LAMORIN FLORDELYN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6169 · HCAL 1846/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1846/2023
[2026] HKCFI 6169
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1846 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Lamorin Flordelyn |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 13 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 25 September 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1846_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 March
2023 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable grounds
under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board
dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition and confirmed the Director’s
Decision, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to the Philippines, she would be harmed and even killed by
her mother and her ex-partner, Julius Caesar, as she had given birth
to an illegitimate daughter in Hong Kong.
Oral hearing
5. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application,
and her case was heard on 29 October 2026.
6. The applicant confirmed that she would rely on the grounds stated in
her supporting affidavit dated 13 October 2023 for her intended
judicial review. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on
the said grounds, she merely repeated the basis of her non-refoulement
claim, namely that both her ex-boyfriend and her own mother wanted to
kill her as she had a daughter with a Hong Kong resident.
7. The applicant added that her daughter is a Hong Kong resident and is
not a non-refoulement claimant. Nevertheless, the applicant wanted to
stay in Hong Kong to take care of her daughter until she could look
after herself without the applicant’s supervision because the father
of her daughter has mental problems and cannot even take care of
himself. The applicant confirmed that she was not legally married to
her daughter’s father in Hong Kong.
Grounds for judicial review
8. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
9. The applicant did not identify any ground for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
10. In her supporting affidavit, the applicant reiterated the basis of her
non-refoulement claim, namely that her ex-partner and her own mother
both wanted to kill her because she had given birth to a baby in Hong
Kong. The applicant also mentioned that both the Director and the
Board did not consider her problem and the decision-making authority
did not give her any chance.
11. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant said that she wanted
to remain in Hong Kong to take care of her daughter, and that the
father of the daughter has mental problems and cannot even take care
of himself, but she did not elaborate on any of the matters contained
in her supporting affidavit.
Discussion
12. First of all, the applicant’s danger from her mother and her ex-
partner had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board. If the
applicant intends to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not
permissible in an application for judicial review unless there were
errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision.
13. As to her assertion in her supporting affidavit that both the Director
and the Board did not consider her problem and the decision-making
authority did not give her any chance, the applicant did not elaborate
on how the Board had failed to consider her problem, or how her
problem ought to be considered.
14. Moreover, the Director’s Decision was superseded by the Board’s
Decision, and was no longer susceptible to judicial review (see Re
Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549). This court will therefore consider only
those grounds directed at the Board in respect of the Board’s
Decision.
15. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
16. Thus, the general assertions put forward by the applicant in her
affidavit that the Board did not consider her problem cannot help the
applicant at all.
17. What the applicant said at the oral hearing, namely that she wanted to
remain in Hong Kong to take care of her daughter, is not a ground for
judicial review either.
18. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Comilang & Ors v Director of
Immigration [2019] HKCFA 10, family unity rights were not a bar to
refoulement of foreign nationals without a right of abode, even when
they have a spouse and children who are permanent residents of Hong
Kong. Thus, separation with her daughter is not a basis on which the
applicant could establish her non-refoulement claim.
19. The applicant’s assertion that the father of her daughter has mental
problems and cannot take care of himself has not been raised to the
Board for assessment of her non-refoulement claim.
20. As held by the Court of Appeal in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims
Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090, the Board had no duty to make
investigation into any matter without the applicant raising it and it
should not be considered by this court at this stage. As can be seen
from the Board’s Decision, the applicant only relied on her fear of
her mother and her ex-partner in the Philippines as her reason for
claiming non-refoulement protection. Thus, the applicant cannot rely
on a new claim as a ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
21. Therefore, the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s
affidavit and what she raised at the oral hearing before this court
cannot be valid grounds for her intended judicial review.
22. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
23. Thus, the applicant cannot ask this court to re-assess her non-
refoulement claim. Nevertheless, this court will examine and
scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural
unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground
being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review.
24. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 7 June 2023 and the applicant was present. Hence,
contrary to the applicant’s assertion in her affidavit that she was
not given a chance, she was in fact given the opportunity to present
her case to the Board in person.
25. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of the applicant’s claims and its reasoning in
rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.
26. The Board had laid out its assessment of the applicant’s claimed fear
from her ex-partner and her own mother in paragraphs 50 to 57 of the
Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
27. In gist, in relation to the applicant’s fear of being harmed or killed
by her ex-partner, the Board found that given his lack of means to
contact the applicant and bearing in mind that he had not even
contacted the applicant since she changed her phone number, the
applicant’s claimed fear of him was simply unreal.
28. Similarly, with regards to the applicant’s claimed fear of harm or
death at the hands of her own mother, the Board found that given her
mother’s lack of means to contact her and bearing in mind that her
mother had not even contacted her since she changed her phone number
and her Facebook account, the applicant’s alleged fear for her mother
to find her and kill her was also unreal.
29. Moreover, the Board found that the alleged threats by the applicant’s
mother and by her ex-partner were private matters without any
acquiescence of the state. The Board also found that the applicant
had never reported the threats from her mother or her ex-partner to
the police in the Philippines. The lack of report to the local police
was not indicative of the state’s inability or unwillingness to
provide protection to the applicant.
30. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had failed to establish, even
to the low standard required, that there was a real chance that she
would be subjected to any of the proscribed forms of harm.
31. Furthermore, the Board had given full reasons in paragraphs 61 to 63
of the Board’s Decision for the finding that it was not unduly harsh
for the applicant to relocate in the Philippines to avoid the alleged
threats by her mother and by her ex-partner, if necessary.
32. It is worth noting that the Board had also addressed the applicant’s
wish to remain in Hong Kong to take care of her daughter. In this
regard, the Board found that the applicant appeared to be more
concerned about the place in which her daughter was to be brought up
than her alleged fear of being killed by her mother and her ex-
partner.
33. In any event, as aforesaid, the applicant confirmed at the oral
hearing before this court that her daughter is in fact a Hong Kong
resident and is not subject to refoulement.
34. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had no real risk of any of
the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to the Philippines.
35. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the
applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its own
decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
36. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
37. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
38. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 04/11/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |04/11/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21564 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 1125/22 (Formerly|
|to use at the hearing, | |RBCZ 5000999/22) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1