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HCMP 410/2025
[2026] HKCFI 4655
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 410 OF 2025
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IN THE MATTER of Soremi Investments Ltd.
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and
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IN THE MATTER of Section 65 of the Legal Practitioners Ordinance, Cap. 159 and Order 106, rule 5
of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A)
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and
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IN THE MATTER of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction
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BETWEEN
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COSIMO BORRELLI |
1st Plaintiff |
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COLIN WILSON (In their capacity as the receivers over
65% of the shares in Soremi Investments Ltd.) |
2nd Plaintiff |
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SOREMI INVESTMENTS LTD. |
3rd Plaintiff |
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and |
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LINKLATERS (A FIRM) |
Defendant |
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and |
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CHINA NATIONAL GOLD GROUP HONG KONG LIMITED |
Intervenor |
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| Before: |
Hon Harris J in Chambers |
| Date of Hearing: |
30 July 2026 |
| Date of Decision: |
30 July 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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1. On 5 November 2025, I made an order
(“Order”)[1] on the 1st to
3rd Plaintiffs’ (“Plaintiffs”) application by originating summons filed on
17 March 2025 for production by the Defendant to the 3rd Plaintiff of documents listed
in the list of documents served and filed by the Defendant pursuant to the order of DHCJ Gary Lam
dated 24 April 2025 (“April Order”). In paragraphs 6 and 7, I made the
following costs orders:
“6. There be a costs order nisi that the 1st to 3rd Plaintiffs pay
the Defendant’s costs of and occasioned by the Originating Summons other than those attributable to the
Intervenor’s intervention and opposition to the Originating Summons.
7. There be a costs order nisi that the 3rd Plaintiff pays
the Defendant’s reasonable costs of compliance with the order of DHCJ Gary Lam dated
24 April 2025 and this Order.”
2. The Plaintiffs applied by summons filed on
19 November 2025 to vary the two costs orders. On 19 May 2026, I dismissed the application in
respect of paragraph 6. That decision the Plaintiffs accept. I also dismissed the application
that the existing paragraph 7 be replaced with an order that the Intervenor shall pay the Defendant’s
reasonable costs of compliance with the Order and April Order[2]. In other words, it was the Plaintiffs’ position that the Intervenor should pay
the costs of compliance with the Deputy Judge’s April Order rather than themselves. I dismissed that
application. It is that decision that the Plaintiffs wish to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
3. A draft notice of appeal is appended to the summons seeking
leave to appeal (“Plaintiffs’ Appeal Application”). Three grounds are contained in the draft
notice.
4. The first is that the Court did not consider properly the
April Order, which required the Defendant to prepare a list of documents with two categories and was
necessitated by the Intervenor’s intervention. Also, the Defendant’s express position was that its costs
incidental to the preparation of the list of documents be in the cause of the Intervenor’s opposition to the
originating summons. Dealing with the second of those two points first, the Defendant’s position in
April 2025 seems to me to be irrelevant, particularly given the fact that it was not the position that the
Defendant took during the hearings, which directly addressed the issues referred to in the first paragraph of
this Decision concerning costs.
5. As is apparent from the language of paragraph 6 of the
Order, I did consider the position in respect of costs attributable to the Intervenor’s intervention and in
paragraph 8, I ordered that the Intervenor pays the 3rd Plaintiff and the Defendant’s costs
of and occasioned by the Intervenor’s opposition to the originating summons. Paragraph 1 of the April
Order provided that the Defendant do produce to the 3rd Plaintiff and the intended intervenor a
list of documents based on Annexure A to the originating summons, with two categories:
“1. Documents that exclusively belong to the 3rd Plaintiff;
2. Documents that belong to the 3rd Plaintiff and the Intended
Intervener.”
6. I took the view, having reached the decision recorded in my
Judgment dated 5 November 2025, that the costs of the preparation of the list itself should be borne
by the Plaintiffs. I was not persuaded on the Plaintiffs’ application to vary that Order that it should be
changed. As the Intervenor submits on the present application, it is not, as the Plaintiffs contend, clear
that the preparation of a list of documents that the Plaintiffs were seeking from the Defendant was a cost
clearly attributable only to the Intervenor’s intervention. I would have expected a list of the documents
that were produced by the Defendant to have been prepared in any event, and the analysis required in order to
divide the list into the two parts that I have referred to does not in itself appear to have added substantially
to the work. It does not seem to me that, in taking this view, I was clearly wrongly exercising the
discretion which it is not in dispute that the Court has in respect of costs.
7. The second ground, as I understand it, is that the brief
reasons I gave in respect of my decision did not expressly deal with the arguments contained in the Plaintiffs’
written skeleton. As a statement of fact, it is correct.
8. The third ground is a variant of the second, namely, that I
did not give reasons for departing from the general rule that costs follow the event (I do not understand it to
be in dispute that there is such a general rule) and that the Intervenor was unsuccessful in its opposition to
the originating summons. It follows that, unless there was reason otherwise, the Intervenor should have
been liable for the costs incurred by the Defendant in preparing the list of documents. As with the second
ground, I accept it is correct that the reasons do not address this particular point.
9. On any appeal of my decision, what the Court of Appeal needs
to be persuaded of is not simply that the reasons did not spell out my reasoning for declining to change my
mind, but that the decision was wrong. For the reasons I have stated earlier, it does not seem to me that
it is reasonably arguable that it was.
10. I, therefore, dismissed the Plaintiffs’ Appeal Application
for leave to appeal. The Plaintiffs do pay to costs of the Plaintiffs’ Appeal Application to the Defendant
and the Intervenor.
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(Jonathan Harris)
Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court |
Mr James Wood, instructed by Kwok Yih & Chan, for the 1st to
3rd Plaintiffs
The Defendant’s attendance was excused
Mr Leon Guo, instructed by GH Legal, for the Intervenor
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