CPY v. TTKJ

FCMP 148/2020

[2025] HKFC 27

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS

NUMBER 148 OF 2020

____________________

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JUDGMENT

(Maintenance – Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13))

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1.  This is a trial on the mother’s application against the father for financial provisions for the benefit of their son, who was born out of wedlock, pursuant to section 10(2) of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap 13 (“the Ordinance”).

2.  In this judgment I shall, for ease of reference, refer to the applicant and the respondent as “the mother” and “the father” respectively.  I shall refer to the son as “J”.  

Parties’ Background

3.  The mother is currently 38 years old and the father is 41.  Both are local Chinese.

4.  The parties, both unmarried, started a relationship in October 2017 and commenced cohabitation in September 2018 at an apartment rented by the father in a decent neighbourhood in Shau Kei Wan.   Shortly thereafter on 7 November 2018, J was born.

5.  Sadly, this family was a short-lived one.  The relationship turned so sour that the father did not renew the tenancy of their home upon its expiry on 30 September 2020.  The mother was forced to leave, bringing J with her, and move to live with her parents at her maiden home.

6.  Shortly thereafter, on 19 October 2020, the mother took out an Originating Summons against the father for custody, care and control of J and for J’s maintenance.

7.  On 19 January 2021, I granted the sole custody, care and control of J to the mother with reasonable access to the father.  At the same time, I ordered the father to pay an interim maintenance of $5,000 per month for the benefit of J.

8.  By another order dated 20 April 2022, the interim maintenance has been increased to $10,000 per month.

Trial in the Absence of the Father

9.  The father participated in the proceedings throughout up to 4 June 2024 when the trial began.   Except from 25 April 2022 to 5 May 2023 when the father was represented by a firm of solicitors he had been acting in person.

10.  At the mention hearing of 2 November 2023 at which the father attended, the trial on J’s maintenance was set down to take place before me on 4 June 2024 (with 5 and 6 June 2024 reserved).

11.  The father also appeared at the Pre-trial Review hearing of 24 January 2024 in which the trial dates of 4 to 6 June 2024 were confirmed in his presence.

12.  The father however failed to appear for the trial on 4 June 2024.  I was informed that the mother’s solicitors had attempted to contact the father in the morning of 4 June 2024 via telephone calls, voice mails and WhatsApp messages but in vain.

13.  I was satisfied that the father was fully aware of the trial dates and he had been served with the relevant orders and documents for trial.  I therefore directed that the trial be proceeded in the absence of the father.

14.  Nothing has been heard from the father up to this date; the only inference I could draw is he deliberately avoided the trial.

The Current Situation of the Parties

15.  The mother and J are currently living at her maiden home, a public housing unit at Shek Kip Mei. This has been the situation since January 2020.  The paternal grandparents and the mother are approved occupants but J is not. 

16.  J is currently 6 years old.  At the time of trial, J was attending a private kindergarten.  He started Primary One in a private school at the Kowloon City area in September 2024. 

17.  Since the mother has to take care of J, she has not been able to engage in any gainful employment. Indeed, this was the situation after J’s birth even when the parties were still on good terms.

18.  As the father did not file any affirmation in opposition and chose not to appear at trial, little is known about his current situation.  All we knew from his Form Es are that the father is allegedly living with his mother and brother at a rented flat in Shau Kei Wan.  The mother said (and I accept) the father’s girl friend is living there too.

Applicable Legal Principles

19.  The present application for maintenance is made under s 10(2) of the Ordinance.  The provision of s 10(2) is as follows,

(2)  The court may as regards a minor, on the application of a person with whom, whether by virtue of an order under subsection (1) or otherwise, custody of the minor lies at law, make in respect of the minor any one or more of the following orders—

(a)  an order requiring payment to the applicant by the parent or either of the parents of the minor of such lump sum (whether in one amount or by instalments) for the immediate and non-recurring needs of the minor or for the purpose of enabling any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred in maintaining the minor before the making of the order to be met, or for both, as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent;

(b)  an order requiring payment to the applicant by such parent or either of such parents of such periodical sum towards the maintenance of the minor as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent; 

(c) an order requiring the securing to the applicant by such parent or either of such parents, to the satisfaction of the court, of such periodical sum towards the maintenance of the minor as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent;

(d) an order requiring the transfer to the applicant for the benefit of the minor, or to the minor, by such parent or either of such parents, of such property, being property to which the parent is entitled (either in possession or reversion), as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent;

(e) an order requiring the settlement for the benefit of the minor, to the satisfaction of the court, of such property, being property to which such parent or either of such parents is so entitled, as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent.

20.  The manner in which how the power is to be exercised by the court is framed in board terms. The court is given a wide discretionary power; it may exercise the power given under s 10(2) as it thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent. 

21.  In WGL v ASB (Child Maintenance under the GMO) [2013] HKFLR 391, Deputy High Court Judge Chu (as she then was) compendiously analysed the differences between Hong Kong and England in terms of the legislative framework and came to the view that, despite the differences in the statutory framework, courts in Hong Kong, in the exercise of discretion under s 10(2), may give regard to the matters provided in the English legislation.  These matters include the factors set out in paragraph 4(1) of Schedule 1 of the English Children Act 1989.  Paragraph 4(1) read as follows,

“In deciding whether to exercise its powers under paragraph 1 or 2, and, if so in what manner, the court shall have regard to all the circumstances including –

(i) the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each person mentioned in sub-paragraph 4 [either parent] has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(ii) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each [parent] has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;

(iii) the financial needs of the child;

(iv) the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child;

(v) any physical or mental disability of the child;

(vi)  the manner in which the child was being or was expected to be educated or trained.”

22.  In Re P (Child: Financial Provision) [2003] EWCA Civ 837, [2003] 2 FLR 865, Thorpe LJ and Bodey J, after having reviewed the authorities, gave helpful guidance on how such application should be approached.

23.  Bodey J gave the following guidance,

[76] In the light of para 4 of Sch 1 to the Children Act 1989 and the authorities to which we have been referred, the following summary can be offered as to the considerations applicable to claims under Sch 1:

(i)      The welfare of the child while a minor, although not paramount, is naturally a very relevant consideration as one of ‘… all the circumstances…’ of the case.

