LEUNG CHO YI, 李竹英的遺產管理人 v. WU PING HUNG 的遺產代理人 AND ANOTHER

DCEC 2446/2019

[2026] HKDC 1262

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO 2446 OF 2019

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IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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Introduction

1.  This action arises out of an accident at work which happened on 11 December 2017 (“Accident”) to李竹英, deceased (“Deceased”) who died about 7 years after the Accident (of illness unrelated to the Accident). She claimed in this action against her then employer employees’ compensation (“EC”) under the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, Cap 282 (“ECO”).

2.  The Deceased was at the time of the Accident employed to work as a masseuse at a massage parlour operated by the original 1^st Respondent “胡炳雄 (Wu Ping Hung) 以前經營芝芝緣水療”.

3.  The original 1^st Respondent never entered an appearance in this action and was absent from all court hearings. Interlocutory Judgment was entered against him on 26 July 2021 leaving compensation to be assessed.

4.  胡炳雄 (Wu Ping Hung) was discovered dead on 3 January 2023. A carry-on Order was granted on 24 November 2023 for substitution by “胡炳雄 (WU PING HUNG) 的遺產代理人” to be the 1^st Respondent (“R1”). R1 has remained absent in these proceedings.

5.  Thereafter the Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board obtained leave from the court on 16 February 2024 to be joined as the 2^nd Respondent (“R2”) in this action to contest the issue of quantum.

6.  The assessment of compensation hearing was originally fixed to be heard on 19 March 2024. The hearing had to be adjourned when the Deceased was admitted to the hospital and could not attend court. She died of illness subsequently on 30 October 2024.

7.  The Deceased was all along represented by Messrs Lau & Chan, assigned by the Director of Legal Aid. She passed away on 30 October 2024 whereupon Legal Aid was discharged. The action was stayed upon the death of the Deceased. It was restored after Letters of Administration were granted on 1 December 2025 to the Deceased’s daughter 梁祖誼 (Leung Cho Yi) as the administratrix of her estate. The administratrix applied for and was granted Legal Aid, and thereafter obtained leave of the court on 27 February 2026 to proceed the action under the title of “梁祖誼 (LEUNG CHO YI), 李竹英的遺產管理人” as the Applicant (“A”).

8.  This is the hearing of assessment of compensation.

9.  Mr Lucas Lau of counsel appeared for A.

10.  R2 was represented by Ms Flora Lam of counsel.

No Witness of Fact

11.  A had adduced in this action a witness statement dated 10 September 2021 from the Deceased.[1] She passed away and could not come to court to testify.

12.  A sought leave to admit the Deceased’s witness statement under the hearsay rule pursuant to s47 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap 8. R2 has no objection. I granted leave accordingly.

13.  The remaining issue would be the weight to be attached to the Deceased’s evidence, her credibility being challenged by R2.

14.  Therefore no witness of fact was called at the assessment hearing.

15.  I read counsel’s written Opening Submissions for A and R2 respectively and heard their submissions in court with reference to the Deceased’s witness statement and the documentary evidence adduced.

The Issues on Assessment of Compensation

16.  The following matters, relevant to the assessment of EC under the ECO, are not disputed:

(1) The Deceased was aged 42 at the time of the Accident;

(2) She commenced working for R1 on 27 or 28 November 2017, met the Accident and sustained injuries in the course of work on 11 December 2017 when she was allegedly assaulted by co-workers;

(3) After the Accident, A was assessed by the Employees’ Compensation (Ordinary Assessment) Board (“Assessment Board”) to be suffering from permanent loss of earning capacity (“LEC”) of 6% for the multiple injuries sustained as a result of the Accident as set out in a Certificate of Review of Assessment/Form 9 dated 25 May 2023 (“Form 9”).[2] Total intermittent sick leaves/certified period(s) of absence from duty were 937 days (granted during the 3-year period from 12 December 2017 to 11 December 2020);[3]

(4) For the purposes of this assessment, the parties have agreed to adopt 5% LEC (excluding 1% impairment in ophthalmology per the Form 9, agreed to be unrelated to the Accident) for assessing compensation under s9 ECO; and

(5) S10A medical expenses are agreed at $4,430.

