LAM KAI v. NG KWOK LEUNG AND OTHERS

HCPI 1460/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO.1460 OF 1999

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J U D G M E N T

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Assessment of damages

1. The plaintiff was a backseat passenger in a Ford private car driven by his father, the 3rd defendant herein, when it collided with a Toyota private car driven and owned by the 1st and 2nd defendants on 12 January 1997 at the junction of Castle Peak Road and San Hi Tsuen Street. The plaintiff was asleep in the back seat and was not wearing a seat belt.

2. At the time of the collision, the Toyota car was travelling east bound along Castle Peak Road. The Ford car, which had been travelling west bound along Castle Peak Road, was making a right turn at that junction, across the path of the Toyota car, into San Hi Tsuen Street.

3. The issue of liability has been compromised between all the parties and interlocutory judgment has been entered in favour of the plaintiff for 85% liability against all the defendants. As between the defendants they are agreed that the 1st and 2nd defendants on the one hand and the 3rd defendant on the other hand will each assume responsibility for half of the 85% liability to the plaintiff.

4. I am here only concerned with the question of damages to be assessed for the plaintiff.

5. At the start of the hearing for assessment of damages, I was informed by counsel for the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant that they have come to an agreement on the overall quantum in this case. The details of that agreement between them was, however, not made known to me due, no doubt, to the fact that no such similar agreement had been reached with the 1st and 2nd defendants.

6. As a result I allowed the legal representatives of the 3rd defendant to be excused from further attendance (upon his request and not objected to by other parties) at this hearing which then proceeded with only the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd defendants taking an active part in it subject to the 3rd defendant reserving his rights to be heard on costs.

Injuries and treatment

7. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was 23 years of age. He was a backseat passenger sitting behind the driver in the Ford car driven by his father, the 3rd defendant. He had fallen asleep in the car when the collision occurred. When the collision took place, the plaintiff lost consciousness and was only awakened briefly when he was rescued from the car by firemen. He then relapsed back into unconsciousness and remained so for an unknown period of time but certainly for longer than the seven days when he was kept in the Intensive Care Unit of Tuen Mun Hospital.

8. The plaintiff was diagnosed to have suffered a severe head injury due to that collision. A CT brain scan taken of the plaintiff showed diffuse cerebral contusion. An operation was performed and an ICP monitor was inserted to monitor the intracranial pressure. Phisiotherapy was carried out on the plaintiff.

9. An MRI of the plaintiff's brain taken some six weeks later showed diffuse axonal damage.

10. The plaintiff was discharged from Tuen Mun Hospital on 3 March 1997. He was granted sick leave from his Master of Philisophy studies programme at the University of Hong Kong up to the end of April 1997. After discharge from hospital, the plaintiff followed up at the neurosugical clinic of Tuen Mun Hospital regularly and received physiotherapy and occupational therapy until his discharge from the occupational rehabilitation programme four months after the accident.

Plaintiff's pre-accident academic achievements

11. There is no dispute that the plaintiff was an academic high flyer before the accident. He had obtained six A's (distinctions) and three B's (credits) in his HKCEE exams in Hong Kong in Form 5. At the "A" Levels exams for entry to the university, he had obtained one A's and two B's with also a B for the Use of English.

12. With such results he was admitted in 1993 to the University of Hong Kong to read for a bachelor degree in the Department of Electrical Engineering after turning down an offer to study aerospace technology in the University of Washington due to financial reasons.

13. The plaintiff read for his bachelor degree in engineering from 1993 to 1996. After that he took on a two-year research degree of M.Phil in Engineering also at the University of Hong Kong. It was into his first year of the M.Phil degree that the accident happened in early 1997.

The plaintiff's studies and work after the accident

14. After discharge from the hospital the plaintiff attempted to return to complete his research programme for his M.Phil degree but was unable to complete it. As an alternative he switched over in an attempt to obtain an M.Sc. but also failed in that attempt. In his first year, the plaintiff failed in five out of six subjects in the M.Sc. degree programme.

15. The plaintiff sought work in the private sector in September 1998 as follows :

(a) From September 1998 to February 1999 he was engaged as a software engineer by Kodex Development Ltd;

(b) From April to September 1999 he was engaged as a software engineer with We Software Ltd;

(c) From October to December 1999 he was engaged as an electronic engineer with System Asia Ltd;

(d) From January to March 2000 he was engaged as a software engineer with Wong's Electronic Co. Ltd.