(ii)     Considerations as to the length and nature of the parents’ relationship and whether or not the child was planned are generally of little if any relevance, since the child’s needs and dependency are the same regardless: J v C (Child: Financial Provision) [1999] 1 FLR 152 at 154B.

(iii)    One of the ‘… financial needs of the child…’ (to which by para 4(1)(c) the court must pay regard) is for him or her to be cared for by a mother who is in a position, both financially and generally, to provide that caring. So it is well established that a child’s need for a carer enables account to be taken of the caring parent’s needs: Haroutunian v Jennings (1980) 1 FLR 62 at 66C; and A v A (A Minor) (Financial Provision) [1994] 1 FLR 657 at 665G.

(iv)    By paras 4(1)(a) and (b) of Sch 1, the respective incomes, earning capacities, property and other financial resources of each of the parents must be taken into account, together with their respective financial needs, obligations and responsibilities. So ‘… the child is entitled to be brought up in circumstances which bear some sort of relationship with the father’s current resources and the father’s present standard of living…’ – per Hale J in J v C (Child: Financial Provision) [1999] 1 FLR 152.

(v)     However, as this latter concept lends itself to demands going potentially far wider than those reasonably necessary to enable the mother properly to support the child, ‘… one has to guard against unreasonable claims made on the child’s behalf but with the disguised element of providing for the mother’s benefit rather than for the child…’ – J v C (Child: Financial Provision) [1999] 1 FLR 152.

(vi)    In cases where the father’s resources permit and the mother lacks significant resources of her own, she will generally need suitable accommodation for herself and the child, settled for the duration of the child’s minority with reversion to the father; a capital allowance for setting up the home and for a car; and income provision (with the expense of the child’s education being taken care of, generally, by the father direct with the school).

(vii)   Such income provision is reviewable from time to time, according to the changing circumstances of the parties and of the child.

(viii)  The overall result achieved by orders under Sch 1 should be fair, just and reasonable taking into account all the circumstances.

[77] From the experience of this case, I would propose three further considerations:

(i)      In considering the mother’s budget, at least in bigger money cases, the court should paint with a broad brush, not getting bogged down in detailed analyses and categorisations of specific items making up opposing budgetary presentations. Rather, the court should do its best to achieve a fair and realistic outcome by the application of broad commonsense to the overall circumstances of the particular case.

(ii)     Comparisons with the commercial cost of providing professional care are unlikely to be of great assistance and may only serve to distract.

(iii)    When setting up a budget for the sort of lifestyle a child should be enabled to have, the court should not generally attach weight to the risk that the father may reduce or withdraw his support when the child comes of age (or ceases education or training) thereby obliging the child to adapt to a lower lifestyle at that time.

24.  While Bodey J said at [76](i) that the welfare of the child is naturally a very relevant consideration as one of ‘… all the circumstances…’ of the case, it should be noted that Thorpe LJ at [44] of the same judgment went further to say welfare must be not just ‘one of the relevant circumstances’ but, in the generality of cases, a constant influence on the discretionary outcome. Apart from this, Thorpe LJ largely agreed with Bodey J’s views.

25.  Lastly, it should not be forgotten that courts in Hong Kong are enjoined by section 3 of the Ordinance that in dealing with matters concerning a child’s custody and upbringing, the courts shall regard the best interests of the child as the first and paramount consideration.

Issue to be Determined

26.  Parentage and liability are not in dispute.  The only issue to be determined is the quantum of maintenance payable by the father. A subsidiary issue is whether carer’s allowance is also payable as part of J’s maintenance.

27.  In my view, the following factors are relevant in the exercise of the broad discretion given to the court in this case:

1.  The living standard of the father;

2.  The financial resources of the mother;

3.  The financial resources of the father; and

4.  The financial needs of J.

The Living Standard of the Father

28.  The living standard of the father can be gleaned from the lifestyle the parties enjoyed during the relationship. The mother’s case is that the couple enjoyed a very comfortable living during the relationship. There was never a time when the father was short of money.  The father was abundant in cash and had the use of credit cards bearing other people’s names for spending.   During the relationship, the couple enjoyed good food and wines at high-end restaurants costing several thousand dollars each plus entertainments at pubs virtually on daily basis and all these were settled by cash.   This somewhat glamourous yet, in my view, unhealthy, life-style is supported by the father’s photos and remarks posted on his social media.

29.  The father arranged the mother to give birth to J at a private hospital the bill of which, as adduced by the mother, was as much as about $210,000 and the same was settled by a credit card bearing a third party’s name.  The father explained to the mother that the credit card was part of his welfare or benefits (福利). I take it to mean that it was part of his remuneration package.

30.  When their relationship was at the verge of breaking down, the mother discovered that the father had purchased a diamond ring for his new girlfriend for $45,800 and the father was seen to have had vacation trips in Taiwan and Japan with this lady, too. Again, all these were supported by evidence adduced by the mother.

31.  On the materials before me, I am satisfied that the parties were able to enjoy a comfortable living standard during the relationship due to the financial resources of the father. This finding has a bearing on how the financial needs of J are to be assessed.

The Financial Resources of the Mother

32.  The mother ceased work since J’s arrival.   She used to live in her maiden home with her parents.  Her father (the grandfather) is 71 years old.  He is a retired civil servant and is in receipt of a monthly pension of $4,900 and a monthly Old Age Allowance of about $4,195.  After retirement, the grandfather had worked as a cleaner for a contractor of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department earning around $10,000 per month. 

33.  Though the father’s payments of the interim maintenance of $10,000 have been irregular and always late, by and large, at trial, the mother has been in receipt of a monthly maintenance of $10,000.  On the top of this, she receives-

(1)  an annuity of $894 from an insurance policy.

(2)  $1,300 given to J from the Government being Cash Allowance under a Trial Scheme to alleviate those waiting for public rental housing.  Since the mother is already an approved occupant of her maiden home, only J is eligible for this allowance.

(3)  support from the grandfather to make up the shortfall.

34.  She and J lives at the current home rent-free as the same is paid by the grandfather.

35.  This situation, however, is untenable.   The grandfather ceased work since March 2024 due to ill health.  He was at the hospital at the time of trial and was diagnosed with dementia.  It was arranged that he would be sent to a Home for the Elderly once being discharged from the hospital.  I was told the social worker is making the necessary arrangement.

