether there is any non-matrimonial property, whether W’s compensation claim should be allowed and whether there should be a departure from equality.

B.      Background

10.  Both of the parties were graduated in the very prestigious universities in the USA.  They met in 1998 and started cohabitation in 2000.  Eventually, they married in Hawaii, the USA on 3 July 2004.

11.  In August 2005, they relocated to Hong Kong and started working for different companies. 

12.  In mid-2012, the parties jointly purchased a property in Repulse Bay, Hong Kong (“the FMH”), with aid of a mortgage.  The parties moved into the FMH in January 2014.  H has been settling the mortgage instalments, management fees, rates and other related expenses ever since.

13.  In around 2015, H began to work and stayed in Beijing until September 2018.  Whilst working in Beijing, in early 2017, H formed a relationship with his current partner (“Madam Li”).  Madam Li delivered their first son (now 8 years old) in January 2018.

14.  In September 2018, H resigned and returned from Beijing to Hong Kong.   At the same time, H also confessed his affair with Madam Li to W.

15.  Eventually, the parties separated in August 2019.  W and the Children moved out of the FMH on 3 September 2020.

16.  In October 2024, H and Madam Li gave birth to their second son, now about 15 months old.

C.      Applicable Law

17.  The parties’ counsel have no issue as to the applicable law, namely section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (“MPPO”) and the 5 steps guidance as provided in the leading CFA authority, LKW v DD[3].  It is unnecessary for me to repeat their contents here.

18.  Nonetheless, it seems to me that the parties’ counsel have different approaches based on the same 5 steps guidance, which will be further discussed in the latter part of this judgment.  Meanwhile, I think that it is important to quote what Ribeiro PJ said in §132 of the judgment in LKW’s case under Step 5 (Deciding the Outcome):

“The framework which has been described in the preceding paragraphs is offered as guidance directing judges towards a systematic consideration of issues which may be relevant to the exercise of their section 7 discretion with a view achieving a fair financial outcome in a matrimonial context. As explained in Section D.1 above, the principles enunciated are guidelines and not strictly binding precedents. The exigencies of a particular case may well lead the judge to adopt a modified approach.”

19.  In gist, distribution of the family assets under section 7 is a discretionary exercise by the court.  No matter what approach, modified or not, to be adopted by the court based on the 5 steps guidance, the ultimate goal is to achieve a fair financial outcome in a matrimonial context. 

D.      Witnesses

20.  During the trial, there were altogether 3 witnesses, namely the parties themselves and W’s father.

E.      H’s employment history and earning capacity

21.  H was a successful former investment banker.  In about 2015, H’s work brought him to Beijing. Later In April 2017, H moved to a major Chinese e-commerce company listed both in the USA and Hong Kong where he stayed in Beijing until September 2018.

22.  Between September 2018 and February 2021, H was out of full-time employment (although he held various directorship and/or consultancy roles as well as started his own business as an entrepreneur at diver times) for about 2 years odd.

23.  Afterwards, H transitioned to a well-known international bank (“H’s Former Employer”) as a Managing Director (Global Co-Head) until March 2024.  Thereafter, in April 2024, he commenced his role as Senior Vice President and Deputy Chief Financial Officer of a listed company doing computer business (“H’s Present Employer”). His base salary is HK$6,000,000 per annum.  On top of this, he is entitled to:

i)     An On Target Discretionary Bonus of 105%[4] of base salary (i.e. HK$6,300,000 per annum);

ii)     Long-term incentive in the form of annual equity grants of US$1,700,000 (equivalent to about HK$13,299,695) to be vested over 3 yearly instalments governed by the terms of award plan[5];

iii)     A Special Sign On Grant of US$1,500,000 (equivalent to about HK$11,735,025.00); and

iv)     A Special One Time Bonus of HK$13,000,000.

24.  In April 2025, H was appointed as the Chief Financial Officer of H’s Present Employer.

25.  Besides, it is accepted by W that all of H’s income is subject to a combined tax rate of 37% on account of his dual US (20%) and Hong Kong (17%) citizenships.  His post-tax monthly income is about HK$853,569.23.  Needless to say, he has very strong earning capacity.

F.      W’s employment history and earning capacity

26.  After graduation in 2000, W started working in New York at Morgan Stanley as a full-time analyst.  In 2003, W pursued an MBA degree at Stanford University.  At around the same time, W took up a buy-out offer and voluntarily resigned from Morgan Stanley.  In 2005, W obtained her MBA from Stanford.

27.  In August 2005, the parties returned to Hong Kong and W joined a well-known watch and jewellery company here (“D Jewellery”) as its General Manager. A few months before the birth of the eldest daughter, W resigned from this company in around September 2007 and became a full-time house wife.

28.  From October to December 2009, W did a “Returnship” at Goldman Sachs.  This was a programme designed for experienced professionals to re-enter the workforce, and was undertaken by W to explore career options after giving birth to the second daughter.  W received an offer from Goldman Sachs at the end of the Returnship, but chose not to accept it.

29.  In 2011, W started her own business providing flower subscription service until 2015.  In February 2015, W sold the business to one of its suppliers.

30.  In June 2016, W joined a very famous international technology company as the Manager of the Greater China Customer Experience Department.  In October 2019, W was promoted to her current position of Industry Head of Large Customer Sales.  Her income per month inclusive of bonuses, equity grants, commissions and allowances total to HK$270,406, which would equate to around HK$4 million per annum.

31.  According to W’s own evidence, her income level could be further increased by 30-45% if she applied for a L8 band position (one level above her current L7 role), which W expects that she would have a decent chance of obtaining.  W seems to suggest that she does not want to apply for this L8 role (even though it is within her reach) due to the longer and less flexible hours, and greater potential travel commitments.  I accept that W may not yet be prepared to commit to seek an L8 position, but in terms of earning capacity, it could be further heightened if she chose to so commit, particularly as the Children getting older.  The third daughter aged 11 years, whilst the second daughter is 15 and the eldest one is just over 18.  I consider that it would certainly be reasonable for her to seek promotion in the foreseeable future.

