CHEN JINHUI v. HUANG YUEXIA, the person appointed to represent the estate of WONG KAM SAN, Deceased AND OTHERS

CACV 178/2021, [2026] HKCA 404

On Appeal From [2021] HKCFI 710

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 178 OF 2021

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO 1524 OF 2012)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the third application of the 4^th to 6^th Defendants (collectively “the Defendants”) by summons dated 5 September 2025 (“the Summons”) for leave to adduce new evidence in their appeal against the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Leung (as Leung J then was, “the Judge”) dated 19 March 2021.

BRIEF BACKGROUND

2.  The basic facts of this case have been summarised in the Court’s previous judgment dated 4 November 2022 ([2022] HKCA 1522, “the 1^st New Evidence Judgment”), and will not be repeated here. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the expressions and abbreviations as defined in the 1^st New Evidence Judgment will continue to be used in this judgment.

3.  By the 1^st New Evidence Judgment, the Court granted leave to the Defendants to adduce what was referred to as “Item 23” as new evidence in the appeal. By a further judgment dated 17 July 2025 ([2025] HKCA 646, “the 2^nd New Evidence Judgment”), the Court granted leave to the Defendants to adduce what were referred to as “Item 2” and “Item 3” as new evidence in the appeal. Item 23, Item 2 and Item 3 relate to a number of purported declarations of the Plaintiff dated 3 February 2022, 25 April 2022, and 21 May 2022 respectively (“the Purported Declarations”), in which the Plaintiff admitted that he had forged various documents used at the trial of the action below (“the Trial”) and relied upon by the Judge to find in favour of the Plaintiff.

4.  By the Summons, the Defendants seek leave to adduce an additional 17 items of documents (hereinafter referred to as “Item 3-1” to “Item 3-17”, collectively “the Proposed New Evidence”) as new evidence in the appeal. According to the Defendants, those documents were derived from the underlying materials (“the Prosecution Materials”) used in the criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff in the Mainland referred to at §§13-14 of the 2^nd New Evidence Judgment (“the PRC Criminal Case”), and were obtained by the Defendants’ lawyer (Mr Wang Xuyang) in Benxi, Liaoning Province, on 10 July 2025 after the conclusion of the PRC Criminal Case against the Plaintiff:

(1)  Items 3-1 and 3-2 consist of some records of interview of the Plaintiff by the PRC Public Security/Procuratorate on various dates in January to August 2022, while Items 3-3 and 3-4 consist of four authorisation letters issued by the Plaintiff/his wife to the Plaintiff’s PRC lawyers and some records of meeting between the Plaintiff and his PRC lawyers on various dates in May to June 2022. Items 3-1 to 3-4 contain evidence of the Plaintiff’s admissions of forgery of documents and procurement of false evidence used at the Trial, and are similar in nature to the Purported Declarations.

(2)  Items 3-5 and 3-6 consist of some records of interview of Zheng Chenghui by PRC public security on various dates in January to September 2022, and a declaration made by Zheng Chenghui dated 20 September 2022. According to the Defendants, Zheng Chenghui was the former Vice  General Manager of Shunfeng, and a colleague and confidant of the Plaintiff. In Items 3-5 and 3-6, Zheng Chenghui admitted that he had participated in the Plaintiff’s fraud, including the forgery of the 6/9/2005 Letter and 8/9/2005 Letter, and he (together with the Plaintiff) procured Wu and Zheng to give false evidence at the Trial. Zheng Chenghui was not a witness at the Trial.

(3)  Items 3-7 and 3-8 consist of some records of interview of Zheng by the PRC Public Security on various dates in January to August 2022, and a declaration made by Zheng dated 21 September 2022. Zheng was the nephew of Wong and his driver/assistant, and was called by the Plaintiff as a witness to give evidence at the Trial. His evidence was accepted and relied upon by the Judge to find in favour of the Plaintiff. In Items 3-7 and 3-8, Zheng admitted that he had given false evidence for the Plaintiff at the Trial, that various documents (namely, the Debt Acknowledgement List, 6/9/2005 Letter and 8/9/2005 Letter) were forged, and that the Plaintiff had offered to reward him for giving false evidence should the Plaintiff succeed in the action.

(4)  Item 3-9 consists of some records of interview of Wu by the PRC Public Security on various dates in January to September 2022. Wu has known Wong, and has had business dealings with him, since the 1980s. Wu was called by the Plaintiff as a witness to give evidence at the Trial, and his evidence was accepted and relied upon by the Judge to find in favour of the Plaintiff. In those documents, Wu admitted that he had given false evidence for the Plaintiff at the Trial, and the Plaintiff had offered to reward him for giving false evidence should the Plaintiff succeed in the action.