36.  The grandmother’s health condition is apparently even worse.  She was diagnosed with Dementia with Behavioural and Psychological Symptoms of Dementia and Schizoaffective Disorder.  At the time of trial, the grandmother had already been sent to a Home for the Elderly for better management.

37.  On the materials before me, it is clear that the grandparents do not have any earning capacity.  In any event, it is not the grandparents’ responsibility of taking care of J financially; it is the father’s responsibility in respect of which the court has a duty to see to it that this responsibility is performed.

38.  I accept the mother, however, made it clear that she would like to return to work when J’s routine has become more stable a few months after the school term commences and provided that she could have the assistance of a domestic helper.  Given the father’s irresponsive attitude and irregular payments, she considered that she could have more certainty and a stronger sense of security if she is able to earn some income.   She estimated she should be able to earn around $15,000 to $18,000 on full time basis.

39.  I am of the view that the mother’s childcare plan is workable and reasonable. The mother, being 38 years old, is still young.  She received formal education up to secondary school level and obtained a Higher Diploma in Sales and Marketing.  She had worked in various jobs such as part-time pastry chef, personal assistant in a dental clinic and office manager.   Her last income was $18,000 per month.  I accept it is both sensible and realistic for the mother to have contemplated to return to work when J’s routine is stabilised and when she could have the assistance of a domestic helper.   I consider that the mother may start by engaging in some part-time job; and, in a mid or longer term, return to full-time work if things go smoothly.  Doing the best I can, I would assess the mother has an initial earning capacity of $10,000 per month that may gradually increase to the bracket of $15,000 to $18,000.

The Father’s Financial Disclosure and Resources

40.  The father’s stance, as can be gathered from previous hearings, is that he has no assets, has significant debts and is unable to pay J’s maintenance sought by the mother. His monthly income is $49,000 gross (or $48,500 net of MPF contribution) only.

41.  The father never participated seriously in the proceedings.  He failed to file any affirmation in response to the mother’s claim notwithstanding he had expressly acknowledged that he would do so at the mention hearing of 2 November 2023. As will be elaborated below, his Form Es were prepared in a haphazard fashion and his financial disclosure was entirely inadequate.

42.  The father filed two Form Es in the course of the proceedings; the first was one dated 30 June 2021 and the 2^nd one (“the Updated Form E”) was dated 22 May 2023. 

The Father’s 1^st Form E dated 30 June 2021

43.  The father’s 1^st Form E was sketchy and causally drawn up.   He disclosed his income was $49,500 gross, his expenses were $33,200 per month and had 2 bank accounts only, namely the Bank of China (“BOC”) and the HSBC, with a total balance of $8,400.

44.  He reported his total debts at $1,890,000, due to 6 creditors, 4 of which were banks, finance companies or moneylenders totalling $640,000, and the remaining two were individuals (one in the name of “Luk” ($1,000,000) and the other in the name of “Tse” ($250,000)), totalling $1,250,000.  Nothing was produced in support of the alleged debts.

45.  In response, the mother issued a Questionnaire on 24 January 2022, focusing mainly on the nature or use of monies that went into and out of the father’s HSBC and BOC accounts. 

46.  The father gave his replies in his Answer dated 11 May 2022, which was prepared by his solicitors but, regrettably, was evidently evasive, with limited and sporadic information and, hence, unhelpful in assisting the court to have a better understanding of his situation. 

47.  His replies were mainly bare assertions either that certain transactions were loans, repayments of debs, or that he was unable to recall the source and purpose of the subject transactions.

48.  This was followed by the mother’s Requests for Further and Better Particulars dated 30 September 2022 to which the father never gave a reply.

49.  Somehow, it came to the mother’s knowledge that the father had an account with the China Construction Bank (“CCB”).  Upon an application by the mother, by an order dated 27 October 2022, the father was compelled to produce the bank statements of his CCB account as a result of which 6 months statements from July 2020 to December 2020 were produced.

50.  Upon having a sight of the CCB bank statements, the mother issued a further Questionnaire dated 7 December 2022. Again, there was no reply.

The Father’s Updated Form E dated 22 May 2023

51.  The father’s Updated Form E was drawn out in the same sketchy and casual fashion; he even left Parts 5 and 6 blank entirely.

52.  The father reported that his income remained at $49,500 gross per month, with monthly expense of 38,000 of which $10,000 was interim maintenance for J.  The balances of his BOC and HSBC accounts were alleged to have gone down to zero.  For reasons only known to him, he failed to report his CCB account.

53.  The father said his debts had increased to $4,750,000, of which $1,000,000 were owed to 5 banks, financial institutions or moneylenders and the remaining $3,750,000 were owed to 4 individuals. 

54.  The mother issued a further Questionnaire dated 14 December 2023 to which there was no reply.

Alleged Loans

55.  As mentioned above, the father claimed in his Up-dated Form E that his debts had increased from $1,890,000 to $4,750,000, of which $3,750,000 were owed to 4 individuals (in the respective names of Li, Yu, Luk and Tse) who, the mother understood, were personal friends, business partners or colleagues of the father. 

56.  The father stated the distribution of these debts were as follows,

Name	Amount
Li	$1,500,000
Yu	$1,000,000
Luk	$1,000,000
Tse	$250,000
Total:	$3,750,000

57.  Significantly, the father attached to his Updated Form E two loan agreements, both dated prior to his 1^st Form E.  It is worthy to note that these were the only documents in support of his allegation of debts.

58.  The 1^st loan agreement dated 15 June 2021 was made between the father as borrower and Li as lender for the sum of $1,500,000 for a term of one year, expiring on 9 June 2022. 

59.  The 2^nd loan agreement was on the same terms and format but dated 10 June 2021 made between the father as borrower and Yu as lender for $1,000,000 with a maturity date also fell on 9 June 2022.

60.  It is to be recalled that the father disclosed in his 1^st Form E of 30 June 2021 that he owed Luk $1,000,000 and Tse $250,000 only. There was no mention whatsoever of his debts allegedly owed to Li and Yu, totalling $2,500,000 or, for that matter, in any amount.  By their respective dates, the 2 loan agreements were entered into by the father well before the filing of his 1^st Form E.  To me, it is a mystery that if the loans as evidenced by the loan agreements were truthful, there is simply no reason why the father would have failed to disclose the same.