32.  In addition, W has been in receipt of investment income, which she estimates to be in the region of the equivalent of HK$225,231. 

33.  In my view, W’s earning capacity is also very strong though not so strong as H’s.

G.      Step 1: Identification Of Assets

34.  The first step in the section 7 exercise is to ascertain the financial resources of each of the parties calculated as at the date of the hearing.  The parties have prepared a schedule of assets and liabilities signed on 10 March 2025 (“Agreed Schedule of Assets”).

35.  At the trial, they resolved the disputes concerning 53 bottles of wine value of HK$260,895[6] as well as the Children’s assets value of about HK$4.5 million[7].  Therefore, subject to the outstanding costs as stated in the parties’ respective Form H4, the remaining assets are as follows:

i)     Joint Assets (the FMH only and excluding wine value of HK$260,895)	HK$35,116,870.32
ii)     W’s assets	HK$33,342,946.58
iii)     H’s assets	HK$57,054,624.96
iv)     Total assets	HK$125,514,441.86

36.  W’s Form H4 suggests that W’s unpaid costs amount to HK$3,295,730 (i.e. HK$2,921,500 + HK$374,230).  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H submitted that is not correct as W’s Form H4 does not reflect the fact that her solicitors were holding HK$2,050,000 on account (for counsel’s fees).  Thus, the correct figure for W’s unpaid costs is HK$1,245,730. (i.e. HK$3,295,730 – HK$2,050,000).  As W did not challenge this submission, I accept and find that the value of W’s assets after deducting her legal costs is HK$32,097,217 whilst the value of H’s assets after deducting his legal costs is HK$55,827,525 (i.e. HK$57,054,624.96 – HK$1,227,100).  Therefore, the total net assets value of the family, if excluding the wine value of HK$260,895, is HK$123,041,612[8].

37.  The below assets are subject of dispute at this trial:

i)     H’s post-separation income, savings and bonuses from the H’s Present Employer and H’s Former Employer[9]. H claims that these should be excluded from computation as post-separation accrual (about HK$28.4m);

ii)     W’s Charles Schwab Account[10] (HK$26,027,191.84), which she said originating from pre-marital gifts from her parents;

38.  W has other pre-marital assets include gifts of stocks from her late mother, in her HSBC stocks account (about HK$367,356[11]), which is not disputed by H.

39.  At this stage, the Court need not attempt to distinguish between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property, that being an exercise best undertaken when considering the distribution of assets in subsequent steps[12].

H.      Step 2: Assessing The Parties’ Needs

40.  It is common ground that this is not a needs case.  The family had a very high standard of livings during the marriage.  The parties have very strong earning capacities. In my view, their respective needs will no doubt be satisfied.

I.      Step 3: Deciding To Apply The Sharing Principle

41.  As is common ground between the parties, this is clearly a surplus case, where the parties’ total assets exceed the amount required to meet their needs, generously interpreted, and thus I consider that the sharing principle shall apply. 

J.      Step 4: Whether Good Reasons To Depart From Equality

42.  As said in LKW’s case, “this is necessarily a complex question which raises a range of separate issues”. Ribeiro PJ further said in §85:

“It is important to stress that while such factors, individually or cumulatively, are potentially capable of resulting in a departure from an equal division, a finding that one or more of those factors are engaged does not necessarily mean that a departure must occur. The weight to be given to such factors is in the court’s discretion to be exercised in Step 5 as described in Section E.6 below. It cannot be over-emphasised that the matter is fact-specific and discretionary. The sharing principle must not be mechanistically applied.”

43.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H submitted that there are very good reasons in this case to depart from equality of the totality of the assets since each party has significant non-matrimonial property (“NMP”).  However, there is no good reason in this case to depart from an equal division of the matrimonial property (“MP”). The fair and principled answer to this case is an equal division of the MP and each party should retain their respective NMP.

44.  On the other hand, Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W submitted that there are good reasons, including behaviour, fairness and the non-matrimonial nature of some assets, to depart from equality in W’s favour.  The source of property (MP vs. NMP) is only one of the many factors in considering how to apply the sharing principle and departure from equality.

45.  It is well established that the source of an asset must be one of the material factors to justify the departure from equality.  Now, I shall deal with and identify the parties’ respective NMP below first.

J.1 H’s post-separation income, savings and bonuses from H’s Present Employer and H’s Former Employer

46.  It is not disputed that the parties separated in August 2019.  The following assets (and liabilities) are indisputably acquired by H after separation:

	Asset & Value	H’s Remarks
(i)	Hang Seng account balance HK$3,289,812.88	=  HK$3,421,472.31    - HK$131,659.43 Where HK$131,659.43 was the last balance prior to his receipt of H’s Present Employer.
(ii)	16,526 shares of H’s Former Employer vested on 13.3.2024, awarded around 20.3.2025 Post-tax: HK$920,161.13
(iii)	H’s Present Employer annual equity grant Grant: US$1.7m Post-tax: HK$8,324,990.10	-     At the time of trial, no part had been vested yet. -     To be vested over 3 years and subject to H being employed at time of vesting over this 3-year period. -     Governed by terms of award plans and agreements, and liable to be repaid if any breach.
(iv)	H’s Present Employer warrants (derived from 2/3 of the one-time sign-on bonus) HK$7,865,000	The grant of HK$13m is subject to being employed for 2 years[13].
(v)	Remaining 1/3 of H’s Present Employer one-time sign-on bonus Post-tax: HK$2,730,000
(vi)	One-time sign-on grant Grant: US$1.5m Post-tax: HK$7,345,579.50	To be vested over 2 years; not fully vested[14].
(vii)	Post-separation pension in H’s Former Employer DC Scheme HK$1,156,665.84
Total:  HK$28,425,543

47.  Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W did not challenge the correctness of above figures and calculations but submitted that in the treatment of NMP, Hong Kong court favours the “telescoped approach”, i.e. simply to adjust the percentage from the starting point of 50% to take into account NMP.  However, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H argued that W has not cited a single authority where the court has held that earnings of a party comparable to H’s income from H’s Former Employer and H’s Present Employer could be characterised as MP.