16. In respect of all the above four jobs, the plaintiff was dismissed by his employer.

17. As from April 2000 he found employment with Oriental Systems Co. Ltd initially as a software engineer but later his title was change to that of a sales engineer with the same company. The plaintiff resigned from this post with Oriental Systems Co. Ltd in August 2001.

18. After resigning from Oriental Systems Co. Ltd, the plaintiff was taken on as an Information Technology Officer and full time temporary teacher with Lai King Catholic Secondary School on a one year contract commencing 1 September 2001. He still holds this post at the time of the hearing.

Plaintiff's neurological impairment

19. There can be little doubt that due to the severe head injury sustained by the plaintiff in the accident arising from the diffuse cerebral contusion and from the diffuse axonal damage, it resulted in damage to the higher cognitive function of the plaintiff.

20. In the words of Dr Fok Kam Fuk, the Senior Medical Officer of the Department of Neurosurgery, Tuen Mun Hospital, as contained in his medical report of 19 January 1999, he believed that the plaintiff's concentration span, abstract thinking and possibly analytic power will be compromised although the plaintiff did show progressive improvement in basic daily activities and memory function.

21. The plaintiff was also examined by his own neurological specialist, Dr Brian Choa who, in his report dated January 2000 opined that the plaintiff, undoubtedly a highly intelligent man, had his higher mental abilities significantly affected by his serious head injury and which has affected both his concentration and his memory. At the time of that examination, Dr Choa estimates the plaintiff's intellectual impairment to be about 10% of the whole person and his mild physical impairment to be 3% of the whole person.

22. Dr Yu Yuk Ling, a specialist in neurology instructed by the defendant to examine the plaintiff, also opined in his report dated July 2000 that the plaintiff suffered a severe head injury involving loss of consciousness and post traumatic amnesia for some two months. Resulting from such head injury, the plaintiff suffers from headache, impairment of higher mental functions and truncal ataxia (i.e. failure of the muscles of the trunk).

23. Dr Yu concludes that the plaintiff probably has impairment of his higher mental functions judging from the severity of the head injury, the plaintiff's symptoms and his academic performance and work record after the accident. Dr Yu further states that these impairments are permanent since at the time of his examination of the plaintiff, it has been 41 months since the accident.

24. Dr Yu assessed the combined permanent impairment to the whole person of the plaintiff to be 14%.

Psychological/Psychiatric impairment to the plaintiff

25. It is also common ground that the plaintiff had suffered from depression and an adjustment disorder psychologically as a result of the accident. In this respect he was examined by an array of clinical psychologists and psychiatrists instructed by both sides.

26. Dr Tommy Chan, a registered clinical psychologist instructed by the plaintiff stated in his report dated March 2000 that the plaintiff failed to complete his M.Phil course due to concentration, memory and comprehension problems after the accident. He was also dismissed four times by his employers in the last one and a half years (prior to the examination by Dr Tommy Chan). He had also been unable to do any vigorous exercise or play volleyball which he loved. The culmination of these losses led to times of depression and suicidal ideations, though without any attempts. The plaintiff was angry over these losses and has hit his head against the wall to express his intense frustration. His level of self confidence has been drastically reduced and he has become more socially isolative.

27. Dr Tommy Chan further states in his report that the plaintiff's academic history reveals someone who used to excel not only in school subjects but also in sports and in other extra-curricular activities. The plaintiff's current stress and perceived losses is accentuated by the fact that he always had a very high expectation of himself and saw himself as a high achiever.

28. Dr Tommy Chan came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's depression and frustration over his current losses and post-accident changes accounts for his adjustment problem and stresses and recommends that the plaintiff undergoes psychological treatment by a clinical psychologist as soon as possible in dealing with his depression and the emotional repercussion from the accident.

29. As a result of the plaintiff's depressed mood and adjustment difficulties, he was referred in March 2000 to the Clinical Psychology Service of Tuen Mun Hospital and was seen by Ms Ide S.F. Chan, a clinical psychologist there on 20 May 2000 with subsequent interviews thereafter.

30. In a report dated 4 October 2001, Ms Ide Chan stated that the plaintiff still has great difficulties in accepting his losses out of his impairment and would continue his current performance with his high achievement in the past. In the words of the plaintiff he was no longer a "superstar" but an "ordinary guy". She further states in the report that this new identity took time to develop through the painful feedback in every episodes of failure. She also estimates that psychological treatment will be required in the coming one to two years.