61.  On the father’s version, his debts increased by $2,860,000 ($4,750,000 - $1,890,000) within a space of 24 months (from 30 June 2021 to 22 May 2023), or on average, at a staggering figure of $119,167 per month, which is more than 2 times of his alleged income.  At the mention hearing of 2 November 2023, the father was reminded by this court that he had the burden to prove his debts.  He should be prepared to inform the court what was his relationship with these individuals (were they friends, colleagues or business partners), how the loan monies were given to him, whether in cash or via bank, and how the loan monies were used, with particulars and supporting evidence.  The father acknowledged he would do so, he even represented to court that he would arrange Li to file a supporting affirmation. It turned out that he did none of these. 

The Father’s Bank Accounts

62.  The father disclosed in the 1^st Form E that he had 2 bank accounts only, namely, the HSBC and the BOC.

63.  The father made fragmented disclosures of his bank statements.  Except for the period of 6 months from July 2020 to December 2020, the father never produced a complete set of bank statements of all his 3 bank accounts covering the period within which he had to make disclosure putting the mother is a difficult position to have the statements cross-referenced and to verify his bare assertions that the deposits were from another account, were loans and the monies were not his.

64.  Mr Hu, counsel for the mother, meticulously and microscopically examined these fragmented materials in order to gain a glimpse into the father’s financial position.   

The HSBC Account

65.  Mr Hu reckoned that in a total of 37 months from February 2019 to February 2021 (25 months) and from May 2022 to April 2023 (12 months), the deposits into his HSBC account were $11,922,181 and the withdrawals were $11,803,648.18, or on average $322,221 and $319,018 respectively. [1]

The BOC Account

66.  A similar exercise was conducted on the father’s BOC account.  From May 2020 to April 2021 and from April 2022 to March 2023 (a total of around 24 months), the total deposits were $6,544,986 (on average $272,708) and the withdrawals were $7,941,424 (or on average $330,893).[2]

The CCB Account

67.  Only 6 months’ statements (from July 2020 to December 2020) were produced. These statements contained far less transactions when compared to the HSBC and BOC accounts, indicating that the father did not operate this account on a day-to-day or regular basis. Yet, there was regular monthly deposit of $23,300 in each and every month into this account, the nature of which is unknown.[3]

Hong Kong Jockey Club Account (“HKJC”)

68.  The father maintained a HKJC account that he operated it with his HSBC account.  What can be gathered from the father’s HSBC account and his HKJC account are that, over a period of 39 months from 22 February 2019 to 2 May 2023, the deposits into his HKJC account were at a considerable figure of about $9,700,000 and the withdrawals were $5,310,000, or on average $190,200 and $104,100 monthly respectively.[4]

Transfers Between Accounts

69.  The father had numerous unexplained deposits into his HSBC account and BOC accounts many of which he asserted in his Answer were transferred from his own accounts.  I accept some of these transfers could be traced to either his HSBC or BOC account; this, however, explained a fraction of the transactions only.  Mr Hu reckoned that in respect of the father’s HSBC account, from 6 May 2022 to 2 May 2023 (over a period of 13 months), there were deposits of $994,138 and the withdrawals were $1,051,621.  The corresponding sums that could be traced from or to BOC account were $647,805 and $253,460 only. [5]

70.  If the examination is expanded to a broader period of time, the uncorroborated figures are even more astounding.  Mr Hu reckoned that in some of the 12 months in which bank statements were available from 12 May 2020 to 14 January 2023 the uncorroborated amount for the BOC account was $5,685,788 (on average $473,816 per month) and the relevant figure for HSBC account in some of the 34 months from 20 February 2019 to 2 May 2023 was $4,822,598 (on average $141,841 per month).[6]

71.  Mr Hu submitted that these uncorroborated figures strongly pointed to the fact that the father had other undisclosed accounts and hidden financial resources.

72.  While I have no reason to doubt the accuracy of Mr Hu’s auditing exercise, out of abundance of caution, I am prepared to accept there may be errors in these figures.  Pausing here, even if one allows there may be errors in the corroboration exercise such as double counting; the ultimate question is what were the sources of these monies at the very beginning?  What has been presented to court is a man who claimed to be earning $48,500 net monthly with an expenses of $38,000 per month and with no reported investments.  Why would he had so much money to bet with the HKJC at the scale way beyond his alleged means?  Why would he have the need to do all these inter-accounts transfers?  I have seen the bank statements against the husband’s Answer, I believe Mr Hu’s analyses craft out the broad landscape of the father’s means.  The precise amount of his receipts is unknown due to his non-disclosure.  The inferences I can draw from these evidences is that he has other sources of income and that he has other undisclosed accounts.  I am sure the father’s financial resources are much more than he openly conceded.

73.  I shall return to this issue when I consider if adverse inference should be drawn against him.

The Father’s Employment

74.  I must say the father’s employment status is not entirely clear, specifically it is unclear whether or not the father has more than one employer; and hence, more than one source of income.

75.  The father reported in his two Form Es that he was an administrative staff and salaried director of a MS Finance Limited with a monthly income of $49,500.  The fact that he was a director of this company was confirmed by the company searches conducted by the mother’s solicitors. 

76.  However, from the father’s name card adduced by the mother, he is a project manager of a surveyors and property consultants company, which I shall refer to as the “R Company”.  This R company was within a group of a listed company, which I shall refer to as the “R Group”.  

77.  A further complication is that the father’s BOC bank statements show his salaries were not paid by the R Company but by another company – “the R Appraisals Limited” – which, one can gather by its name, is within the R Group.  At the same time, the father’s MPF documents stated MS Finance was the father’s employer.  On the face of it, MS Finance is not related to the R Group.  At this point, it is difficult not to be reminded of the fact that the father was in constant receipts of $23,300 per month into his CCB account from an unknown source.  All these suggest that the father may have other sources of income.  He could have come to court to clarify but he chose not to do so.

Stocks Investments

78.  There is evidence that the father has stocks investments.  First, there is evidence from the mother that the father maintained investment accounts with Guotai Junan Securities (Hong Kong) Limited and CCB.  Yet, he reported nil in his Form Es.  Second, there were two deposits into his HSBC account ($200,000 on 24 November 2020 and $110,271 on December 2020) from “Sun Hung Kai In” which he explained in his Answer that he had an investment account with Sun Hung Kai Investments Services Limited but no documents or statements relating to this account were ever disclosed by him. It is entirely unclear as to the extent of his assets held in these accounts.