17.  In assessing EC under the ECO, the remaining issues on quantum requiring this Court’s ruling are:

(1) The Deceased’s monthly earnings at the time of the Accident; and

(2) The period(s) of temporary incapacity in respect of which s10 periodical payments should be payable to A.

The Deceased’s Monthly Earnings

A’s Case

18.  A’s pleaded case is that the Deceased had “commenced work for only 15 days as at the time of the Accident, had worked for 6 days and earned about $6,500 in total”.[4]

19.  The Deceased in her witness statement filed on 14 September 2021[5] elaborated on her earnings as follows:

(1) R1 would charge customers $280 per 45-minute session for massage service, from which $100 would be paid to the masseuse/the Deceased;

(2) The tips paid by the customers would be paid directly to and wholly pocketed by the masseuses;

(3) R1’s massage parlour opened 24 hrs round the clock. She worked 12 hours a day (11 am to 11 pm);

(4) She received all income ($6,500) in cash; there was no salary receipt;[6]

(5) A few days after commencing work, the Deceased was allegedly assaulted by a co-worker on 1 December 2017 (“the 1^st Assault”). She was granted 4 days of sick leave from 2 to 5 December 2017 and could not work. She had therefore worked for R1 for 6 days only from about 27 November 2017 up to the Accident;

(6) The Deceased and her daughter had been living on Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (“CSSA”) after she divorced her husband in 2006. By 2016, she had been working part-time as a shop salesperson for about 120 hours per month in order to qualify for low income CSSA as required by the Social Welfare Department (“SWD”); and

(7) As her daughter grew up, the Deceased had by mid-2017 planned to work full-time and not to rely on CSSA. She commenced working for R1 as a masseuse since about 27 November 2017.

20.  R1 did not adduce any evidence to challenge A’s evidence on the alleged earnings.

21.  On the evidence of the Deceased, A’s counsel Mr Lau argues that the Deceased’s daily income should be taken to be $1,083.33 ($6,500/6), an average of the 6 days of work. She would have but for the Accident expected to work full time for 26 days a month, earning $28,166.7 ($1,083.33 × 26).

A’s Alternative Case

22.  Alternatively, on the basis that the Deceased had worked for 6 days during her 2-week employment with R1 but discounting the 4 days sick leave resulted from the 1^st Assault, Mr Lau argues that the Deceased would have worked about 60% of the work days in a month.

23.  Mr Lau also relies on some self-reported declarations of income records covering a period from June 2016 to November 2017 submitted by the Deceased to the SWD in support of her application and eligibility for CSSA.[7] They show that the Deceased had reportedly worked for about 15 to 16 days per month on average - which Mr Lau calculates also to be around 60% of the work days in a month, and for 6 to 10 hours every day.

24.  On the strength of the above evidence, Mr Lau argues for an alternative case that the Deceased’s monthly earnings should be calculated based on no less than 16 work days per month, ie $17,332.8 ($1,083.33 × 16).

R2’s Case

25.  R2 attacks the credibility of the Deceased by reference to some discrepancies in her witness statement and the SWD records as to the date of commencement of work (whether 27 or 28 November 2017) with R1, that she had reported to the SWD to have worked as a salesperson earning $400 on 27 November 2017 (the date she allegedly commenced working for R1 as pleaded), exaggeration and inconsistencies of her report to the treating doctors and the police on different occasions on the injuries sustained by her in the 1^st Assault and the Accident, the absence of any documentary evidence or report regarding the alleged 1^st Assault, etc.

26.  R2’s counsel Ms Lam submits that the Deceased’s pleaded earnings and work details were no more than her own bare assertions. As her credibility is highly in doubt, the court should not accept her evidence or A’s pleaded case.

27.  Without any reliable evidence based on which the court could assess the Deceased’s monthly earnings, R2 seeks to rely on the “Quarterly Report of Wages and Payroll Statistics” published by the Census and Statistics Department in March 2013. Table 8 shows the average monthly income of a “Masseur” to be $16,963 on an average of 26 work days per month.

28.  As no separate category of “Masseur” is listed in the statistics reports of the following years, Ms Lam proposes to adopt the Consumer Price Indices for the years 2014 to 2017 for the possible increments, from which she calculates the average monthly income of a masseur as at the date of the Accident (2017) to be $18,722.48. This would translate to a daily wage of $720.10 ($18,722.48/26 days), which Ms Lam argues to be the average daily wage of a masseur in 2017.