(5)  Item 3-10 consists of copies of Zheng’s witness statements for the Trial containing what the Defendants say were handwritten annotations made by the Plaintiff to direct or coach Zheng to give false evidence at the Trial, and an expert report on handwriting dated 19 July 2022 which found that the annotations were written by the Plaintiff.

(6)  Item 3-11 relates to the Notebooks/Work Record of the Plaintiff which the Defendants say are the “real original version of the Work Record” of the Plaintiff and demonstrate that the version of the “Work Record” produced by the Plaintiff as evidence at the Trial in support of his account of what happened on 10 January 2003 was false.

(7)  Items 3-12 and 3-13 consist of a declaration dated 26 October 2022 by the officers of PRC Public Security (Gu Nan, Liu Sheng and Wang Yong) who took part in investigating the Plaintiff, and the transcript of examination of Liu Sheng and Wang Yong in the PRC court on 3 January 2023. In those documents, they denied having coerced or tortured the Plaintiff into confession.

(8)  Item 3-14 consists of a medical report of the Plaintiff dated 25 July 2022 which indicated that the Plaintiff was in good health and was not suffering from any particular conditions. The purpose of the medical report is to counter the Plaintiff’s allegations that he had been tortured or ill-treated while under restraint or detention.

(9)  Item 3-15 consists of an expert report on handwriting dated 11 May 2022, which opined that the handwriting on an envelope was that of Tian. The relevance of the identity of the person whose handwriting appeared on the envelope lies in the fact that at the Trial, the Plaintiff gave evidence that on 18 July 2011, he unexpectedly received a mail containing the 6/9/2005 Letter and 8/9/2005 Letter[1]. However, in the records of interview of the Plaintiff (see Item 3-1 above), he admitted that the 6/9/2005 Letter and 8/9/2005 Letter were forged, and the envelope (which allegedly contained the forged letters received by the Plaintiff on 18 July 2011) was in fact sent by Tian from Beijing to the Plaintiff’s home upon his direction. The fact that the handwriting on the envelope was that of Tian would tend to support the veracity of the admission made by the Plaintiff in the record of interview.

(10)  Item 3-16 consists of “reconstructions” carried out by the Plaintiff in April 2022 at the request of the PRC Public Security of how he fabricated the 1995 Letter, the 10/1/2003 Confirmation, the 8/9/2005 Letter, and other documents which he adduced as evidence at the Trial in support of his case.

(11)  Item 3-17 consists of an expert report on handwriting dated 1 July 2022 on the signatures attributed to a person called Lan Xiulin on an agreement dated 1 April 2000 and a letter dated 2 April 2000 in respect of an alleged debt of US$2 million owed by Wong appearing on the Debt Acknowledgement List. The expert evidence suggests that the signatures were actually the Plaintiff’s handwriting, and supports the veracity of the Plaintiff’s admission in his record of interview dated 31 March 2022 (see Item 3-1 above) that the said debt and the person “Lan Xiulin” were fabricated by him.

5.  The Defendants seek leave to adduce Items 3-1 to 3-17 on 3 alternative bases: (i) the principle in Noble v Owens [2010] 1 WLR 2491, (ii) Ladd v Marshall, and (iii) as evidence of matters which have occurred after the Trial.

6.  The Plaintiff opposes the admission of the Proposed New Evidence on the following principal grounds: (i) the Defendants’ conduct of producing highly selective materials from the PRC Criminal Case against the Plaintiff instead of producing all relevant evidence, including evidence and materials relevant to the question of the voluntariness of the Plaintiff’s alleged confessions, (ii) the incredibility or unreliability of the alleged confessions or admissions by the Plaintiff and various individuals, (iii) lack of relevance or cogency of the proposed evidence, (iv) non-satisfaction of the Ladd v Marshall conditions, and (v) the Defendants’ delay and unreasonable conduct.

7.  Having considered the documents and submissions before us, we are of the view that it is appropriate to determine the Summons on paper pursuant to Order 59, rule 14A(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A.

