HKSAR v. TIN TAK HO AND ANOTHER

DCCC 645/2021

[2022] HKDC 259

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CRIMINAL CASE NO 645 OF 2021

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REASONS FOR SENTENCE

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1.  D1 and D2 appeared before me facing a charge sheet consisting of 6 charges as follows.

2.  Charge 1 against both D1 and D2 is Conspiracy to defraud, contrary to Common Law and section 159C(6)  of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200. Particulars are that they, between 1 October 2017 and 22 December 2018, both dates inclusive, in Hong Kong, conspired together to defraud Manulife (International)  Limited (“Manulife”)  by dishonestly falsely representing that D2 was the handling agent for the insurance policy applications, causing and inducing the said Manulife to underwrite and issue the said insurance policies and to pay commission or other payments in relation to the said insurance policies to D1 and D2.

3.  Charge 2 against D1 only is Forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.  Particulars are that he, on an unknown day between 1 October 2017 and 29 December 2017 (both dates inclusive), in Hong Kong, made a false instrument, namely a simplified application form for savings products with the policy number 38-0277293-3 purportedly signed by Wong Cheuk Ying, with the intention that D1 should use it to induce Manulife (International)  Limited to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it, to do some act, to its own or any other person’s prejudice.

4.  Charge 3 against D1 only is Forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.  Particulars are that he, on an unknown day between 1 October 2017 and 14 December 2017 (both dates inclusive), in Hong Kong, made a false instrument, namely an application form for traditional products with the policy number 38-0271610-4 purportedly signed by Lee Ho Tsun, with the intention that D1 should use it to induce Manulife (International)  Limited to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it, to do dome act, to its own or any other person’s prejudice.

5.  Charge 4 against D1 only is Forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.  Particulars are that he, on an unknown day between 1 October 2017 and 14 December 2017 (both dates inclusive), in Hong Kong, made a false instrument, namely an application form for traditional products with the policy number 38-0271609-6 purportedly signed by Lee Pak Yin, with the intention that D1 should use it to induce Manulife (International)  Limited to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it, to do some act, to its own or any other person’s prejudice.

6.  Charge 5 against D1 only is Forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.  Particulars are that he, on an unknown day between 1 October 2017 and 22 December 2017 (both dates inclusive), in Hong Kong, made a false instrument, namely an application form for traditional products with the policy number 38-0273871-0 purportedly signed by Leung Pak Lam, with the intention that D1 should use it to induce Manulife (International)  Limited to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it, to do some act, to its own or any other person’s prejudice.

7.  Charge 6 against D1 only is Forgery, contrary to section 71 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200.  Particulars are that he, on an unknown day between 1 October 2017 and 22 December 2017 (both dates inclusive), in Hong Kong, made a false instrument, namely an application form for traditional products with the policy number 38-0273872-8 purportedly signed by Leung Pak Wah, with the intention that D1 should use it to induce Manulife (International)  Limited to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it, to do some act, to its own or any other person’s prejudice.

8.  D1 pleaded guilty to all 6 charges.  D2 pleaded guilty to Charge 1 ie the only charge against him.

Facts admitted by D1 and D2

9.  At all material times, D1 was a Senior Branch Manager of Manulife and was a down-line agent of a Mr Lam (“Lam”), a senior figure in Manulife; D2 was an insurance agent of Manulife and was a down-line agent of D1 working in the same team under Lam.

10.  In about October or November, 2017, D1 disclosed to PW6, a down-line agent of D1, that Lam had asked D1 to look for some ‘headcount’ with a view to boosting the sales performance of the team.  On another occasion, PW6 noticed that D1 was filling in some application forms for insurance policy and signed in the fields of ‘Policyholder’, ‘Insurance Advisor’, and ‘Manager’.  On a subsequent occasion, D1 disclosed to PW6 that D1 had sought assistance from D2 to deceive Manulife by submitting bogus insurance policy applications.

11.  In late 2017, D2 told D1 that he was suffering from illness and was unable to perform his work.  In order to retain the job of D2 with Manulife and upon D1’s suggestion, D2 agreed with D1 for D1 to name D2 as the handling agent of some insurance policy applications, which were handled by D1, and that D2 would return all the relevant commission received from Manulife to D1. After they had reached the agreement, D2 passed his ManuTouch user ID and password together with his temporary receipt book to D1 for processing the relevant insurance policy applications.  D2 had not sold any insurance products to customers at all material times.