48.  It is not disputed that only in February 2021, some 1.5 years after the parties’ separation, H re-entered full-time employment at H’s Former Employer and that in April 2024, he began his new employment at H’s Present Employer.  In §94 of LKW’s case, it said:

“Where one of the parties acquires certain assets after separation without any help or contribution from the other, the court may well exercise its discretion to exclude such property from an equal division. However, if at Step 2, an endeavour to meet the parties’ financial needs is the sole or paramount concern, its acquisition after the separation may not prevent such property from being included in the award.” (emphasis added)

49.  Based on this passage, “needs” is the reason to allow a party to share the other’s NMP.  Besides, a recent UK Supreme Court decision Standish v Standish[15] , given on 2 July 2025, summarised the relevant legal principles in UK on the topic of NMP (see §§46 - 56).  The parties’ counsel do not have the opportunities to address me on this important case as they had already lodged their respective closing and reply submissions before the decision.  In gist, the UK Supreme Court distilled 5 key principles relevant to the application of the sharing principle, which structure how UK courts distinguish and deal with matrimonial and non‑matrimonial property in financial remedy cases:

1. Conceptual distinction

•     There is a conceptual distinction between matrimonial property (fruits of the marital partnership/common endeavour) and non‑matrimonial property (typically pre‑marital, gifted or inherited assets).

•     The focus is on the source of the asset and the nature of the parties’ contributions, not whose name appears on the title.

2. Sharing applies only to matrimonial property

•     The sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property and does not apply to non‑matrimonial property.

•     Allowing sharing of non‑matrimonial property would render the matrimonial/non‑matrimonial distinction largely meaningless, so that proposition is expressly rejected.

3. Equal division as the starting point

•     For assets classified as matrimonial, the starting point is equal division between the spouses.

•     Departures from equality may be justified by recognised factors (for example, needs or overall fairness), but equality is the “appropriate and principled” starting position once non‑matrimonial property is excluded.

4. Non‑matrimonial property outside sharing, but available for needs/compensation

•     Non‑matrimonial property is not ordinarily subject to the sharing principle and should not be treated as part of the pool for equal division.

•    Such property can, however, still be called upon to meet needs or, where appropriate, to provide compensation for relationship‑generated disadvantage.

5. Matrimonialisation depends on treatment, not title

•     Non‑matrimonial property can become matrimonial (“matrimonialised”), but this depends on how the parties have treated the asset over time and what fair inferences can be drawn from that treatment.

•     A change of legal title (including transfers into a spouse’s or joint names, or transfers for tax planning) is not, by itself, sufficient; the key question is whether the parties have genuinely treated the asset as part of the family’s shared wealth.

50.  Strictly speaking, this UK Supreme Court decision is not binding on the Hong Kong court but I consider it highly persuasive.

51.  In the present case, the parties’ financial needs have been met.  I fail to see any help or contribution from W in respect of H’s post-separation earnings.  W seeks to argue that she is entitled to share in H’s post-separation earnings, on the basis that such income or earning capacity are the “fruits of years of division of family roles”, and that H was hired by H’s Former Employer not just for his skills, but for the connections he built over the marriage.

52.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H rightly submitted that both in England and in Hong Kong, that earning capacityis not capable of being a matrimonial asset to which the sharing principle applies or in which a spouse is entitled to share.  See: Waggott v Waggott §§121-128 per Moylan LJ; as endorsed in Hong Kong in SSLT v SMFC (Ancillary relief; Non-matrimonial Assets)[16] at §§124-125 per HHJ I Wong.  Thus, I must concur that the sharing principle does not extend to a party’s earning capacity.

53.  Besides, H was out of full-time employment since his back to Hong Kong from Beijing in September 2018.  He relocated to Hong Kong, wanting to spend more time with the Children and also taking a career break whilst he explored alternative job options, including starting an investment fund or a business.  I therefore find that H’s income from H’s Former Employer (commencing in February 2021) and H’s Present Employer (commencing in April 2024) were assets acquired by H not by use of any asset which had been created during the marriage, but by virtue of his personal industry.  W also fails to show that H’s post-separation earnings had “matrimonialised” or become merged or entangled with MP.  This court is not bound to adopt the “telescoped approach” as suggested by W.  As there is no justification for W’s sharing in H’s NMP, I exercise my discretion to exclude such property amounting to HK$28,425,543 from being shared by W.  In my view, it is nothing unfair to W.  As to whether H’s NMP can provide compensation for relationship‑generated disadvantage, W’s compensation claim will be discussed in the latter part of the judgment.

J.2 W’s Charles Schwab Account

54.  H accepts that W has NMP in this case, in which he should not (and has not sought to) share.  The only outstanding dispute between the parties as to the characterisation of W’s assets concerns the status of the assets in W’s Charles Schwab Account which currently sits at HK$26,027,191.84.

55.  W claims that W’s Charles Schwab Account is comprising of inter alia cash gifts from W’s parents (which was intended for her before the marriage and not obtained through the industry of both parties), and W’s shares (obtained through her present employment and vested after parties separated).  However, W accepts that there is no documentary evidence of the source of US$239,442.45 originally standing in her Charles Schwab Account on 1 January 2015.  Throughout the years, there had been injection of these shares into her Charles Schwab Account, she had also sold the stocks and put the cash back into this account.  She further accepted that not all of her Charles Schwab Account contains her post-separation accrual.

56.  Nevertheless, W seems to maintain that 100% of the W’s Charles Schwab Accountshould be excluded from the computation of MP; whilst H contends that 1/3 of those assets should be treated as MP and remaining 2/3 being NMP.