31. As for the nature of the psychological treatment given to the plaintiff, Ms Ide Chan stated in a further report dated 30 October 2001 that "the core issue lies at the re-defeinition of one's identity." Ms Chan further states that the psychological treatment helps to reduce the negative emotions. It enhances the patient's general functioning and facilitates the full use of his residual cognitive abilities. The learning and application of compensatory skills may also play a role to reduce the adverse impacts caused by the cognitive impairment. Nevertheless, further restoration of cognitive abilities may be limited as most of the natural recovery appears in the first few years.

32. There is also a report of Dr Lo Chun Wai, a specialist in psychiatry, dated 19 October 2001 in which Dr Lo states that what affects him (the plaintiff) most is a sense of despondency. He feels angry towards his fate. He is resentful. The future appears insecure and uncertain. He stops reading the Bible and going to Church. He avoids he former classmates, roommates and church friends. He avoids the jobs he cannot manage. He becomes more attached to his wife and needs her guidance.

33. Dr Lo comes to the conclusion that the plaintiff is suffering from a psychiatric condition called Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety Depression and his problems are more psychological than somatic. Psychotherapy would help and the prognosis with regard to his psychological problem is favourable as long as he could maintain a stable job with adequate pay and a supportive home environment.

34. However Dr Lo states in his report that the prognosis of his neurological deficits seems less favourable since it is already four and a half years (at the time of his report) after the injury the improvement should be minimal. Improvement in psychological well being may not mean a concomitant improvement in his cognitive power.

35. There is also a report from the clinical psychologist instructed by the defendant, Dr Calais Chan, who, while accepting there was "significant but modest deterioration in specific aspects of his (the plaintiff) intellectual functions" and there was "a mild tendency for his memory to be overloaded by complex visually presented material", took the view that the plaintiff's attentive function was highly susceptible to cognitive interference by pre-occupied thoughts and worries associated with emotional states of anxiety and depression and that his overall cognitive functions will appreciably improve after resolution of his emotional symptoms.

Main disputed issue

36. The main issue in dispute between the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd defendants is whether it was reasonable or not for the plaintiff not to have submitted to the intensive psychological treatment advocated by Dr Tommy Chan, the plaintiff's own clinical psychologist, which treatment was also recommended by Dr Calais Chan, the defendants' expert.

37. It is the primary case of the 1st and 2nd defendants that had the plaintiff submitted to the intensive treatment recommended by Dr Tommy Chan, the plaintiff would have effectively and fully recovered from all his disabilities and impairment arising from the accident and would not have suffered any pre-trial loss of earnings or future loss of earnings.

38. On the other hand, the plaintiff submits that firstly, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have taken on the psychological treatment recommended by Dr Ide Chan of the Clinical Psychology Service of the Tuen Mun Hospital. The three months or so between the time when he was advised by Dr Brian Choa to seek psychological treatment in January 2000 and his being referred to the Clinical Psychology Service of Tuen Mun Hospital in March of the same year is minimal and, in all the circumstances of this case, reasonable. Neither can the plaintiff be faulted for the number of sessions he had with Dr Ide Chan as those sessions and the frequency thereof were prescribed by Dr Ide Chan despite the fact that the sessions with Dr Ide Chan were not of the same intensiveness as recommended by other experts in particular Dr Tommy Chan.

Findings and resolution of the issue in dispute

39. From the totality of the medical evidence before me, it is clear that a distinction must be drawn between the neurological impairment and deficit sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the diffuse cerebral contusion and axonal damage to his brain on the one hand and the psychological disorder which he suffered by way of depression and adjustment disorder. Only when these two aspects of his injury are appreciated to be distinct from one another can the issue be determined in context.

40. In this respect therefore I accept without the least hesitation what was stated by Dr Lo Chun Wai, namely that the treatment given and the improvement to the plaintiff's psychological problems may not mean a concomitant improvement in his cognitive power (which was affected by his neurological impairment).

41. I find from the sum total of the medical evidence before me that the plaintiff's neurological impairments which affected his higher cognitive functions, memory and to a lesser extent his physical movements were, by and large the, cause of his intellectual impairments and which led to his inability to complete his M.Phil studies as well as his M.Sc. and possibly also accounted for his being dismissed from his first four jobs. It was this painful realization that due to such intellectual impairment that he was no longer the high achiever that he once was which led to his depression and adjustment disorder.

42. It follows therefrom, and I further find, that the treatment given to the plaintiff in respect of his depression and adjustment disorder was essentially to get the plaintiff to "let go" the notion that he was once a high achiever and to replace that with the idea that he is now an "ordinary guy".