12.  In December 2017, Manulife received a total of 10 application forms for insurance policy in the name of 9 persons including D1’s brother Ken and Ken’s wife Wong for an insurance product known as “La Vie” purportedly handled by D2.  Manulife also received the relevant initial premiums in the total amount of $306,357.20 in cash and a credit card payment authorization slip in the amount of $60,990.77 for authorizing the sum to be debited from Ken’s credit card account, together with 10 temporary receipts that originated from D2’s temporary receipt book.  The 10 application forms for insurance policy were purportedly signed by D2 as the handling insurance advisor and the respective 9 policyholders.  In fact, D2 had not handled the said 10 application forms for insurance policy or appended his signatures thereon.

13.  In the application form for the insurance policy/product subject of Charge 2, the reported mobile phone number and the reported address of the policyholder were respectively found to be a number subscribed by D1 and an address previously occupied by D1, Ken and their mother.  PW7, PW8, PW9 and PW11 (respectively the “policyholders” in respect of Charges 2, 3, 4, and 5)  had not applied for the concerned insurance policies or appended their signatures on the respective application forms and confirmed that they had not paid the relevant premiums.  In late 2017, D1 had sought the assistance of PW12 (the “policyholder” in respect of Charge 6)  in taking out an insurance policy with a view to boosting up D1’s sales performance and that D1 agreed to pay for the premium.  Yet, D1 had not asked him to sign on the relevant insurance application form.  D1 was in fact the person who made the 5 application forms for insurance policies/products subject of Charges 2 to 6 without the knowledge of PW7-9 and PW11-12.

14.  D1 later submitted the application forms for the 10 insurance policies/products to Manulife.  Believing that the policyholders as stated on the said 10 application forms for insurance policies/products had in fact applied for and paid the initial premiums for the said insurance policies and believing that the information stated therein including the signatures of the policyholders and that D2 was the handling agent were genuine, Manulife approved the applications and released $16,350.19 and $194,356.47 as commission to D2 on 21 December 2017 and 8 January 2018 respectively.  Manulife also released $280,300.50 as overriding commission to D1 on 8 January 2018.  Had Manulife known that the said 10 application forms for insurance products contained false information, Manulife would not have underwritten and issued the insurance policies, nor to pay the commission and overriding commission to D2 and D1.

15.  As agreed with D1, D2 withdrew the commission in relation to the said 10 insurance policies from his bank account and passed the same to D1 or deposited into D1’s bank account.

16.  Concerning the initial premium of $60,990.77 debited from Ken’s credit card account on 22 December 2017, bank records showed that a cheque in the exact amount had been drawn from D1’s bank account and the sum was deposited into Ken’s bank account on 11 January 2018.

17.  On 4 March 2018, the insurance policy subject of Charge 2 lapsed due to default in payment of further premium.  On 16 and 23 April 2018, D1 encashed two cheques in the respective sums of $330,000 and $200,000 (total amount: $530,000)  that were drawn on Lam’s bank account.  On 16, 23 and 24 April 2018, Manulife had respectively received $330,410.30, $98,643.10 and $98,643.10 in cash (total amount: $527,696.50)  as further premium payments for the other 9 insurance policies together with relevant temporary receipts that were issued from D2’s temporary receipt book.  In fact, it was D1 who arranged for the submission of the said premium payments and the relevant temporary receipts to Manulife.

18.  On 23 April 2018 and 8 May 2018, Manulife respectively released $163,146.66 and $97,366.50 as commission to D2 in relation to the 9 remaining insurance policies.  As agreed with D1, D2 again withdrew the commission in cash from his bank account and passed the same to D1.

19.  In about April 2018, PW6 noticed that D1 was filling in some application forms and signed in the fields of ‘Policyholder’ for changing the insurance plan to another plan which required less premium payment.  D1 revealed to PW6 that most of the bogus insurance policies were related to the insurance products in the name of “La Vie” and “Premier Estate Protector”.