57.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H are very helpful to summarise the relevant chronology as follows:

(I)	In January 2005, W’s Father transferred a total sum of US$1.18m to her ABN -AMRO account.
(II)	At some unidentified point in time, when W’s then account manager left for UBS, she also transferred her ABN-AMRO funds into a UBS account.
(III)	In June 2012, the parties purchased the FMH.  W put down HK$5.25m of downpayment[17].
(IV)	In January 2015, W deposited a total sum of US$728,126.55[18] (“Deposit”) from her UBS account into W’s Charles Schwab Account.  -     Prior to the Deposit, W’s Charles Schwab Accounthad a pre-existing balance of US$239,442.45. -     After the Deposit, the total new balance in W’s Charles Schwab Account was US$972,436.15 in January 2015.
(V)	In March 2024, W liquidated certain shares in W’s Charles Schwab Account, made some investments to earn additional income, and transferred US$724,608 (approx. HK$5.65m) worth of the shares from her Schwab               (employee) account into W’s Charles Schwab Account.
(VI)	By September 2024, W’s Charles Schwab Accounthad substantially increased in value to about US$3.3 million (approx. HK$26.0 million).

58.  Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W did not challenge the above chronology in W’s closing and rely submissions.

59.  H does not dispute the evidence that US$1.18m (in item (I) above) was provided by W’s father to W, but contends that it clearly does not prove that the entirety of the current value of the W’s Charles Schwab Accountis NMP.  During oral testimony, W admitted that the credits of US$432,716.35 could have been from the shares earned from her present employer which she had sold and then transferred into this account, and could have stemmed from her pre-separation earnings.  H specifically draws the Court’s attention to the fact that the current value in this account is around US$3.35 million – which is over 4 times the size of W’s Deposit in January 2015 (around US$728,000).

60.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H submitted that without engaging in minute retrospective investigations as deprecated in LKW’s case, a fair treatment would be to assign 2/3 of the W’s Charles Schwab Account balance as NMP, and 1/3 as MP. Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong further quoted §18(b) of K v L[19]:

“[o]ver time, the non-matrimonial property initially contributed has been mixed with matrimonial property in circumstances in which the contributor may be said to have accepted that it should be treated as matrimonial property or in which, at any rate, the task of identifying its current value is too difficult.”

61.  In light of the lack of documentary evidence coupled with W’s oral testimony, I reject W’s case that 100% of W’s Charles Schwab Account balance should be treated as NMP as the balance has already been mixed with the matrimonial property.

62.  Regarding H’s submissions relating to 2/3 of the W’s Charles Schwab Account balance as NMP and 1/3 as MP, Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W did not make any specific submissions to oppose the same in W’s closing and rely submissions.  On the other hand, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H submitted that as shown in the table below, the characterisation of 1/3 being MP is also broadly consonant with the proportions of what H contends to be MP v NMP at the material times:

	(A)	(B)	(A)/(B) × 100%
Jan 2015 Deposit into W’s Charles Schwab Account	Pre-existing balance	W’s Deposit into W’s Charles Schwab Account	32.88%
	US$239,442.45	US$728,126.55
March 2024 injection of the shares	Injection of the shares	Balance as at 31.12.2023	35.95%
	US$724,608	US$2,015,355.65

63.  The task of identifying the current value of W’s Charles Schwab Account as NMP is always very difficult.  Nonetheless, I consider that H’s submissions concerning 2/3 of the W’s Charles Schwab Account balance as NMP and 1/3 as MP are fair to W.  At least, Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W did not make any submissions to persuade me that such apportionment is unfair.

64.  As H accepts W’s other pre-marital assets in her HSBC stocks account amounting to HK$367,356[20], Shares/Grant amounting to HK$1,258,626.30 and Pensions amounting to HK$1,514,757.76, I conclude that the total sum of W’s NMP is HK$20,492,201 as stated in H’s Calculation of Balancing Lump Sum, the figures in which are not challenged by W.

65.  Similarly, I exercise my discretion that H shall not share W’s NMP.

J.3 W’s compensation claim

66.  Before dealing with this claim, I am duty-bound by section 7(1)(f) to have regard to and make findings as to the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any financial contributions, contributions made by looking after the home or caring for the family including the children.

67.  In the present case, H occupied the traditional roles of breadwinner on the one hand and W was working during some period of time of the marriage but mainly was the homemaker or child-carer on the other handduring most of the time of the marriage, in particular during the period when H was working in Beijing.  As no submissions as to any “special” or “stellar” contribution made by any of the parties, I find that their contributions to the family are more or less the same.

68.  Turning back to W’s compensation claim, in §11 of her closing submissions, she claims that she made two career sacrifices: (1) giving up the BCG offer in the middle of her MBA from Stanford University, and (2) giving up work in D Jewellery just before the eldest daughter was born.  However, in §101 of W’s closing submissions, she added one more sacrifice, namely giving up to pursue returned work after the Goldman Sachs Returnship.

69.  The evidence of W is that when she was job seeking one of her criteria was that the job should give her flexibility to tend to the Children’s needs as H had left it to her to care for the Children. In her career sacrifice, W forewent her high earning potential (c.f. her trajectory starting at Morgan Stanley, enhanced by her undertaking a Stanford MBA, but she was thereafter unable to further develop her career in management consultancy with BCG and instead went into sales – currently an Industry Lead).  She suffers great loss in bringing higher non-financial contribution to the family, which enables H to continue to develop his career.

70.  Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W submitted that this court shall take into account the relationship-generated disadvantage suffered by W, in the form of her career sacrifice and continuous, non-financial contribution which enables H to reach new career height after height, and depart from equality in her favour.

71.  On the other hand, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H submitted that the principle of compensation will only be applicable in a “very rare and exceptional case”: SA v PA[21] at §36(i); cited by the Court of Appeal in EBS v NTCD (Ancillary Relief)[22] at §34.  Such a claim “appears very rarely to have been established” (Waggott v Waggott at §139), and is often described as “a very rare creature indeed” (WC v HC[23] at §21(vii); ND v GD (Financial Remedies)[24] at §44.

72.  Apart from the very high threshold of establishing a compensation claim, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H further contended that the absence of proof of track record is fatal to such a claim.  In SA v PA§36(iii), it said that:

“Such a high earning career will have been practiced by the claimant over an appreciable period during the marriage. Proof of this track-record is key.” (emphasis added)

73.  In rejecting the wife’s compensation claim, Mostyn J inSA v PA at §68 explained that:

“The wife had no appreciable track record by the time she gave up work. It is not even known what she was earning when she quit, let alone whether they were high earnings. It is impossible to speculate where she would be now had she made different decisions at that time” [emphasis added].