DISCUSSION

8.  In the 1^st New Evidence Judgment, the Court discussed the applicable principles for the admission of what may, for want of better expressions, be referred to as “pre-trial new evidence” (in respect of matters which occurred prior to the trial) and “post-trial new evidence” (in respect of matters which have occurred after the trial) as new evidence on appeal. As mentioned at §16(3) of the 2^nd New Evidence Judgment, different principles apply for the admission of pre-trial new evidence and post-trial new evidence. The admission of pre-trial new evidence is generally governed by the Ladd v Marshall conditions (subject to the Court’s residual discretion to admit the evidence in exceptional circumstances notwithstanding the non-satisfaction of the Ladd v Marshall conditions), while the admission of post-trial new evidence is subject to the Court’s discretion under Order 59, rule 10(2) of the Rules of the High Court. We refer to the discussion at §34 and §§48-49 of the 1^st New Evidence Judgment in respect of the relevant principles for the exercise of the Court’s discretion in relation to these 2 categories of new evidence in “fraud” cases, and do not propose to repeat the same here, save to emphasise that the distinction between them lies in whether the “matters” sought to be proved by the proposed new evidence occurred before or after the date of the trial or hearing, not whether the “evidence” sought to be adduced was produced or obtained before or after the date of the trial or hearing.

(i)  Post-trial new evidence

9.  Items 3-1 to 3-4 and 3-16 are similar in nature to the Purported Declarations. We see no reason why they should be treated differently from the Purported Declarations insofar as the question of whether leave should be given for their admission as new evidence in the appeal is concerned.

10.  Items 3-5 to 3-9 relate to various alleged admissions by the participants of the Plaintiff’s fraud (“the Fraud Participants”), some of whom gave evidence as the Plaintiff’s witnesses at the Trial. The admissions were made after the Trial, and the proposed new evidence should be regarded as post-trial new evidence. The Court’s reasons for granting leave to the Defendants to adduce the Purported Declarations apply equally to Items 3-5 to 3-9.

11.  Items 3-12 to 3-14 relate to the circumstances in which the Plaintiff made the alleged confessions, and concern matters occurring after the Trial. They are relevant to the issue of the voluntariness of the Plaintiff’s confessions, and thus the veracity of those confessions. In our view, leave ought to be granted for them to be adduced as evidence in the appeal in order for the Court to properly assess the admissibility of, and/or the weight that should be given to, the Plaintiff’s confessions.

(ii)  Pre-trial new evidence

12.  Items 3-10, 3-11, 3-15 and 3-17 concern matters occurring before the Trial, although the relevant evidence was produced or obtained after the Trial. We have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the Ladd v Marshall conditions are satisfied:

(1)  The Defendants had no access to Items 3-10 and 3-11 prior to the Trial. Also, it seems fairly clear that the forensic examination of the annotations on Zheng’s witness statements (Item 3-10), the envelope (Item 3-15), and the agreement dated 1 April 2000 and letter dated 2 April 2000 (Item 3-17) were prompted by the admissions made by the Plaintiff and/or the Fraud Participants. The relevant evidence, ie Items 3-10, 3-11, 3-15 and 3-17, could not, in our view, have been obtained at the Trial by the Defendants with reasonable diligence.

(2)  The potential impact of Items 3-10, 3-11, 3-15 and 3-17 should not be looked at in isolation, but should be assessed in conjunction with other items of which leave has been or is granted for their admission as new evidence in the appeal. Viewed holistically, these items of new evidence reinforce each other and, if they are ultimately accepted by the Court as admissible and reliable, provide a strong case that the Plaintiff obtained the Judgment by fraud. We are satisfied that Items 3-10, 3-11, 3-15 and 3-17, if admitted and accepted, would probably have an important influence on the result of the case.

(3)  Lastly, the various items of proposed new evidence are apparently credible.

13.  We next consider the principal objections raised by Mr Wong, SC on behalf of the Plaintiff to the admission of the Proposed New Evidence.