43. I further find that while such treatment meted out to him by Dr Ide Chan has improved the plaintiff in the psychological sense, I also accept the evidence of Dr Lo Chun Wai that such psychological treatment does not necessarily mean a similar improvement to the plaintiff's neurological impairment which is the main cause of his intellectual deficit. In this respect I note that Dr Yu Yuk Ling has stated quite categorically that the plaintiff's neurological impairment is permanent.

44. In so far as the issue in dispute between the parties is concerned, I accept the evidence of the plaintiff that the sessions he had with Dr Ide Chan, the intervals and frequencies of those sessions were set by Dr Ide Chan.

45. Moreover, where there are a number of experts in the same field, with differing recommendations as to the treatment to be followed, the plaintiff is entitled to have a choice as to which of the experts' recommendations he accepts provided that what he chooses is not unreasonable in all the circumstances of the case. In the present case, the plaintiff had elected to consult Dr Ide Chan and having made that election had followed the treatment meted out by her in attending the sessions set down by her.

46. In so holding, I have particularly in mind what was stated by Dr Ide Chan in her report dated 10 December 2001 where she states :

"...one of the important treatment goals is the rebuilding of a new identity. Mr Lam (the plaintiff) is required to look forward and to reappraise himself instead of lingering on his past and the tragedy to cause (sic) the loss. The repeated examination however just does the opposite to ask him to recall the trauma and to compare his past with his present. Moreover, the patient has already been informed of his ability level, so further assessment could not help him to acknowledge the change, but just confronted him again of his limitation without any constructive purpose."

47. I also accept his evidence that the sessions he had with Dr Ide Chan has resulted in improvement to his psychological problems and he is still continuing to receive treatment from her. I accept that the plaintiff feels comfortable with Dr Ide Chan and generally feels that she has been able to assist him in tackling his depression and adjustment disorder.

48. In all the circumstances of this case, I am not prepared to find or to hold that it was unreasonable of the plaintiff to have preferred the treatment and the course of that treatment as prescribed by Dr Ide Chan as opposed to the recommendations by the other experts. This is all the more so where there is no clear evidence that the treatment or the course of it as prescribed by Dr Ide Chan was wrong or wholly inappropriate in the circumstances.

Pain suffering and loss of amenities

49. Quite apart from the neurological and psychological impairment referred to above, there is evidence which I accept that the plaintiff had been an outstanding volleyball player, both in his secondary school days and university days before the accident and has collected over those times an impressive array of medals and trophies which testify to that fact.

50. After the accident however, one of the effects of his neurological deficits is that his physical movements and agility is no longer what it used to be before the accident. This has resulted in the plaintiff being unable to take part in volleyball and other sports at the level which the plaintiff used to, and no doubt enjoyed, before he had these injuries. These constitute one part of his loss of amenities.

51. Damages under this head has been agreed between the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd defendants at $500,000 and that amount will be assessed accordingly.

Loss of earnings (pre-trial)

52. There is evidence before me that the plaintiff was drawing a monthly sum from the University of Hong Kong between October 1996 to July 1998 ranging from $13,417 to $15,550 respectively. That was no doubt the research grant which the plaintiff was paid (funded by Texas Instruments) for his research during his M.Phil programme.

53. There is evidence from the defendant's expert Mr Mok that upon completion of his M.Phil, with that degree, the plaintiff, if he remained in the academic field, will likely be taken on as a Research Assistant I. I accept that evidence and it fit comfortably with the monthly amount paid to the plaintiff while he was undertaking the M.Phil programme which is within the range of the salary of a Research Assistant II.

54. I also accept the evidence of the plaintiff that but for the accident and but for his failure to complete his M.Phil programme and his failure to obtain even an M.Sc. in engineering, he would have wanted to continue in the academic field.

55. There is unchallenged evidence that the salary range for a Research Assistant I in the Department of Electrical & Electronic Engineering at the University of Hong Kong in 1998 is from $17,100 to $19,055.

56. I further take the view that by the time of trial in 2002, the plaintiff, had there been no accident, would likely have reached the top level of salary as a Research Assistant I. I have only been supplied with the 1997 and 1998 salaries level of these posts in the University of Hong Kong but not the 2002 salaries. However, those statistics that I have been supplied with show an increase in salary level of just over 5% between 1997 and 1998. Projecting that to the year 2002, it probably indicates the top salary for a Research Assistant I in 2002 to be in the region of about $23,000.