The Father’s Failure to Give Full and Frank Disclosure

79.  Plainly, the father’s financial disclosure was as opaque as he wanted to be, in breach of his duty to give full and frank disclosure.

80.  The duty of full and frank disclosure is onerous; it is an absolute and continuing one.  Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children states at [13.101].

The importance of the duty of both parties to make disclosure of their assets which is full, frank and clear cannot be overemphasised. Unless a court is provided with correct, complete and up-to-date information on the matters to which, under the MCA 1973, s 25, it is required to have regard, it cannot lawfully or properly exercise its discretion in the manner ordained by that section. The duty on each party is absolute, and it must be discharged regardless of whether the application for a financial remedy is adjudicated upon by the court after full evidence has been heard, or settled after an exchange of financial information between the parties leading to a consent order. The duty is also a continuing one: a party must not mislead the other party and the court into assuming that his financial situation is unchanged if in fact it has changed. Any material changes in the financial situation of either party occurring between the filing of their Form Es and the final dispatch of the claims by the court must be brought to the notice of the other party and the court at the earliest opportunity. A party who seeks to negotiate and secure a settlement without informing the other party about a material change in his or her financial circumstances runs the risk that, if a settlement is reached and a consent order is made, the consent order will be set aside by the failure to provide full, frank and timely disclosure. Shortcomings in disclosure will be visited by orders for costs against the offending party, often on the indemnity basis. Furthermore, deviation from the standard of disclosure required may be visited by the court drawing adverse inferences against the party in default.                                (emphasis added)

81.  Although Rayden’s comments were made in the context of divorce ancillary relief proceedings between husband and wife, the duty clearly applies also to proceedings between unwed parents over financial provisions for their children, as in the present case before me: see TKLK v WKJ (FCMP 38/2007) (date of judgment: 5 October 2016, by HH Judge Bruno Chan), at [46].

82.  On if and how adverse inference could be drawn, as I said at [84] of CCYL v CCSR (Ancillary Relief) [2022] HKFLR 448, [2023] 1 HKC 335, [2022] HKFC 238, the court should be careful to ensure that the father’s failure does not give rise to what is called a ‘cheat’s charter’ as Dame Butler-Sloss P put it in Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829 (CA) and quoted by Mostyn J in NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure) [2011] EWHC 3270 (Fam), [2012] 1 FLR 1211.  If the drawing of adverse inferences is to be too conservative, unfairness would be visited on the claimant giving rise to what might be termed a non-discloser’s dividend: NG v SG (Appeal: Non-Disclosure).  I accept that the court must be astute to avoid this unfairness and that a strong message must be sent out that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told.  But the court must be realistic and there must surely be some finding, soundly based on admissible evidence, as to the broad extent of the hidden funds.  This finding can be as broad or precise as the facts of the case demand.

83.  Mostyn J summarised the relevant principles in NG v SG (Non-Disclosure) on how adverse inferences are to be drawn:

[16] Pulling the threads together it seems to me that where the court is satisfied that the disclosure given by one party has been materially deficient then:

(i)      The Court is duty bound to consider by the process of drawing adverse inferences whether funds have been hidden.

(ii)     But such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. It would be wrong to draw inferences that a party has assets which, on an assessment of the evidence, the Court is satisfied he has not got.

(iii)    If the Court concludes that funds have been hidden then it should attempt a realistic and reasonable quantification of those funds, even in the broadest terms.

(iv)    In making its judgment as to quantification the Court will first look to` direct evidence such as documentation and observations made by the other party.

(v)     The Court will then look to the scale of business activities and at lifestyle.

(vi)    Vague evidence of reputation or the opinions or beliefs of third parties is inadmissible in the exercise.

(vii)   The Al-Khatib v Masry technique of concluding that the non-discloser must have assets of at least twice what the Claimant is seeking should not be used as the sole metric of quantification.

(viii)  The Court must be astute to ensure that a non-discloser should not be able to procure a result from his non-disclosure better than that which would be ordered if the truth were told. If the result is an order that is unfair to the non-discloser it is better that than that the Court should be drawn into making an order that is unfair to the Claimant.

84.  In the more recent case of Moher v Moher[2019] EWCA Civ 1482; [2020] 2 WLR 89; [2020] 1 FLR. 225; [2019] 3 FCR. 244, the English Court of Appeal held that in the event of non-disclosure of a party's financial resources in a financial remedies case, the court was not obliged to give a precise figure or bracket for the undisclosed resources before making an order.  Instead, it should: (i) seek to determine the extent of the undisclosed resources; (ii) draw such adverse inferences as were justified; and (iii) where appropriate, infer that resources were sufficient that the proposed award represented a fair outcome.  Moylan LJ said,

86.  My broad conclusions as to the approach the court should take when dealing with non-disclosure are as follows. They are broad because, as I have sought to emphasise, non-disclosure can take a variety of forms and arise in a variety of circumstances from the very general to the very specific. My remarks are focused on the former, namely a broad failure to comply with the disclosure obligations in respect of a party's financial resources, rather than the latter.

87.  (i) It is clearly appropriate that generally, as required by section 25, the court should seek to determine the extent of the financial resources of the non-disclosing party.

88.  (ii) When undertaking this task the court will, obviously, be entitled to draw such adverse inferences as are justified having regard to the nature and extent of the party's failure to engage properly with the proceedings. However, this does not require the court to engage in a disproportionate enquiry. Nor, as Lord Sumption JSC said, should the court “engage in pure speculation”. As Otton LJ said in Baker v Baker [1995] 2 FLR 829, inferences must be “properly drawn and reasonable”. This was reiterated by Baroness Hale of Richmond JSC in Prest v Prest [2013] 2 AC 415 , para 85:

“the court is entitled to draw such inferences as can properly be drawn from all the available material, including what has been disclosed, judicial experience of what is likely to be being concealed and the inherent probabilities, in deciding what the facts are.”

89.  (iii) This does not mean, contrary to Mr Molyneux's submission, that the court is required to make a specific determination either as to a figure or a bracket. There will be cases where this exercise will not be possible because the manner in which a party has failed to comply with their disclosure obligations means that the court is “unable to quantify the extent of his undisclosed resources”, to repeat what Wilson LJ said in Behzadi v Behzadi [2009] 2 FLR 649 .

