ADIWAL BHUPINDER SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 904/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2954

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 904 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By summons (“the Summons”) filed on 29 December 2025, the Applicant seeks leave to appeal, out of time, against this Court’s decision dated 18 November 2025 (“the Decision”), whereby his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 26 November 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”) and the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 25 March 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”) was dismissed.

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. The Applicant is therefore late in taking out the Summons by 27 days.

3.  In determining whether to extend time for appealing a refusal of leave, the court will consider: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office CAMP 64/2020 [2020] HKCA 844 at §10).

4.  Given that the statutory period for lodging an appeal is 14 days, the present delay is substantive. However, no explanation whatsoever has been proffered by the Applicant for such delay. In the supporting affirmation, the Applicant merely reiterates that his life is in danger in India, alleging that his enemies can harm him and even kill him. The Applicant also asserts that his adversary can readily locate him through the police. He claims his right to life, to protection under the criminal law, and to be safeguarded against extrajudicial killing and related threats.

5.  I next turn to the merits of the proposed appeal. It is settled principle that an extension of time will not be granted where the appeal is manifestly lacking in substance (see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017).

6.  In the present case, it is plain that the Applicant discloses no arguable basis upon which the appeal can succeed. First of all, part of his challenge was directed at the Director’s Decision. It is however well-established that once the matter had been taken to the Board, the Director’s decision was superseded and ceased to be amenable to judicial review (Re Moshin Ali CACV 54/2018 [2018] HKCA 549).

7.  As for the Board’s Decision, the Applicant identified no legitimate public law ground upon which it could be set aside. He pointed to no error of law, irrationality, or procedural unfairness that would warrant the Court’s intervention. Absent such grounds, it was not the role of the Court to intrude or override the Board’s function as the primary decision-maker.

8.  The Applicant has wholly failed to demonstrate why his application for leave to apply for judicial review should not be dismissed in light of these circumstances.

9.  The lack of merit in the proposed appeal weighs heavily against granting an extension of time. To allow the Applicant to pursue a challenge that is clearly untenable would only serve to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily, disrupt the orderly administration of the refoulement process, and prejudice the interests of the proposed respondent.

10.  For these reasons, the Summons seeking an extension of time to appeal to the Court of Appeal is dismissed.