29.  On the Deceased’s monthly earnings at the time of the Accident, Ms Lam submits that it would be reasonable to adopt 16 work days in a month as proposed in A’s alternative case and in light of the Deceased’s report to the SWD prior to the Accident. R2 therefore argues that the Deceased’s monthly earnings should be: $11,521.60 ($720.10 × 16 days).

Ruling on Monthly Earnings of the Deceased

30.  The method of calculating earnings is provided in s11 of the ECO. The provisions of s11(1) and (2) relevant to the present case are as follows:

“(1) … the monthly earnings of an employee at the time of the accident shall be the earnings—

…

(b) computed in such manner as is best calculated to give the rates per month at which the employee was being remunerated during the previous 12 months if he has been so long employed by the same employer, but, if not, then for any lesser period during which he has been employed by the same employer,

…

(2) Where by reason of the shortness of the time during which an employee has been in the employment of his employer or of the casual nature of the employment, or of the terms of employment, it is impracticable to compute the rate of remuneration of such employee at the date of the accident, regard may be had to the average monthly amount which, during the 12 months previous to the accident, was being earned by a person of similar earning capacity in the same grade employed at the same work by the same employer, or, if there is no person so employed, by a person of similar earning capacity in the same grade employed in the same class of employment and in the same district.”

[emphasis added]

31.  There is no dispute that the Deceased was only employed by R1 for about 2 weeks from 27 or 28 November 2017 up to the date of the Accident.

32.  Despite R2’s challenge of her credibility, without the Deceased testifying in court and being cross-examined, the court cannot, and indeed it is unsafe and unfair for me to come to any view or make a ruling on the issue of credibility.

33.  I however do not find the Deceased’s evidence as stated in her witness statement that she had earned $6,500 for 6 days of work (based on the alleged income of $100 per session of 45 minutes plus tips directly received from the customers) unreasonable. She had on separate occasions reported the same figures to the Labour Department on 1 June 2018 of the charge by R1 of $280 per 45-minute session,[8] and to the SWD on 5 February 2018 of total cash income of $6,500 received from her work with R1.[9] There is no contradictory evidence before the court. On such evidence, her daily income working for R1 would be $1,083.33, as suggested by Mr Lau.

34.  I also note that the Deceased had worked and reported to tax for the year of assessment 2015/2016 total income of $154,359,[10] equivalent to average monthly earnings of $12,863 whilst she was receiving CSSA. This corroborates the Deceased’s evidence that she had wished to engage in steady work and not to rely on CSSA as her daughter grew older.

35.  On the other hand, I agree with R2’s counsel Ms Lam that without any reliable corroborated evidence of the Deceased’s earnings or of other persons under the employ of R1, it would be impracticable for the court to assess the Deceased’s earnings by application of s11(1)(b). The second limb under s11(2), ie “the average monthly amount which, during the 12 months previous to the accident, was being earned by a person of similar earning capacity in the same grade employed… in the same class of employment and in the same district” would be applicable in accordance with the principles laid down in the Court of Appeal judgments of Or Wing Ming v Ho Bing Chi [2008] 2 HKCLRT 20 at §§24-25 and Lai Cheung Kwong v Lo King Sum [2008] 3 HKLRD 643 at §16.

36.  In considering the Deceased’s monthly earnings under the second limb of s11(2), I accept Ms Lam’s submissions that the government statistics on the average monthly earnings of a masseur would be helpful reference.

37.  The average monthly earnings of a masseur of $18,722.48 as at 2017 (based on the government statistics as at 2013 and the Consumer Price Indices, explained in §28 hereinabove), is equivalent to about 17 days of work in a month on the daily income of $1,083.33. This is more or less in line with the evidence of the Deceased’s report to the SWD that she had prior to the Accident worked for about 15 to 16 days in a month, as submitted by Mr Lau.

38.  On the overall evidence, I consider it reasonable to adopt the Deceased’s monthly earnings to be $18,722.48, based on the government statistics, in assessing compensation under the ECO.