14.  First, Mr Wong points out that the 8^th Affirmation of Zhang filed by the Defendants on 23 October 2025 (“Zhang 8”) in reply to the evidence filed by the Plaintiff on 3 September 2025 in relation to Item 23, Item 2 and Item 3 (“the Plaintiff’s Evidence”), has inappropriately and without the Court’s leave referred to, adopted and/or cited the contents of the 7^th Affirmation of Zhang filed on 11 September 2025 and the Proposed New Evidence as sought, but not yet allowed, to be adduced under the Summons. Mr Wong argues that if the Defendants consider that they are entitled to file the entirety of Zhang 8 as reply evidence to the Plaintiff’s Evidence (which the Plaintiff does not accept), the taking out of the Summons for leave to adduce the Proposed New Evidence would have been wholly unnecessary and a waste of the Court and the parties’ time, to which the Plaintiff should be fully compensated by costs. On the other hand, if the Defendants take the view that they are not entitled to file the Proposed New Evidence without the Court’s leave, substantial parts of Zhang 8 would need to be struck out, necessitating further rounds of interlocutory application(s), thereby wasting substantial time and costs[2]. It seems to us that, leaving aside the issue of costs which we shall deal with at the end of this judgment, the questions of (i) whether the Defendants are entitled to rely on the Proposed New Evidence as evidence in reply to the Plaintiff’s Evidence, and (ii) whether the Defendants ought to be granted leave to adduce the Proposed New Evidence under the Summons, are two separate matters. If the Plaintiff considers that the whole or any parts of Zhang 8 are objectionable, the Plaintiff may, if so advised, make such application in relation to Zhang 8 as he wishes. The fact that the Defendants’ reply evidence in Zhang 8 refers to, adopts or cites various parts of the Proposed New Evidence is not itself a ground for refusing to admit the Proposed New Evidence under the Summons.

15.  Second, Mr Wong complains that while the Defendants have sought to adduce evidence relating to the admissions made by the Plaintiff and other individuals in the PRC Criminal Case, they somehow selectively chose not to adduce (or disclose) the Plaintiff’s evidence in the witness box in open court that he had been tortured by the authorities and forced to make various confessions, or the records of interview of the Plaintiff and other individuals who, prior to being held under restraint or supervision in Liaoning Province, did not confess to their alleged “crimes” and confirmed the evidence given at the Trial to be true. Mr Wong says that the Defendants have not been forthcoming in producing to the Court all relevant evidence on inter alia the question of the voluntariness of the alleged confessions, and the Court should be extra-cautious in entertaining yet another application by the Defendants for leave to adduce new evidence. Mr Wong also says that the conduct of the parties is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the discretion to admit (or refuse) new evidence, and on this ground alone, the present application ought to be refused[3]. Whatever view one may take of the Defendants’ litigation conduct or strategy in relation to the present application, it has not been suggested by Mr Wong there is any duty of full and frank disclosure on the part of the Defendants. We do not consider that the Defendants’ failure to adduce or disclose evidence in the Plaintiff’s favour is a sufficient ground by itself to reject the Defendants’ application herein.

16.  Third, Mr Wong says that the purpose of the Proposed New Evidence is to show that the Plaintiff and his witnesses have voluntarily confessed to fraud at various times. However, such evidence is already before the Court by way of the Purported Declarations. It is difficult to see what the Proposed New Evidence adds to the Purported Declarations. The burden is on the Defendants to show that the Proposed New Evidence, on top of the Purported Declarations (whether by themselves or read together therewith), probably has an important influence on the result of the appeal. Mr Wong submits that this ground of objection is relevant to the question of discretion (and also costs)[4]. Mr Shieh, SC (on behalf of the Defendants) argues, however, that the Proposed New Evidence contains the Plaintiff’s detailed account of how the fraud was carried out, evidence from other individuals who corroborate the Plaintiff’s confession, and contemporaneous documents which support the Plaintiff’s account of fraud and undermine the allegation that his confession was obtained by torture. The Proposed New Evidence is not the same as the Purported Declarations. Further, the introduction of further and more elaborate materials on the Plaintiff’s fraud from the same and other sources can reinforce the strength of the existing materials. We accept Mr Shieh’s submission. The mere fact that evidence of the Plaintiff’s confession of his fraud can already be found in the Purported Declarations is not a sufficient reason to rule out the Proposed New Evidence, even though it is to the same or similar effect, at this stage.