74.  In the recent Hong Kong case of EBS v NTCD (Ancillary Relief)[25], the Court of Appeal held that (obiter) in any event, this was not an “exceptional case calling for a separate element in adjusting the apportionment between the parties over and above what the Judge awarded having taken into account relevant matters including contributions made by the wife” (§44).

75.  In LKW’s case, Ribeiro PJ expressed his view as follows:

“126. In my view, the risk of double-counting in “clean break cases” arises not merely because of a potential overlap with financial needs but because compensation for “relationship-generated disadvantage” is, like “contribution”, already intrinsically factored in as part of the sharing principle.  By recognizing that a spouse who has given up a potentially lucrative career to take up a traditional role within the family should enjoy equal status with the breadwinner and should receive an equal share of the assets unless there is good reason to the contrary, the sharing principle gives effect in principle to this form of compensation.

127.  I therefore find it difficult to see how double-counting can be avoided if some additional premium is to be attributed to the lost opportunity of an independent lucrative career. ………” 

76.  In WLK v TMC[26]§119, Ribeiro PJ further elaborated that:

“the element of compensation ought to be approached as an aspect of the sharing principle’s application and not as a separate claim for financial loss. The court should proceed on the footing that compensation for relationship-generated disadvantage is usually factored in when applying the sharing principle to an extent determined by the nature, certainty, permanence and other qualities of the disadvantage incurred, and that it will only be in exceptional cases that a separate and further element of the award should be dedicated to such compensation” (emphasis added).

77.  I must be very cautious whether to allow the departure from equality based on the W’s compensation claim since the present case is a “clean break” one as agreed by the parties and therefore, the risk of double-counting is extremely high.  I further agree with the submissions of Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H that establishing a compensation claim is subject to a very high threshold.

78.  Turning back to the W’s allegations concerning this claim, she had only relied on her giving up her employment at D Jewellery in her 3 Form Es.  However, in her 10^th Affirmation, W introduced an additional alleged basis for a compensation claim.  She claimed that she had “always wanted to work in management consultancy” but that she had rejected an offer received from BCG for joining their San Francisco office in 2005.  She moved to Hong Kong as what H preferred.  Then W began working at D Jewellery.  She claimed that this was “a sacrifice I had to make for our family”.

79.  There are some factual disputes between the parties. H said that he has no recollection of any such BCG offer.  After having carefully considered the parties’ evidence, on the balance of probabilities, I reject the W’s allegation of receiving any offer from BCG.  First, W has not produced any documentary proof of the BCG offer, not to say the exact terms of this offer, such as salary etc.  In other words, I am not satisfied that the terms of the BCG offer in San Francisco must be better than that of D Jewellery in Hong Kong. W simply fails to prove the alleged career sacrifice.  Secondly, W’s 3 Form Es were all prepared by her very experienced family lawyers.  Thus, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H rightly contended that if it was such an important event as W now claims, W would have mentioned in at least one of her 3 Form Es.  It is too late for W to suddenly mention the BCG offer in her 10^th Affirmation.

80.  There is also a minor factual dispute as to why the parties returned to Hong Kong in August 2005.  H maintains that this was being encouraged by W’s mother. H said that he was not from Hong Kong and had no family in Hong Kong at the time, and he was doing well in America.  On the other hand, W all along has very close relationship with her parents who are living in Hong Kong.  It would have been entirely natural for W’s parentsto want her to return to Hong Kong.

81.  During cross-examination, W also admitted that she was inclined to return to Hong Kong in December 2004.  As a matter of fact, W did open the ABN-AMRO account in Hong Kong in January 2005 for the intended receipt of the HK$8 million gift from her parents.  I consider that all these are inconsistent with the notion that she wanted to stay in the US.

82.  Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W tried to attack the credibility of H by submitting that his answers are consistently evasive.  I disagree.  Bearing in mind that H was asked to give evidence on what happened in about 20 years ago, I consider that his evidence is overall credible.  After having carefully considered the parties’ evidence, on the balance of probabilities, I find that instead of H’s preference to return to Hong Kong, the parties were encouraged by W’s mother or parents to return to Hong Kong in August 2005 and that W had not made any sacrifice by so doing.

83.  More importantly, as admitted by W during cross-examination, she had not spent any time at all working as a management consultant, I therefore accept the submission of Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H that even if W did receive any purported BCG offer in 2005 and even if she gave it up in favour of returning to Hong Kong, W had no proven track record in management consultancy.  I must reject her compensation claim in relation to the alleged BCG offer and her return to Hong Kong.

84.  Regarding W’s compensation claim in relation to D Jewellery, no documentary evidence of W’s performance, trajectory, references from her superiors and/or earnings in this company is produced.  Similarly, there is no documentary evidence of her giving up to pursue returned work after the Goldman Sachs Returnship.

85.  I have no or insufficient evidence to form a view as to what W would have earned if she had not left D Jewellery or if she works for Goldman Sachs.  Although W had done very well at university, her academic success is not a sufficient indicator of commercial or financial success and cannot be a sufficient proven track record.

86.  Accordingly, I am not satisfied that at the material times, W had given up a high earning career for the benefit of the family which would have led to earnings at least equivalent to that presently enjoyed by H.  Despite of being a housewife for several years, W’s present income is very high.  Bearing in mind the risk of double-counting and the requisite high threshold, it is not an exceptional case to allow W’s compensation claim.

J.4 H’s Conduct

87.  W alleged two conducts of H: (1) whether H had unreasonably refused to vacate the FMH; and (2) whether H had unreasonably opposed the sale of the FMH, which are claimed to be good reasons to depart from equal division in her favour.

88.  Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W submitted that “conduct” can extend to economic misconduct, including the ways which a party had conducted himself and the litigation, provided the high standard of “inequitable to disregard” is met: OG v AG[27], at §35.