20.  Between April and July 2018, Manulife received applications for changing the insurance plan of 7 of the 10 insurance policies with the same insurance amount.  This resulted in an excess of premiums paid.  As such, Manulife arranged for the refund of premium to the relevant policyholders by issuing a total of 8 cheques in the total amount of $537,124.05.  On a few occasions, PW6 accompanied D1 to visit the banks for depositing cheques issued by Manulife concerning the refund of premiums into the policyholders’ bank accounts.  D1 disclosed to PW6 that the money for the premiums in fact came from Lam and therefore, D1 had to contact the policyholders to get back the money for Lam.

21.  Between June and September 2018, sums with identical amounts as the refunds made by Manulife to these policyholders (except for one policy)  were deposited into D1’s bank account.

22.  Due to change of some insurance plans, Manulife re-calculated the amount of commission that D2 was entitled to.  In the result, D2 had to repay $217,974.62 back to Manulife.  When D2’s service was eventually terminated on 26 July 2018, he still owed Manulife some money.  On 4 October 2018, D1 issued a cheque to Manulife to settle this debt.

23.  On divers dates in August and December 2018, the other 9 policies including those related to Charges 3 to 6 lapsed due to default in payment of further premiums.

24.  Under caution, D2 stated that:-

(a)  as suggested by D1, D2 had reached an agreement with D1 to name D2 as the handling agent of the insurance policy applications secured by D1 in order to retain D2’s job with Manulife;

(b)  he agreed to return all the commission received from Manulife to D1;

(c)  he gave his ManuTouch user ID and password to D1 to access D2’s account for printing the proposals in relation to the insurance policy applications;

(d)  he also passed his temporary receipt books to D1 for conducting the sales of insurance policies;

(e)  he had not performed the sales activities or met the policyholders of the 10 insurance policy applications due to his sickness; and

(f)  he did not know about the underlying falsity of the insurance policy application.

25.  D1 remained silent under caution.

Criminal records

26.  D1 has a clear record.

27.  D2 has a clear record.

Antecedents

28.  D1 is aged 47 (43-44 at the time of the offences), was an insurance agent between 2007 and 2019.  D1 previously resided in private housing in Tokwawan.

29.  D2 is aged 56 (52-53 at the time of the offence), was an insurance agent between 2015 and July 2018.  D2 previously resided in public housing in Ap Lei Chau.

Mitigation

D1

30.  Mr Edward TC Chan of counsel mitigated on behalf of D1.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

31.  D1 had at one time resided in public housing in Kwai Chung.  He finished F5 education and obtained university degrees while working full time including a BBA from Open University, an LLB degree in PRC Law from Tsinghua University.  In 2015, he earned the professional qualification of “Certified Manager of Financial Advisors”.

32.  Between 1997 and 2007, D1 had worked in different banks in Hong Kong moving up from being a teller to a senior officer.  D1 joined the insurance field in 2007 and worked in Manulife till 2019.  He reached the post of Senior Branch Manager.  After his arrest, he lost his job at Manulife and he is now working as a taxi driver.

33.  D1 is married with two daughters aged 15 and 13 both secondary school students. Wife is a primary school teacher.

34.  D1 committed the offences out of desire to assist D2 and pressure from superior.  He is remorseful and pleaded guilty at first opportunity.

35.  For Charge 1, there is no sentencing tariff and the maximum penalty is 14 years’ imprisonment.

36.  Mr E Chan referred to the following cases:-

(a)  HKSAR v Lai Wai Ho, CACC 392/2006;

(b)  HKSAR v Tong Kam Sun, DCCC 72/2015;

(c)  HKSAR v Chan Chi Ming (transliteration)  & Anor, CACC 203/2006 (Chinese judgment);

(d)  HKSAR v Lau Fong, DCCC 227/2019 (Chinese Reasons for Sentence); and

(e)  HKSAR v Ho Ka Keung (No 2) [2009] 1 HKC 88 (CA).

37.  For Charges 2 to 6, there is no sentencing tariff.  The maximum penalty is 14 years’ imprisonment.

38.  It was submitted that the offence of forgery was akin to that of using a false instrument or using a copy of a false instrument, contrary to respectively sections 73 and 74 of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap 200, both carrying the maximum penalty of 14 years’ imprisonment.

39.  It was submitted that the Court of Appeal in Lai Wai Ho did not disturb the sentence of one year’s imprisonment for the offence of using a copy of a false instrument (Lai Wai Ho para 12).  In that case, the offence of using a copy of a false instrument took place prior to the conspiracy (Lai Wai Ho para 13).

