CHONGAN TIJAN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 846/2022

[2022] HKCFI 3170

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 846 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.      Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.      A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 19 August 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 1134 of 2017 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  The applicant appeared before the Court on 28 September 2022.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant came from Gambia as a visitor and he was granted permission to stay in Hong Kong until 8 September 2014.  He overstayed and on 10 September 2014 he surrendered himself to the Immigration Department.  He lodged his non refoulement claim on 24 September 2014. His claim was considered on the grounds of Torture risk, BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention. By Notice of Decision dated 6 November 2015 (“the Director’s Decision”), the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement application for the reason that the applicant’s claim was not substantiated.

5.  By another letter dated 15 March 2017, the Director invited the applicant to submit additional facts relevant to his application in relation to Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (Risk of violation of the right to life) (“BOR 2 risk”).  The applicant submitted additional facts in support of his claim under BOR 2 risk.  Having considered the facts, by Notice of Further Decision dated 30 March 2017 (“the Director’s Further Decision”), the Director refused the applicant’s application on the BOR 2 risk as well.

6.  He appealed the Director’s Notice of Decision and the Director’s Notice of Further Decision to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 29 September 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal on claim on all grounds.

7.  He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 9 November 2018 (“the Court’s Order”) for want of prosecution.

8.  His appeal to the Court of Appeal against the Court’s Order was out of time. He had made 2 applications to the Court of Appeal for extension of time. The Court of Appeal dismissed his last application on 23 April 2020.

9.  His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28 July 2020.

10.  His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 13 June 2022.

11.  He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 20 June 2022.

12.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

13.  The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by the people of the National Intelligence Agency (“the NIA officers”) because of the embezzlement and corruption of his half-brother Ngou Bah.

14.  The Director found that his claim was not substantiated on the grounds that he did not received ill-treatment from the NIA officers and his half-brother had been granted presidential pardon, showing that it was unlikely that the NIA officers would harm or kill him; that state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was a viable option for him.

15.  He appealed the Director’s Decision to the Board. The Board, having considered the evidence, agreed with the Director. It further found the presidential pardon granted to his half-brother would not be affected by the new government.

16.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

17.  In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted to the immigration officer a statement, in which he said he learned from his cousin in Gambia that his half-brother was charged with embezzlement and corruption and was convicted; that his half-brother had used his name to open an account with a bank and therefore the police would consider that he was involved; that he had evaded tax payment; that if he returned to Gambia, he would be arrested, tortured or even killed by the police. However, he was unable to produce any documents to prove the bank account matter.

18.  The Director considered that the applicant relied upon the same or similar facts of his previous claim, which has been considered. There is no reason that the NIA officers are still interested in him after a lapse of 5 years. As to the bank account, there is no evidence from the applicant to prove his case. If he had evaded tax payment, it is lawful for the police to arrest him. He should have a fair trial in Gambia.

19.  The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the same or similar facts in support of the subsequent claim, such facts, when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

20.  The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he stated:

a.  he is a genuine non-refoulement claimant, who has no other safe place to stay;

b.  the Director’s Decision is wrong as there was no interview for him;

c.  the immigration officer is invited to tour around his country to understand the situations there himself;

d.  if he did not run away, he would have been killed by his enemies.

DISCUSSION

21.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

22.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant said he has no family in his own country now.

23.  As to his grounds stated under paragraph 20 above, they do not assist his application. 20a is not relevant; 20b is the procedure under the Ordinance and as he has had the interview in his previous claim, there is simply nothing amiss in this procedure. 20c is irrelevant as the immigration officer was entitled to refer to the country of origin information without going to his country for his investigation of the facts. 20d is also irrelevant.

24.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

25.  Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

26.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

27.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

28.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

29.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments on the intended RPO, he said if he has further evidence, he will make another application to the court.

30.  I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

31.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

32.  RPO in terms of paragraph 30 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1