A’s Injuries/The Medical Evidence

39.  A’s pleaded case is that the Deceased was assaulted by the shop manager during work on the night of 11 December 2017 in the Accident. She attended the Accident and Emergency Department of Yan Chai Hospital immediately shortly after 1 am on 12 December 2017. Medical evidence shows that she had reported being hit on the head resulted in multiple injuries.

40.  Medical examination revealed multiple abrasions over her forehead and right arm and bruises over her left elbow and thigh. She was admitted to the Emergency Medicine Ward, treated and was discharged 3 days later on 15 December 2017.[11]

41.  The Deceased continued to attend the Accident and Emergency Department of Yan Chai Hospital for treatment and complained of persistent headache and dizziness. Diagnoses of post-concussion syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder were made.[12] She gradually complained of more serious pain and symptoms of the head and neck, and nasal, eye and ear problems all allegedly related to the Accident.

42.  Medical evidence shows that the Deceased had ever since attended various hospitals and clinics in different specialties, and was granted intermittent sick leaves up to 25 January 2024, ie more than 6 years after the Accident, for a total of 1,866 days as set out in the summary of sick leave certificates.[13] Most of the sick leaves were granted upon the diagnoses of headache/head injury/neurological problem.

Form 7/Form 9/Certified Sick Leaves

43.  For the purposes of the ECO, the Deceased was first assessed by the Assessment Board in 2021 and 2022. As set out in the Certificate of Assessment/‌Form 7 issued on 5 August 2022 (“Form 7”),[14] she was assessed to be suffering permanent LEC of 3.5% in respect of multiple injuries resulting in neck pain, stiffness, upper limbs numbness; head wound scar; and psychiatric impairment resulted from the Accident. Intermittent sick leaves granted from 12 December 2017 to 11 December 2020 for a total of 937 days were endorsed.

44.  Upon the Deceased’s objection and review by the Assessment Board, the assessment of LEC was revised to 6% in respect of multiple injuries resulting in neck pain, stiffness and numbness; headache and head scar pain; left corneal scar; residual decrease in memory; and psychiatric impairment, with the same sick leaves endorsed, as set out in the Form 9 issued on 25 May 2023.

45.  A did not lodge an appeal against the Form 9.

46.  R2, after joining in these proceedings to contest quantum, obtained leave and filed an appeal under s18 of the ECO on 19 February 2024.[15]

47.  At the time of the assessment hearing, the parties came to agreement on LEC of 5% (based on the Form 9 but excluding 1% LEC in ophthalmology) for assessing s9 compensation under the ECO.

Certified Periods of Absence/Section 10 Compensation

48.  Regarding the certified periods of absence, R2 confirmed its position to adopt total sick leaves of 937 days certified in the Form 9.

49.  A’s counsel Mr Lau argues for the full 36 months allowed under s10(5) for assessing s10 compensation on the basis that total sick leaves resulted from the Accident granted to the Deceased amount to 1,866 days as set out in the summary of sick leave certificates, well beyond the 36-month statutory limit.

50.  Mr Lau’s arguments, as set out in his Opening Submissions, are premised on the proposition that the statutory presumption provided under s10(2) of the ECO, namely “a period of absence from duty certified to be necessary by a registered medical practitioner… shall be deemed to be a period of total temporary incapacity irrespective of the outcome of the injury”, is rebuttable by fraud and other evidence. He has referred to and set out at length §§13-36 of the judgment of Sin Fu Yau v Wong Po Kee Ltd and Anor [2007] 1 HKLRD 159, quoting numerous authorities.

51.  He also refers to the Court of Appeal judgments of Kan Wai Ming v Hong Kong Airport Services Ltd [2011] 3 HKLRD 497 (CA) per Fok JA (as Fok PJ then was) at §17 and Yu Tat Kam v Chu Tung Shing and Anor [2009] 6 HKC 411 per Yuen JA at §§23-27 which illustrate the court’s discretion in overriding the s10(2) presumption on the specific facts and circumstances in those cases.

52.  The reference to numerous authorities and statement of legal principles, without explanation or elaboration on their application to the specific facts and circumstances of the present case, and how the court should exercise its discretion in overriding the s10(2) presumption and under s10(5), is not helpful to the court. It does not assist A’s arguments on extending the certified period(s) of absence.

