NASIR ABDUL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1333/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3677

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1333 OF 2021

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 28 April 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 1 April 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 6 September 2021.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 1 April 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 15 April 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In both the Summons and his supporting affirmation dated 28 April 2026, the applicant did not explain his delay in appealing, nor did he give any ground of appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 22 June 2026, when I asked the applicant for his reason for being late in appealing and the grounds of appeal, he said that he had already told his friend to write down for him. After I told him that his friend did not write any reason for his lateness or any ground of appeal in the Summons or the affirmation, the applicant then said that he wanted to appeal because his situation in Pakistan was still dangerous, what he wrote down in his case was true and correct, and he would go back if the situation was good.

9.  What the applicant said at the hearing cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal against my decision, nor for the intended judicial review.

10.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

11.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

12.  In the circumstances, the applicant did not give any reason for his delay in appealing and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal. Thus, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

13.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.