TRIA AYU ASTINA AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5912 · HCAL 369/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 369/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5912
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 369 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Tria Ayu Astina |1st Applicant |
| |Tria Ayu Astina Hanania Alisha (a minor) |2nd Applicant |
| |by Tria Ayu Astina, her next friend | |
| |Tria Ayu Astina Seezhan Waseem (a minor) |3rd Applicant |
| |by Tria Ayu Astina, his next friend | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicants in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the 2nd applicant be
amended to “Tria Ayu Astina Hanania Alisha (a minor) by Tria Ayu
Astina, her next friend”, the name of the 3rd applicant be amended
to “Tria Ayu Astina Seezhan Wazeem (a minor) by Tria Ayu Astina,
his next friend”, and the name of the putative interested party be
amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants’ application for leave to apply for
judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s
decision dated 1 December 2022 be dismissed.
Observations for the applicants:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 13 March 2023, the 1st applicant,
on behalf of herself and the 2nd and 3rd applicants, applied for leave
to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of
the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 1
December 2022 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be
viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
0369_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The 1st applicant is the mother of both the 2nd and 3rd applicants,
who were born in Hong Kong on 27 February 2020 and 16 March 2021
respectively.
3. The Board found that the 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants were unable to
make out their claims for non-refoulement protection on all the
applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”).
Hence, the Board rejected their appeals/petitions against the decision
of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 23 August 2021
and confirmed the same, which rejected their claims for non-
refoulement protection.
Amendments
4. The 2nd and 3rd applicants are both minors and represented by their
mother, ie the 1st applicant, as their next friend. Thus, the name of
the 2nd and 3rd applicants should be stated in Form 86 as “Tria Ayu
Astina Hanania Alisha (a minor) by Tria Ayu Astina, her next friend”
and “Tria Ayu Astina Seezhan Wazeem (a minor) by Tria Ayu Astina, his
next friend” respectively, and on this court’s own motion their names
are amended accordingly.
5. The applicants named the Board as both the putative respondent and the
putative interested party in the Form 86, when the Board should only
be the putative respondent, and the Director should be the putative
interested party.
6. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative interested
party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
7. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicants had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
8. However, the 1st applicant filed Form 86 on behalf of herself and the
2nd and 3rd applicants on 13 March 2023, which was 3 months and 12
days after the Board’s Decision (made on 1 December 2022). The
applicants were hence late for 12 days in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicants to make the Leave
Application.
9. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
10. The applicants did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay in making the Leave Application.
11. At the oral hearing before this court on 15 October 2026, the 1st
applicant only said that she could not remember why the application
was filed late. She said upon receipt of the Board’s letter, she
replied to the letter right away, and that happened when she was
admitted to hospital. The 1st applicant said that she took medicines
which caused her to be forgetful, and she was sorry that she could not
tell this court the reason for the delay.
12. Although a delay of 12 days is not substantial, the explanations given
by the 1st applicant are clearly not satisfactory. If what she said
about replying to the Board’s letter right away upon her receipt of
the letter, there was simply no reason for her to file the Leave
Application out of time. More importantly, there is no merit in the
applicants’ intended judicial review as discussed below.
13. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicants to file the Leave
Application, even if an application for extension of time was made.
The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the ground of
being made out of time alone.
14. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application in respect of all the applicants.
The applicants’ case
15. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicants’ case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
16. In sum, the 1st applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection
because if refouled to Indonesia, she feared being harmed by her
father on the basis of his expressed disapproval of her in the past.
She further claimed that she and the 2nd and 3rd applicants would
suffer discrimination and bullying by the villagers in her home area
on the basis that: (1) she had given birth to the 2nd and 3rd
applicants out of wedlock (carrying a social stigma); and (2) that the
2nd and 3rd applicants are of mixed ethnicity.
17. The 2nd and 3rd applicants were both very young when their cases were
assessed by the Board, and they were both represented by the 1st
applicant.
18. This court notes that the Board had enquired with the Duty Lawyer
Service (“the DLS”) as to whether they would represent the 2nd and 3rd
applicants before the Board. However, the Board was informed by the
DLS on 29 April 2022 that they would not assign any lawyer to
represent the 2nd and 3rd applicants. Hence, the Board proceeded to
hear the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ case with the 1st applicant being
their representative at the Board’s hearing.
Legal representation for the 2nd and 3rd applicants
19. Since the 2nd and 3rd applicants are minors, the 1st applicant, in her
capacity as the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ next friend, must act by a
solicitor according to Order 80, rule 2 of the Rules of the High
Court.
20. The 1st applicant applied for legal aid for both the 2nd and 3rd
applicants, but the applications were refused by the Director of Legal
Aid on 10 August 2026.
21. At the oral hearing before this court on 15 October 2026, the 1st
applicant confirmed that she would not engage a private lawyer to
represent the 2nd and 3rd applicants.
22. As the 2nd and 3rd applicants were legally represented before the
Director, and no new evidence would be adduced in the Leave
Application, this court considered that the lack of legal
representation for the 2nd and 3rd applicants in the Leave Application
was a mere irregularity and it would not prejudice them. Hence, this
court waived the irregularity and proceeded to deal with the Leave
Application.