89.  On the other hand, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H set out the relevant legal principles of this issue much more detail in H’s closing, which I agree.  In gist, where personal conduct is relied upon, it must reach the exceptionally high standard of being “gross and obvious” so much so that it is “repugnant to anyone’s sense of justice” or is “inequitable to disregard”.  See LWK v DD §§100, 104; citing Wachtel v Wachtel at 119; LCC v LTLA [28]§§34, 61. The requisite threshold has “consistently been set at a high or exceptional level” (LCC v LTLA§48, adopting Tsvetkov v Khayrova[29] §43.  The conduct must be “truly exceptional”: McCartney v Mills McCartney[30] at §§286-287.

90.  Where conduct is relevant, a party asserting conduct should adopt a two-stage approach as follows (See LCC v LTLA §§47-48):

Stage 1:  A party asserting conduct must prove:

(i)   the facts relied upon; and if established,

(ii)  those facts meet the conduct threshold, which has consistently been set at a high or exceptional level; and

(iii) that there is an identifiable negative financial impact upon the parties which has been generated by the alleged wrongdoing. A causative link between act/omission and financial loss is required.

Stage 2: If Stage 1 is established, the court will go on to consider how the misconduct, and its financial consequences, should impact upon the outcome of the financial remedies proceedings, undertaking the MPPO s 7 exercise which requires balancing all the relevant factors.

91.  Thus, conduct allegations which have no impact on the ancillary relief award may be excluded altogether: see McCartney§288.

92.  If the matters complained of fail to reach the requisite standard, then it would be wrong to take such matters into account, and they cannot be taken into account as part of the “overall circumstances” of the case.  See Miller/McFarlane[31] §§59, 64-65 (per Lord Nicholls); §145 (per Baroness Hale) and §§161, 164 (per Lord Mance). 

93.  I shall deal with the alleged H’s unreasonable refusal to vacate the FMH first. 

94.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H correctly pointed out that it was never mentioned in any of W’s Form Es. Even when W referred to her moving out of the FMH in her 10^th Affirmation[32], there was no allegation at all of any alleged “unreasonable refusal by H to move out” of the FMH.  The first time that this issue was raised by W was in the week prior to the trial: first in her Opening Submissions dated 3 March 2025, followed by the Agreed List of Issues dated 8 March 2025.

95.  The FMH is jointly purchased by the parties.  In my view, H should have the right to stay there.  The parties agreed to have separated even under the same household.  Besides, W simply fails to prove that H had in fact agreed to move out of the FMH, and then subsequently refused to do so.  In so far as W was said to have had to incur additional rent because of H’s alleged refusal to vacate the FMH, any such expenses would have already been compensated and reflected by the varied interim order for the Children’s maintenance made by me.  A substantial portion of H’s interim Children’s maintenance was precisely to account for the portion of rental incurred by W for the benefit of the Children.  Therefore, I am not satisfied that W has suffered any prejudice and/or “negative financial impact” at all.  In any event, I consider that W plainly cannot reach the “high or exceptional” threshold required. 

96.  For the alleged H’s unreasonable refusal to sell the FMH, it was never mentioned in any of W’s Form Es.

97.  After the fair reading of the relevant correspondence between the parties’ solicitors[33], in particular letter dated 14 October 2022, I find that H’s former solicitors had restarted discussions on the proposed sale (or lease) of the FMH but W did not immediately agree to H’s proposal to sell the FMH. 

98.  For whatever reason as to why the parties could not eventually reach the agreement for sale, in my view, W cannot prove that H unreasonably refused to sell the FMH. Instead, it was W who complained about the rush of effecting a sale and asked numerous questions to be filed in a sworn document, etc.  She obviously could not satisfy the threshold of showing any “gross or obvious” misconduct of H in relation to the sale of the FMH.

99.  Besides, I also consider that there is no incentive for H to delay the proposed sale or to deliberately depreciate the realizable value of the FMH since all the mortgage repayments (including outstanding principal owing) are repaid by H single-handedly – which in fact benefits W.  Besides, since the parties hold the FMH in joint name, H will eventually suffer if the realizable value of the FMH is depreciated upon sale.  In any event, whether the market value of the FMH will go up or down is totally uncontrollable by the parties.  In case the market value of the FMH really goes up, I doubt very much that W will accuse H of unreasonable refusal to sell the FMH.

100.  There are some other matters alleged for the first time in W’s Opening dated 3 March 2025, but not in the Agreed Statement of Issues, such as H’s unreasonably delay in seeking full-time employment etc.  These matters have never been raised in any of W’s Forms E or her 10^th Affirmation.  W’s counsel also had not cross-examined H on these matters at the trial.  It will cause unfair prejudice to H if I allow W to raise them.  Hence, these matters will not be dealt with by me in this judgment.

101.  To sum up, I find no “gross or obvious” misconduct of H as alleged.

K.      Step 5: Deciding The Outcome

102.  W made the 1^st proposal on 3 March 2025 that H to transfer the FMH to her and pay 100% of outstanding mortgage with the transfer of the Club Membership of HKCC by H to W, if no transfer of the Club Membership, then H to pay HK$2.25 million to her.

103.  She made the 2^nd proposal on 9 March 2025 that H to transfer the FMH to her and pays 60% of outstanding mortgage with the transfer of the Club Membership of HKCC by H to W.

104.  In W’s closing, she revised the proposal that H to transfer the FMH to W (with H and W each bearing 50% of any stamp duty), and W do discharge the outstanding mortgage of the FMH with the transfer of the Club Membership of HKCC by H to W and transfer of the Hong Kong Golf and Tennis Academy Club (“W’s HKGTA membership”) or the proceeds of sale thereof (ie HK$1,844,000) by W to H.

105.  On the other hand, H made the open proposal on 27 February 2025:

a.      the FMH be sold and the net proceeds after discharge of the outstanding mortgage be divided as follows:

i.   Reimbursement to H of the mortgage payments made by H between the date of this order and the sale of the FMH;

ii. The balance be divided equally between the parties.

b.      H shall continue to pay the mortgage instalments of the FMH until the sale and H to pay a lump sum of HK$7.9 million (adjusted upwards from HK$6.6 million) on the basis of a sale of the FMH and 50:50 division of MP. 