53.  Mr Lau has not made submissions as to how and why the court should exercise its discretion to extend the certified period(s) of absence and deviate from the Form 9 for assessing s10 compensation.

54.  Mr Lau also refers to the Court of Appeal judgment of Choy Wai Chung v Chun Wo Construction & Engineering Co Ltd [2001] 2 HKLRD 803 in which the court exercised its discretion to extend the periodical payments up to the statutory maximum of 36 months allowed under s10(5). But the exercise of discretion by the Court of Appeal was upon an appeal against the Form 9 issued in that case, and facts specific and sensitive as well.

55.  In the present case, as submitted by Ms Lam, the Form 9, against which no s18 ECO appeal was lodged by A, “shall be admitted in evidence without further proof on its production in any court” and “shall be evidence of the matters stated therein” by operation of s16H ECO.

56.  It is trite that such evidence can become conclusive when the appeal procedure not being invoked. The assessment is to be final unless appealed within the period prescribed under s18 ECO (see Ng Ming Cheong v Mass Transit Railway Corp [1997] HKLRD 1231 (CA) at p 1236H to I; and Leung Shui Cheong v Au Chung Yin Jimmy [2023] HKCA 963 at §§49-50).

57.  I am not convinced by Mr Lau why the Form 9 assessment on certified period(s) of absence is not conclusive evidence for assessing EC in the present case, and how the court should exercise its discretion to deviate from the same.

58.  In any event, s10(5) of the ECO provides that in assessing periodical payments in respect of temporary incapacity, the court may allow an extension of no more than 12 months for an employee who has received periodical payments under the section for a period of 24 months from the date of commencement of the temporary incapacity. The employees shall thereafter no longer be entitled to periodical payments beyond 36 months under s10, but shall be deemed to have suffered permanent incapacity which should be covered under s7 or s9 of the ECO.

59.  It is clear that the Form 9 certifies intermittent sick leaves from the date of commencement of incapacity on 12 December 2017 to 11 December 2020, covering a full 3-year period, for a total of 937 days, which is the maximum allowable under s10(5) of the ECO.

60.  The Assessment Board’s endorsement of the sick leaves granted therefore accords with the statutory limit set out in s10(5), ie covering a period of 36 months from the first day of sick leave issued on 12 December 2017 to 11 December 2020 and no more, despite there were numerous further sick leaves granted to the Deceased after that.

61.  In my view, further extension of sick leaves beyond 36 months from 12 December 2017, or after 11 December 2020, from the days certified in the Form 9 is expressly not allowed under s10(5). A’s claim for further periodical payments after 11 December 2020 is flawed by the clear wordings of s10(5).

62.  I accept R2’s submissions that the 937 days of (intermittent) sick leaves certified in the Form 9 should be adopted for assessing s10 compensation.

63.  The evidence shows that the Deceased had worked for 2 days during the sick leaves from which she earned $600. The parties are agreed that a sum of $600 should be deducted from s10 compensation.

Computation of Compensation

64.  I assess employees’ compensation under the ECO as follows:

Section 9: $18,722.48 × 5% × 72	$67,401
Section 10: $18,722.48 × 937/30 × 4/5 - $600	$467,212
Section 10A: Medical expenses (agreed)	$4,430
Total:	$539,043

65.  Total employees’ compensation is thus assessed at $539,043.

Interest

66.  No claim for interest on the compensation adjudged is pleaded by A. Nor did any party make submission on the claim for interest. No award of interest should thus made.

Costs

67.  I have read and heard the parties’ submissions on costs.

68.  R2, being a public body, was granted leave to join in these proceedings under s25A(a) of the Employees Compensation Assistance Ordinance, Cap 365 and O15 r6 of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”) to contest the issue of quantum.

69.  The objectives are to carry out R2’s statutory duty, in the spirits of the ECO, in screening out “unmeritorious or inappropriate claims to ensure (inter alia) that this assistance mechanism will not be abused, its recipients will not exaggerate their claims, and public funds will not be used for improper purposes”. In doing so, R2 ought to “act as a filter and adopt an impartial attitude in the proceedings so as to assist the court in coming to a correct ruling” (see Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board v Woo Chun Wah (2019) 22 HKCFAR 495 at §45).

