LE THI DOAN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 886/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3625

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 886 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By summons (“the Summons”) filed on 12 January 2026, the Applicant seeks leave to appeal, out of time, against this Court’s order dated 3 November 2025, whereby her application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office dated 23 March 2020, affirming the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 20 December 2017 which rejected her claim for non-refoulement on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, was dismissed.

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. The Applicant is therefore late in taking out the Summons by 56 days.

3.  In determining whether to extend time for appealing a refusal of leave, the court will consider: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office CAMP 64/2020 [2020] HKCA 844 at §10).

4.  Given that the statutory period for lodging an appeal is 14 days, the present delay is substantial. After considering the explanation provided by the Applicant in her affirmation, it is necessary to state that the fact that she was legally unrepresented does not excuse her non-compliance and she should not be allowed to gain any advantage from acting in person. It was incumbent upon her to obtain leave within the statutorily stipulated time period, and the fact remains that she has failed to do so.

5.  In any event, even if I were minded to accept that the non-compliance was inadvertent, the most important consideration is for the Applicant to demonstrate that there are arguable grounds upon which the appeal could reasonably succeed. However, I am not remotely satisfied that this has been successfully done by her. It is well-established that the Court will not exercise its discretion to extend time where the proposed appeal is, on its face, devoid of merit (see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017).

6.  The absence of merit in an intended appeal weighs decisively against the grant of an extension of time. To allow the Applicant to proceed with a challenge that is plainly without merit would serve only to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily, prejudice the proper administration of the refoulement process, and undermine the interests of the proposed respondent.

7.  Accordingly, the Summons for extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal is dismissed.