Oral hearing
23. The applicants requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and their case was heard on 15 October 2026.
24. The applicants had stated a few grounds under the heading “GROUNDS FOR
REVIEW” in the 1st applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 10 March
2023, and the 1st applicant confirmed that all the applicants would
rely on what were written there as their grounds for judicial review.
When this court asked the 1st applicant to elaborate on the grounds
stated therein, she merely said that everything was written there and
she had nothing to add.
25. This court then asked the 1st applicant if there was anything she
would like to say in respect of the cases of the 2nd and 3rd
applicants, but the 1st applicant answered in the negative.
Grounds for judicial review
26. The applicants are required to identify clearly the grounds for their
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
27. The applicants did not advance any ground for their intended judicial
review in Form 86.
28. In the 1st applicant’s supporting affirmation dated 10 March 2023, the
1st applicant mentioned a few matters under the heading “GROUNDS FOR
REVIEW”, which are summarised as follows:-
1) Failure to consider the fact that she had stated in her claim that she
and her two children would be harmed upon refoulement;
2) Failure to consider the country of origin condition that the authority
of her country would not be able to protect her; and
3) Failure to consider the fact that she raised in her claim.
29. The 1st applicant did not elaborate on any of the above grounds for
challenging the Board’s Decision at the oral hearing before this
court. As aforesaid, she merely said that everything was written
there and she had nothing to add.
Discussion
30. First of all, all the 3 grounds stated in the 1st applicant’s
supporting affirmation were advanced without any particulars.
31. In essence, the 1st applicant is challenging the Board’s finding of
facts in the 1st and 3rd grounds as summarised above. However, she
did not state which “facts” that she raised had the Board failed to
consider. All the 3 applicants’ danger of being harmed and/or
discriminated had been assessed but rejected by the Board. If the
applicants intend to challenge the Board’s finding of facts, it is not
permissible in an application for judicial review unless there were
errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision.
32. In the 2nd ground as summarised above, the 1st applicant mentioned
that the Board had failed to consider the country of origin condition
that the authority of her country would not be able to protect her.
In other words, she sought to challenge the Board’s finding on state
protection. Nevertheless, the 1st applicant did not specify how the
Board erred in its assessment of state protection.
33. Contrary to what the 1st applicant stated in the 2nd ground, this
court notes that the Board had fully considered the availability of
state protection to the applicants both against harm from the 1st
applicant’s father and possible discrimination or harm from the
villagers of the 1st applicant’s local area (see paragraphs 67 to 78
of the Board’s Decision).
34. In fact, in the Board’s assessment of the viability of internal
relocation for the applicants, the Board had also considered that
there was current legislation in Indonesia which protected the 2nd and
3rd applicants from discrimination, despite that the 2nd and 3rd
applicants’ basis of claim, namely discrimination by the local
community, could not be equated with that of wider Indonesian society
(see paragraphs 108 to 109 of the Board’s Decision).
35. Thus, this court finds that the Board had given sufficient
consideration as to the availability of state protection to the
applicants. This court finds no flaw in the Board’s finding in this
regard.
36. It is therefore this court’s view that the grounds stated in the 1st
applicant’s supporting affirmation are not valid grounds to challenge
the Board’s Decision.
37. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
38. Thus, it is not for this court to re-assess the applicants’ cases for
non-refoulement protection. This court will only scrutinize the
Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality, despite the lack of any valid grounds being advanced by
the applicants.
39. In assessing the applicants’ appeals/petitions, the Board held an oral
hearing on 18 August 2022. The 2nd and 3rd applicants (attendance
excused) were represented by the 1st applicant, who was present at the
hearing. Thus, the applicants did have the chance to present their
cases to the Board through the 1st applicant.
40. The Board had given a detailed discussion of the applicants’ case, and
laid out its material findings of fact in relation to the 1st
applicant’s claims and its consideration of the claims of the 2nd and
3rd applicants separately in paragraphs 44 to 46 and 57 to 78 of the
Board’s Decision respectively.
41. In gist, the Board accepted the basic facts spoken by the 1st
applicant, including that she had problems with her father in around
2009/2010 and that her father might have assaulted her to a minor
extent and she left the family home as a result. The Board also
accepted that she was subjectively afraid of meeting her father again
and being harmed by him, as well as being afraid that the 2nd and 3rd
applicants might be discriminated against by the villagers in her home
area.
42. However, in considering the evidence, there was no or no reliable
evidence to show (and the Board did not accept) that: (1) the 1st
applicant’s father would harm or kill the applicants if they were
returned to Indonesia now; (2) the applicants faced risk throughout
Indonesia; (3) the applicants suffered injuries to the required
severity; and (4) the state of Indonesia was unwilling to help the
applicants for a Convention reason.
43. With regards to the applicants’ fear of harm from the 1st applicant’s
father, the Board found that given the long period of time that the
1st applicant had had no contact with her father and the 1st
applicant’s own evidence that according to her sister, her father did
not want to have anything to do with her anymore, the chances of the
1st applicant’s father wishing to even confront her in relation to her
past transgressions was slim. The Board was of the view that the 1st
applicant’s fear that her father would seriously harm or kill her and
the children was only speculative.