106.  H refuses to transfer his Club Membership of HKCC to W.

107.  Before discussing the parties’ open proposals, I shall deal with the issue concerning thetransfer of the Club Membership of HKCC by H to W.

K.1 H’s Club Membership of HKCC

108.  H joined HKCC in 2009.  Upon the suggestion of W’s Father, H’s membership was obtained through his American citizen quota; and at a time when H was already working at Goldman Sachs as an MD.  It is not disputed that H’s membership in HKCC has no saleable debenture and hold no value (as reflected in the Agreed Schedule of Assets and H’s Form Es).

K.1.a Jurisdiction under s 6(1)(a) MPPO

109.  H’s primary position is that the Court has no jurisdiction under s 6(1)(a) of the MPPO to order H to transfer his HKCC membership to W, because the HKCC membership is not “property” within the scope of s 2(1)(a) or s 6(1) MPPO.  It is an interesting argument.

110.  Before looking at the relevant sections of MPPO, it is more important to read the relevant articles of HKCC’s Articles of Association[34]. Article 43(a) expressly provides that:

“Rights of members not transferable:

(a) The rights and privileges of a member shall be personal to himself; they shall not be transferable by his own act or by operation of law and shall cease upon his death or upon his ceasing from any cause to be a member under the provisions of these Articles or Bye-laws”.

111.  Articles 43(b)-(e) of HKCC’s Articles of Association further provide a mechanism under which an ordinary member may transfer his membership to his former spouse, within 6 months from the date of the Issuance of the Certificate of Making Decree Nisi Absolute, upon compliance with the relevant procedure and filing of application, and subject to the General Committee’s absolute discretion (which could be withheld without providing any reason).

112.  In my view, based on the plain meaning of these Articles, the membership in HKCC is still transferrable as between an ordinary member and his former spouse only, but not other third party, and further subject to the specific and strict mechanism as aforesaid.

113.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H argued that the Court has no jurisdiction under s 6(1)(a) of MPPO to order a transfer of H’s HKCC membership to W, because the HKCC membership is not “property” within the scope of s 2(1)(a) or s 6(1). 

114.  Under s 2(1) of MPPO, “property” is defined as “any real or personal property, any estate or interest in real or personal property, any money, any negotiable instrument, any prescribed instrument within the meaning of section 137B of the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155), debt or other chose in action, and any other right or interest whether in possession or not.”

115.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong quoted the House of Lords’ case in National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth[35] at 1247G-1248A, in which Lord Wilberforce gave the further criteria of “property” that it must be “definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence or stability”.

116.  In W’s rely submissions, Mr Egerton, Mr Marwah and Ms Lee for W referred me to the same House of Lords’ case and accepted such further criteria but submitted that H’s membership in HKCC plainly falls within such further criteria.

117.  In my view, H’s membership in HKCC can no doubt be definable according to the Articles of Association of HKCC.  It can be easily identifiable by third parties.  As discussed above, it is capable of assumption by a former spouse subject to the specific mechanism though not by any other third parties.  It has some degree of permanence as the membership is for life and transferrable in a very limited situation subject to the General Committee’s absolute discretion.  Hence, I consider that H’s membership in HKCC falls within the further criteria of “property” in Ainsworth’s case.

118.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H further contended that “property” under s 2(1) and s 6 of MPPO must be realisable.  The definition of “property” under MPPO s 2(1) is in identical terms to the definition of “property” under s 2 of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap. 179) (“MCO”).  “Property” is also defined under s 26(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1965 (“MCA 1965”) in England and Wales again in substantially identical terms to those in MPPO s 2(1) / MCO s 2[36].

119.  Under s 26(5) of MCA 1965, it was further provided that in making any orders the court shall have regard to “the nature of the property representing the net estate of the deceased and shall not order any such provision to be made as would necessitate a realization that would be imprudent having regard to the interests of the dependants…”.

120.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H therefore argued that s 26(5) of MCA 1965 presupposes that property is realisable and hence the imposition of the limitation on the circumstances which it should be realised.

121.  First, I consider that s 26(5) of MCA 1965 is not applicable in Hong Kong as there is no equivalent or similar section in either MPPO or MCO. Secondly, according to the definition of “property” under s 2 of MPPO, there is no expressed requirement of being capable of realization.  Lastly, even if s 26(5) of MCA 1965 is applicable in Hong Kong, my interpretation of the said s 26(5) is that the most important criterion for the court to consider shall be “the interests of the dependants” rather than whether the subject property is realisable.  Hence, I reject H’s submission that “property” under s 2(1) and s 6 of MPPO must be realisable. 

122.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H also submitted that H’s HKCC membership is not “property” for the purposes of s 6 of the MPPO since it also empowers the Court to make an order for sale apart from an order to transfer. I must agree that H’s HKCC membership is not saleable as it is not legally possible to do so.  Nevertheless, it does not mean that it cannot be transferred under s 6.  In the present case, if H is ordered to sell his HKCC membership to W or to the public at certain price, it would be certainly unlawful for the General Committee to approve the sale in accordance with its Articles of Association.  Therefore, no sensible court will make such an order for sale. But, if H is ordered to transfer his HKCC membership to W within the time limit ie 6 months from the date of Decree Absolute, it would be lawful for the General Committee to approve the sale in accordance with its Articles of Association albeit the committee may exercise its absolute discretion not to approve the same. 

123.  It is noteworthy that in the present case, Decree Absolute cannot be issued since section 18 declaration has not yet been granted.  Therefore, 6 months period is not expired.

124.  To conclude, I am of the view that the court has jurisdiction to order H to transfer his HKCC membership to W.  However, I have to emphasize that I form this view based on the specific facts of this case, in particular the contents of the HKCC’s Articles of Association but not a general view that all club memberships are within the definition of “property” under s 2 of the MPPO and transferrable under s 6 of the MPPO.