90.  (iv) How does this fit within the application of the principles of need and sharing? The answer, in my view, is that, when faced with uncertainty consequent on one party's non-disclosure and when considering what Baroness Hale and Lord Sumption JJSC called “the inherent probabilities” the court is entitled, in appropriate cases, to infer that the resources are sufficient or are such that the proposed award does represent a fair outcome. This is, effectively, what Munby J did in both Al-Khatib v Masry [2002] 1 FLR 1053 and Ben Hashem v Al Shayif [2009] 1 FLR 115 and, in my view, it is a legitimate approach. In that respect I would not endorse what Mostyn J said in NG v SG [2012] 1 FLR 1211, para 16(vii).

91. This approach is both necessary and justified to limit the scope for, what Butler-Sloss LJ accepted could otherwise be, a “cheat's charter”. As Thorpe J said in F v F [1994] 1 FLR 359 , although not the court's intention, better an order which may be unfair to the non-disclosing party than an order which is unfair to the other party. This does not mean, as Mostyn J said in NG v SG, at para 7, that the court should jump to conclusions as to the extent of the undisclosed wealth simply because of some non-disclosure. It reflects, as he said at para 16(viii), that the court must be astute to ensure that the non-discloser does not obtain a better outcome than that which would have been ordered if they had complied with their disclosure obligations.

85.  I have set out the manner in which the father made his disclosure, it is clear he was adopting a “catch me if you can” tactic.  I am satisfied that he plainly and deliberately failed to give a full and frank disclosure of his financial situation.  The fact that he was acting in person most of the time cannot be an exoneration.  I have come to the conclusion that the present case is one where such adverse inference could be properly and reasonably drawn.  The court has been placed in a very difficult position, as it simply does not have a good idea of the extent of his wealth, specifically his monthly receipts.  What can be certain is the father earns much more than he was willing to admit.  He has been leading a comfortable and somewhat glamourous lifestyle that cannot be sustained without money.  I am prepared to draw adverse inferences against the father that he is earning substantially more than the $49,000 that he admitted and that he has sufficient financial resources to provide reasonable maintenance for J at the level found by this court.  It has been said where a party had been guilty of not making full disclosure, he could not complain if uncertainties were determined against him:  L v C [2007] 3 HKLRD 819, at [191(2)].

The Reasonable Needs of J

86.  In examining the mother’s budget on J’s needs, all that is required is a broad brush approach in the exercise.  In doings so, I shall apply broad common-sense to the overall circumstances of this particular case; and at the same time, I shall bear the welfare of J in mind, shall guard against unreasonable claims that are in fact for the mother’s benefit and shall discard the fact that J was born out of the wedlock.

87.  The findings that I have arrived at regarding the mother’s childcare plan, the father’s standard of living, the mother’s earning capacity and the father’s financial resources are factors relevant in the exercise of the broad discretion given to the court in this case. 

88.  At the time of trial, J was attending K3.  As from September 2024, J has been attending Primary One at a private school in Kowloon. The school fees (payable by 10 instalments) are on average about $4,600 per month.

89.  J has been diagnosed by a senior medical officer of the Department of Health with having Motor Coordination Disorders and Mild Language Disorder.  He has been arranged to receive speech therapy and physiotherapy and has made some improvements.  He is encouraged to engage in more training and physical exercises.   All these trainings require funding. 

90.  The mother acknowledged there were free public schools for J.  Given that J has been assessed to have a better ability in English than in Cantonese and considering the father’s financial ability, I consider it is reasonable, and indeed in her own right as the sole custodian parent and in the absence of any meaningful involvement of the father, to have chosen a private English primary school for J.

Domestic Helper

91.  The mother said she requires the assistance of a domestic helper.  I accept that a domestic helper would relieve the mother from being a full-time carer so that she could work to earn some meaningful income.  At the same time, when being queried by the court that the school’s extra-curricular activities (“ECAs”) of $6,000 is seemingly on the high side, the mother explained she has to keep J at school so as to allow her to work.  I consider that if there is a domestic helper, it is not necessary for the mother to spend so much on ECAs.

Housing Need

92.  The current home is a 1-bedroom unit of about 300 ft² only.  The living environment was far from ideal. The mother and J occupy the bedroom and the grandparents used to sleep at the living room.   This is not the situation now. As mentioned above the grandmother is now staying at a Home for the Elderly and when the grandfather is discharged from the hospital, he would also be sent to a Home for the Elderly, leaving the mother and J residing at the unit.

93.  One may think that with the paternal grandparents residing at some other places, the mother and J’s housing need is resolved.  This, unfortunately, is not the case.  Since J is not an approved occupant of the current home, I accept it is highly likely that the mother and J would either be allotted a smaller flat or simply be ordered to move out, given the long waiting queue for housing.  The mother and J already made an application for allotment of a unit in 2020 but there is no guarantee that a unit would be allotted to them anytime in the near future. 

94.  There are further complicating factors.

95.  The first is if the mother has some earnings of her own on the top of the maintenance paid by the father, there is a real risk that her monthly receipts would exceed the income threshold of $19,730 for a 2-person household set by the Housing Authority that allows her and J to apply for public housing.  On the other hand, if the mother does not work, she would lose the much needed certainty and sense of security.

96.  The second factor is if the mother is to work, she would require assistance of a domestic helper in taking care of J.  This would mean she requires a 2-bedroom flat.  The evidence (and I accept) is that the rental of a 2-bedroom flat in the Kowloon area near to J’s school is around $15,000 to $17,000. 

97.  I find all these complicating factors are real and that the mother is being caught in a dilemma.  Considering the father’s erratic payments and irresponsible attitude, I endorse her intention to return to work.   If the mother is to work, it is for sure that she would have to surrender her current home; and hence, there is a need for renting a flat.  A 2-bedroom flat is required in light of the need to accommodate the domestic helper and the growing need of J.   I assess the mother and J’s housing need at $16,000 per month.

98.  I listened with care on her needs to run the household on the basis that she and J have to move out.  I find her items are realistic and reasonable; and as I see it, in some ways, restrained, as can be seen from her not stating any entertainment and holidays expenses for herself. I assess her monthly needs as follows.