40.  It was submitted that the total sum of the commissions received by D1, either directly or indirectly via D2, namely just over $750,000 was still considerably lower than the $1.25M in the case of Lai Wai Ho, the facts of which took place in 2002 to 2004; the scale of the fraud in the present case is considerably smaller than that in the case of Chan Chi Ming.

41.  It was therefore submitted that for Charge 1, the starting point for D1 should not exceed 3 years’ imprisonment.

42.  As regards Charges 2 to 6 relating to Policies 1 to 5 referred to in the Re-amended Summary of Facts, the facts of which happened within the time period of Charge 1.  It was submitted that these policies are part and parcel of the Conspiracy to defraud (Charge 1)  and therefore the sentences on Charges 2 to 6 should be made concurrent with that of Charge 1.

43.  It should also be noted that the two cheques drawn on Lam’s bank account, totaling $530,000, were used to pay for the further premiums of Policies 2 to 10.

44.  Adopting the criteria set out in Ho Ka Keung (No 2) para 11, it was submitted that the nature of the conspiracy committed by D1 was not the most serious or sophisticated type, that he involved D2, there was no international element, the sum involved was not very substantial, albeit he was the central person (or one of the central persons)  in the scheme.

45.  D1 is likely to be barred from working in the financial/insurance industry after serving his sentence.

46.  Mr E Chan submitted a total of 6 mitigation letters (all in Chinese)  written respectively by D1 himself, his wife, his ex-colleague, his two business associates and a church person-in-charge.  The contents are generally that D1 is remorseful, regretful, shameful, has turned to Christ, wants to rebuild himself and will abide by the law; that D1 is a loving husband and father, diligent and responsible, was under stress coming from his superior, did not benefit monetarily; that D1 was helpful, kind, but lost his career; that all asked for a chance for D1 to turn a new leaf and pleaded a lenient sentence for him.

47.  Mr E Chan also submitted a few academic certificates, a volunteer certificate and an unsigned compliment letter for finding a lost property.

48.  There was then a Part 2 of the mitigation submissions conducted in camera and which centered on defence solicitors’ letter dated 31 December 2021 and a witness statement of an ICAC officer dated 5 January 2022 (together “additional papers”).

D2

49.  Mr Kay Chan of counsel assigned by the Director of Legal Aid mitigated on behalf of D2.  The following is a summary of the mitigation submissions.

50.  D2 faces only one charge ie Charge 1.

51.  D2 resides with his wife, his 14-year-old son and his 90-year-old mother.  D2 was educated to secondary school level and had been an insurance agent with Manulife (with no basic salary and on commission)  with Manulife since around 2015.  His employment was terminated in July 2018.  He is currently a part-time night shift cleaner earning $4,000-$5,000 a month.

52.  D2 has a clear record.  He suffered two serious heart attacks between 2011 and 2019.  He has received multiple heart operations since 2011. By late 2017, D2’s health has deteriorated to a point that he was unable to carry on working as an insurance agent.  Mr K Chan submitted a number of medical reports and discharge slips and appointment slips to support D2’s claim and his other medical issues.  The latest update is that D2 just received another heart operation in December 2021.

53.  D2’s timely plea should entitle him to the full 1/3 discount.

54.  D2 appreciated this offence involves breach of trust and professional duty as an insurance agent and the court will consider passing a deterrence sentence.

55.  It was submitted that D2 committed this offence out of desperation to retain his job.  By the time of the offence, because of his ill health, D2 could no longer bring in business to meet his sales quota.  That was why D2 agreed to the conspiracy proposed by D1.  D2 committed the offence out of gullibility, false hope and desperation.

56.  D2 has never handled the 10 bogus applications.  The laying of charges reflected the role played by each defendant.  It was submitted nothing in the forgery charges alleged that D2 knew of the falsity of the 10 forged applications.  Nonetheless, Mr K Chan was prepared to acknowledge that D2 knew that his name was being used as the handling agent of these 10 applications which made them, on this ground, false.

57.  It was submitted D2 only agreed to a small part of D1’s overall scheme; that D2 only agreed to lend his ManuTouch account and temporary receipt book for the sole purpose of satisfying his quota as handling agent.  It was submitted that D2’s understanding was that the insurance policies that D1 would put his (D2’s)  name under were legitimate policies paid for by legitimate customers.