44. In respect of the applicants’ fear of discrimination by the villagers,
the Board found that the 1st applicant’s assertion that the villagers
in her home village would discriminate her and her children was also
the 1st applicant’s own speculation.
45. In respect of the 2nd and 3rd applicants, the Board found that the 1st
applicant’s assertion that they were born out of wedlock might not be
completely true. The 1st applicant confirmed that she was married to
the 2nd and 3rd applicants’ father in Hong Kong in 2019 in an Islamic
marriage. Although the Board accepted that the 2nd and 3rd
applicants, being of mixed race, would fall within the “membership of
a particular social group” ground, the Board found that there were
legislations in place in Indonesia that aimed to protect all citizens
from acts of racial and ethnic discrimination. The Board found that
there appeared to be no sound reason on which to argue that the 2nd
and 3rd applicants would be deprived of basic government services
based on their ethnicity. If the 2nd and 3rd applicants did face
discrimination, it was evident that legislation was in place for them
to seek assistance from the authorities, if necessary.
46. As aforesaid, the Board had thoroughly discussed the issue of state
protection to the applicants upon their return to Indonesia.
47. Furthermore, the Board had explored the viability of internal
relocation for the applicants as a matter of caution. The Board had
given full reasons in paragraphs 104 to 112 of the Board’s Decision
that even if the 1st applicant was afraid to return to her home area
with the 2nd and 3rd applicants, there was no reason why they could
not relocate to other parts of Indonesia and stay there without undue
hardship.
48. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicants were not entitled to non-
refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds under the USM.
49. It is clear that the Board had considered the 2nd and 3rd applicants’
cases separately from the 1st applicant, and also the 2nd and 3rd
applicants’ specific risk as children of mixed race.
50. However, this court notes that the Board had plainly committed an
error of law in its interpretation of BOR 2 Risk[1]. The Board stated
that “BOR 2 Risk relates to being deprived of life by the government
upon refoulement” and “The Appellants have not shown that there are
substantial grounds for believing that, if refouled, there would be a
real risk or substantial grounds for believing that they would be
subjected to a real risk of prohibited treatment – namely, the
government of Indonesia would deprive them of life” in its assessment
of the applicants’ BOR 2 Risk (see paragraph 83 and 114 of the Board’s
Decision respectively).
51. As held by the Court of Appeal in Kulwinder Kaur v Director of
Immigration and another [2022] HKCA 48, “The authorities establish
that the right to life is also violated by extra-judicial killings by
State agents or by non-State actors, where the State fails to take
steps to avoid a threat to life emanating from non-State actors or
private persons.” Thus, violation of right to life is not confined to
the deprivation of life by the government, as conceived by the Board.
52. However, as held in Re Kulwinder Kaur, supra, the issues under BOR 2
Risk are not separable from those under BOR 3 Risk[2]. Upon
determining that there is no BOR 3 Risk, there is no arguable ground
for any BOR 2 Risk (see also AA v Sweden (2017) 64 EHRR 20 and RM v
Gerard Paul Muttrie Esq, HCAL 166/2015, 3 March 2016).
53. As the Board had found that there were no substantial grounds for
believing that the applicants would face a genuine risk of being
subjected to ill-treatment under BOR 3, even if leave was granted to
the applicants in the Leave Application for reason that the Board had
erred in law in its interpretation of BOR 2 Risk, there is simply no
reasonable prospect of success for their claim for non-refoulement
protection in this regard.
54. It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to
grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical
purpose (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of
2015). Thus, even assuming that the Board had committed the aforesaid
error and the applicants’ cases were remitted to the Board for re-
consideration, the outcome for their non-refoulement claims would
still be the same. This court is therefore not prepared to exercise
its discretion to grant any remedy to the applicants.
55. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that there is no realistic
prospect of success for all three applicants in the Leave Application
and hence leave must be refused.
Conclusion
56. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application in respect of all the
applicants is dismissed for being made out of time and also for devoid
of merits.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicants/the |putative respondent / the |
|interested parties as |applicants’ |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such putative|
|Court the order |on: 21/10/2026 |interested parties as may |
|granting leave and any| |be directed by the Court /|
|directions given | |the putative interested |
|within 14 days after |Applicants’ ref. no: |parties’ solicitors on: |
|the leave was granted |Nil |21/10/2026 |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | | |
| | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|b) issue the | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|originating summons | |Claims Petition Office |
|within 14 days after | |Putative respondent’s ref.|
|the grant of leave and| |no.: |
|serve it in accordance| |USM 18649, 18650 and 18651|
|with Order 53, rule 5;| | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative interested |
|c) supply to every | |party’s ref. no.: |
|other party copies of | |QA T/C 141/21 (formerly |
|every affidavit which | |RBCZ 10081/21) |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 142/21 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 10082/21) |
|including the | |QA T/C 1025/21 (formerly |
|affidavit in support | |RBCZ 11063/21) |
|of the application for| | |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Department of Justice, |
|6(5)). | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Risk of violation of right to life under Article 2 of section 8 of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[2] Risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.