Monthly Needs

General

Item	Amount
Rent (a 2-bedroom flat in Kowloon)	16,000
Utilities (electricity, gas, rates, telephone & water)	1,000
Food	3,500
Household expenses	1,000
Domestic helper(s)	4,830
Total monthly household expenses	$ 26,330

Mother’s Personal Expenses

Item	Amount
Meals out of home	1,000
Transport	1,500
Clothing / Shoes	1,000
Personal grooming (including haircut and cosmetics)	1,000
Insurance premia	3,735
Total monthly personal expenses	$ 8,235

J’s Expenses

Item	Amount
School fees	4,600
School books and stationery	450
Transport to school (including school bus)	1,000
Medical / Dental	500
Extra Curricular Activities	4,000
Entertainment / presents	500
Holidays	500
Clothing / Shoes	200
Lunches and pocket money	500
Uniform	250
Others (School’s Miscellaneous fees)	600
Total monthly expenses for J	HK$ 13,100
Total  Monthly Expenses	$ 47,665

99.  Thus, the mother’s monthly budget to run the household are $47,665, of which $26,330 are general expenses, $8,235 are the mother’s personal expenses and the remaining $13,100 are expenses for J.

100.  I attribute half of the general expense as J’s expense; so taking J’s personal expense together would give a sum of $26,265 (($26,330 ÷ 2) + $13,100).  I round it up to $27,000 per month.

101.  Taking a board brush approach, I assess J’s monthly needs at the time of trial (ie without rental of a private flat and the costs of domestic helper) was $15,850 ($5,500 ÷ 2) + $13,100)).  I round it up to $16,000. 

Carer’s Allowance

102.  The mother earned around $18,000 per month in her last job. She seeks a carer’s allowance in the sum of $10,000 per month as J’s sole carer from the date of application up until when the mother is able to hire a domestic helper and obtain full time employment.

103.  It is well settled that the court may augment the periodical payments order for a child to include an allowance for the mother, especially if the mother has to give up work or is unable to work because she has to look after the child: Haroutunian v Jennings (1980) 1 FLR 62; WGL v ASB (Child Maintenance under the GMO) [2013] 1 HKFLR 391, at [194]; see also, K v W (Children – Removal from Jurisdiction) [2006] 2 HKFLR 292, T v J  FCMP 38 of 2007 (unreported, dated 26 August 2008); H v S FCMP 70 of 2008 (unreported, dated 29 April 2009) and IDC v SSA [2013] HKFLR 61.

104.  Thorpe LJ said at [42] of Re P (Child: Financial Provision), supra, that a more generous approach to the calculation of the mother’s allowance is not only permissible but also realistic and essentially a broad-brush assessment is to be taken.   On the approach to be adopted, the learned judge said,

[48] In making this broad assessment how should the judge approach the mother's allowance, perhaps the most emotive element in the periodical payments assessment? The respondent will often accept with equanimity elements within the claim that are incapable of benefiting the applicant (for instance school fees or children's clothing) but payments which the respondent may see as more for the benefit of the applicant than the child are likely to be bitterly resisted. Thus there is an inevitable tension between the two propositions, both correct in law, first that the applicant has no personal entitlement, secondly, that she is entitled to an allowance as the child's primary carer. Balancing this tension may be difficult in individual cases.In my judgment, the mother's entitlement to an allowance as the primary carer (an expression which I stress) may be checked but not diminished by the absence of any direct claim in law.

[49] Thus, in my judgment, the court must recognise the responsibility, and often the sacrifice, of the unmarried parent (generally the mother) who is to be the primary carer for the child, perhaps the exclusive carer if the absent parent disassociates from the child. In order to discharge this responsibility the carer must have control of a budget that reflects her position and the position of the father, both social and financial. On the one hand she should not be burdened with unnecessary financial anxiety or have to resort to parsimony when the other parent chooses to live lavishly. On the other hand whatever is provided is there to be spent at the expiration of the year for which it is provided. There can be no slack to enable the recipient to fund a pension or an endowment policy or otherwise to put money away for a rainy day. In some cases it may be appropriate for the court to expect the mother to keep relatively detailed accounts of her outgoings and expenditure in the first and then in succeeding years of receipt. Such evidence would obviously be highly relevant to the determination of any application for either upward or downward variation.

105.  In dealing with mother’s allowance by way of an independent assessment, Thorpe LJ had regard to the likely costs of running the home, to the fact that the mother is to be the child’s primary carer, who provided 24-hour care for the child.  That level of care would be difficult to buy in, even for a wealthy and resourceful father. Unlike nannies, a mother is not entitled to days off, weekends off and holidays; see [54].

106.  This approach was followed in IDC v SSA, supra, where HH Judge Bruno Chan said,

84.   The evidence before the court is that the Mother used to earn between HK$20,000 - $30,000 per month before she gave birth to Z. While she is certainly not entitled in law to claim her carer’s allowance on the same basis of a wife for ancillary relief, it would not be inappropriate in my view instead to use her former average income as the basis for assessing her allowance as the primary carer, which as Thorpe LJ said in Re P above, and using his words here, may be checked but not diminished by the absence of any direct claim in law, and that in order to discharge this responsibility as the primary carer of Z, she must have a budget that reflects her position and the position of the Father both social and financial, as she should not be burdened with unnecessary financial anxiety or have to resort to parsimony when the Father chooses to live lavishly.

107.  Due to the cessation of the father’s financial support, the mother had to discharge her foreign domestic helper in August 2021.  J was then less than 3 years old and was no doubt desperately in need of a carer.  Even as of now this little boy is still in his tender years and requires much care and attention.  I was told the father rarely saw his son.  The mother was and is a single-parent taking care of her son 24 hours around the clock with no support from the father.  She has not had the kinds of help, assistance, support, time or break that other mothers would; eg where those fathers would take care of the children some of the time or sharing some of the holiday periods.  She has to perform all the roles of mother, maid/cleaner and nanny.   

108.  I remind myself of Thorpe LJ’s advice that the mother’s entitlement to an allowance as the primary carer may be checked but not diminished.   I consider that the mother’s claim for carer’s allowance is well justified. The $10,000 being sought is well below the amount that the mother could have earned from the market and is, in my assessment, reasonable.

109.  I shall allow 6 months’ time for the mother to rent a flat and to hire a domestic helper.  By then, the mother should be able to return to work. I, however, have regard to the fact the mother’s ability to earn will continue to be curtailed in some ways for the simple reason that a domestic helper could never take up the role of a mother. Upon the expiry of 6 months, the carer’s allowance shall reduce to $3,000 per month. 