17.  Fourth, Mr Wong argues that for those witnesses who testified at the Trial (namely, the Plaintiff, Zheng and Wu) and who now (rather suddenly, inexplicably but voluntarily) say they previously told a lie and wish to tell the truth (as evidenced by their confessions found in Items 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-7, 3-8 and 3-9), their evidence would not, as a rule, satisfy the third condition in Ladd v Marshall, which is still a condition that needs to be satisfied for fraud cases. Even if it is suggested that Ladd v Marshall does not apply to the “confessions” as they came into existence after the Trial, the rationale as to the credibility of such evidence still applies, and there is no reason why the Court should exercise its discretion to admit evidence which is clearly not credible or reliable[5]. In our view, the relevant “matters” sought to be proved by the proposed evidence are the confessions of the Plaintiff, Zheng and Wu. Those confessions are relevant to the question of whether the Plaintiff obtained the Judgment by fraud. Since the confessions were made after the Trial, relevant evidence of the confessions should be regarded as post-trial new evidence. Ladd v Marshall does not apply to the admission of such evidence. Instead, the matter is governed by the court’s discretion under Order 59, rule 10(2) of the Rules of the High Court. It cannot be said that an admission of having given false evidence contrary to one’s previous sworn testimony is generally to be regarded as incredible or unreliable. On the contrary, an admission against interest may, depending on the circumstances, be strong evidence of the truth of the admission. The weight that should be given to the confessions made by the Plaintiff, Zheng and/or Wu is a matter to be considered at the hearing of the appeal. We do not consider that Items 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-7, 3-8 and 3-9 should be ruled out at this stage on the simple ground that the evidence contained therein is incredible or unreliable. In passing, we should mention that the position is different from “Exhibit ‘ZRW-32’”, which related to the confession by Tian that he took part in the Plaintiff’s fraud. In the 1^st New Evidence Judgment, this Court refused to exercise its discretion to admit “Exhibit ‘ZRW-32’” as new evidence in the appeal of the 1^st to 3^rd Defendants[6] for the specific reasons mentioned at §61 of the 1^st New Evidence Judgment. In particular, Tian was not a witness at the trial and his evidence formed no part of the reasoning by the Judge in the Judgment. Moreover, Tian made it clear that he was not prepared to give evidence to support what he said in the interview, and thus his credibility could not be tested by the Plaintiff’s lawyers in the Hong Kong proceedings.

18.  Fifth, Mr Wong submits that Items 3-5 and 3-6 (relating to the records of interview and a declaration of Zheng Chenghui) should not be admitted because he was not a witness at the Trial and his evidence did not form part of the evidence considered by the Judge and formed no part of the Judge’s reasoning in the Judgment, and thus those items cannot be relevant to the fraud issue[7]. We do not accept this submission. What Zheng Chenghui said in the records of interview and declaration supports the Defendants’ case that the Plaintiff obtained the Judgment by fraud. Mr Wong has not pointed to any evidence which indicates that Zheng Chenghui is not prepared to give evidence in the Hong Kong proceedings (whether in the appeal or in any re-trial which may be ordered in the event that the appeal should be successful) such that his evidence cannot be tested by the Plaintiff’s lawyers. Further, the position now is different from the situation prevailing at the time when the Court considered Tian’s evidence in the 1^st New Evidence Judgment. There is now a much more substantial body of evidence, other than the Plaintiff’s own confessions, of the Plaintiff’s fraud, and the evidence of Zheng Chenghui contained in Items 3-5 and 3-6 should be viewed in the light of the totality of the evidence currently before the Court. We consider that leave should be given for Items 3-5 and 3-6 to be adduced as new evidence in the appeal, leaving the question of the weight of Zheng Chenghui’s evidence to be considered at the hearing of the appeal.

19.  Sixth, Mr Wong submits that the expert’s conclusion in Item 3-15 that Tian wrote the “impressions” on the 8/9/2005 Letter[8] is directly contradictory to the alleged confession by the Plaintiff that he himself had written those impressions in his record of interview dated 26  March 2022 at 13:00, and in his case re-enactment (Item 3-16)[9]. However, as correctly pointed out by Mr Shieh, Item 3-15 is about the handwriting on the envelope that Tian sent to the Plaintiff in July 2011, not the impressions on the 8/9/2005 Letter. Mr Wong’s submission is based on a misunderstanding of the expert evidence in Item 3-15.