57. The median salary in the case of the plaintiff for the pre-trial period comes to half of ($17,100 + $23,000) which gives $20,050.

58. The parties have agreed that the working period of the plaintiff to calculate pre-trial loss of earnings to be 42 months and have also agreed that the actual pre-trial earnings of the plaintiff to be $529,239.

59. The pre trial loss of earnings therefore comes to :

($20,050 x 42) - $529,239 = $312,861

60. In so holding I have declined to follow the figures provided by the experts called on behalf of both the plaintiff and the defendant as their figures are more pertinent to salaries in the private sector. Whilst I cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the plaintiff might end up working in the private sector had he not met with the accident, it would be much too speculative to do so in view of the plaintiff's own evidence that, given a choice, his tendency would be to remain in the academic field.

Other special damages

61. All the other items of special damages with the exception of the loss of the vehicle have been agreed between the plaintiff and the 1st and 2nd defendants in the global amount of $24,405.

62. I shall deal separately with the claim for loss of the vehicle.

Loss of vehicle

63. The plaintiff claims $50,000 for loss of the Ford private car FF 7535 in which the plaintiff was a passenger at the time of the accident and which, at that time, was being driven by the 3rd defendant, the plaintiff's father.

64. The only evidence adduced in this respect is a Sales Contract of Good Faith Management Limited dated 14 July 1996 which shows that the plaintiff bought this vehicle, presumably second hand, for the price of $53,000 at that date.

65. No other evidence has been adduced as to what was the damage to this car from the accident or even what happened to it thereafter.

66. In submission, counsel for the plaintiff suggested that the Court should infer from the purchase price of $53,000 and taking account for the depreciation of the vehicle between the time it was bought in July 1996 and the accident on 12 January 1997, that I could make an award of $50,000 under this head.

67. I take the view that on the evidence adduced, the plaintiff has not even begun to prove its claim under this head of damage. Accordingly I decline to make any assessment under this head of claim.

Future loss of earnings

68. At the time of trial, the plaintiff is in employment as an information technology officer with the Lai King Catholic Secondary School, being a full time temporary teaching post and is earning $17,100 per month. He is on contract for one year and the contract expires at the end of August this year.

69. Had it not been for the accident, in all likelihood, the plaintiff would have obtained his M.Phil degree. It is likely that he would have remained in the academic field and I cannot rule out the possibility of his achieving some higher degree such as a doctorate.

70. Much has been made by the defendants that the plaintiff's result in his bachelor degree course as indicated by his supervisor, Dr Nelson Yung, does not show him up to be in the top level as he was placed 56 out of a class of 105 in his final year of his bachelor degree course (which was before the accident). However, when the full picture is looked at which shows that the plaintiff, in his first year, was placed 81 out of 109 students, in his second year, he was placed 69 out of 102, then being 56 out of 105 in his third year, the picture slowly emerges that the plaintiff was steadily improving over the three years of his bachelor degree even though he may not have been in the top level of the class.

71. Bearing that in mind, even if the plaintiff would not have achieved the rank of a full Professor in the academic field, I would say that there is a good chance of the plaintiff becoming a Senior Research Assistant in time and perhaps to a lesser degree the possibility of his making an Assistant Professor. In taking this view, I have not lost sight of the evidence of Mr Mok, the defendant's expert, that the rank of Senior Research Assistant requires proof of research record while a doctorate is required for an Assistant Professor and in both cases the recruitment is global.

72. In reaching this conclusion, I have accepted the comments passed on the plaintiff by the supervisor of his M.Phil programme when he spoke of the plaintiff before the accident as :

"I interviewed him (the plaintiff) before agreeing to be his M.Phil. supervisor. My decision was based on his pattern of improving performance and his attitude towards his study. He showed real interests in the project proposed and I was able to see his desire to obtain a master degree and excel in his research."

and his comments of the plaintiff after the accident and after the plaintiff's failure to complete his M.Phil degree :

"Mr Lam has been hardworking and diligent, and has always wanted to complete his M.Phil. It is with regret to see the course of events took place in such a way that this could not be fulfilled for the time being."

73. Although those last words of Dr Yung suggests that it may still be possible for the plaintiff to complete his M.Phil ambitions at a later date, I have also noted the opinion expressed by the defendant's neurological expert Dr Yu Yuk Ling that the intellectual impairment to the plaintiff is permanent.