K.1.b Whether it is fair to order a transfer

125.  Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong for H further submitted that the Court should exercise its discretion against making such an order.

126.  W acknowledged that it was open to her to apply for a membership of HKCC herself (subject to a joining fee of approx. HK$675,000), even though this may take some time to approve or process.  She certainly will have the financial means to do so.

127.  W seeks to justify her need for the HKCC membership by reference to the Children’s use.  However, it is not disputed that the Children could continue to use HKCC even if W will no longer be a member.  What’s more, the eldest daughter would soon be eligible to apply as a junior member in her own right. 

128.  Indeed, W has not explained why she really needs this membership as she already has the HKGTA membership, nor did she explain why she proposes to transfer her HKGTA membership (or its sale proceeds) to H but insists the transfer of H’s HKCC membership to her.  Besides, she has not produced sufficient evidence to prove how frequent she used the HKCC facilities in the past.  In any event, I consider that she can enjoy and use the similar facilities in HKGTA with or without the Children.  There is no good reason as to why H has to transfer his HKCC membership to W. 

129.  On the other hand, I agree with H that it is in the interest of the Children that H shall retain his HKCC membership so that he can continue to visit the club with them, where they feel familiar, comfortable and safe. Besides, I think that the Court is also entitled to take into account the fact that H’s 2 sons with Madam Li will lose out unnecessarily if H is ordered to transfer his HKCC membership to W.  Of course, the interests of H’s 2 sons are not the first and main consideration of the Court.

130.  After having considered all the circumstances, as a matter of overall fairness, I exercise my discretion not to make any transfer order for the HKCC membership in favour of W.

131.  W made the alternative in her 1^st Proposal that H to pay W a sum of HK$2.25 million in lieu of the HKCC membership transfer.  I see no justification to make such alternative as it has no resale value.  She never explains how the figure of HK$2.25 million comes from.  In any event, I would assume that her final proposal in her closing has superseded the 1^st and 2^nd proposals previously made by her.

K.2 Parties’ Proposals

132.  I am of the view that all W’s proposals are unreasonable as she requests for the transfer of the H’s HKCC membership to her, which is rejected by me. Furthermore, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong pointed out in H’s reply that the critical percentage division of MP under W’s revised proposal is 61% to W and 39% to H.  As I also reject W’s compensation claim and find no “gross or obvious” misconduct of H, her revised proposal is unfair to H.

133.  Turning to H’s proposal for sale of the FMH contrasting with all 3 W’s proposals for transferring the FMH to her, Mr Nagpal and Ms Wong in H’s closing submitted that H’s proposal would enable the parties to equally share the risk or reward from the eventual sale price. 

134.  I agree with H’s submission that this is not a case where the FMH must be retained for the benefit of the Children as W all along alleged that H has unreasonably refused to sell the FMH.  Besides, no explanation is given by her as to why she now wanted the transfer of the FMH to her.  Hence, I shall exercise the discretion to order sale of the FMH as proposed by H.

135.  I also agree that if the FMH is ordered to be sold, both parties be permitted to bid for it (if they so desire) and the property should be sold to the person who makes the highest offer – whether that be either of the parties or a third party. 

136.  H has fairly agreed that, as between the date of the order and the date of the sale of the FMH, H would continue to pay the mortgage instalments in full, subject to reimbursement of such payments after the sale.  H has also fairly not sought to claim back any of the payments already made by him since the parties’ separation even though such reduction of the outstanding mortgage loan was of substantial benefit to W.

137.  After the exclusion of the parties’ respective NMP as discussed above, I agree with the calculation as stated in H’s Calculation of Balancing Lump Sum, which are not challenged by W, that the amount of balancing lump sum payable by H should be roughly about HK$7.9 million, on the basis of a sale of the FMH and equal division of the parties’ total MP in the sum of HK$39,006,997.

138.  In the circumstances, I am of the view that H’s proposal is fair to W.

L.      Conclusion

139.  To sum up, the parties have very strong earning capacities and their respective needs are well met.  It is a clean break case without spousal maintenance.  Based on the overall fairness, I consider that parties shall retain their respective own NMP but share their total MP equally in view of a 15-year marriage with no good reason to depart from equal sharing of MP.  I now make an order as follows:

a.      Within 3 months from the date of the Decree Absolute, the FMH be sold by private sale in the open market or by public auction for a price of not less than HK$35,000,000, or any other price and by any other mode of sale as agreed by the parties, and the net sale proceeds after discharge of the outstanding mortgage as at the completion date of the sale be divided as follows:

i.      Reimbursement to H of the mortgage instalments made by H between the date of this order and the completion date of the sale;

ii.      The balance be divided equally between the parties.

b.      H do continue to pay the mortgage instalments, rates, management fees, and other utilities charges etc of the FMH until the completion date of the sale and H do pay W a lump sum of HK$7.9 million upon completion of the sale, which can be deducted from the balance as he is entitled under (a)(ii) above.

c.      Parties do share all costs, estate agent fees and other expenses in relation to the sale of the FMH equally.

d.      Parties be permitted to bid for the sale of the FMH (if they so desire).

e.      Parties be at liberty to apply solely for the purpose of implementation of this order.

f.      Save as to the above, all parties’ ancillary relief claims against each other be dismissed.

140.  Section 18 declaration be granted.

141.  Regarding the question of costs of the ancillary proceedings, H just revised his open proposal by adjusting the lump sum payable by him to W upwards from HK$6.6 million in his opening to HK$7.9 million in his closing.   Besides, the parties’ respective costs incurred as stated in their respective Form Hs has been duly deducted from their respective own assets for the purpose of calculating the total value of the family pot.  In the circumstances, I exercise my discretion to make an order nisi that there be no order as to costs of these ancillary relief proceedings including all costs reserved, if any, which shall become absolute unless any of the parties apply to vary by summons with supporting affidavit, if necessary, within 14 days from the date of this order. 

142.  Last but not least, I must thank all counsel for their assistance.