20.  Seventh, Mr Wong complains about the Defendants’ delay and unreasonable conduct. In addition to the points already dealt with above, Mr Wong argues that the Defendants have not been forthcoming as to the time when they first knew about or gained possession of the Prosecution Materials or any part thereof, that the 6^th Defendant’s agents, who had participated in the trial of the PRC Criminal Case, must have been fully aware of the contents of the Prosecution Materials, including the existence of the Proposed New Evidence, by 4 January 2023 at the very latest, and that the Defendants had further delayed by about two months before taking out the Summons after they had obtained the Prosecution Materials on 10 July 2025. In reply, Mr Shieh submits that the Plaintiff is merely nitpicking about mere differences of expression in the supporting and reply affirmations of Zhang, and the Plaintiff simply has no good answer at all to the Defendants’ evidence and submissions that the application to adduce the Proposed New Evidence was taken out without delay and with reasonable diligence. There is, in our view, some validity in Mr Shieh’s criticism that the Plaintiff’s allegation that the Defendants have not been forthcoming about the time when they first knew about or gained possession of the Prosecution Materials or any part thereof is nitpicking of the differences in the language and/or expressions used in Defendants’ evidence. In any event, we have considered the evidence filed by the parties, and accept Mr Shieh’s submission that under the relevant laws and regulations in the Mainland, including Article 55 of the Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of PRC Criminal Procedure Law, and Regulations 32, 33 and 37 of the Regulations on Lawyers Handling Criminal Cases of the All China Lawyers Associations, the Prosecution Materials could not be disclosed by the Defendants’ PRC lawyers or provided to the Defendants for any purpose other than in relation to the PRC Criminal Case while the criminal proceedings and the appeal were still ongoing in the Mainland. We also accept the Defendants’ evidence that the Prosecution Materials were not available or retrievable for use other than in relation to the PRC Criminal Case until June 2025, and their PRC lawyer (Mr Wong Xuyang) did not receive a full set of the Prosecution Materials until 10 July 2025. We are not satisfied on the evidence before us that the Defendants were guilty of unjustified delay in taking steps to obtain the Prosecution Materials. As for the 2 months’ delay in taking out the Summons after the Defendants obtained the Prosecution Materials, we take into account the substantial volume of the evidence contained in the Prosecution Materials and the consequent time required by the Defendants to study the materials and formulate and prepare the application. We consider that the Defendants could have made the application sooner, but the delay is not so substantial or unreasonable that we would feel compelled to dismiss the Summons on the ground of delay alone.

21.  Lastly, Mr Wong has made various points which essentially go to the issue of the weight of the evidence sought to be adduced, eg the annotations on copies of Zheng’s witness statements together with the expert opinion on handwriting that the annotations were made by the Plaintiff (Item 3-10)[10], the reliability of the expert report concerning the signatures attributed to “Lan Xiulin” (Item 3-17)[11], the similarities (or dissimilarities) between the signatures on the “forged” documents produced at the trial and those on the re-enactment documents, as well as some inconsistencies in the evidence (Item 3-16)[12], and the relevance of the Notebooks/Work Record (Item 3-11)[13]. We do not see that the points made by Mr Wong are sufficient to cause us to refuse to exercise our discretion to grant leave for the above items to be adduced as new evidence in the appeal. They should, instead, be considered as matters relevant to the weight of those items to be dealt with at the hearing of the appeal.

22.  In all, we are satisfied that leave should be granted to the Defendants to adduce Items 3-1 to 3-17 as new evidence in the appeal. Having reached the above conclusions, it is not necessary for us to consider whether Noble v Owens provides the Defendants with a possible alternative basis for their admission as new evidence in the appeal.

DISPOSITION

23.  The following orders are made:

(1)  leave be granted to the 4^th to 6^th Defendants to adduce Items 3-1 to 3-17 as new evidence at the hearing of the appeal;

(2)  the order made in paragraph (1) above shall not prejudice the right of the Plaintiff to make submissions on the admissibility, weight and/or truthfulness of the evidence contained in Items 3-1 to 3-17 or any part thereof at the hearing of the appeal;

(3)  the Plaintiff shall have leave to file and serve evidence (if so advised) to deal with the issues in paragraph (2) above within 49 days from the date of the order herein;

(4)  the 4^th to 6^th Defendants shall have leave to file and serve evidence in reply (if so advised) within 35 days thereafter;

(5)  no further evidence may be filed without leave of the court; and

(6)  liberty to apply.

24.  On the issue of the costs of the Summons, notwithstanding the matters urged upon us by Mr Wong, including the allegation of delay and unreasonable conduct on the part of the Defendants, which we have dealt with above, we consider that the fair order to make would be costs in the cause of the 4^th to 6^th Defendants’ appeal. We so order.

25.  In relation to the costs thrown away by the adjournment of the hearing of the appeal originally scheduled on 25 and 26 November 2025, the Plaintiff has confirmed that he has not incurred any costs in relation to the adjournment[14], while the Defendants have not indicated what, if any costs, have been wasted by the adjournment. We do not consider that the Plaintiff should bear the Defendants’ costs of the adjournment occasioned by the latter’s repeated applications for leave to adduce new evidence. We make no order as to the costs of the adjournment.

26.  Lastly, there has already been very substantial delay to the progress of the Defendants’ appeal as a result of the repeated applications by the Defendants for leave to adduce new evidence. We make an order that no further application for leave to adduce new evidence may be made without leave of the Court.