ANA YULIATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5561 · HCAL 1092/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1092/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5561
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1092 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Ana Yuliati |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 5 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 29 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1092_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim as not
substantiated on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board confirmed the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 31
October 2022, which rejected her non-refoulement claim.
The applicant’s case
3. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
4. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by a loan
shark named Mr S, from whom her husband used her name to borrow 15
million Indonesian Rupiah without her consent, as she could not repay
the loan.
Oral hearing
5. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and her case was heard on 24 September 2026.
6. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of her
intended judicial review which were stated in her supporting
affirmation dated 5 July 2023, she merely confirmed that she would
rely on them and said that her country and her family could not
protect her.
Grounds for judicial review
7. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
8. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
9. In her supporting affirmation dated 5 July 2023, the applicant first
mentioned that she did not agree with the Board’s Decision, she had
life threat in her country Indonesia, her enemy was a powerful man who
never abided by the law and gave money to the police, the authority
listened to him word for word, and that no one in society would help
her.
10. The applicant then advanced 6 grounds under the heading “GROUNDS FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW”. The grounds are summarised as follows:-
1) The adjudicator did not consider her claim;
2) The adjudicator did not accept her documents as the documents were in
her mother language;
3) The officer refused to give her time to translate the documents
because he had no time;
4) The translator did not help her at all and became angry if the
applicant did not understand;
5) The interpreter asked her not to take long time for interview as he
had another job; and
6) She asked the court to help her and save her life.
11. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only said that she
would rely on the grounds stated in her affirmation and that her
country and her family could not protect her.
Discussion
12. First of all, the applicant’s danger in her country had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If she intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review.
13. In fact, the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection was
rejected because the Board did not consider that the applicant faced a
real risk of any of the proscribed harm from Mr S if she was refouled
to Indonesia. In other words, the Board found that applicant did not
face any risks as claimed, and hence there was no need to consider
state protection. Thus, the applicant’s assertion at the oral
hearing, namely that her country and her family could not protect her,
cannot be a valid ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
14. All the grounds (except ground (6) which is not a ground at all) that
were contained in the applicant’s supporting affirmation were asserted
without any specificity. Many applicants in similar applications used
them like a template without any regard to their own cases. The
applicant is no exception.
15. She did not state: (1) how the adjudicator did not consider her claim;
(2) which part(s) of her claim was not considered; (3) what documents
she intended to submit were rejected as they were not translated; (4)
how the interpreter or translator’s attitude had prejudiced her; and
(5) what she wanted to tell the Board was not presented because of the
attitude of the interpreter or translator.
16. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
17. Thus, the general assertions that were contained in the applicant’s
affirmation cannot help her at all.
18. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
19. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
20. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 22 May 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present her case to the Board
in person.
21. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. The Board’s
findings and assessment of the applicant’s claims were laid out in
paragraphs 28 to 43 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary
to repeat the same here.
22. In gist, the Board found that the applicant was inventing answers to
its questions due to the many inconsistencies and contradictions in
the applicant’s evidence related to her contact with her family and
change of her mobile phone numbers. The Board also found significant
internal inconsistencies within the applicant’s claims in her Non-
refoulement Claim Form and her evidence at the Board’s hearing. The
Board considered that the applicant’s significant delay in making her
non-refoulement claim further undermined her credibility.
23. Due to the multiple, material inconsistencies and implausibilities in
the applicant’s evidence together with her non-persuasive explanations
and her making new claims at the Board’s hearing, the Board found that
the applicant was not a credible witness. The Board rejected: (1) the
applicant or her husband owed any money to Mr S; (2) Mr S had ever
threatened the applicant; (3) the applicant lost contact with her
parents or husband or children; and (4) the applicant overstayed in
Hong Kong for fear of harm from Mr S. The Board considered that the
applicant had fabricated her claims to create a basis upon which to
apply for non-refoulement protection.
24. Thus, on the evidence before it, the Board did not consider that the
applicant faced a real risk of any of the proscribed harm from Mr S if
she was refouled to Indonesia, and rejected her non-refoulement claim
as not substantiated on any of the applicable grounds under the USM.
25. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make findings on the availability of
state protection as the Board found that the applicant did not face
any real risk of harm.
26. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that she qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in her home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
27. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to Indonesia, it
is not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.
28. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was primarily within the realm of the Board in dealing with her
appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to come to its own
conclusion. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
29. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
30. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
31. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 30th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |30/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |30/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 21155 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 998/22 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ/5000859/22) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1