58.  It was further submitted that D2 did not intend to benefit monetarily from the agreement.

59.  It was submitted there was delay in prosecution (one year 10 months from arrest in October 2019 to first appearance in court).

60.  It was submitted D2’s involvement was significantly lower than D1’s which justified a discrepancy of sentences between co-conspirators.

61.  Mr K Chan asked for a CSO or, alternatively a suspended sentence.

62.  In conclusion, Mr K Chan asked for a lenient sentence on behalf of D2.

63.  Mr K Chan also submitted a total of 13 mitigation letters (most of them in Chinese)  written by D2’s wife, his son, his elder brother, his eldest sister, his 2^nd eldest sister, his secondary school teacher, his 4 secondary schoolmates, his 2 ex-colleagues cum friends, and his mother. The contents are generally that D2 is a kind and responsible family man who takes good care of his wife and son and 90-year-old mother; that D2 committed the offence only because he wanted to keep his no-basic-salary job in his weak physical state; that he had not benefitted in monetary terms; that D2 had been a hard-working man but that changed since 2011 when he began to have heart disease – his employment and income became unstable; D2’s health deteriorated after a relapse of his heart problem, resulting in a downturn in performance in Manulife – that was why he acceded to D1’s suggestion in order to keep his job in the hope that he might perform again after he has recovered; that D2 had a good character and was courteous to others; that D2 is truly regretful and promises not to repeat his misdeeds; that D2 has only recently been discharged from hospital again; that D2 is remorseful and many of the letter-writers asked for a lenient sentence for him so that he may reunite with his family sooner.

64.  Following an adjournment due to a public health issue, Mr K Chan filed a further set of written submissions with leave granted ex post facto. The gist of it is that because D2 has a long-standing heart problem which required multiple heart operations and because of the fact that he cannot receive vaccination (medical certificate dated 28.1.2022 showing he is not fit for Covid vaccine until 6 months after 17.12.2021), it was submitted that there was a real risk that D2 will have more severe complications arising from a Covid infection.

65.  Mr K Chan referred to three sentencing authorities, namely:-

(a)  HKSAR v Wong Yun Chuen, HCMA 110/1998;

(b)  R v Ullah Khan (1994)  15 Cr App R (S)  320; and

(c)  R v Eileen Stevens [2003] 1 Cr App R (S)  32.

66.  Relying on Wong Yun Chuen, Mr K Chan submitted that if humanitarian considerations are sufficiently strong, a suspended sentence may be appropriate.

67.  Referring to Ullah Khan, Mr K Chan relied on the dicta that serious health problems were capable of being exceptional circumstances.

68.  The principal case that Mr K Chan relied on was Eileen Stevens. In that case, the appellant had a number of medical problems, including ischemic heart disease, asthma, diabetes and aesophagitis reflux and bilateral hearing loss; the future prognosis regarding her cardiac state was poor.  The appellant was granted suspended sentence.

69.  Mr K Chan quoted from the judgment of McKinnon J, thus:-

“The only question is whether there are present here exceptional circumstances, justifying the exercise of the power to suspend the sentence. The learned judge did not expressly consider the question of exceptional circumstances in sentencing the appellant, although he was asked to do so. Whether he did in fact do so or not, it is our clear view that the very serious heart condition of the appellant, with a poor future prognosis and the real probability of a custodial sentence causing many problems, as her general practitioner put it, even possibly a further heart attack, do amount to exceptional circumstances.”

70.  Mr K Chan submitted that in view of D2’s extreme ill-health and the potentially life-threatening effect of a custodial sentence with the risk that Covid poses, D2 would suffer a high risk of deteriorating health upon custody and his survival in custody cannot be guaranteed.  It was further submitted that the circumstances of D2 amounted to “exceptional circumstances”, justifying the exercise of the court’s discretion to suspend the sentence of imprisonment.

Sentence

71.  There are no sentencing tariffs for these offences.

72.  From the figures supplied by the prosecution in court showing that the premiums received roughly balance out the commissions paid to D1 and D2, this gives an appearance of there being no loss suffered by Manulife. However, this is an appearance only because given the bogus nature of the insurance policies, Manulife has suffered a loss of opportunity to make a profit out of those insurance policies.  What is more, I was told that Manulife has also made an additional payout of about $300,000 being made up of commission ($22,752.28)  and year-end bonus ($273,815.27)  to the up-line manager(s)  of D1.