70.  The following costs orders are agreed by A and R2. I accept that they are reasonable in light of the authorities and make the costs order nisi accordingly:

(1) R1 do pay A’s costs of the action on the issue of quantum and of the assessment of compensation, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed;

(2) R1 do pay R2’s costs of the action on the issue of quantum and of the assessment of compensation, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed;

(3) There be no order as to costs between A and R2, including all costs reserved (if any); and

(4) A’s own costs (subject to any wasted costs which may be ordered by this Court as set out in the section hereinbelow) be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

71.  In the absence of application from any of the parties to vary this costs order within 14 days, the costs order nisi shall become absolute.

Preparation of Assessment Bundles/Wasted Costs

72.  In the present case, the trial on quantum/assessment of compensation of EC claim, where the Assessment Board had conducted assessments and issued the Form 7/Form 9, would most unlikely involve complicated medical issues. The court will most unlikely require to consider or even refer to substantial medical evidence.

73.  This is particularly the case when A and R2 did not have great disputes on the Form 9 all along. At the assessment hearing, they were able to agree on the permanent LEC at 5%, and were only narrowly apart as regards the certified sick leaves for assessing s10 compensation.

74.  Against this background, this Court found it wholly inappropriate that the legal representatives of A and R2, when agreeing and compiling the assessment bundles, had seen it fit to include 5 box files containing more than 2000 pages of hospital records of the Deceased including extensive consultation notes, tests results, appointment slips, hospital protocols, prescription forms, requests for information forms, referral slips, etc. A lot of these documents, in particular the appointment slips, forms and protocols, do not contain or provide any meaningful medical information on the patient’s medical conditions, such as the Deceased’s injuries, treatment, recovery, sick leaves or permanent LEC relevant to assessing compensation under the ECO.

75.  In my view, it was not necessary for most of these documents, not containing any meaningful medical information, to be obtained, discovered and adduced in evidence in the first place. Medical reports and at most treatment/consultation records and notes covering the relevant period, and nothing more, should normally suffice.

76.  The inclusion of such voluminous hospital records in the assessment bundles is wholly unnecessary but an unjustifiable waste of resources and costs, particularly when A’s counsel confirmed (as expected) at the commencement of the hearing that he would not rely on nor even refer to any of these documents.

77.  R2’s counsel Ms Lam referred to 3 out of the 2000 odd pages of hospital records which contain notes of (the Deceased) “…now working as a sales agent”[16] and her requests made to the treating doctors for extension of sick leaves[17] back in 2019. Ms Lam argues that such evidence would impugn the credibility of the Deceased and challenge the sick leaves certified in the Form 9 (in support of R2’s appeal against thereof).

78.  Such reference would not be helpful where the Deceased could not testify in court and be cross-examined. In any event, it would not be necessary as R2 at trial had accepted the certified period(s) of absence in Form 9 which covers all sick leaves granted in 2019.

79.  Practitioners must exercise prudent judgment in discovery and when compiling trial bundles, which should include only documents that are necessary and directly relevant to the issues before the court.

80.  During trial, on the court’s own motion, I raised the issue of wasted costs under O62 rr8 and 8A of the RDC and section 53(1) of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 in respect of the indiscreet preparation/‌unnecessary inclusion of the 5 box files of medical records in the assessment bundles. Counsel for A and R2 were not able to provide justification therefor.

81.  I do not see why A should bear those costs unnecessarily and unjustifiably incurred by the legal representatives; neither should such costs be paid out of the public funds of Legal Aid or R2.

82.  Upon considering all the circumstances of the case, the evidence adduced and the issues involved, I am satisfied that there is before this Court evidence which would likely lead to a wasted costs order being made as provided under O62 r8B(1) of the RDC.

83.  I therefore direct that the legal representatives of A and R2 do (i) show cause within 14 days from the date hereof as to why they should not either jointly or individually bear the wasted costs of the preparation of the 5 box files of 2000 odd pages of unnecessary medical records and notes in the trial bundles personally and on an indemnity basis; or (ii) each give an undertaking not to charge their clients the costs.

84.  I shall deal with the matter of wasted costs by way of paper disposal upon receipt of the written representations from A and R2, unless any party requires for an oral hearing.

85.  Lastly, I thank counsel for their assistance.