What is the amount payable by the father?

110.  The exercise of assessing a child’s needs and determining how the needs are to be shared is never an exact science.

After Renting of a New Flat and Arrival of a Domestic Helper

111.  I have assessed that, moving forward, J’s monthly needs are $27,000 per month (see [100] above).   As the mother will be engaging in gainful employment after the arrival of the domestic helper, I consider it is fair that she should also be responsible for a portion of J’s expenses.  Doing the best I can and considering the huge disparity in parties’ earning capacity, I have come to the view that the father should be responsible for 80% of J’s expenses; in real terms $21,600 ($27,000 X 80%) per month. On the top of this should be added $3,000 for carer’s allowance, totalling $24,600. 

Current Amount Payable

112.  I have assessed J’s monthly needs at the time of trial at $16,000 (see [101] above).Since the mother was and is still without any income, the father should be wholly responsible for J’s expense.  On the top of this $16,000, a sum of $10,000 carer’s allowance should be added, making a total of $26,000.  

113.  As it is likely that J would not be entitled to the allowance payable by the Government referred to in [33] above in the near future, I have not included it in arriving at these figures.

Backdating and Lump Sum

114.  Our statutory framework allows the court to give a lump sum order for the immediate and non-recurring needs of a child or for the purpose of enabling any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred in maintaining a child before the making of the order to be met, or for both: see Section 10(2)(a) of the Ordinance at [19] above. Significantly, it should be noted that such a lump sum order could be made in respect of those liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred even before the application was made.  That is to say, where appropriate, the maintenance could be backdated up to the birth of J. 

115.  As is the power to make a maintenance order under section 10(2) of the Ordinance, backdating is a matter of discretion of the court; such power is to be exercised judicially. Speaking of backdating, HH Judge Barnett in the English case of H v C [2009] EWHC 1527 (Fam), [2009] 2 FLR 1540, [2009] Fam Law 802, had this to say,

[82] Thus I turn to consider how far the order for maintenance should be backdated. At para 31 of their 'position statement' filed for the final hearing, the mother's counsel contend for reasons of simplicity and to take account of any 'extras' paid by the father that the order should be backdated to 15 September 2003. Mr Marks expressed concern that any sum produced by backdating could or would be more of a benefit for the mother than the children. For example, the carer's allowance generally falls to be viewed as an allowance is respect of care to be given in the future. Backdating an order must, therefore, involve payment in respect of care already given: the children have been cared for and are doing well without a carer's allowance having been paid. In such circumstances does backdating do no more than, at least in part, provide a benefit for the mother? Indeed the mother was cross-examined about what she would do with any 'lump sum' produced as a result of backdating and, in particular, whether she would spend the totality of it on the children. As a matter of fact she said she would as she had only been concerned to ensure the children were properly provided for. In a case such as this where, for the reasons already given, the mother has had to fight tooth and nail over many years and in the face of material non-disclosure to get proper maintenance for the children, I find this a deeply unattractive argument. Two points should be made. Firstly, when assessing maintenance it is proper for a court to include, to whatever extent may be appropriate, a carer's allowance, and secondly, there is undoubted power to backdate any order made. If the combination of those two clear and uncontroversial propositions is that the mother is, as it were, to be 'compensated' for care already given, then I am more than happy that it should be so… (emphasis added)

116.  When the mother made her application, J was less than 2 years old; he is now 6.  As in the case of H v C, supra, the mother in the present case has to fight tooth and nail over 4 years for a relief on behalf of their son.  The mother has consistently been in shortfall and struggling to make her ends met.  It is out of sheer luck she has been able to seek help from her parents.  There have been reasonable liabilities or expenses already incurred. Further, I am in agreement with HH Judge Barnett: I do not see anything wrong or unjust even if the backdated order contains an element of compensation.  In my judgment, justice requires the maintenance to be backdated as from the month following her application (ie as from 1 November 2020).   From November 2020 to February 2025 are 52 months; this means a total of $1,352,000 ($26,000 X 52 months).   For the reason that the duration of an interim maintenance order under the Ordinance is limited to 3 months: see section 13(3) of the Ordinance, I asked the mother’s solicitors to update the court on the amount of maintenance already received, whether under the interim orders or not.  I am told the figure currently stands at $512,820.30. Credit is to be given to this $512,820.30; hence, a lump sum of $839,179.70 ($1,352,000 - $512,820.30).  I round up the figure to $839,200.

Attachment of Income Order

117.  I am satisfied that, on the evidence before me, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the father will not make full and punctual payment in compliance with the maintenance orders granted by this Judgment.  This is therefore an appropriate case where I should make an attachment of income order on the court’s own motion, which I hereby do.  The evidence is that the father is in receipt of monthly salary from R Appraisals Limited, which clearly is an income source under the Attachment of Income Order Rules (Cap 13A).  I make an Attachment of Income Order that the income source is to pay the monthly maintenance directly to the mother.

Orders

118.  For the reasons aforesaid, I make the following orders:

1.  The father do pay a lump sum of $839,200 to the mother within 21 days of this order;

2.  The father do pay the mother J’s monthly maintenance in the sum set out below, the first payment to be made on 1 March 2025 and subsequent payments on the 1^st day of each and every succeeding month until J attains the age of 18 or ceases full time education, whichever is the later:

(i)   from March 2025 to August 2025, a monthly sum of $26,000; and

(ii)  as from September 2025 and thereafter, a monthly sum of $24,600.

3.  An attachment of Income Order be made in respect of the monthly maintenance payable by the father.

4.  Penal notice be endorsed; personal service be dispensed with.

Costs

119.  The mother is on any view the winning party.  Indeed, these proceedings are brought for and on behalf of J, who, and no other, is the sole beneficiary out of the present proceedings: see KS v ND [2013] EWHC 464 (Fam) at [19].   I see no reason why the father should not pay the mother’s costs of these proceedings.  For the reason that the father is guilty of non-disclosure, the mother is entitled to costs on indemnity basis: see ML v YJ (No. 2) (Stellar Contribution) [2009] HKFLR 122 and Hashen v Ali Shayif [2009] 2 FLR 896.  I make an order nisi that the father do pay the mother the costs of these proceedings (including all costs reserved), with counsel certificate, on an indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed. The mother’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

120.  Lastly, I thank Mr Hu for his assistance.