73.  I bear in mind a breach of trust by each of the defendants towards their employer.  For this reason and because of the ease with which these offences could be committed by an insurance agent, a deterrent sentence is called for in order to deter would-be offenders.  There was here also actual loss suffered by the victim.  Immediate custodial sentence is therefore the only sentencing option against both defendants.

74.  Having viewed the Chronology of Events dated 7 January 2022 prepared by the ICAC, I do not accept D2’s submission that there was delay in prosecution.  I note that although D2 was quite forthcoming in helping the investigators, D1 kept silent under caution which necessarily prolonged the investigative process.  Overall, given the nature of this type of fraud, I am not satisfied that the period between arrest and first court appearance was too long to be categorized as delay, let alone undue or unreasonable delay.

75.  I note the narrow compass within which Charge 1 was settled by the prosecution ie the false representation was limited in scope in that it covered only the falsity of the identity of the handling agent.  As such, I feel able to adopt a lower basic starting point of 18 months for Charge 1.  As between D1 and D2, D1 was the ringleader or the mastermind.  Because of this factor, D1 deserves a higher starting point of sentence and I assess that to be 20 months.

76.  For Charges 2 to 6, these offences resulted in loss to Manulife as alluded to earlier for which D1 (out of the 2 defendants)  is solely responsible.  Given the reasonable degree of sophistication in the mode of execution, I adjudge that a starting point of 35 months for each would be appropriate.  Taking a global view of the matter, these offences of the same nature spanned over a period of about 3 months and as such, I consider a global starting point of 5 years would be appropriate.

77.  D1 and D2 pleaded guilty to their respective charge(s)  in good time therefore earning for themselves the usual 1/3 discount.

78.  For D1 additionally, because of the mitigation based on the additional papers, I am prepared to give him a further discount resulting in a cumulative discount percentage (including the 1/3 discount for pleading guilty)  of 40%.

79.  There are no other mitigating factors that I can see for either defendant that will justify any further reduction in sentence.  In particular, I should make the point that the clear records of the defendants count for little in this type of offence which is often committed by persons of clear record.

80.  As between Charge 1 and the rest of the charges against D1, there is a degree of overlapping of facts the totality of which formed the bigger scheme of fraud perpetrated by D1.  For this reason and bearing also in mind the totality principle, I will impose partially concurrent sentences.

81.  Regarding the mitigation grounds lately submitted on behalf of D2, I note there is a lack of medical prognosis of D2.  I feel that Mr K Chan in making his submissions has overstretched the seriousness of the medical condition of D2.  Although D2 has had no less than 2 heart operations performed on him, there is no suggestion that he is not recuperating from them.  Besides, the Correctional Services Department (“CSD”)  have their own medical facilities which no doubt will take care of all inmates’ health including that of D2.

82.  As for the additional Covid risk that is said to pose to someone in the position of D2, ie someone who has a long-standing health problem without taking vaccination against Covid, I am confident the CSD will make special provisions for this necessarily small group of inmates in order to ensure their physical well-being while serving their respective terms.

83.  I am therefore not persuaded to exercise my discretion to suspend the imprisonment term of D2 either under the exceptional circumstances ground or humanitarian ground or otherwise.

84.  The individual sentences are as follows.

85.  For Charge 1, D1 will go to prison for 12 months; D2 will go to prison for 12 months.

86.  For Charge 2, D1 will go to prison for 21 months.

87.  For Charge 3, D1 will go to prison for 21 months.

88.  For Charge 4, D1 will go to prison for 21 months.

89.  For Charge 5, D1 will go to prison for 21 months.

90.  For Charge 6, D1 will go to prison for 21 months.

91.  In the case of D1, I order that 3.75 months of each of the sentences on Charges 3 to 6 to run consecutively among themselves and the result is to run consecutively to the sentence on Charge 2.  So for Charges 2 to 6, the aggregate sentence is 36 months.

92.  I order that one month of the sentence on Charge 1 is to run consecutively to the sentences on Charges 2 to 6, making a total sentence of 37 months in the case of D1.