74. The figures supplied to me show that in 1998 the salary range for a Senior Research Assistant to be between $28,075 and $30,785 (by three incremental points) and that for an Assistant Professor to be between $46,190 and $77,165 (by 11 incremental points).

75. On the other hand, the plaintiff's present salary is $17,100. The plaintiff's evidence is that he has made some applications for other similar teaching posts as the one he is presently holding when it expires in August this year but as yet he has not heard anything by way of reply. Nor does he know if his present contract will be renewed when it expires.

76. I find that in all the circumstance of this case, there will definitely be future loss of earnings to the plaintiff without his M.Phil degree. Doing the best I can, by way of multiplicand, I will take the difference between the top level of the salary of a Senior Research Assistant in the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering of the University of Hong Kong and the plaintiff's present salary. In so doing, I take the view that the possibility of the plaintiff achieving a rank higher than that of Senior Research Assistant (if not for the accident) is offset by the fact that there is still room for the plaintiff to climb higher in the employment ladder even in his present condition and he may yet in time achieve a higher salary than at present.

77. Given that the statistics which I have been provided for in relation to the salary of a Senior Research Assistant goes back to 1998 and giving allowance for some increase since 1998, I set the multiplicand at $15,000 per month.

78. The multiplier is agreed between the parties at 15.

79. The loss of future earnings comes to $15,000 x 12 x 15 = $2,700,000.

80. There will also be an assessment of loss of Mandatory Provident Fund which should be 5% of the loss of future earnings. That comes to $135,000.

Loss of earnings capacity

81. Clearly, in view of the plaintiff's impairment, he is likely to be at a disadvantage in the labour market if he should become unemployed.

82. That risk in my view is not great. Although he was fired from his first four jobs in relatively short periods after starting work, his track record showed that he was able to secure alternative employment in the space of a month or two at most following dismissal.

83. His record also showed that in his last two jobs, namely with Oriental and his present teaching post, he was able to hold down those jobs without getting fired. It may be that with treatment resulting in improvement to his psychological condition, his ability to hold down a job has increased. If that be the case, it would be all the more so in future.

84. In the circumstances, I accept the submission of the defendants that a nominal sum of $50,000 will be sufficient under this head of damage.

Future medical care

85. In the light of the evidence in this case, in particular, the fact that the plaintiff was paid $200,000 interim payment in August 2000 one of the purpose of which was to enable the plaintiff to seek psychological treatment in the private sector, yet the plaintiff opted to obtain such psychological treatment from the Tuen Mun Hospital instead of from the private sector, I am not convinced that the plaintiff, after all this time, would seek such treatment from the private sector.

86. This is all the more so when the plaintiff has not only accepted the treatment given to him by Dr Ide Chan, but has in the witness box testified to the fact that he has complete faith in that treatment and feels comfortable with it.

87. My view is that it would serve no purpose now for the plaintiff to change to the private sector for psychological treatment. Indeed he would be best served to continue his treatment with Dr Ide Chan in whom he has complete faith and who has undoubtedly done a good job with the plaintiff.

88. The cost of the sessions with Dr Ide Chan is $44 per session being under the auspices of the Hospital Authority. The sessions are at approximately three-months intervals. There is suggestion that the plaintiff will probably need to continue such treatment for the next one or two years. Giving some margin for the continuation of treatment, $500 will adequately cover the cost of future medical treatment in this respect.

Interests

89. Interests will be awarded at 2% per annum on damages for pain suffering and loss of amenities from the date of writ until judgement.

90. Interests on all special damages (including loss of pre-trial earnings) will be awarded at half judgment rate from the date of the accident until judgment. However, adjustment will be made to take account of the fact that interim payment of $200,000 had been made in August 2000 to the plaintiff.

Summary

PSLA	$500,000
Pre-trial loss of earnings	312,861
Other special damages	24,405
Future loss of earnings and MPF	2,835,000
Loss of earnings capacity	50,000
Future medical care	500
Interests on PSLA	21,890
Interests on pre-trial loss and specials	62,417
Sub-total:	3,807,073
Reduced by 15% contributory negligence:	3,236,012
Further deduct $200,000 interim payment:	3,036,012

Conclusion

91. Accordingly, damages is assessed in favour of the plaintiff as against the 1st and 2nd defendants at $3,036,012. The plaintiff's contributory negligence has already been taken into account in arriving at this figure. So too the interim payment.

Costs

92. There will be a costs order nisi that the 1st and 2nd defendants pay to the plaintiff the costs of the assessment such costs to be taxed if not agreed.